Here are the key points from the forum monograph: (1) The United States has hired record numbers of contractors to serve in the conflict zones of Iraq and Afghanistan but has not seriously examined their strategic impact. (2) There are clearly advantages to using contractors in conflict zones, but they have three inherent characteristics that have serious negative effects during counterinsurgency operations. We cannot effectively control the quality of the contractors or control their actions, but the population holds us responsible for everything the contractors do, or fail to do. (3) Contractors compete with the host government for a limited pool of qualified personnel and dramatically change local power structures. (4) Contractors reduce the political capital necessary to commit U.S. forces to war, impact the legitimacy of a counterinsurgency effort, and reduce it's the perceived morality. These factors attack our nation's critical vulnerability in an irregular war - the political will of the American people.
Read the entire monograph at INSS.
Comments
It all comes down to this IMO. A GOVERNMENT IS NOT A BUSINESS. Whenever a profit motivated enterprise becomes mixed with a mission motivated eneterprise there are terrible conflicts of interest. War has only one mission for a responsible gvernment, and that is to insure the survival of the people they are responsible for, not somebody elses population.
PS Ken's right!.
Who, me...
I've been reading but not participating, other than to as always take any opportunity to make an adverse comment about Robert Strange McNamara. That guy was either the USSR's highest placed Mole or so brilliant none of us could possibly understand what he was doing. My inclination is toward the former possibility...
Re: the thread in toto:
I disagree with Hammes on most things. However, on this one he's fairly and uncontroversially about right. Leading me to say "So?"
All Armies, all nations have always used contractors in one forma or another. In US practice, the usage has ranged from adequate and controlled to totally out of control and there are several historical examples of each pole and many stops in between. We screw things up, we over correct and eventually, we get it sorted. It's the American way and has been since 1741.
The international milieu is in constant flux. All the Baby Boomers who grew up in the Cold War seem to avoid recognition of that era as the aberration. It was. Today is life as usual. Enjoy it, I am.
International norms and international 'law' are always behind the power curve because bureaucracies aren't as flexible as people. Nothing new there and nothing to worry about. On that same line, insurgents or whatever will almost always be far more adaptive and flexible than big bureaucratic forces which the US Armed Forces certainly are. That could be rectified but Congress is unlikely to approve any moves to do that.
A truly professional armed force will not be a political problem -- hybrid forces will be. It is critical that armed forces be employed in their primary roles, deviation into the political may be required from time to time but they should be minimized in number and time. Political stuff is best done by political entities. Armies will NEVER do those things well, they may do them adequately but they will likely cause as many problems as they solve. Plus diversions to political efforts elsewhere could plant seeds -- particularly in a less then totally professional force.
<b>Slapout's</b> good question:<blockquote>"So here is my question if a National Policy is flawed from the start(the decision to go to War in the first place) is there any Strategy that can overcome that Policy deficiency other than to say we should stop what we are doing?"</blockquote>deserves an answer, I think. Mine is; Depends -- <b>every war is different</b> but as general rule I'd say the prognosis for success would be slight and running or appearing to run is often ill advised, ergo, best be careful what you do to avoid bigger problems. Unintended consequences are a bear and third order effects are difficult to predict...
I'm a firm believer in the 1/3 Rule; in any war 1/3 will oppose, 1/3 will favor and the remainder can be swayed -- mostly not by the morality -- all war is essentially immoral but some are necessary and most people sense that --but by the degree of success being obtained and the speed and apparent ease involved. That has been historically correct for the US. Which third leans where is dependent upon the party in power at initiation of combat. The independents and moderates are the swing voters -- in more ways than one -- and they just want results, period.
I'll also note that not only <b>ADTS'</b> cited wars but virtually all in which we've been involved occurred because the opponent thought we would not fight. Bad mistake. Worst thing you can do is hack off a bunch of Americans and cause them to have to do stuff they don't wanta do (another of the many reasons why a Draft is a bad idea). They just wan to go and get the job done and get back to Miller Time.
I appreciate the wake up call ADTS. It gives me an opportunity to provide my COIN / FID operation sentiments (Don't do 'em, they're dumb, expensive and usually have unsatisfactory endings; there are better ways) via one of my favorite quotes. I think it's a quite accurate summation and appropriate to this thread not least because it negates the requirement for a great many contractors:<blockquote>"War means fighting. The business of the soldier is to fight. Armies are not called out to dig trenches, to live in camps, but to find the enemy and strike him; to invade his country, and do him all possible damage in the shortest possible time. This will involve great destruction of life and property while it lasts; but such a war will of necessity be of brief continuance, and so would be an economy of life and property in the end.<br><br>
<i><b>Thomas J. Jackson</b> quoted by G. F. R. Henderson</i></blockquote>
MAC and Slapout:
MAC:
I referenced "saccharine" to atone for the possible transgression of cutesy collegiate anecdotes. (And indeed, part of what I am about to write below is not saccharine, but rather hard-edged). If *you* wish to be saccharine, its all good, to be colloquial. And rest assured you have not offended me in any way, shape or form. I do think we are reaching agreement, or at least understanding, on many of the points in our conversation, although new ones may emerge, including one (I suspect) which (again) I will write about below. That all having been said, I've enjoyed our conversation immensely.
First, I would simply note, winning has led to peace, but as you noted with respect to "Man, the State, and War" on another thread, force is always in the background. Realism is not a theory of war per se, but of (constantly shifting) equilibrium(a) of power, was one formulation given to me, and one I like. War may lead to peace, but war may reoccur.
When I referenced Saddams behavior as anomalous, I was referring more to Desert Storm than OIF. Perhaps then too he was concerned about the Persians, but *why did he miscalculate?* And again, why have others (Noriega, Milosevic) doubted our resolved? (I actually stole this question from Robert Jervis.) Are signals simply misperceived, distorted or disregarded in an authoritarian regime, or something else?
Your Grandmothers observation is interesting, although, upon consideration, perhaps not surprising. It seems reasonable to me that one who has lived through heavy conventional bombing would not doubt that an atomic bomb would have been used, if available. Really, is there a difference between how one is killed, at least via aerial bombardment?
Where I think we possibly depart is the utility of grabbing the population by the nads. Your reference to "Man, the State, and War" makes me think you might be familiar with Stathis Kalyvass magnum opus, "The Logic of Violence in Civil War." I saw him present a paper, after which he was asked (early 2007?) "What advice would you give General Petraeus?" His response was, "I dont answer questions like that, because my response would be something like, 'Be brutal" (or "cause fear" - I forget exactly what he said). I quote, from page 114, "Once the war is underway war-related benefits tend to... [induce] individuals, for whom survival is important, to collaborate less with the political actor they prefer and more with the political actor they fear." Now, Kalyvas qualifies this remark tremendously, but I thought it worth quoting. I employ the usual disclaimers (given the potency and potential brutality implied by the quote, *more* than the usual disclaimers) but I'd be interested in your take.
Slapout:
I hate to give such a curt response, and it is curt because of lack of cognitive capacity on my part, but it would seem to me, "No." The sunk costs, and often (usually?) the desire to avoid appearing like a dove (which equals appearing like a wimp) forecloses such an option. At times those whose reputations as hawks are robust have options that doves or potential doves lack, e.g., Nixon going to China, or (a lesser example in my opinion) Nixon withdrawing from Vietnam "with honor." But Im digressing, and probably not really answering your question, and again, my answer would be "No." The only point I would make is that there is a small literature in the public policy field on policy termination; an article by Iris Geva-May (I can get you the citation if you want it) is in my opinion the best one.
MAC/Ken?
Trick or treat!
ADTS
MAC and Slapout:
MAC:
I referenced "saccharine" to atone for the possible transgression of cutesy collegiate anecdotes. (And indeed, part of what I am about to write below is not saccharine, but rather hard-edged). If *you* wish to be saccharine, its all good, to be colloquial. And rest assured you have not offended me in any way, shape or form. I do think we are reaching agreement, or at least understanding, on many of the points in our conversation, although new ones may have emerged, including one (I suspect) which (again) I will write about below.
First, I would simply note, winning has led to peace, but as you noted with respect to "Man, the State, and War" on another thread, force is always in the background. Realism is not a theory of war per se, but of (constantly shifting) equilibrium(a) of power, was one formulation given to me, and one I like. War may lead to peace, but war may reoccur.
When I referenced Saddams behavior as anomalous, I was referring more to Desert Storm than OIF. Perhaps then too he was concerned about the Persians, but *why did he miscalculate?* And again, why have others (Noriega, Milosevic) doubted our resolved? (I actually stole this question from Robert Jervis.) Are signals simply misperceived, distorted or disregarded in an authoritarian regime, or something else?
Your Grandmothers observation is interesting, although, upon consideration, perhaps not surprising. It seems reasonable to me that one who has lived through heavy conventional bombing would not doubt that an atomic bomb would have been used, if available. Really, is there a difference between how one is killed, at least via aerial bombardment?
Where I think we possibly depart is the utility of grabbing the population by the nads. Your reference to "Man, the State, and War" makes me think you might be familiar with Stathis Kalyvass magnum opus, "The Logic of Violence in Civil War." I saw him present a paper, after which he was asked (early 2007?) "What advice would you give General Petraeus?" His response was, "I dont answer questions like that, because my response would be something like, 'Be brutal" (or "cause fear" - I forget exactly what he said). I quote, from page 114, "Once the war is underway war-related benefits tend to... [induce] individuals, for whom survival is important, to collaborate less with the political actor they prefer and more with the political actor they fear." Now, Kalyvas qualifies this remark tremendously, but I thought it worth quoting. I employ the usual disclaimers (given the potency of the quote, *more* than the usual disclaimers) but I'd be interested in your take on this quote.
Slapout:
I hate to give such a curt response, and it is curt because of lack of cognitive capacity on my part, but it would seem to me, "No." The sunk costs, and often (usually?) the desire to avoid appearing like a dove (which equals appearing like a wimp) forecloses such an option. At times those whose reputations as hawks are robust have options that doves or potential doves lack, e.g., Nixon going to China, or (a lesser example in my opinion) Nixon withdrawing from Vietnam "with honor." But Im digressing, and again, my answer would be "No." MAC/Ken?
ADTS
IMO LeMay was full of Moral certainty and of his Mission and the Strategy to use the available tools of his time to complete that Mission, which was to force Japan to unconditional surrender. In contrast McNamara appears to be a man full of Moral Uncertainty almost guilt as it relates to Vietnam. He was at the policy level and I don't think he really believed in the decision to go to War in Vietnam in the first place.
So here is my question if a National Policy is flawed from the start(the decision to go to War in the first place) is there any Strategy that can overcome that Policy deficiency other than to say we should stop what we are doing?
Ken White, I checked and could not find any other updates as to McNamara's view of LeMay and Vietnam views.
ADTS,
I do hope that you don't think that I consider your comments hostile or that my curt and direct comments are impolite or lack constructive intent... Please know that I consider you a kindred spirit and wish you to think of me as saccharine ... :-)
Reference "surge and years of misery". This is exactly what I mean... also... my comments regarding "humanitarian assistance" are reserved NOT for tsunami or earthquake assistance missions ... but those humanitarian efforts that insist on cease-fires and armistices that only serve to perpetuate and prolong the conflict and suffering without a clear winner. Historically, winning has lead to peace. Peace is an expression of a judicious mixture of reason and force.
Reference... "there is greater tolerance for and propensity to dehumanize the enemy (in conventional war), whereas in unconventional warfare one cannot..." Maybe it is a function of location and salesmanship. Commanders fighting conventional battles seek to avoid urban areas... Also, the state has to get those conscripts to hate so as to pull on the little guy. The unconventional battle on the other hand is for the population's hearts and minds... Grabbing the locals by the nads does not necessarily ensure that their hearts and minds will follow (Gen. George Patton)... The unconventional fight is akin to an election campaign... or activities of a used car salesman. You want the voter to like you... or the customer to buy your used car. Indiscriminate violence does not bode well for the election cycle or sales.
Saddam Hussein miscalculated. I submit that the Persians were his target audience in regard to the presence of nuclear weapons. He had to lie to us to maintain the facade vis-a-vis the Persians. In his mind... we overreacted and should have known that the Persian was the greater threat in the region. We had already kicked his ass a number of years before.
I believe that we dehumanized the Japanese to a greater extent than the Germans. I once mentioned to my Grandmother (who endured a number of air-raids in Schweinfurt... yes Schweinfurt... maybe we can also discuss Wuerzburg)) that I did not believe the U.S. would have dropped an atom bomb on Germany. She disagreed... her opinion... Germany surrendered before the bomb was ready.
Regarding discussion whether we should have or should now drop bombs in empty spaces to send a message is... in my opinion... a silly discussion. We dropped the bombs... it ended the war and saved lives... I would support a similar decision if it ends a brutal, bloody war and when the suffering is all said and done actually saved lives... Call me brutish, inhumane and ghoulish... but hey.. its Halloween.
v/r
MAC
MAC and Slapout
Again, an anecdote or observation that is possibly too saccharine for this forum. Regarding latenight dormroom discussions, its my recollection is that they were held primarily in the dorm lounge (and, probably quite lamentably for those involved, primarily among males only). Alas, polite and constructive discourse did not always follow. (Between this and my regretting my "mere B" in my "Meaning of Life" class, you might think I regret tremendously my college experience - emphatically not the case!) As for the bong, well, I dont think SWJ incorporates that functionality, at least at present.
Youre right: it was about saving American lives. *But - and here I think I see your point better, which is: it also - ultimately - saved Japanese lives and misery.* And that, of course, corresponds to your metric between surge and "four years of misery."
I am not sure the logistics of a finite number of bombs justified the use of them on populated areas. (And as an aside, isnt it interesting that weve thus far not discussed the firebombing of Tokyo or Dresden (and elsewhere)?) But to play devils advocate with my own argument, perhaps indeed they would have been dismissed had such a potent example of their force not been provided. (And here it is worth noting that the bomb was "required" not just once on a populated area, but twice.) Regarding the "finite argument," I am less persuaded - this may seem overly clever, but if the other side does not know that the number of weapons is finite, then does not the possibility of more than just two weapons have to enter into the other sides thought process? Did Hiroshima and Nagasaki break the will of the Japanese, or did the fear of future Hiroshimas and Nagasakis break the will of the Japanese, or was it something else?
As for the "racist" argument about bombing Germans, at the risk of appearing PC, I do think it is "fair game" to ask if Germans were subhumanized to the point of the Japanese during WW II; my sense is, no. Times were different, and I do think stereotypes were more prevalent.
As an aside, I wonder whether a difference between small wars and big wars (precise terms, eh?) is in the former, there is greater tolerance for and propensity to dehumanize the enemy, whereas in unconventional warfare one cannot, or at least should not, do so, at least according to contemporary COIN doctrine and practice, e.g., Chieu Hoi (admittedly not contemporary) or Sons of Iraq/CLC or the current Taliban negotiations. This, I think, goes with MACs point about COIN "forc[ing] U.S. forces to sacrifice [their] own lives in order to save the host nation population from themselves."
Regarding Lemay, alas, my copy of the book is probably sitting in a box underneath other boxes, but if memory serves, Fred Kaplan, in The Wizards of Armageddon, relays the following anecdote. This is tangentially related (at best, probably) to Slapouts point, but I think its interesting and (hopefully) somewhat relevant. The "whiz kids" or some of their analogues had (pre-)Schelling-esque projections for when Japan would surrender. Lemays algorithm was different. He looked at a map, calculated when the last city on it would be destroyed, and declared that that would be when the war was over.
Why Saddam did not take us seriously is a superb question. Ive read some of the Iraqi Perspectives Project, and the NYT story(ies?) that he thought we knew he didnt have WMD, so we were going to invade regardless of what hed done. But what about Desert Storm? Certainly he knew our capabilities. And why did Noriega or Milosevic doubt American power? (Why *did* they doubt Bush and/or Clinton?)
ADTS
Slapout... you are absolutely correct... it was all about saving American lives... This leads me to contemplate a different line of reasoning. The challenge with assuming another government's population centric COIN fight (insurgency as civil war) actually forces U.S. forces to sacrifice own lives in order to save the host nation population from themselves... This altruistic approach has limited utility and ends, as correctly pointed out by ADTS, in failure.
Maybe applying the primary firefighting managed burn strategy... (firefighters don't rush into a burning building to put out the fire... the strategy is to isolate the fire, wet-down and protect the neighboring structures, and allow the fire to burn itself out) is a better option.
Lunacy abounds... just happy to be on the team :-)
v/r
MAC
"But I digress from my initial point... We applied a "created a wasteland and call it peace" approach ... i.e. created a wasteland around two cities in order to save the rest of the Japanese from themselves... this only 65 years ago... I'll concede the potential argument that we might not have known what the bombs' actual destructive power entailed, but we had a pretty good idea." by MAC
I would argue that it was not about saving Japanese....it was about saving Americans. LeMay pretty much said that in some of his later speeches. He considered it immoral to do anything that would allow the enemy to gain an advantage over the US that would allow them to kill more Americans.
ADTS,
"... armed interventions not in the national interest are bound to fail..." and the elites will argue what is in the national interest until maybe the plebs tire of making the sacrifices... or one or the other elites tire in their convictions...
I actually agree with your premise that intervention ultimately prolongs the conflict, and that perhaps like a wildfire it is best left to burn itself out. The same sentiment would apply to humanitarian intervention... Allowing the fire to burn itself out is actually a primary firefighting strategy... firefighters don't rush into a burning building to put out the fire... the strategy is to isolate the fire, wet-down and protect the neighboring structures, and allow the fire to burn itself out... a managed burn.
As for Hiroshima and Nagasaki, late night undergrad dorm discussions (have not had one of those in a long time) and dropping atomic bombs on population centers or empty spaces... What a compassionate argument... but then we only had a couple of these atomic monstrosities and risking their use on empty spaces only to go unappreciated by the Japanese leadership might have been a consideration... It appeared that the Japanese military leadership just didn't believe we were serious about winning the war... In response, decision-makers went with "target the city" to make sure that the Japanese got the message... or do we wish to delve into the racist argument that we would have never dropped the atomic bomb on Germany? How would the "dropping bombs in empty spaces approach" have played itself out when dealing with Saddam Hussein. Did he not consider the possibility that we were serious? But I digress from my initial point... We applied a "created a wasteland and call it peace" approach ... i.e. created a wasteland around two cities in order to save the rest of the Japanese from themselves... this only 65 years ago... I'll concede the potential argument that we might not have known what the bombs' actual destructive power entailed, but we had a pretty good idea.
The metric between surge and four years of misery is "four years of misery"... simple math really. What can be done about it is a separate and more detailed post. Rest assured that I have an opinion on the matter :-)
To recap... it is immoral to kill ones way out of an insurgency but that does not mean you can't if you have available resource on hand and embrace amorality as an expediency... It is also immoral to prolong a conflict or humanitarian crisis through intervention as it is best to allow the fire to burn itself out...
Wikipedia tells me that a "republic is a form of government in which the people or some portion thereof retain supreme control over the government" and representative democracy a "form of government founded on the principle of elected individuals representing the people, as opposed to autocracy and direct democracy". I'm going with republic in which the people or SOME PORTION THEREOF (patricians, equestrians, plebeians) retain supreme control over the government...
Aren't these late night undergraduate dorm discussions great? Please pass the bong :-)
v/r
MAC
MAC
First, permit me an anecdote that may be overly saccharine and autobiographical. In college, I took a class entitled "The Meaning of Life." Despite the enticing title, I received (if memory serves) a mere B, and was left to continue to ponder my future. Hence if I fail to respond to or comprehend appropriately many of your points, it is because of lack of aptitude, rather than effort, at moral philosophy.
Next, let me acknoweldge what I think COL Gentile would bring up. Contemporary historiography on the UKs small wars of the 1950s and 1960s shows it encompassed a fair degree of brutality, more than acknowledged, although, so far as I know, not mass killing.
That said, as noted, we no longer can one have a peace of the dead. We also concur that it is not moral to kill ones way out of an insurgency.
I disagree still about your view regarding whether conscripts or a professional military have a higher propensity to revolt against the Republic (but see below!). You view the militarys insularity as the basis for an institution that would not undertake such an act. I look at a professional militarys insularity as harboring the potential to foster an environment, especially (say) during a crisis in which politicians are universally viewed as inept, and inferior to a government administered by the military. I think the professional military personnel would be able to control the conscripts exposure to the outside world, such that they would not be subject to agitation by outside groups, at least enough to influence them substantially. Let me be clear: this is an extremely hypothetical scenario brought up for conversations sake, rather than something causing me insomnia.
Ill take your second-to-last point next, although its not a major point of interest between us. I would use the term representative democracy - we vote for representatives and (in theory, of course) they represent our passion and reason. I dont know if I would use the term Republic, despite its ubiquity in everyday parlance, simply because I am not familiar enough with its etymology. But youre certainly correct that we have multiple checks and balances, some in the constitution - House and Senate; Congress and President - some acquired over time - judicial review - some informal - "factions" or parties. Enough, though. Perhaps the better question would be whether our form of democracy is better than the other forms, to paraphrase Winston Churchill.
To get, perhaps, to the crux of your post, my own bias is that absent purely humanitarian interventions, e.g., the 2004-2005 tsunami, *armed interventions not in the national interest are bound to fail.* (Interestingly, the tsunami helped end the Aceh conflict and, Im not sure but think "Cavguy" has written on it, played some, less peaceful role in ending the Sri Lankan/LTTE insurgency.) But to return from the parenthetical digression, because armed interventions are bound to fail, it is quite possibly better not to intervene at all. Take Vietnam. Yes, South Vietnamese were condemned to reeducate camps or forced to flee on boats (or C-141s or helicopters if lucky) because of communists. But wouldnt the number of South Vietnamese in reeducation camps or forced to flee have been less had the US never intervened, enlisted those poor souls help while prolonging the war, or encouraged the SVN government to do the same? In other words, rather than trying to end a conflict through immediate (or gradually escalating) intervention, ultimately prolonging the conflict, perhaps like a wildfire it is best to let it burn itself out.
And if that did not addres the crux of your post, hopefully this does: I have never seen a dead body, or an emaciated one, other than in or on magazines, television and movies. And I do recall the photos of emaciated prisoners in the Balkans. But I still - hesitantly, because of the disclaimers in the prior two sentences - retain my opinion that the US intervened at precisely the right time - after the Dayton Accords ensured the US would only have to use the threat, rather than the actual use of force. Like Vietnam and Somalia, I suspect, were there to be any significant casualties, the US would have "cut and run."
As for Hiroshima and Nagasaki, as a query that smacks of latenight undergrad dorm discussion, why couldnt a bomb have been dropped in a desolate location as an example of what could befall far more populated areas? I would agree that the dropping of the bomb was superior to an invasion, but I imagine the vulnerability of relatives who served in the war influences my response.
To return to your pointed question, though, I simply cant come up with a metric of "one initial surge" versus "four years of misery." Your case is a good one, and again, magazine covers of emaciated prisoners come to mind - I just question what can be done. I remember George Stephanopoulos (!) saying - justifying (a?) foreign policy - that Camus (!) said "We cant stop every innocent getting killed, but we can stop some innocents from getting killed." It seemed like an intelligent quote, and its obviously stuck with me. I just dont know how all the hard line-drawing in reality derives from that quote.
Yes, an enjoyable conversation.
ADTS
ADTS,
Of course you can kill your way out of an insurgency... is it moral to do so? Of course not... but that is no the point that I am making... I can also argue that you can't kill your way out of an insurgency because it is too resource intensive...
Referencing Hiroshima and Nagasaki was not done to delineate between conventional, unconventional, regular or irregular warfare but to address the issue of limits. Riddle me this... what is more barbaric... killing a large portion of the population in one initial surge or prolonging the misery and physical and psychological terror for lets say four years... Was this not the approximate length of the Sarajevo siege in which the West stood idly by and feed the victims but refused to attack and kill those who sought to create a wasteland and call it peace?
Of course we can't create a wasteland and call it peace... a peace of the dead... I thought I acknowledged this specifically when I said that "we've evolved so much since then".
I make the distinction between democracy and republic because the United States of America is a Republic... If we are indeed a "democracy" as traditionally understood i.e. "one man-one vote.... then ours as in the electoral college and representatives in all forms of public office is indeed a watered down version of democracy...
I am not sure why my point that a professional force is safer for the Republic than a conscript one is provocative? I explained my reason why... namely the conscript who does not wish to serve is targeted for agitation and subversion by non-military interest groups... We are actually saying the same thing... you see the conscripts to be sheep-like in the service of some military megalomaniac... I see the conscript to be sheep-like in the service of a political one...
Great conversation...
v/r
MAC
MAC
I very much envy your grasp of history and your fluid writing style. I write to respectfully comment on, and disagree, with some of what you wrote. Apologies if I am breaking into your and COL Gentiles dialogue.
First, "you cant kill your way out of an insurgency." Id note that your examples of insurgencies are roughly 2000 years old. As for Hiroshima and Nagasaki, neither were insurgencies, as you well know, even if your point is to illustrate that we are not as far from - dare I say it - barbarism as one might think. I would simply argue that an industrialized, modern democracy cannot conduct, over any long span of time, a campaign of brutality against an insurgency. Id be happy to supply a bibliographic reference (or perhaps two) that make the same argument, but I suspect you already know them, and the goal here is not to produce a syllabus.
Second, I may well be dense, but if this is what you are referring to, I doubt we would see a return to Vietnam-style machinations by individuals to subvert the draft and system. It left too bitter a taste in the collective mouth (to coin a phrase). Perhaps I am naïve, but I suspect that a much more streamlined and equitable system would be put into place. I have no basis for my contention, admittedly, other than my perception of how Vietnam was perceived.
Third and most provocative was your claim that a professional army is more safe for the Republic than a conscript one (and I query as to why you make a Republic/democracy distinction). Hasnt the argument been made before that the military is insulated from society and insular in its culture? I dont expect a coup anytime soon, but I would think, everything else being equal (i.e., this not being a banana republic with a history of military intervention) a professional military would be more coup-prone. Perhaps I am missing the point, as the masterminds of my hypothetical dastardly coup plot would be military professionals - and perhaps conscripts would be more likely to be sheep-like - but I raise this for your consideration.
Respectfully,
ADTS
Gian,
I very much disagree with the catch-all "will of the people" as center of gravity cliche. We accept too many cliches as truth... One of my favorites is "you can't kill your way out of an insurgency"... Really? Anyone remember "Carthago delenda est" (Cato the Elder, Senator, Roman Republic, 140ish B.C.E.)? You can actually kill your way out of an insurgency and sell the surviving population into slavery.... Not that I am recommending that we "make a wasteland and call it peace" (Tacitus). Far from it... I highlight these historical examples merely to remind all of us that creating a wasteland i.e. Hiroshima and Nagasaki had to be destroyed in order to save the Japanese from themselves, is not as old a notion as we would like to believe. Hiroshima and Nagasaki was only 65 years ago... but we've evolved so much since then...
The "will of the people" as center of gravity argument is actually quite dangerous... It is the same scapegoat provided by Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg and his chief of staff Erich Ludendorff during the twilight of WWI. Blaming the "will" of the people for ones defeat is also the geneses of the "Dolchenstoss" myth.
I personally don't want a return to a conscript military for a number of reasons... Let me caveat... these are off-the cuff reasons all requiring greater specificity and historical proofs.
First reason, a conscript military is less professional in terms of "know-how"... We would spend too much time training folks the basics that don't want to be there... How much more knowledgeable is the long-serving professional NCO versus the drafted, conscript NCO.. who by the way will depart after his mandated service time has expired. I submit that we can field weapon systems such as the Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle (BFV) or Abrams M-1 and all that computer crap precisely because we have a professional military. Reason Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) did not purchase the BVF was not because it was a bad product... the IDF is a conscript military and requires equipment with less train-up time i.e. fire and forget... not highly sophisticated smart weapons requiring lots of continuous training to master etc, etc... I further submit that since a conscript military can ill afford intensive training (time, money, etc) it must rely more on fire-power... this translates into more indiscriminate targeting ... you fill in the blanks for who gets whacked.
Second reason... the conscript military becomes a political instrument in the hands of politicians... Moral connections and self-serving concerns for those who do not wish to serve for one reason or another will be exploited... called agitation and subversion? Do we really want the honorable gentlewoman or gentleman from this or that great state, or special interests with lots of money agitating one segment in the military off against another... Actually no difference from purchasing the loyalty of specific military units as done in post Roman Republic era. How would discontent with political leadership or policy play itself out (as it did during latter Vietnam period) today? Ten years into Iraq and Astan... multiple combat tours for individuals and units... think about it...
Third reason, I believe the Republic (not democracy) can best control a unified professional military... It is more difficult exploit the military instrument for partisan political reasons as highlighted in reason 2. You have to deal with the military instrument in its entirety... since you are unable to exploit conscript discontent.
Finally, we are bound to retrograde... and to reduce the number of outposts along the frontier... Can you imagine the discussions during the pull back from the "Hadrian Wall" decision brief? Same shit different epoch.
Lunatic fringe, brother...lunatic fringe... :-)
v/r
MAC
COL Gentile:
I have two thoughts regarding "affordability" and one additional thought (I think). The first is Steve Walt's take on it (walt.foreignpolicy.com - sorry I don't know the specific post). His argument is that we can make strategic blunders and let wars like Afghanistan drag on without resolution precisely because for a great power like the US, they're cheap. I think GDP is about $14trillion -$15trillion - hence a war costing a "mere" $100billion is cheap.
The second is it seems I've read (casually, usually through Google news; hence no names come to mind other than Roubini) a lot of late about an upcoming economic collapse or at least bad stagnation (I, too, am not an economist, so forgive any sins I make). Those people (some of whom are not economists, either) tend to argue that the US *will* cut back on its spending on the war due to budgetary constraints. On the one hand, I think $100 billion is relatively little when GDP is so high; on the other hand, I can see arguments easily made to end the war for fiscal reasons, *just* as a simple and "mere" line item, by those who want to enhance their reputation as deficit hawks; on the proverbial third hand, not to engage in partisan politics, but given the legislative landscape I think will emerge, I find it hard to see the US leaving, self-imposed deadlines notwithstanding.
The third is the international (or later in this paragraph, Afghanistan domestic) politica system. Apologies if I missed this in this thread, but you brought up civilians and policy. I think there's an element to the cessation of the Vietnam War you might be missing thus far. I'm reading Wilbanks right now and the diplomatic (and of course, corresponding military) interplay between the Soviets, China, the US, and the Vietnamese (both North and South) was complex to say the very least. How does that similarity - or dissimilarity - affect the dynamics of Afghanistan, including (or not including) withdrawal? With whom must we negotiate? With whom should we negotiate? With whom can we negotiate? To whom, if anyone, do we perceive we must demonstrate resolve? And if the Vietnam War was fought and continued for some of these reasons, but those reasons are not present in Afghanistan, is the game worth the candle? Yes, we're negotiating with the Taliban from what I read, but they're not AQ, are they?
ADTS
Oh Brother Slap, you nailed the essential problem in my mind with this sentence with regard to the Vietnam War:
"There was a moral connection to the people but there was no moral reason to fight the war."
Perfect formulation of the problem, and dare I say better strategy should have discerned this essential truth.
I always come back to historian George Herring's superb interpretation of the war:
based on what the American people were willing to pay morally and materially the war was unwinnable.
In short better counterinsurgency (Krepinevich) or conventional (Summers) tactics could not save the failed strategy and policy that was unable to figure this basic truth out.
gian
Bill:
I wonder that very same thing myself. I often hear from people in the "know" that what will end these wars will be the economy and that we cant afford them anymore. But then I often ask to that response, well we have afforded them for the last nine years, why not nine or nineteen more? Accordingly I ask if this is the case and it will be the economy and the fact that we cant afford the wars anymore what will be the mechanism that causes it all to end?
Alas, I just dont know enough about the political economy of the US relative to these wars to answer these questions.
what do you think?
gian
"I didnt say it in my first post but a prime reason for the lack of moral connection is that there is no draft. In Vietnam, and as unfair and misapplied as the draft was in terms of race and class, there still was a moral connection between the people and the war because not only theory but also in practice their sons could have to go fight. This moral connection during the Vietnam War was actually what produced the strident and visceral responses to the war, which often times sadly was taken out on the military. Because there was a feeling of moral connection there was also a willingness to confront the military and its political leaders head on." by gian gentile
Totally, I come from that Army. The fact that MLK was shot and then RFK was shot and them RMN was forced to resign didn't help any.
There was a moral connection to the people but there was no moral reason to fight the war. We had and still have a Communist Government 90 miles off the coast of the Continental US that could directly attack the the US, but we learned to live with them. And yet at the same time we went half way around the world to fight in country that was never a direct military threat to the US. The Moral justification just wasn't there to send and maintain half a million troops there.
Just a couple of quick thoughts/questions:
Do we think that the recent and current economic difficulties will serve as an effective "appetite suppressant;" one that will curb these "wars of nation building on the frontiers of instability throughout the world?"
Did economic difficulties/considerations in the early 1970's play much this same role re: the ending of the Vietnam War and the change in American foreign policy that followed soon thereafter?
(Thus, not necessarily "will" but a significant change in available "means" drives a re-calulation in both instances?)
You too Mac!
Here is what caught my eye with TX's piece, it was, what seems to me, the tired old saw that in counterinsurgency and irregular war the center of gravity, almost by rule, is the "will" of the American people. Of course, at its heart, the "will" argument comes out of the Vietnam better war thesis; the notion that the US had won the war in the South only to lose the war in 75 because the American people lost their "will" to continue. I dont care for this argument because it takes our eye off of what the real reason for American loss in Vietnam: failed strategy and policy.
It is really quite the militaristic argument if you know what I mean; the idea that only the weak civilians and their will can lose a war for us.
I didnt say it in my first post but a prime reason for the lack of moral connection is that there is no draft. In Vietnam, and as unfair and misapplied as the draft was in terms of race and class, there still was a moral connection between the people and the war because not only theory but also in practice their sons could have to go fight. This moral connection during the Vietnam War was actually what produced the strident and visceral responses to the war, which often times sadly was taken out on the military. Because there was a feeling of moral connection there was also a willingness to confront the military and its political leaders head on.
We obviously dont have that now, which partly explains the ironic condition where Americans by and large "support" the soldier, have bumper stickers on the back of their cars, have high respect for the military, but at the same time have no moral connection with the war because unless they volunteer, their blood and treasure is not on the line.
I am torn over this issue. On the one hand, as a soldier in service to the democracy I want the moral connection to be there and the draft is the best way to establish it. But on the other hand, perhaps we dont need a draft and instead an appetite suppressant to conduct these seemingly never ending wars of nation building out on the frontiers of instability throughout the world.
just some thoughts, what do you think?
gian
Gian,
"Will" defined as the mental faculty to deliberately choose or decide upon a course of action i.e. the act of exercising the will. See also determination...
The amateur historian/social observer in me asks when exactly will we (did we) lose the connection between the "people" and "soldiery" and why? It is bound to happen... and like previous states in history we too will become dependent on foreign contingents to meet our manpower needs.
... or will we continue to fight these "small wars" into the far future precisely because the American people are morally connected with the soldiery and draw no distinction between "support the troops" and sustainable frontier engagements. How much longer must we endure the self-serving rhetoric that a political opponent voted to withhold funding for (refused to support) our brave men and women fighting on the frontier?
Always a pleasure to converse with you...
r/
MAC
Mac:
Agree, my only point was that the "will" of the American people will not keep the United States from doing so, since we have been at these wars for nine years now and if Les Gelb is right we will be in Afghanistan to 2014 and perhap beyond.
General Petraeus himself said we will be fighting these wars for our "lifetime" and that of our "children" as well.
gian
Leaving moral considerations aside... we can not "fight these wars for a long, long time." A couple of considerations... All successful empires, such as Roman, Ottoman at its heights, or British, taxed the locals to pay for indirect rule and capital improvements. We do not... We tax the U.S. taxpayer to build and maintain the current international system... Paul M. Kennedy, "The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers" sought to make the economic case that unlimited wants of empire will eventually be held in place by the chains of limited resources...
I submit that you can't keep a force deployed along the frontier indefinitely, even if employing a professional military... No empirical proof... just a gut feel.
r/
MAC
This is somewhat off point.
What safeguards to contractors have in the event of injury which may limited in scope or permanent?
Many of the company's now use the Defense Base Act as the primary insurance "protection" for its employees or contractors. Recently, MPRI converted many of its independent contractors to employees. This included deductions for FICA and Federal Income Tax withholding. The company address is in Bermuda (this is one of the "holding company's" of L-3..the main company.
Those of you who are now on contract or considering going on contracts..and where the provisions of your insurance are under the Defense Base Act better fully understand the ramifications and serious problems with implementing the provisions should you be injured or killed.
Google "Defense Base Act" for further information..
Why do we think that American will is a "critical vulnerability" in irregular wars if we have been fighting irregular wars on a sustained and significant basis for the last nine years and American will has yet to be broken?
Perhaps because there is no moral connection between the American people and the fighting of these wars and therefore will is not an issue, nor will it be, and we can fight these wars for a long, long time.