Your COIN Is No Good Here; Don't Abandon COIN

"fundamental error of interpreting instances where force is not visible as proof that power is not present." By MAC

That should be a Small Wars quote of the year.

Dennis,

Reference... as a principle of governance, the Rule of Law requires that the legal system -- police, laws, courts, etc. -- operate fairly; all parts of society are subject to the same set of laws, including the government.

You ask if I can envision a way to foster the fairness concept at the local level and a mechanism to put the concept into action... IMO, Kenneth Waltz in "Man, the State and War" explains best when he writes that we commit a "fundamental error of interpreting instances where force is not visible as proof that power is not present." We tend to focus on reason over force whereas disputes are settled by institutions that combine reason and force. "Disputes between individuals are settled not because an elaborate court system has been established but because people can, when necessary, be forced to use it." I agree with Dr. Waltz when he explains that we want the benefits of an effective legal system but are often unwilling to pay the price for it. In the case of Astan... you will have to impose this legal system and enforce it. Mother may I does not a legal system make. How far are you willing to go? It appears that the Karzai administration actually appreciates its limitations...

There exist in Afghanistan a multitude of mechanism for regulating relationships and managing violence. The means to push back against encroachment by the central government is to build a stronger coalition... and if need be rebel. Fighting is a form of negotiation. How barbaric...

Sharia is the legitimating source of constitutional authority, justified by law and governing through it. Very much in line with... for example, St. Paul's formula "all Power is of God" i.e. the prince wields power as a trust... How about... "we hold these truths to be self evident.... that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness."

As a legitimating source, the sharia represents a powerful and containing check on the ruler. The concept of a legitimating source of constitutional authority reflects the common notion of sovereignty that somewhere there exists a power or right to which all others must yield. This power or right DOES NOT belong to the state... for if it did, tyranny must follow. Sharia scholars contend that rulers freed from the bonds of sharia would seek absolute power... Sound familiar? It actually makes sense to me that the locals, although lamenting the harsh justice, accept it willingly because the Taliban themselves are also subject to the very same authority.

I do not presume to tell the Afghans if sharia will best serve the role of constitutional authority but it makes sense to me... especially since I have bought into the whole inalienable rights endowed by their Creator thing... Not because I wish to establish a theocracy or to force religion on an enlightened and modern people but because checks against power gabs and tyranny are always required.

v/r
MAC

Mac said this a while back as I have been away from this thread for a few days:

"I had hoped to imply... and have said... that our theories of modernization, political development and indirect rule upon which our population centric COIN doctrine is based are plain wrong in an Astan context and that the best we could hope for is to learn existing rules of play... then whack some bad-guys and depart Astan with as much frontier prestige intact as possible..."

Makes perfect sense to me as a general statement of strategy for Afghanistan.

gian

MAJ McCallister and COL Jones,

First, thank you MAJ McCallister for the reference. I will definitely check out Feldman's book.

Now, I may have misspoke a little in my discussion of the Rule of Law. I shouldn't have said that there has been a failure to enforce the Rule of Law. My view of the Rule of Law is that it is not something that is "enforced" exactly. I would define the Rule of Law as the means by which a society fairly regulates the relationship between the government and the people and regulates certain aspects of relationships between private individuals or groups. In my view, it is a critical aspect of any functioning stable society.

COL Jones pointed out that an effort to enforce the Rule of Law where the population perceives the enforcement to be unjust is Tyranny. Amen. But I would argue that the Rule of Law by definition requires just enforcement -- and whether the enforcement is in fact just is defined by the people. By this definition, the Rule of Law does not exist in Afghanistan. There are laws and there are people to enforce those laws, but the Rule of Law requires that the legal system -- police, laws, courts, etc. -- operate fairly. In other words, all parts of society are subject to the same set of laws, including the government. I don't think that this is a western construction either, but is a principle of governance. A government that does not operate under the Rule of Law is going to have real problems gaining legitimacy. It seems pretty clear that the GIRoA has failed in this area, among others. Perhaps the Taliban has been better?

I have not been to Afghanistan to see how things work on the ground. While I have spent time in Iraq, the issues of governance were much different, particularly with regard to Rule of Law issues. Even before the invasion, Iraq had a pretty robust legal system that functioned fairly in most cases and had the trust of most of the population (obviously, the government was immune from justice and in certain cases created "special tribunals" to deal with political enemies). After the invasion, we worked very hard to screw things up. For some reason, Americans are pretty myopic when it comes to understanding other legal systems; even though the Iraqi courts look very much like courts in most of the rest of the world, because it wasn't an adversarial, common law system, to many Americans it just wasn't "justice."

But I digress...

My next question is whether there exists in Afghanistan at the local level some mechanism for regulating relationships -- among the people in the form of dispute resolution, and with the local governing structure that gives individuals the means to challenge government action? As was said, the people trust the Taliban to deliver justice more than GIRoA, but they don't trust them all that much either. Is there an alternative or could one be fostered at the local level? By asking this question, I am also sensitive to the reality that we cannot impose such a system. Can you envision a way to help to foster the concept of the Rule of Law at the local level and a mechanism to put the concept into action? It would seem that the best possible course would be to take advantage of already existing local institutions that could fill that role. While shari'a law appears to be somewhat distasteful to most westerners, is that the best hope for a just legal system or is there some alternative?

I suspect that neither or you are lawyers, but you both seem to have a deep understanding of the way things work on the ground. I agree with your general argument that we cannot impose our system of government (or justice) on Afghans, and we have made a grave mistake by attempting to do so. But I do believe that the Rule of Law, broadly, is critical, even if it only really works when applied at the local level.

Thanks again for the very illuminating discussion.

Dennis,

Simply..."patronage governance" or networked governance are attempts to build and manage coalitions IOT gain, maintain and retain power. Patronage governance is susceptible to corruption and exclusion...

COL Jones' definition of legitimacy makes the most sense because we implicitly embrace the notion that the individual is a member of the nation, shares in a collective life, and integrates his activities with the general activities of the collective... i.e. state. The state expresses the general will in search of the common good (Hegel).

Reference critical importance of the Rule of Law. I recommend Noah Feldman's "The Fall and Rise of the Islamic State" to get a more nuanced feel for shari'a, Islamic law, and how our Western notions of rule of law may clash with Afghan sources of constitutional authority/legitimacy and justice.

r/
MAC

Rob...

... I don't think you are wrong... and like all good fanatics who believe that God would be on his side if "the deity" had all the facts, wish to share with you my understanding of patronage systems... and frontier governance... Don't be too frustrated with my sniping just because I am passionate about the subject matter... The bottom line... it all smells like ass...

Our conversations have morphed into an either or when we both know that the real world is complex. Our positions have evolved into a top-down" or "bottom up". We both know that it is probably a combination of both... a judicious mix of carrot and stick, purse and sword, force and partnership...

I argue from the position that the Astan "constitution consolidates nothing at the national level" because "covenants without swords are but words" (Hobbes). The national government, regardless of the Khan in power, must placate the wild bunch beyond the capital city. We've been trying to empower the Khan (central government) for the last ten years by building bureaucratic capacity and a professional, effective security force... I propose without an effective security force, he can not enforce a consolidating constitution.

Our opinions differ in respect to creating a "more perfect union" or "the perfect union". In my opinion... the GIROA can empower (patronage) disempower (deny patronage) in the short term, but it can not maintain this condition in the long run. There will always be some group that thinks it can come out and piss downstream when we go bathing... I further believe that we can not impose an equity mechanism in Afghanistan that will function on auto-pilot once we depart. Impersonal power is as susceptible to corruption as personal power.

Why would a local mullah support an alliance with Christian forces.. maybe because the GIROA has empowered this group that had no power before? I really don't know the answer to that question since I am currently sitting in my Mom's basement and acting the pathetic blogger... give me a job and I'll answer your question :-)

Please know that we are not practicing one-upmanship... we are actually providing a valued service to our fellow SWJ contributors by providing different points of view, all the while touching the same elephant whose breath smells like ass...

v/r
MAC

COL Jones, MAJ McCallister,

Thank you both for your responses. It is unfortunate that these issues have become the responsibility of the military to address. Even FM 3-24 recognizes the need for these types of issues to be dealt with by diplomats and politicians, with the military simply to means to put the policies into action on the ground. However, since the diplomats and politicians are calling this a war, the military is stuck with it. As an aside (and with tongue firmly in cheek), has anyone in the military pointed out that politics and diplomacy are not our job and that maybe the State Department ought to be asked what they think? Just askin'.

OK, I guess I need to take a step back and ask for a definition of "patronage governance." This term seems to be a critical part of the answers from both COL Jones and MAJ McCallister. While I know what a patronage system is generally, I am not sure that I understand how the term is being applied in this instance. My understanding is that a patronage system is one where a single central authority -- in this case Karzai -- channels his power and resources through his political friends and allies. Sounds simple enough. But what does that have to do with legitimacy?

It seems to me that no matter to whom authority is delegated, if they have not earned the support of the population, the conditions are ripe for an insurgency to grow. Given the large regional, ethnic, and cultural divides within Afghanistan, a patronage system that works as COL Jones describes -- i.e., it "heaps all political and economic benefits on one half (or part) of the population and in equal part denies the same to the other half" -- is always doomed to failure. Has that been the case?

How was the King able to keep the country together? From what has been said here, it sounds as though the King did not assert much of his authority at the local level at all. It seems to me that the King allowed local leaders great autonomy, but the local leaders in turn acted in the King's name, even where he had no actual input into the decision of the local leaders. Still patronage, I guess. Why did that seem to work where the current patronage system doesn't?

It seems to me that at the end of the day, the only way to build stability in the countryside and thus blunt the influence to the Taliban and AQ is the let the local regions/tribes/villages govern themselves as they want, and provide them with the support and security they need. If the central government wants in on the action, they need to figure out how to work with the local leaders -- perhaps by allowing the local leaders to govern as they see fit in the name of the central government.

I might suggest that one of the glaring issues that is missing from this discussion is the critical importance of the Rule of Law. Perhaps one of the reasons that the Afghan government is failing to gain the support of the population is the abject failure to enforce the Rule of Law. It does not seem that the criminal law is being enforced evenly across the country. As for dispute resolution, there does not seem to be a reliable system for providing a neutral and disinterested party to hear cases -- it seems that the court system is completely dysfunctional (although I admit, this conclusion is based on my limited knowledge). There is no reason why justice cannot be dispensed at the local level through whatever means the local population deem reasonable. Yes, there may be human rights issues involved in allowing localities to dispense justice and those might be tricky to address, but in broad terms, that would seem workable. It is not like the west where having a more uniform system of justice throughout a country is important for commerce and for other reasons. Afghanistan, it seems, is made of up many remote and isolated villages or regions populated by people who may have never left their valley. Besides which, why do we have any interest in how justice is dispensed at the local level so long as the people regard it as legitimate?

Legitimacy, it seems, is the critical issue. I think COL Jones defined legitimacy best: "recognition of the populace of the right of governance to govern." Said another way, legitimacy requires a "social contract" between those who govern and the populace. It is not for us to write that contract for them. We certainly can help to mediate the discussion and can help to create the conditions for the negotiations to take place by providing security and helping the population to secure themselves. However, at the end of the day, it is up to Afghans to figure out how to govern themselves.

What we have done is to write the contract and enforce it ourselves based only on our concept of government (I know, this is pretty obvious and I am preaching to the choir). What I am asking is if anyone has any idea what would happen if we simply stopped trying to expand the power of the central government and instead focused on working with the local leadership? Obviously, some of the regional leaders are part of the patronage system. Working around that would be a problem. But the much ballyhooed discussion of "Tribal Engagement" seems to provide a model that could be built upon. But what would be the effect of letting the central government sink or swim on its own?

Dennis,

Here are some different musings on the subject of legitimacy, politicians, prostitutes, pirates and poorly governed spaces.

Afghan society is an artificial assemblage of naturally independent groups. Patronage governance evolved precisely because any attempt at government needed to bring separate group behaviors (strong ethnic, regional and tribal divides) into line and encourage (force?) them to admit a common authority i.e. coalition building and coalition management.

Patronage governance in Afghanistan simply does not work the way Bob describes. Patronage governance works differently depending on the circumstance and terms of the "social contract" between the government (patron) and local ally. The idea that "what always happens is that whichever team takes power,... heap(s) all political and economic opportunity on one half of the populace and in equal part denies the same to the other half" is just plain wrong. The
"what always happens" statement reflects a limited and prejudiced (as in pre-judgment) appreciation for the art and science of patronage systems/networks. Patronage governance is a handmaiden of legitimacy... are we not paying attention to our own electoral process?

Why patronage systems? Maybe because the locals figured out a long time ago that building a single coherent political society from a multiplicity of traditional societies; to increase cultural homogeneity and value consensus; and developing a deep and unambiguous sense of identity (anyone paying attention to identity politics in the U.S. lately?) is a bridge too far and patronage governance the best means for creating a more perfect union and to provide for the common defense (when required). Our attempts at imposing solutions vice allowing the locals to manage conditions is the problem. Afghanistan is not the graveyard of Empires... Afghanistan is the graveyard of Western social "oughtist" theories... as in.. the Afghans ought to act like this....

Afghanistan is indeed the easiest place to encourage and engage in unconventional warfare... "Oh, enemies all around. The Bashkai are the worst. All town comes out and pisses downstream when we go bathing. Shocking!" (The Man Who Would Be King).

Reference politicians, prostitutes and pirates... "so they pass the problem to the military to solve on their behalf"... and the military flicks the bugger right back towards the politician all the while extolling its non-political function when we all know that what is required along the frontier are warrior diplomats... The "politicians on their hands" argument as currently package sounds like a softer version of the old "Dolchenstoss" myth.

"That'll be all pig"... (Babe, 1995)

v/r
MAC

"First, I would like to say how very interesting this discussion is. It is very much like a political science seminar. It touches on fundamental issues with regard to what is the nature of government and its relationship to the governed." Said by Dennis M.

I would say Guerrilla Warfare is Political Science....except with guns.

First, I would like to say how very interesting this discussion is. It is very much like a political science seminar. It touches on fundamental issues with regard to what is the nature of government and its relationship to the governed.

Having said that, I find it interesting that this discussion is taking place in an ostensibly military-oriented forum. Shouldn't this discussion be taking place among diplomats or at DoS? Maybe it is, but it seems the broader discussion of which this is just a part is being driven by the military. That is a little bit disconcerting for a number of reasons.

As for my two cents, I think COL Jones hit the nail on the head in his description of the greatest fiction in Astan -- that our Western eyes only see what we expect a country to look like when we look at the map. The Anbar anecdote that Mr. McCallister mentioned illustrates this problem very well. It seems that our definition of a legitimate government is one which has been democratically elected. Of course, as you both have mentioned our prejudices go deeper than that, extended to most functions of government. If a government is not consistent with our western model of government, then it is not legitimate.

I am starting to think that this blind spot makes the whole exercise in Astan a fool's errand. We could limit our role to hitting AQ where we find them, but as the Taliban gain more influence throughout the country, finding AQ will become harder and harder. So we need to stabilize the countryside. That certainly does not mean we need to support the central government. If most of the map is comprised of self-governed space, I would think we could safely cut the central government loose.

I ask ya'll, could we accomplish our mission of "defeat-disrupt-disable-deny sanctuary" and let the Afghan government sink or swim on its own? I wonder is such a strategy is sellable domestically since it seems everybody's understanding of "stability" is tied to the idea of a strong central government, popularly elected. But if it were, would focusing our strategy on some variation on "tribal engagement" -- working only at the local or regional level -- really be a better means to accomplish our objective?

Slapout9:

That would be me.

Kthxbai

"Creating friction trying to enforce the fiction"... great stuff... I also liked the Robin Hood analogy....

Self-governed spaces translates into networked governance...

"Get out there and govern" along the frontier translates into invasion, conquest, occupation and punitive expeditions followed by rebellion, revolution ... and repeat.

Less is indeed more...

r/
MAC

Who in Afghanistan has the Moral Authority from God to lead the Country? Find that person and support him and I think things will change rather quickly. Until then focusing on Government (The Mental Level of War) is not going to get us very far IMO.

Brother Rob,

We agree on the vast majority of all issues discussed... so I need you to know that I am not singling you out for my "idiocy"... I too am "weary of idealistic agendas wrapped in realistic rhetoric by policy types"... so please take my criticism in the spirit intended.

You condemn moralistic arguments but continue to make them in support of fixing the Afghan government. We've been trying to fix the "corrupt" government and bureaucracy for ten years. The Taliban eliminated blatant corruption by publicly executing the select worst offenders and sending the message that all patronage would henceforth be controlled and distributed by the Taliban political machine. How do we fix it? Please, no platitudes of leveraging the populace who really only want the same rights of liberty etc, etc... Lets talk specifics... do we execute someone publicly or not?

Reference provincial leadership. The monarch assumed that local elites administered the province. Very hands-off. Not so sure that the King actually cared how the locals choose their leaders as long as the local elite pledged their loyalty to the monarch, maintained order and stability, provided military levies when required and paid the provincial taxes on time. Interesting anecdote... after recruiting tribal elders in Anbar to create a more perfect union and to provide for the common defense, these same said elders wished to participate in the district and provincial councils... "Absolutely not!" was our reply even after the tribal elders had done all that is expected of kinship leadership... "you were not elected by the good people of Anbar to represent them in the councils of government"... Not sure how this story enriches the present post, suffice it to say that we remain clueless as to governance along the frontier.

IMHO, the issue isn't Karzai government corruption or its inability to govern effectively... Having introduced the notion that the social welfare state is the center of the Afghan social universe we now expect the Karzai government to conquer the countryside to make it happen... Just because we no longer question the idea that the state should be an intricate part of our personal lives (I challenge anyone to highlight one aspect of my personal life that is not regulated by the state in some way), we now seek to impose on the locals an all encompassing state apparatus... This, under the rubric of serving the general welfare, as a general good, in accordance with the general will. The countryside pushes back and President Karzai resorts to traditional strategies of direct and indirect rule, coalition building and management techniques... I actually believe if Karzai could conquer the countryside outright so as to establish a strong centralized social welfare state he would have done so already. But he can't, and since population-centric COIN is the art of the possible... he is stuck with muddling through.

I am not so sure that the personification of the Karzai government "as the causational source of the current insurgency" serves a useful purpose ... especially after reading Lieutenant Colonel Ehsan Mehmood Khan's insightful paper "A Strategic Perspective on Taliban Warfare". LTC Ehsan Mehmood Khan explains that the Taliban have pledged to fight until complete politico-military dominance is achieved. Maybe the Taliban will back-off their total domination goal if we exchanged the Karzai administration for one led by Dr. Abdullah Abdullah whose Pashtuness remains contentious. But then, the Dr. Abdullah Abdullah regime would also be expected to conquer and establish a credible social welfare state in the countryside. I give it a week before the popular press starts screaming about corruption and cronyism in the Dr. Abdullah Abdullah administration.

I've said it before and I'll say it again... the most frustrating aspect of being a FIDesta is the fact that many times you have to pick a side and hold your nose... and plan for a retrograde with a semblance of one's frontier prestige intact.

v/r
MAC

Gian,

... incorrect implication... I was putting words in Rob's mouth by spelling out what he might have meant by the term empowering government... My intent was to question how his initiatives would differ and succeed where previous attempts at building civil society had failed.

I had hoped to imply... and have said... that our theories of modernization, political development and indirect rule upon which our population centric COIN doctrine is based are plain wrong in an Astan context and that the best we could hope for is to learn existing rules of play... then whack some bad-guys and depart Astan with as much frontier prestige intact as possible...

I can't help but shake my nasty belief that social checks and balances and mechanisms to manage violence are already spelled out in the Astan social contract and that President Karzai actually plays by these rules... regardless whether we believe them to be good, bad or ugly...

v/r
MAC

Right Mac, what I disagree with I think is more an implication from your post, that since we are there then our only real choice for better or for worse in Afghanistan is the path of state building. That path may need tweaking and correction but it is still about building Afghan institutions. No?

gian

Rob,

All forms of governance require checks and balances... and if the study of history is any indication... a checks and balances mechanism usually evolves, whether under monarchy, aristocracy, or democracy.

I assume that you want to impose in Afghanistan a checks and balance mechanism. I further assume that we agree that a written constitution is the same as a social contract. My last assumption is that we agree that the social contract or written constitution is only as powerful as the force that is able to sustain and enforce it.

I need to address a couple of points before I delve too deeply into my suck... First, "replace tyranny of warlords"... would you agree that the "tyranny" of the warlords was limited in scope and territoriality? Second, establish a "US-like democracy in a centralized government"... This is the choice for autonomous and parochial communities? A tyranny of petty warlords limited in scope and territoriality to be replaced by an all powerful central government? I can deal with a petty warlord and if need be replace him with a more benevolent amir... but fighting against a strong central government?

I believe that you subscribe too much power to the one-man patronage system... it doesn't exist... it can't exist for it is subject to some natural law that limits its size, scope, reach and sustainability. In Afghanistan all opportunity and governance is not merged in one man... nor does he wield absolute power... Obedience has certain limits within which the Khan, mullah, warlord, jang salar must keep. Rebellion is actually an obligation under Islamic law if the Khan, mullah, warlord or jang salar does not govern in accordance with the tenet to "do good and to forbid evil"...

Checks and balances exit in Afghanistan as do mechanisms to manage the violence. President Karzai is well aware what they are... Experience in negotiating social contracts and governance in the territoriality we call Afghanistan is much older and more detailed than the grand experiment in representational government we call the U.S.A. Our rhetoric about "empowerment" and legitimacy just muddies the water... The locals have been working the issues since before Alexander crossed the frontier...

v/r
MAC

Boyd analysis of Robin Hood.

Guys,you are forgetting that Robin Hood had Fryer Tuck (moral right) on his side. Robin Hood won at the Moral Level of War first, after that evrything else followed.

Gian,

Please expound on what you disagree with... I can not learn if no one defines my idiocy... :-)

r/
MAC

Robert:

Building on Mac's post (although not necessarily agreeing with it) here is the rub which Mac's post brings out with yours. First, I agree completely with your ideas on foreign policy and strategy and how they relate to AfPak.

But as soon as you come to the point where you talk about building a better government with the US in some kind of neutral position in Afghanistan we end up back in the same old nation building box again in whatever way you wish to improve on how we go about doing it. So there seems to be a contradiction in your argument: on the one hand you are calling for realism and the acceptance of limits in American power; but on the other hand by using terms like "enabling" the Karzai government and "protecting it", well those concepts when put in practice are a recipe for long term nation building in the place.

Perhaps to meet your excellent goals on foreign policy and strategy it is time with regard to Afghanistan to accept the fact that nation building as a military method is not in our interests to carry out and we should adopt an operational method that focuses on our prime vital interest in Afghanistan: suppression of AQI. In my view we do not need to do generational nation building in Afghanistan to accomplish this goal. And I am not exaggerating things when I say "generational" because General Petraeus has stated that we will be fighting the war there for "our lifetime" and probably the "lifetime" of our kids too.

gian

Bob,

I understand assuming a neutral role... but the recommendation for switching from an active to neutral posture may be a bit too late... Do we actually believe that anyone in the game will find our pronouncements of neutrality credible?

How we do we propose to translate "empower" the government into concrete actions... Please define government... I thought the the Karzai administration was the government... or are we talking about government bureaucracy?

Is the objective for empowering government to deny insurgents room for maneuver, provide desired service more effectively, overcome the isolation of parochial communities, and speed penetration of national authority, morals and values into legitimate governance and government infrastructure? After reading vast amounts of literature (both U.S. and European) concerning our attempts at creating a viable civil society in Astan, how would renewed attempts at "empowerment" be any different?

I lament the fact that we still have not figured out what the true revolutionary grievances are... and that our 10 year attempts of uniting "the Afghan people" into a constitutional community continue to fail.

How different are your approaches from those already tried?

v/r
MAC

The "burn Sherwood Forest, kill Robin, train and equip the Sheriff of Nottingham, funnel massive aid to the King John and his cronies to enrich and sustain King John in power" analogy is the best yet... but we should also mention that the real King John signed the Magna Carta which greatly reduced the power he held as the King of England and allowed for the formation of a powerful parliament.

As a die-hard FIDesta... I meditate and contemplate much on whether true sovereignty and legitimacy is a thing easily bestowed in one fell swoop or whether both are the product of process... Maybe it is time to accept the fact that our social theories for generating legitimacy (as outlined in FM 3-24) are just plain wrong... Maybe there is more to creating legitimacy than self-selecting and encouraging a local loyal ruling elite (pro-western, educated, cosmopolitan) who by definition posses the authority to shape their societies if not yet the means to do so.

What does it really mean when we define a populace as poorly governed? Is being poorly governed akin to being poorly administered? The implicit assumption appears to be that only a strong central government knows how to govern and administer best. Yes, good people of Nottingham Forest, you can actually vote for your own Sheriff as representative of the central government to tax and oppress you. Either way... it just sounds too dictatorial... but then it really isn't my call because the true FIDesta does not challenge the sovereignty of the host nation leadership... or so I am repeatedly told... FM 3-24 explains the same.

I've heard it said that the mythic Robin Hood was a yeoman... a free man who it appears did not take kindly to being poorly governed and poorly administered... in response the real King John (Khan Karzai?) signed the Magna Carta... The Magna Carta (result of poor governance and administration?) forced the real King John to rule, govern and administer Nottingham Forest indirectly...

Think about it... its all about indirect rule and population centric COIN a vehicle towards achieving this end... not that there is anything wrong with that... But it really sucks when the good guys engaged in FID are forced to pick a side and hold their noses... but it is what it is.

Maybe I have too much faith in the Afghan concepts of sovereignty, legitimacy, social system and traditions when I propose that the Afghans will work it out themselves... the English did. The sooner we stop trying to impose our concepts of sovereignty, legitimacy, governance and administration... the sooner we can unass the AO with a semblance of our frontier prestige intact.

r/
MAC

...And to the Dobbins piece, well for starters he accepts a certain view of history that has been largely challenged and in many cases overturned by historians. His first mistake is to think that the insurgency was defeated in the South (Sorley's better war thesis) which it was not by 73-74 (Elliot, Trullinger). The Vietnam War was never just about insurgency or conventional operations, it was JUST war and the North Vietnamese communists and their allies in the South understood this better than we did and that is why they won.

Also, although I agree wholeheartedly with brother Dave Maxwell's point about too much hyping of the Coin vs CT thing, the problem as I see it and as reflected in this Dobbins piece is that the only kind of Counterinsurgency the American Army and other parts of the American military seem to be able to elevate to the operational level is population centric Coin (Duck dude cover your ears or take some pepto b so you dont retch). The American Army and military when it looks to counter (space intentionally put between these two words) insurgencies should be able to treat CT and Coin equally at the operational level. Unfortunately CT is subsumed as a lesser tactical mission within population centric coin or nation building.

Then Robert what is your solution to the problem? If you say it is the government itself that is the problem and leads to the insurgency then what do we do, put a new government in place more attune to the needs of the people, or do we make ourselves the government until a better Afghan one can come along?

gian