SWJ Korea News and Opinion Update

Cole::<blockquote>"Then I pointed out that this years rate in Iraq is in the 50s. Guess our current bunch of heroes have done something right."</blockquote>Not to take anything away from the guys and gals who were in Iraq and who deserve a bunch of Attaboys but I doubt most of them would or do call themselves heroes. Regardless, casualty rates are a really poor metric for judging any conflict, way too many variables. The real issue in Iraq is success in achieving the strategic goal -- and it's entirely too early to tell. Take another 20 to 30 years before we know for sure.<blockquote>Also responded that our casualties in Afghanistan total around 1400+ in contrast to Vietnam with 58,000 over a similar timeframe.</blockquote>Speaking of variables...

Two entirely different wars, virtually no comparison other than we are still using an inferior cartridge in the primary weapon of most Troops. The earlier one was a monumental waste and achieved no strategic success or even minor gains. In fact in many senses, not least in what it did to the US Army, it did more harm than good -- thus my comment that precipitated this thread hijack. The current one will be less monumental if more expensive but will last about as long with fewer casualties. Any strategic success is a dubious proposition.<blockquote>Having Americans in Europe since the end of WWII prevented a WWIII and won the Cold War. Something more than mildly favorable about that tripwire effect and deterrent.</blockquote>Is that right? Hmm. Since they were there, we cannot say for sure that in their absence we would have seen / do see the same result. A combination of 15K US warheads and US economic power did far more to prevent WW III and end the Cold War than did Seventh Army. The USSR emphatically did not want another 25M KIA, indeed it could be -- has been -- said that our continued presence there extended the Cold War unnecessarily...<blockquote>...nuclear weapons there [North Korea](already attempted to be exported to Syria and Mynamar some say)...</blockquote>Do you know this or do you merely suspect that they possess nuclear capability? Did they attempt to export weapons or technology? ;)<blockquote>That tends to lead me to believe there is more than business as usual going on there.</blockquote>You may be right but I'm dubious. We'll have to wait and see, won't we...

Dave Maxwell's last two paragraphs above are quite correct IMO.

All this may be new to some and there are some different wrinkles -- there's only been one prior change in the leadership in 46 years -- but the absolute fear that gripped the South in 1975 as Kim Jong Il approached his 1 Jan 1976 '65th Birthday' (a point Koreans believe end the ability of one to do great things) proved totally unwarranted and the bargaining by the North continued. Much as it did before -- and as it has since...

It's still same stuff, different day.

Bill M:

Perhaps business as usual is a bad phrase. However, I do believe that the Kim Family Regime is following the Kim Il Sung playbook that has been in use for 60 years. Certainly you are very correct that there can be miscalculation with catastrophic effects but while Y-P Do is the most aggressive act in recent years it fits the pattern to support a number of ongoing internal actions.

First is succession. The problem we have today is that Kim Jong Un does not have the benefit of being head of the Organization and Guidance Department which controls the party and the military and approves every political and military appointment. Kim Il Sung appointed Kim Jong Il to his position in 1973 and he then had 21 years to consolidate his power, eliminate his opposition, and establish his legitimacy. Recall that throughout this period some of the major provocations included the Park Chung Hee assassination attempt, the 1976 Ax murder, the Rangoon bombing, and the KAL airline bombing just to name a few of the major ones. All of these were nominally planned by Kim Jong Il so he could make his bones as the Dear Leader. If the regime continues I am sure we will see Kim Jong Un getting credit for the Choenan sinking making him a great naval strategist as well as the great artillery commander for the Y-P Do fires.

Second is the fundamental regime strategy of conducting provocations to gain political and economic concessions. This has been a very effective strategy and has been key to survival of the regime. So the Y-P Do action while different in scope and perhaps intensity (compared in recent years) is not a deviation from the Kim Il Sung playbook.

Third, the regime depends on the external threat from the US and the ROK to legitimize its Songun or military first policy. It needs tensions high to justify the diversion of resources for national security (read regime survival) which helps to keep a lid on the population (but of course the regime's security services are really responsible for that oppression). Ironically, one of the things that could cause collapse of the regime would be the signing of a peace treaty and the removal of the "threat" to the South.

Yes, the problems are significant and the real danger is going to come when Kim Jong Il dies and Kim Jong Un has not had sufficient time to consolidate his power. Then we are going to be in for some potentially interesting times. The longer Kim Jong Il lives the better chance that Kim Jong Un will have though it is highly doubtful that he will get the 21 years his father had.

Yes, the conditions are not the same as the 1980's and 1990's but the playbook remains the same and is being followed (with adaptations to the current conditions). And yes the times ahead are potentially the most dangerous we have seen since 1950-1953.

But my misuse of business as usual should be interpreted to mean that it is in the best interest of all the parties to maintain the status quo, prevent collapse for as long as possible, while recognizing that the regime will continue to conduct provocations as a key element of its strategy.

Sir, I have to differ with your opinion that this is business as usual, even though I don't think you meant that literally.

North Korea has been anything but static. Under the great leader North Korea was supported by the Soviet Union and was much more powerful militarily (weapons were relatively modern, the government was relatively stable and the people weren't starving), when the Soviet Union collapsed North Korea (mostly under the Dear Leader) had to adapt its strategy to survive, and while China provides some support, they're also a nation whose economy is largely built on a State sponsored black market (selling arms and drugs), so while no longer allied with their previous Cold War allies, they're very allied with the likes of Iran, Burma, etc. Perhaps the only constant is their relationship with China.

North Korea is rotting from the inside out, and despite the regime's best efforts to keep information about the outside world out of North Korea, it has been seeping in, and new ideas are probably forming in pockets of populace, which could be extremely dangerous to a regime that only survives because they control 99% of the information, and of course through the employment of brute force to suppress any sign of resistance.

This clearly isn't the North Korea that existed in the 80s, or even the 90s. This is a regime close to collapse approaching a regime change that perhaps the military doesn't support. The best way for the incumbent to maintain power is to rachet up the tension with their sworn enemies in hopes of unifying the country, which may be the logic behind their recent attacks on the ROK. Just like Pakistan needs India as an enemy to survive as a State, the same probably holds true for nK. They're national identity based on my studies is based on war.

Of course the danger is that Kim will miscalculate and actually cause a war instead of simply increasing tensions. Only time will tell how this latest episode will evolve.

"I of course have not read the (illegal) wikileaks leaked cables and only found the above excerpt so far in the NY Times article"

Ditto.

Also read the NYT articles about missile cooperation between Iran and the DPRK.

You mean this paragraph from the NY Times article?

"Gaming out an eventual collapse of North Korea: American and South
Korean officials have discussed the prospects for a unified Korea,
should the Norths economic troubles and political transition lead the
state to implode. The South Koreans even considered commercial
inducements to China, according to the American ambassador to Seoul.
She told Washington in February that South Korean officials believe
that the right business deals would "help salve" Chinas "concerns
about living with a reunified Korea" that is in a "benign alliance"
with the United States."

I still believe that that despite what one reads in a cable excerpt that there all parties still believe in the status quo being maintained for as long as possible Furthermore it will be business as usual for the past 60 years as north Korea and more specifically the Kim FamilY Regime, will continue to conduct provocations to gain political and economic concessions as a key to its survival.

I of course have not read the (illegal) wikileaks leaked cables and only found the above excerpt so far in the NY Times article, but we should keep in mind that the above excerpt is likely only the analysis of a US diplomat probably writing for the ambassador that describes an interpretation of discussions held with South Korean diplomats and in no way should be assumed to be the firm positions of South Korea or China. There has been a lot of gaming out of the collapse of north Korea between the ROK and US and there have been numerous discussions with the Chinese (particularly at the track II level) particularly since 1996. The above is nothing really new and to me does not mean that there is any hope of a change from business as usual. Talk is one thing. Active preparations and concrete actions are another. Show me those and then I will believe that there will not be business as usual.

Suggest reading some of these articles. Business as usual either has changed or will change due to cooperation beteen rogue states:

http://www.nytimes.com/pages/world/index.html

Excuse me, I meant "ought to do the deed" - a Freudian slip - which certainly leads back to the deed.

The last thing China would want is the Korean peninsula unified under Western tutelage.

Beijing prefers to use N. Korea as a strategic buffer: one of their major concerns is that unification and absorption by S. Korea would see a democratic country, and possible a U.S. ally, on their border.

As for the perpetual blackmail by Pyongyang as concerns their concentration of artillery and rocket tubes turning Seoul into a fire storm?

Does it really matter if all 10,000 supposed tubes are capable of firing, or firing at once - four to five thousand ought to do the dead!

I do not believe that China will cause regime change in north Korea. First, it does not want the headache that 23 million people will bring to it and it does not want to absorb it or make it a protectorate of some kind (or in old terms a vassal state). It, like all members of the 6 party talks wants to maintain the status quo for as long as possible because what comes after is complex and dangerous (and hopefully the longer the regime drags on the weaker it will get and ideally will go out with a whimper vice a bang). That said, I do strongly believe that China is preparing well for the eventual reunification of the Peninsula under ROK control because that is the only likely outcome. How is China preparing for reunification? First it has established itself as the ROK's number one trading partner. Second and more importantly it is entering into 100 year lease agreements with the DPRK. I suspect that the Chinese plan will be to use the ROK Constitution (stating that all Koreans on the peninsula are citizens of the ROK) as a lever to ensure that it maintains access to some of the largest untapped natural resources in the world (according to the UN Development Program). It will use some interpretation of international law and say that since it entered into agreement with citizens of the ROK that the ROKG must honor those leases. Furthermore when the Kim Family Regime collapses it will be China that sees it first and acts to shore up its borders to contain things within north Korea and prevent spillover, while entering north Korea to both secure DPRK nuclear weapons to prevent them from being secured by the ROK, as well as eliminating any evidence of Chinese complicity in the DPRK nuclear program.

Of course there will be eventual ROK and international assistance to stabilize the collapsed north but the final Chinese card to be played will be its proposal that all foreign troops (to include the Chinese and US) withdraw from the Peninsula. China will argue that since the ROK and CHina are inextricably linked economically and that there is no threat from the mainland there is no need for foreign troops on the Peninsula. Thus as Mac says the buffer zone concept is dead - China's long term end state is US troops off the Asian land mass and I believe that is the end game China is playing for.

One last comment to sum up the problem of the north. I think it is truly the ultimate catch 22. To bring about deliberate regime change by anyone is a dangerous game for any of the parties to play as the consequences are significant and controlling the "fallout" (pun intended) is too complex. That said as long as the Kim Family Regime remains in control provocations like this will continue. It will not (and actually cannot) change its behavior because whether we want to believe it or not, the regime believes that its actions all contribute to regime survival which is its vital national interest. Members of the regime see really only two outcomes - survival or what they perhaps fear most - the Romanian outcome and being hung by their heels.

So the status quo means the same business as usual for the last 60 years and at best we can hope to manage the crises because we are unlikely to change the regime's behavior in any appreciable manner (and even if we reach an agreement it will most likely be broken to support future efforts that contribute to regime survival in the regime's calculus).

Cole,

No, not really. If China executed a regime change option its direct influence would still stop at the 38th parallel. No major change in the balance. On the other hand, if ROKG - U.S. executed a regime change option our influence would reach all the way to the Yalu River... Lets not forget what happened the last time our side (ROKA - U.S. military) washed its feet in this river. On the hand, maybe the Chinese would welcome and embrace our efforts at unifying the peninsula under Western tutelage.

Actually, I am not so sure that the "buffer zone" paradigm is still applicable... and I have asked as such in a previous post... Maybe Japan no longer requires our protection from Chinese hegemony and the buffer zone paradigm is all wrong... Maybe its all about the buffer zone itself (north and south Korean squabbles) and the Chinese - Japanese rivalry has run its course... Maybe.. maybe... :-)

r/
MAC

Speaking of artillery, found this link today on Google News:

Who knows how many hardened artillery sites are along the border and how many systems are in each and connected via tunnel. In the above article and RAND link inside, they claim they might only be exposed for 75 seconds...but that was based on Crusader.;)

Unless the war happens in the winter, not much off-roading would be going on. Will dams get blown on purpose sending cascading cold and then frozen water? Would our counterfire occur from roads? Would counterfire radars work well in mountains? In the winter, chemical munitions would be more persistent, as well, and I really doubt we would give the ROKA nuclear artillery. Which direction does the wind blow?

Maybe the ROKA needs to put some MLRS on that island and USAF Reapers could test out Gorgon Stare there and experiment with air-to-air missiles on Reapers if they get attacked.

Mac, reference your earlier point about China doing stability ops instead of a joint U.S./China/ROKA force, wouldn't that just put a stronger China that much closer to Japan?

In support of Cannoneer No. 4... I'd like to submit a bit of additional information in support of the 10,000 artillery pieces assumption development phase...

Fact: Korea is predominantly mountainous terrain i.e. high ridges, valleys and passes.

Fact: Three major movement corridors i.e. Western Corridor (Seoul - Panmunjom), Chorwon Valley in approximate center and the Eastern Corridor along a narrow east coast strip astride the Sea of Japan.

Where are the 10,000 artillery pieces located? Are all 10,000 tubes located along the Western Corridor or dispersed between the Western Corridor and the Chorwon approach? Before we answer this question we must consider that one artillery piece is part of a system consisting of an artillery piece, forward observers, fire direction centers, communications, and logistic tail (something needs to transport all those shells), etc, etc. All these independent components require a bit of space so as to pull the lanyard. Lets say we wish to position an artillery battery of six guns and its support tail on line or in a lazy W... Is there enough space within the Western corridor to accommodate 10,000 pieces? There exist only a limited number of primo firing positions to support the tubes and support tail. This is a fact of available terrain. If you have not maneuvered in Greek Valley, Squad South or the Chorwon and don't believe me, please read "the River and the Gauntlet" by S.L.A. Marshal. S.L.A. Marshal describes the challenge faced by the 3ID Artillery Brigade to deploy its tubes in support of the fight.. There wasn't enough primo real estate to deploy just one battery of artillery much less a battalion. Hence, a platoon or battery and its support tail will either occupy the primo firing position or be staggered along the limited number of available roads waiting to occupy the primo firing position. The Air Tasking Order and counter-fire fight takes this eventuality into consideration. I've also heard of those guns hidden inside the mountains and war-gamed how to exploit the location of these guns... Bottom line... it is very hard for me to believe that there actually exist 10,000 arty pieces and support tail hidden inside the mountains or positioned along the ridge-line (although any good computer simulations can make the impossible firing position a virtual reality) ready to open up on Seoul at a moments notice. Guns have to be fired every now and then... like vehicles that have to be driven or they dry-rot in place. The nKorean frontline artillery just doesn't do much range-firing. Not saying that the crews didn't rotate and participated in gunnery training elsewhere...but it is the guns trained on Seoul that need exercising to work properly. Also, the "(t)hey (I assume nKorean artillery crews) are analog and independent and will fire until they are either destroyed or run out of ammo" comment sounds like it reflects a computer simulation rather than the actions of flesh and blood human beings...

Bottom line, nKorean artillery will have to move to its firing position prior to a major engagement. Other artillery units will move IAW movement tables but will have to have to wait to occupy a previously occupied firing position... The move, wait, occupy dance greatly reduces the number of 10,000 pieces ready to fire at any given time and reduces the total number prepared to open up on Seoul on a moments notice... It also makes these same artillery systems quite vulnerable to ROKA counter-fire efforts.

Just some food for thought... nothing more..

r/
MAC

It's pretty much a given that 10,000 artillery pieces will open up on Seoul immediately.

Why is that a given?

Accepting the assumption above:

How many rounds do we assume will be misfires?

How many projectiles do we assume will be duds?

How many projectiles do we assume will miss what they were aimed at and hit targets of no particular importance causing few casualties?

How many projectiles do we assume will be intercepted in flight?

How many days do we assume it would take to issue 155mm nuclear munitions to the ROKA field artillery?

You know what happens when you assume.

Having lived here in South Korea for 6 of the past 7 years I still find it strange that there is no national fervor...rhetoric...public opinions being expressed. You can haul out hundreds of thousands of folks over US beef imports. But sink a ship, shell sovereign territory...nothing.

I work for a major defense contractor and am interjected into daily manufacturing and civilian life and opinions. There's just no rumble in the jungle here....

You may know that a very large part of China used to be considered as Corea (with a C, not a K) and is still considered homeland to some. There is not much love lost there.

If I were to guess, the populace fears a serious strike from the north because they still remember the last time. It's pretty much a given that 10,000 artillery pieces will open up on Seoul immediately. They are analog and independent and will fire until they are either destroyed or run out of ammo. I suppose they are willing to sacrifice hundreds of thousands of northern troops to surge into the south causing destruction and murder on a grand scale.

I pray that our newest undersea weapon system (Seawolf) does its job well these next few weeks. The best message we could send to the north would be that none of their deployed submarines came home.

And yes, my waterwings are on alert.

Cheers, Viper40

"On the other hand, I would support a Chinese effort of regime change north of the 38th parallel... but I am not sure that this is currently in China's best interest... but that time may come... sooner rather than later." by MAC

Thats some Strategic stuff there.

Well my family just sent around an internet link with the LTC Bateman article about the wounded parade at the Pentagon. That led me to research that article and point out that it first appeared in May 2007, which was why the cited deaths were so high. Then I pointed out that this years rate in Iraq is in the 50s. Guess our current bunch of heroes have done something right.

Also responded that our casualties in Afghanistan total around 1400+ in contrast to Vietnam with 58,000 over a similar timeframe. Have not heard about any sniper attacks of Muslims in Bosnia anytime recently. Guess our current and recent past servicemembers get some credit.

Having Americans in Europe since the end of WWII prevented a WWIII and won the Cold War. Something more than mildly favorable about that tripwire effect and deterrent.

Finally, since 1953, we have never had the intersection of changing DPRK leadership, nuclear weapons there (already attempted to be exported to Syria and Mynamar some say), and two serious incidents in the same year with more coming, plus a $28K to 1.8K disparity in family income between the South and North that is far higher than at anytime in history. That tends to lead me to believe there is more than business as usual going on there.

Cole:

With respect to using our Army as tripwire and to 'fix' things, how's our record of success in that sphere? They told me that doing the same thing over and over while hoping for a different result was a definition of stoopid. Yet we continue to beat our heads against that wall...

There are better ways to solve those problems,

But I digress. Re: your question:<blockquote>"So is North Korea about to be the new Europe with a larger, longer term presence. I read Ken's Scotsmen reference about past Korea incidents. I well remember the 1976 axe incident. But with so many events so close together and the threat of DPRK nukes, are things now the most serious since the early 50s?"</blockquote>No and no. It's just business as usual. Same stuff, different day...

Cole,

First, nowhere in any of my posts regarding this thread do I propose anything close to "the military should be fixated on strategy" comment you attribute to me. Of course grand strategy is a civilian leader function... recommendations for the application of the military instrument, on the other hand, is a military leadership responsibility. Strategy is not all that matters... what a silly concept... A given strategy requires appropriate tactics and operations to succeed... tactics and operations reflect a given plan (strategy). It is a package deal... Lets not forget the required resources to make the engine purr.

Ill keep it simple... I maintain that the Korean peninsula as currently delineated is a buffer zone to maintain a respectable distance between China and Japan... and as such the frictions of buffer zone power politics and diplomacy are quite normal and exploitable by both sides... The ROKG is tired of buffer zone power politics and diplomacy (hence irritation at U.S. favoring Japan over Korea) and has sought in the past to create greater political/military maneuvering room for itself... Frustrated as the ROKG may be... it knows that it remains a pawn between the two big players China and U.S. who will determine buffer zone power politics and diplomacy for some time to come.

You lost me with the whole "saving our Army for big wars, trip wires, fighting the Russians or Chinese, nuclear escalation, genocide in the Balkans and Army equipment sailing around the Black Sea" thread... so Ill skip it...

I thought I was pretty clear that the reason I think we are still in Korea is to protect Japan... I asked if the premise for our continued stay in the area had changed and if it did... how? No responses. I also believe that we should hold China responsible for nKoreas behavior especially if, as you explain, the Kim regime starts exporting nukes. Do we actually believe ourselves to be in a better position to chastise and punish the Kim regime? Reminds me of the scene in "Road Warrior" in which the Mel Gibsons character (PRC) tells the good folks surrounded by lots of bad men (ROK and U.S.)... "if you want to get out of here, you talk to me." Riddle me this... what are we actually doing to combat and punish the Kim regimes for its current international illegalities? It sucks when we don't have the required leverage to change the system doesnt it? Funny because I believe the balancing mechanism in place on the peninsula is actually designed to limit everyone's leverage.

I wonder if you are implying that you want nKorea to cease to exist? I don't support a U.S. or ROKG initiated "regime change" option... nor do I see this as a viable option for anytime soon for reasons already expressed... On the other hand, I would support a Chinese effort of regime change north of the 38th parallel... but I am not sure that this is currently in China's best interest... but that time may come... sooner rather than later.

Not selling anything... but I am spouting my own personal suck... :-)

r/
MAC

Mac, not sure I understand your point or that of all those who constantly advertise that the military should be fixated on strategy (isn't that a civilian leader function?). If strategy is all that matters, why not just pull out of the middle east, Korea, Europe etc. and simply rely on our nuclear deterrent and missile defenses for rogue states.

We say we should save our Army for big wars...what big wars? Why would we fight Russia or China on land, air/space, or sea when we both have nukes and worries of nuclear escalation are real?

So if our Army is better used as a deterrent tripwire, to fix genocide in the Balkans and elsewhere, terrorism in the middle east, and to stomp on rogue states if they get too frisky, why do we need so much heavy armor? Wouldn't medium armor (bigger than Stryker, smaller than Abrams or 50-70 ton GCV) that we can actually move in a hurry make more sense?

I can't picture a Marine amphibious ship or Navy T-AKR ship with Army equipment sailing into the Black Sea, even if Turkey allowed it. It is equally unlikely we would wait for Taiwan to be seized and then try an amphibious assault on it or mainland China. Doesn't that leave forward deployed deterrent tripwire and air deployment to an adjacent ally as the most likely realistic scenarios for the Army?

If you are implying that we stay in Korea because it prevents China from assuming control of North Korea and eventually the south as a pathway to Japan, then I may buy that given how close South Korea is to Japanese islands. Are you saying it is preferable to let China perform the Stability operation with a failed DPRK instead of the U.S. or both of us and the South?

What happens if North Korea continues to exist and starts exporting nukes elsewhere to generate revenue? Are we really going to risk conventional bombing of nukes on a small state adjacent to China, Japan,and South Korea. Just one rogue DPRK nuke that got through from the north would create mass casualties and a huge fallout region, as would any nuclear response from us.

So is North Korea about to be the new Europe with a larger, longer term presence. I read Ken's Scotsmen reference about past Korea incidents. I well remember the 1976 axe incident. But with so many events so close together and the threat of DPRK nukes, are things now the most serious since the early 50s?

ENJOY YOUR THANKSGIVING ONE AND ALL...

Dumb question... what is the historical and ideological premise upon which the current strategic circumstance is based? What is it? Is it containing Chinese influence and maintaining a secure buffer (Korean peninsula) between China and Japan? One of the more irritating aspects for the ROKG in regard to the ROK and U.S. relationship remains the perceived U.S. favoritism of Japan over Korea.

Does the premise of containing the PRC so as to protect Japan still apply? If the premise still applies then why the hand wringing and gnashing of teeth? We should be well experienced at this stage of our historical relationship to realistically manage our current Chinese-Korean-Japanese-U.S. relations. If not, what is the evolved premise?

It seems to me that we can't free ourselves from a "five stages of grief approach to strategy" when it comes to dealing with the Korean peninsula: denial, anger, bargaining, depression and hopelessness, and finally and hopefully, acceptance.

Denial. We deny the fact that the Korean peninsula is nothing more than a buffer zone between China and Japan and the periodic unpleasantness of frontier friction the normal price of power politics/diplomacy.

Anger. The Kim regime just doesn't get that we seek to help integrate them into the greater family of peaceful countries in the region. After a while, good will spurned turns to anger and calls for regime change.

Bargaining. Always. The saving grace has been that we were wealthy enough in the past to send the incorrect message of weakness by giving, giving, giving so as to avoid conflict. What will happen when we are constrained by limited resources... wait... this is uncanny and China holds a number of trump cards. We are dealing with Machiavellians (not that there is anything wrong with that)... if you give, give, give in order to avoid conflict, you might find yourself at a disadvantage when conflict comes.

Depression follows.

Acceptance. If there is no strategic answer to the North Korean issue... then change the premise.

Skinny-down sidebar. Do we really believe that nKorea is technically and financially capable of pulling off violent "regime change" and annexation and integration of the ROK into a greater DPRK? Have we learned nothing from our own attempts at doing the same we credit the DPRK of being capable of?

Cordially, from a proud member of the lunatic fringe :-)

r/
MAC

"Plus don't forget we soon will have two Hyundai plant neighbors and a Kia plant just across the Georgia border. My son and I use a lot of Korean performance tires, too." by Cole

Slapout,Al(Cultural Center of the Universe)is just North of Montgomery,Al so I am familiar with Hyundai(we already have one plant,one is under construction). This is all part of Alabama's plan to save America. The Yankees keep outsourcing our industry and we keep bringing them back. Next year when Wall Street outsources Washington we are going to move the capital back to Montgomery where it is supposed to be. Roll Tide!!!!

Play nice Slap (coming from me?). At least Sarah can almost see Russia from her house.;) In all seriousness, she has an Army combat veteran son, a cute daughter (who can't dance that well but can get votes), and she's not so bad herself...plus she has lots of common sense.

As for not liking Koreans, I had a South Korean landlord for many years when I was a business owner. Nice self-made blue collar guy with a doctor daughter, dentist son, and computer-geek son despite having no college degree himself.

Could relay similar stories about many different Korean and other Asian piano students my mom has had over many years in the Bay Area. Hard working people we could take many lessons from.

Plus don't forget we soon will have two Hyundai plant neighbors and a Kia plant just across the Georgia border. My son and I use a lot of Korean performance tires, too.

Fortuitously, I've been working with a TRADOC-approved Training Support Package for Korea for more than a few months now. Any ideas for a RSTA platform attack scenario (already using Afghanistan scenarios for reconnaissance and security missions)? I never did Korea.

I've got 1:50K maps and really wonder how Strykers would survive in those narrow valleys where infiltrating infantry/SOF could engage them from forested/mountainous flanks. Yet Strykers seem to be the game plan for Korea based on the basing.

Not sure I buy the argument that we don't have room for Korean-based forces in the U.S.??? But considering the distance, why don't we have more heavy forces at least prepositioned there? Of course the South Koreans have darn nice tanks.

How does the planned consolidation further south at Humphreys play into all this? Seems like a good idea...or an easy nuke or TBM target. Have to agree with Ken et all that South Korea could kick North Korea booty on their own, but they must know that Seoul would take a huge artillery licking in that event. Like most nations, the DPRK has really crappy air defenses (except guns) and a poor air force, too. Yet once again, it is ground forces where we would have much more difficulty...yet the money always goes elsewhere.

But all this talk about reunification tells us once again why a stability operation must follow combat operations...or economic collapse. Units must be equipped for that inevitability.

And Slap, as for your point about bombing China (?), I'm not sure how long our Korean-based jets would last in a war with China and its 1,000+ TBMs. I also wonder where you could find enough flat straight unoccupied land without a rice paddy on it for a B-52 airfield.;) Happy Thanksgiving.

"He thought it would be a good idea to nuke the entire peninsula and pave it over as a B52 airstrip. He was an interesting cat, old George." by Publius

Well this is my next question, is our real interest to maintain a base in ROK in order to strike China?

Dave Maxwell, I don't know for sure who blew up the deal, it just didn't happen.

Have you guys herd what Sarah Palin said on Glenn Beck's radio show? We should honor our NORTH Korean treaty!!!!!

Happy Thanks Giving to all!

I've done a lot of strategic intelligence work in Korea--in fact, one of my languages is (or used to be) Korean. I've dealt with south and north, north, of course, in a difficult setting. Frankly, although I made friends in South Korea, I was never sorry to leave the country. Koreans are incredibly brave and courageous allies, but they're also Koreans. That means something in Asia and I have to say that it would not surprise me to see the ROKs all of sudden just decide to head north one fine day.

Ken White is correct in that US Forces are not there to threaten or constrain the North. They are there to serve as a "stabilizing influence," read, keep the South from heading north. Remember how the UN Command is structured.

There is no strategic answer to the North Korean issue. China knows this and they're as uncomfortable as we are. The Commies never liked this type of generational cult of personality thing and everybody's just gotta be hoping that the 25-year-old four-star general proves a little saner than his father. There is a difference in the Kims. Kim Il Song was a brutal tyrant. Kim Jong Il is a brutal tyrant who also happens to be batshit crazy. Nobody will miss him.

But then there is the solution that Captain George, one of my running buddies in Vietnam, came up with when we were discussing basing issues relative to B52 strikes in Vietnam. George was a Korean War vet and had spent at least one peacetime tour there, way back when it was pretty primitive. He didn't like Korea or Koreans. He thought it would be a good idea to nuke the entire peninsula and pave it over as a B52 airstrip. He was an interesting cat, old George.

Was it the ROK who "said no" to FTA or was it the US automakers who placed restrictions on the US negotiators? Where you stand depends on where you sit but the bottom line is both countries pressed hard to get the best deal for their respective countries and they could not reach a compromise agreement. I so not think it was a question of the ROK saying "no" to the US anymore than is was the US saying no to the ROK.

While no expert on Korea, I see a lot of wisdom and experience in Dave, MAC and Ken's submissions.

I do wonder about the wild cards though. I can read a map. What if a North Korean meltdown (which seems inevitiable to me), leads not to reunification with South Korea, but rather to a reunification with China? How does South Korea feel about that possibility? How does the US or Japan feel about it?

Wasn't the entire penninsula part of the Han Empire? China seems to take a long view on such things, both as to the importance of the past, and as to patience in returning to former positions.

Or, perhaps there is a middle ground, where China, Japan, and South Korea all agree to a Marshall Plan-like approach to catch and sustain North Korea as a sovereign state under new management once it falls. Sometimes a buffer helps everyone stay friendly.

One thing that is certain is that this is a situation that will continue to evolve and that the solution of 1954 was a temporary one. Key is to avoid any foolishness that draws a lot of big players into a fight that none of them want.

Tyrtaios, I got it...thats pretty good.

Everyone else, still seems they owe us a bunch of money. We seem to be suffering from Rodney Dangefield Syndrome "We don't get no respect". But ROK can say no to a trade deal to our President but when things get nast they call on Uncle Sam. And I am not saying we should bring them home but we should make a profit doing it, we have know problem doing that at home, and it's all a Global Free Market now right, do what you are good at and sell it for money. So if we collect all the back rent and some compound interest, I don't think there would be a budget deficitI think there would be a surplus. And if they don't like we could sell the invasion rights to China for a nice profit I would think.

More to it than guaranteeing ROK security and they do pay us. Japan and Korea both fund a fair amount of our costs in the region.

We are there not to constrain the North who are dotty but not totally stupid. We've been there to keep the South from going North and to keep Japan on side and preclude any reason for them to get expansionist ideas. Carter started to push withdrawing from the area in 1975 and both nations promptly started rattling sabers...

Not a deterrent force to the North -- look at their history, do the math and look at the geography -- but a brake on Southern and Japanese desires, needs which have probably passed. However, we have to keep myths alive for budgeting and political purposes. The bureaucracy changes but slowly...

Slapout,

First we are treaty allies. We have pledged mutual defense (thus the name Mutual Defense Treaty). Second, Congress has legislated requirements concerning host nation funding for stationing costs for US forces and the requirement is that the host nation fund 75% of those stationing costs. Only Japan meets that requirement the last I knew. The ROK has paid somewhere between 45-50% over the years and it is always a source of alliance friction as this is negotiated at regular intervals.

Keep in mind that to bring these forces home would be a huge tax bill because there are not sufficient facilities to station all the OCONUS forces in the states. To "bring home" all the troops that are permanently stationed overseas would end up in a reduction of overall US force structure because we could not afford to sustain these forces in. CONUS.

Slapout9 - Japan kicks-in a great deal, even though they don't have the yen to do so (get it?), in covering the cost for support of infrastructure which including utilities, maintenance and physical upgrades, as well the payroll of the JP workforce aboard bases on Honshu and Okinawa.

Though it's out of my expertise, I would bet S. Korea also kicks in a buck or two?

Here is my question. Since we are guaranteeing ROK security in the region why aren't we charging them for this vital service and Japan to for that matter. Why do we pay foreign countries for the right to die for their country? Seems they should be paying us. We don't need to be cutting our budget, I think we need to start collecting some rent from these folks.

Dave,

No disagreements on the general situation... but I submit that "stability and friction" as defined by local and the regional players and based on current strategic calculus and cost benefit analysis lies well within acceptable levels and is likely to remain acceptable to all players for some time to come. At the risk of sounding crass and inhumane... 2 x KIA ROK Marines and X amount of won in damages is well worth the price to retain the current power balancing mechanism in play on the peninsula...

I further submit that the PRC is likely to step in if a "security dilemma" begins to threaten to unravel the currently accepted balancing mechanism.

Reference reunification costs... Thucydides described a direct correlation between availability of resources, strategy and tactics. He explains the reason it took the Greeks so long to conquer Troy was not so much owing to the scarcity of men as of money. If the Greeks had the money, they could "have stuck to the siege (instead of farming and privateering to feed and finance the effort) and the capture of Troy would have cost them less time and less trouble." The availability of resources indeed influences strategy and tactics...

r/
MAC

BK,

... exactly... it is in everyone's best interest to play along with the face-saving ritual of threats and payments...

Here is a bit of counter-intuitive thinking... "salvageability" evolves into a viable and exploitable survival strategy for the Kim regime and is wholeheartedly supported by the PRC, ROKG, Japan and the United States (feed me Seymour).

I like to assess the situation on the peninsula in its historical context. Thousand years of history have shaped the special Chinese-Korean-Japanese relationship. I had a great conversation with a ROKA officer a number of years back who was hell bent on lecturing me as to our weaknesses and the ROKs special and historical relationship with China. I reminded him politely that this may be true, but that China was also a close neighbor and the U.S. far away (and all that close proximity entails).

In the near term, Japan welcomes a divided Korea... while a long term outlook does not bode well for Japan when it will eventually face a united Korean economic powerhouse... (thinking in historical time frames of course). Also, PRC reach currently stops at the 38th parallel in a divided Korea whereas its influence will extend all the way to Busan in a united Korea. Korea, after all is the "dagger pointing at the heart of Japan"... and the threat to Japan, as mentioned before is not so much Korea but big China.

I am not so sure (and as a committed imperialist pains me to say this) that a U.S. presence is actually needed to contain the nKorean threat... even if only to soothe the worries of our Japanese ally... Nor do I believe that a military coup or instability in nKorea after one or another factional power grab would result in a major theater war... Any one remember the Chinese punitive expedition against Vietnam? China's twenty-nine-day incursion into Vietnam in February 1979 was a response to what China considered to be a collection of provocative actions and policies on Hanoi's part. China engaged in a brief, limited campaign that involved ground forces only. Once the Chinese felt that Vietnam had been sufficiently chastised, announced that the campaign was over. Beijing declared its "lesson" finished and the PLA withdrew. I venture to say that the nKorean leadership alliance understands China's capacity to render and take away. Furthermore, nKorea understands that it doesn't stand a chance against a limited but coordinated action by the PRC, ROKG, Japan and U.S.. I venture to say that the various factions vying for favor at the Kim court wouldn't respond in an apocolyptic manner but would exploit the correlation of power/forces to survive. Although the Kim regime is a cult it isn't a suicidal one akin to Jim Jones and the Peoples Temple. It is a hell of a lot more rational then credited.

Thanks for suffering this long winded post of the lunatic fringe... :-)

r/
MAC

Mac,

I do not disagree at all. Well aware of Chungmu, had penty of access as well over many years to include the current versions. It is somewhat ironic in that it is in every member of the 6 party talks straetgic interests to maintain the status quo. No one wants to deal with regime collapse or war and while I submit that our strategic aims have been deterrence and then ending the nuclear program, the defacto strategy for everyone has been maintaining the status quo.

But we must understand that with the status quo comes the north's provocations and we are not going to prevent them because they are key tools in their straetgic playbook and critical to regime survival. But I will standby my thesis that there will not be long term stability on the Peninsula until the Kim Family Regime goes away and the reunification process takes place (but between now and then because of collapse or even war due to the collpasing regime - we will see a period of even greater regional instability unfortunately. This is going to be a pay me now or pay me later and in reality the South and the international community are going to have to eventually deal with it because the end of the regime is very nearly inevitable - the question is, will the ROK, US and the international community be prepared to deal with the "fallout?")

And regarding reunification: I am well aware of the costs and the controversy as well as the feelings of many Koreans (emotionally many want reunification; but at the same time practically few want it due to the costs and the potential negative impact on the South). I was somewhat heartened to see President Lee's proposal for a reunifcation tax this summer as I think that was his trial balloon to begin sensitizing the South Koreans to the costs but of course it went over like a lead balloon.

I concur with MAC but would go one step further than he explicitly said (if he meant to suggest it at all) and argue that delaying the re-unification nightmare that is inevitible is not just a ROK strategic objective, it is a US one as well. But it is a finite objective, as long as the Kim regime has lasted, there will come a point when it is no longer salvageable and something will have to be done.

I would also argue that once the north does collapse, the PRC will get involved either because the ROK hesitates, invites it in explicitly, or because it gets dragged in based on the refugee problem for the north. At this point, the PRC becomes dangerously close to an ever paranoid (at least regards to China) Japan which must now ramp up its own defenses against this perceived threat. Now you have two of the world's better economies (PRC and SKorea) tied up with the stablisation of the north (while the PRC may be able to shoulder this burden to some extent, SKorea is likely to suffer dire consequences) and the third suddenly shifting economic priorities to defenses it never really needed before. So for the sake of regional stability, having the US on the Korean pennisula is vital to maintaining regional economies, and the US only really needs to be there so long as nKorea remains a "threat."

Ultimately, the question becomes, when does the status quo become too risky (fear of nKorea's military launching a coup that bleeds into a MTW) or too immoral (given the humanitarian crisis in the north). I think you could make a strong case that the latter has already occurred. Now we're just waiting for the former to become too blatant to ignore.

Looks like its a topic for long winded posts...

After four trips over there including one stint at authoring a part of then 5027 and futilely trying to find out who, precisely, was going to drop bridges and blow tank traps, I do believe MAC has it right.

So does Dave. We need a strategy for dealing with theater and three nations who conspire to do things we don't catch too well other than ex post facto. We have not been able to do that since 1953. Nor are we going to do it when our cultural awareness and sensitivity is minimal and our governmental culture changes at two, four, six and / or eight year intervals.

Then again, maybe we don't need such things. From 3,200 mil deflection errors in the South to Rabbits in the wire outside Oulette to purposely undefined lines in the sea and islands that have seen fascinating uses since 1950, the theater sure has been interesting and entertaining these many years...

Dave,

I served as the 2ID G-5 and Theater Support Command G-5... as such I extensively researched, investigated and attained subject matter expertise on Chungmu (ROK Government Populace Resource Control Plan and process/procedures/events upon declaration of martial law). I also acted like a SME on reunification requirements).

I served in Germany when the wall came tumbling down and closely monitored the Bundersrepublic Deutschland (BRD) nuts-and-bolts planning and execution efforts for how to physically integrate former German Democratic Republic (GRD)... and all the attached baggage i.e. social, political, economic, and military considerations... It should come as no surprise that the Republic of Korea Government (ROKG) sent observers... and prolific note-takers.

I actually read portions of the ROKG plan for unification while researching and acting the SME for Chungmu... primarily the economic/financial/social costs involved... These costs are tremendous... We are talking about three lost generations... 60-80 year olds, 40-60 year olds, with the 20-40 year olds being the least "damaged" and most retrainable for adapting to modernity and functionality in the ROK. Imagine what the folks are taught in Kim Ill Song - Kim Jong Ill University and its applicability to live in the ROK... nKorea is a cult. Rebuilding nKorea infrastructure and restructuring of social capital to reflect ROK realities, standards and requirements is a daunting task and much more intensive than faced by the BRD during reunification efforts with the GDR.

We tend to dismiss the idea that it is in the ROKG best interest to maintain the current status quo... better to pay off the Kim regime (prop up current regime) than to assume the economic and social costs of regime collapse and unification... It is much cheaper to continue the charade and may actually reflect a desire by ROKG for the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) to pick up the tab for some "state-and-capacity building" before unification is "forced" on the south... This is a waiting game between ROKG and PRC... not to mention a concerted effort by the PRC to make some noise in the east while maneuvering in the west... (does anyone read the Chinese Military Classics anymore?). Do we actually believe that the ROKG is unable to absorb an initial nKorean attack and to retaliate with overwhelming vigor? I served as the 2ID G-3 Air and know what is spelled out in the Air Tasking Order starting at N hour. On the other hand, there is a greater requirement for "Lebensraum" in the south... and if I was a Kim family man would worry more about the south coming north... South is running out of farm land and living space... Seoul is bursting at the seams and will in time need to expand north...

NKorea's actions are old hat and continue to be lamented by most as blatant attempts at a most successful strategy of extortion... but is it extortion when it is in everyone's best interest to play along with the face-saving ritual of threats and payments? We all know that this is the relationship we presently believe to be best for all parties involved... It is all theater... farmers dressed in traditional and colorful costumes twirling in circles... Don't be fooled by the bright-shinning-dangling object and the rhythmic jingles of bells and beat of the drums.

Apologize for the long-winded opinion...

r/
MAC

Some have asked why north Korea is conducting these provocations and why we cannot effectively counter them. I just forwarded a pretty good NY Times article that may be useful. But let me offer a few thoughts on strategy. I have attached some charts that may be illustrative as well.

Our only significant response to a north Korean provocation was in 1976 after the Panmunjom ax murders when we deployed a significant show of force (to include B52's and F111's, Carrier Battle Group and infantry battalions deployed aloft for air assault as we sent in the ROK Special Forces and Engineers to cut down the tree.)

The north's fundamental survival strategy is to conduct provocations to gain political and economic concessions. This has worked effectively for the past 60 years. Why is this so?

I would ask that we ponder what our strategy is toward the Korean Peninsula. What is the ROK/US Alliance strategy?

The fundamental strategy until 1994 has been solely focused on deterring war with north Korea. In 1994 a second strategic aim was added and that is the elimination of the north Korean nuclear program. For the US this has been the major objective of strategy on the Peninsula. The ROK went through a decade of the Sunshine Policy as an attempt to entice the north to change its behavior which the current Lee administration has just assessed as failure.

But I would submit that the above strategic aims - deterrence and elimination of the nuclear program - as well as alliance friction from 1997 through 2009 has caused a kind of strategic paralysis that has allowed the north to literally get away with murder and sustain the lifespan of the Kim Family Regime.

The fundamental problem in my mind is that there is not an alliance strategy that will solve the "Korea Question." (note this is from paragraph 60 of the 1953 Armistice that called on all parties to bring together the political leadership within 3 months of the signing to solve the "Korea Question" - which is the division of the Peninsula). The ROK/US alliance has not developed a long term strategy that will lead to the only end state that can eventually bring stability to the Peninsula and that is a reunified Peninsula without the existence of the Kim Family Regime. The catch 22, however, is that removal of the Kim Family Regime will lead to a likely series of collapse effects or war.

The bottom line is that we need a strategy beyond deterrence and elimination of the north Korean nuclear program. Once we have that then we can deal with these provocations effectively but until our strategy goes beyond deterrence and nuclear program elimination we will remain stuck in this 60 year do loop of provocations and concessions.

Here are a couple of other comments I sent off line to some people asking me questions.

What about Team Spirits in the past as a response to provocation?

Yes, Team Spirits (as well as Foal Eagle, Ulchi Focus Lens and Ulchi Focus Clear exercises) were excellent exercises that accomplished a number of objectives including: causing the north to go on alert and at times mobilize which gave us some good intel reads; and second, it caused the north to expend significant resources as they went on alert.

But these were planned exercises done 4 times a year for quite a period of time and were not executed in direct response to provocations.

A re-initiation of a robust combined exercise program would have a significant impact if we had the resources and we were not engaged in other areas of the world.

And of course from the north's perspective, today's events are the result of the ROK 9 day exercise they are currently conducting, the ROK was conducting artillery firing from Y-P Do and the north told them to stop at about 0820 and of course the ROK did not so at about 1430 the north initiated its fires.

But we should also keep in mind a couple of things. It is likely that the Regime has been planning this provocation for a long time as over the last 12-18 months they have been repositioning and reinforcing this specific area with artillery systems. We know that the 4th Corps Commander, GEN Kim was reassigned from Pyongyang earlier this year before the Choenan sinking. He is a key player in the regime and his move to a corps command after being at the highest levels in the regime is almost like GEN Petreaus going from CENTCOM to ISAF. GEN Kim formerly ran the Reconnaissance Bureau which is one of their major SOF HQ and responsible for provocations. This was a deliberate action obviously sanctioned by the regime and, not to beat a dead horse, is designed to keep the north in the news to ultimately get political and economic concessions.

In response to the question is the north doing this because it does not believe the US will support the ROK in a war? Can we conduct new Team Spirits?

Actually, in my opinion, the north absolutely believes that the US will go to war if the north initiates a war. While the vital national interest is survival of the Kim Family Regime and the single strategic aim is reunification of the Peninsula under regime control (which is the only long term way for the regime to survive in their assessment) the key condition they need to accomplish this is US troops off the Peninsula as well as the severing of the Extended Deterrence Concept. I have mentioned this previously regarding Hwang Jong Yop informing us that the regime knows it cannot win a war because of the very likely use of US nuclear weapons if the north attacks the South.

All services were well represented in Team Spirits. The infrastructure still exists logistically and has been improved over the years (the late winter exercise which was Team Spirit morphed into a combined Foal Eagle and RSO&I - reception, staging, onward movement and integration - to be able to ensure that reinforcement of the Peninsula remained viable).

But can we afford to conduct these exercises today? Probably with a significant Air and Naval capability but not a ground (Army and Marine) capability due to commitments to CENTCOM.

It may seem counterintuitive but the north is not conducting these provocations to prepare for or start a war and they believe they can get away with them because they believe the ROK and US will not conduct a response that the alliance leaders believe could lead to war (deterrence being the main goal of our strategy). But the real irony is that if the alliance did respond with significant military force it is unlikely that the regime would go to war unless the response threatened the survival of the regime. The north will back down in the face of strength and power and will not initiate a deliberate attack unless it can achieve the correlation of forces it needs to be successful as well as has an element of at least operational if not strategic level surprise. Recall how the Korean War began in 1950. The north stopped all propaganda and had called for talks at Kaesong and was making deliberate overtures to the ROK and many analysts were reading this as the north had no intention of going to war. I will be real worried when the north stops its belligerent rhetoric and provocations.

If this thing escalated any further, we'd have to re-name this blog "Big Wars Journal". Yeesh...

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