by Colonel Robert M. Cassidy
Download the Full Article: A Précis on the Logic of the Afghan War
This Thanksgiving weekend marks when the duration of our current war in Afghanistan surpasses the duration of the Soviet-Afghan War. About nine years ago, on 13 November 2001, the U.S. backed and advised Northern Alliance forces marched into Kabul. Approximately three weeks later, on 7 December 2001, the Taliban quit Kandahar. However, chasing the Taliban and al Qaeda out of Afghanistan required considerably less strategic thinking, resolve, and leadership than it does to design a long-term solution which undermines and precludes al Qaeda sanctuary here and in Pakistan. Pundits, policymakers, and the public are losing patience, wondering, why nine years on, the U.S. and its partners have not been able to yet create durable stability in Afghanistan. The reasons why it took so long to give Afghanistan the strategy and emphasis it required are manifold, and some are explained in this précis. Afghanistan is governable but it requires a government suited to its complex character. It is not the graveyard of the U.S. and NATO. Nor do the Afghans perceive our current effort as an imperial conquest.
The Afghans would welcome peace and normalcy. They have suffered predation and conflict for well over three decades, dating back to the bloodless usurpation of Zahir Shah in 1973. More importantly, collusion between al Qaeda, the Haqqanis, the Afghan Taliban, the Pakistani Taliban, and others in the Pashtun areas, in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, represents the gravest threat to the homelands of the U.S. and its partners. This précis addresses the efforts to help build durable stability in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to eliminate sanctuary for al Qaeda and its nefarious hosts. This perspective derives from research which informed a brief the author delivered at the U.S. Army War College April 2010 Strategy Conference and an essay written for requirements at the U.S. Naval War College in May 2010 . The first part, below, framed that presentation and amplified a list of near truisms about the region. Part one also briefly identifies imperatives for success in the theater. The second part lays out the context and the rationale for the comprehensive counterinsurgency argument and the counterterrorism-light counterargument, followed by a rebuttal and a conclusion.
Download the Full Article: A Précis on the Logic of the Afghan War
Colonel Robert M. Cassidy, U.S. Army, is serving in Afghanistan. These views stem from service there and a study on Afghanistan and Pakistan completed at the U.S. Naval War College in 2009-2010. After peer review and editing, this became an article which appeared in the August-September 2010 issue of the RUSI Journal with the title, "The Afghanistan Choice: Peace or Punishment in the Pashtun Belt." The post-peer review printed article can be found at this link. The Army War College brief can be found here.
About the Author(s)
Comments
M.L., Well said, but I'm not sure that it is even worth the dollar to begin with. I hear a lot of terms thrown around by people in positions they shouldn't be in like "number one foreign policy priority," "national strategic interest,"etc, etc. The military, protecting its own institutional interests, which are neither linked to the operational or strategic interests of the U.S. in the region, has beat the "strategic necessity" drum so long and so loud, that one of the arguments now is that to leave Afghanistan would be to admit defeat and suffer a significant blow to U.S. credibility. That is only because we built the narrative that way. It is like the arrogant military leadership from the colonel level on up (i.e. those spouting "near truisms") have put a poison pill in the well to ensure that the politicians cannot withdraw the military because it would be harmful to the military institutionally. The narrative could have been crafted much differently and we could be picking off terrorist a-holes, rather than fighting every goatherd with a bag of fertilizer and a yellow jug in Afghanistan. What is the argument against that? There's more of a threat from Afghanistan than... Pakistan? Yemen? Mexico, when you really get down to it, poses a more immediate strategic threat to the U.S., its citizens, and its economy than Afghanistan. The U.S. military leadership has zero strategic perspective today. While there could be hidden agendas that make a bit more strategic sense, the way they are crafting the narrative and wasting money in Afghanistan is still inexcusable. One quick stat: According to Giustozzi, we were spending $15-16 million per killed Talib in 2005, about half of that in 2006. I wonder what the price is now that we've ratcheted up the spending over here so immensely? While many cheer when a high X thousand dollar weapon kills one dude, I find myself thinking that they're winning the "bleeding war" (from Reidel) at the strategic level. But what do I know? I don't have the "expertise" to publish "near truisms."
There is a game called "The Dollar Auction." The rules are simple. The auctioneer puts $1 up for auction, beginning at 1 cent. He will sell to the highest bidder. The catch is that the <i>second</i> highest bidder must also pay his bid - and he doesn't get anything.
Generally, the game proceeds along, and eventually someone bids $1, leaving someone else with a bid of 95 cents or something similar. Then the fun part starts. The second-highest bidder has an incentive to bid $1.01 because he will only be out 1 cent instead of 95 cents. The original bidder of $1 then has the same incentive to bid, say, $1.10.
The bids continue well beyond $1. Eventually, the game becomes more about winning than profit. Dollar bills have gone for $3-$5 dollars, and sometimes $20. The bidding often becomes heated and emotional.
We've been in Afghanistan a while now. COL Cassidy sounds like he is bidding $3 for a $1 bill rather than articulating a viable way ahead for Afghanistan.
A comprehensive COIN strategy in Afghanistan with the aim of transforming that country into a working, non-terrorist democracy is certainly the best outcome we could want. Given enough time, money, and blood, we might be able to achieve it.
The problem is that this strategy will take so long and be so expensive that it won't be worth the effort. Sure, we'll end up with a buck, but how much will we have paid for it?
A limited counter-terrorism strategy is certainly not capable of producing the same results as a COIN strategy. However, it is much more efficient. While we may get, say, 75% of the effectiveness, we get it at 10% of the cost. We get more bang for the buck.
The 800lb gorilla in the room is the defense budget. It will shrink, and soon. While COIN is the most effective strategy, it is also the most manpower intensive, ergo, the most expensive. COL Cassidy does not mention this fact.
It is time we opted for a more efficient strategy. While not as effective, a limited counter-terrorism strategy is more sustainable in the long run.
what is one man's good historical analogy is another man's statement that the two points are not comparable. Or in other words, historical analogies are like opinions and everybody has one. Of course it is a statement of fact, and an essential point in the philosophy of history, that Vietnam is not Afghanistan, how could it be? History is about the uniqueness and discrete aspects of historical events and actors.
But to be fair, there are plenty of folks who have compared Vietnam to Afghanistan by way of analogy (Bob Cassidy being one)via the better war thesis and the idea that a better general rode onto the scene in Vietnam and saved the day, and the same sort of thing happened in Iraq with Petraeus, and again in Afghanistan with McChrystal/Petraeus. That analogy, whether implicit or explicit, is alive and well and often deployed in contemporary writings on Afghanistan.
gian
A fourth -- and potentially most important and most compelling -- reason why "Afghanistan is not Vietnam?"
It does not occur in the context of a intense great power rivalry and conflict, to wit: The Cold War; wherein, the insurgents -- not only in Vietnam but throughout the world -- could expect, and did receive, substantial and critical assistance from America's then-great power rivals: The USSR and Communist China.
Robert C. Jones:
Very well stated. But I would take what I read as your key point, "Certainly these sanctuaries make the suppression of the insurgent very difficult. But it is the preservation and protection of illegitimate government that makes the defeat of the insurgency impossible." and swap the positions of sanctuary (and external support) and legitimacy.
Sanctuary and support of the insurgency is the key in my view because it provides a place to go when pressed and is a source of supply, men and material, that can't be cut off. You can go on and on and on with advantages like that. Some Ugandans think that is why a butcher's crew like the LRA has been able to hang on so long. Niel Smith has a very interesting comment about this over at "Is armor antithetical to good COIN?" SWJ bog post.
I wonder how important "legitimacy" is when the opponent advocates and practices a totalitarian ideology? The current gov in Afghanistan may not be "legitimate" in the eyes of many or all, but can a gang of throat cutters like the Taliban be legitimate? You do what they say or they kill you. Same with the Viet Communists. Your opinion of them doesn't matter much once they achieve power. The Afghan "people" consist of a lot of groups who have had very unpleasant experiences with the Taliban and they may not care so much about legitimacy as long as the Taliban aren't able to tyrannize them.
One other minor point, about this statement "the self-interests of those senior members of said government") more than to the people it is supposed to represent, is a recipe for failure." I think the senior members of both insurgencies we are talking about are even more committed to their self interests. They are supremely committed to their self interests. The difference is that their self interests are ideological and that makes them many times more lethal and dangerous to their own people. And once they are in power and preserve those self interests with an effective police state, they don't often fail regardless of how their people suffer.
The comparisons between Afghanistan and Vietnam are inevitable. Some are better than others, and none are perfect. In this piece Bob takes this position in arguing for not comparing the two:
"There are a host of reasons why Afghanistan is not Vietnam. The top three are: the Viet Cong did not fly suicide projectiles into America and kill over 3,000 people; the U.S. has now foregone conscription and has a seasoned volunteer and counterinsurgency-capable force; and there are no NVA (PAF) regiments poised to invade from Pakistan or fight with the Taliban in Afghanistan."
All true statements, but I question how material they are. For me I cannot help but come back again and again to the one key, and I believe most material, way the US involvement is exactly the same in Afghanistan as it was in Vietnam:
In both cases the US is committed to, and measures success in, the sustainment of a Host Nation government in power that is widely viewed as illegitimate by its own populace.
This is a hanging chad from the old model of COIN that the US learned from the British and employed throughout our own colonial era of the 1900-1930s; and retained as we incorporated many French COIN concepts into the present. Intervention in the insurgency of another is always tricky. Intervention when one is committed to emplacing and sustaining a government that answers more to that intervening power (and to the self-interests of those senior members of said government) more than to the people it is supposed to represent, is a recipe for failure.
In Malaya the British left a stable and now thriving country behind because they relinquished control of the government. The insurgency was contained and attrited through good counterguerrila operations, but ultimately faded away because its primary issue of causation, British-based legitimacy of government, had been resolved.
In this article Bob also agonizes over the sanctuary of the FATA, just as in Vietnam we agonized over the sanctuary of the North Vietnamese state (a sanctuary we built for the Vietminh in 1954), and Laos and Cambodia (a sanctuary we allowed by constraining ourselves with laws that outlaws care little about). Certainly these sanctuaries make the suppression of the insurgent very difficult. But it is the preservation and protection of illegitimate government that makes the defeat of the insurgency impossible.
For my vote, we need to worry far less about the sanctuary of the FATA, and far more about the illegitimacy of the Karzai government. Both are important, but the latter is, IMO, the key to attaining stability for the Afghan people, and defusing the danger that currently emanates from the FATA.
(Note: Bob and I are both Fellows with the Center for Advanced Defense Studies, are both over-educated SF Colonels, and both have recent/current experience in Afghanistan in positions with daily access to senior-level leaders and staff. Reasonable minds can differ, and I appreciate CADS for being an organization that encourages independent thinking among its Fellows)
I read this last night and found it deeply troubling. Reading it in the morning, I still find it trouble, although it makes me less angry than it did last night. I am deeply suspicious of the depth of scholarship and strength of self-confidence that engenders using a list of "near truisms" as the start of a supposedly academic essay. Near truisms imply that these items are not really up for discussion by the informed, although I believe many people who I would consider experts on the area would have points of disagreement on these truisms. They, at least in some cases, show what may be proven to be a significant strategic myopia, especially points 1 and 2. 4 bears discussion as well. I think that argument could be made... with major caveats. How can it be governed, i.e. at what level? Will a central government have the capacity at any time in the near future to govern the state as a whole, reaching into all the wild spaces? Furthermore, the colonel glibly refers to counterinsurgency in Afghanistan AND Pakistan. Explain, please, to those that aren't expert enough to write papers starting with "near truisms," how a successful counterinsurgency is waged on the southern side of the Durand? That this 9-page paper reads somewhat like the narration of a power point brief is telling. It really does not bring much of strategic merit to an already tired discussion. We need better from our senior leadership than lightly academized cheerleading.