How Afghanistan Ends

Dave D, Dave M, Gian... et al...

Sincere apologies to one and all...

My intent was not to express contempt or disrespect for the function or decision of the SWJ editors, the author of "how it all ends", or Gian's request for further discussion...

It appears that my comments were impertinent and exceeding the limits of propriety and good manners. How about irreverent and critical of what is generally accepted or respected? Obviously ...

I very much (always have) respect the decisions of the SWJ editors...

MAC's day in court... While I might believe that discussing how a strategic culture and its elites evolve and change over time is actually a worth while effort... (and for all our amateur psychiatrists) ... IT HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH IRRITATION FOR HOW THE PROCESS MIGHT WORK... I personally am interested in gaining a greater understanding for how strategic theory (to deal with complex threats) is created and defended. I thought this thread important, notwithstanding the dangers of ANY debate devolving into personal attacks and to encourage debate on this issue. We could have address the issue raised by Gian and managed the discussion by delineating clear targeting criteria and rules of engagement before hand... i.e. "MAC... before we get into the meat of this... don't hassle and call the author names"... as if hassling the author and name-calling actually adds anything positive to the discussion... I actually believe that the vast majority of us are well mannered, confident in our opinions and mature enough to refrain from play ground name-calling... but sadly this is no longer the case...

This thread has taught me not to presume the role of court jester (truth to power and all that stuff) and to be more circumspect in the consequences of my ill-advised attempts at humor or sarcasm.. take your pick. I sincerely apologize to Gian for not heeding the warnings of an African Proverb... "It is better to have an intelligent enemy than a stupid friend"... I am the stupid friend...

I apologize for acting the fool... but I can't promise that it won't happen again...

In closing... Dave D, Dave M, Gian, et al... apologies all around... but you have to admit.. the "Attica, Attica, Attica" chant was a little funny... you see? I can't help myself :-/

Humbly... mean it...

MAC

Don't most academic journals handle the issue by using disclosure rules?

I guess I don't really have a problem with it in this instance because I recognized the name and previous work (have the book on my shelf).

The reader has responsibilities, too.

As long as there is transparency why is it a problem? A similar discussion took place on Abu Muqawama some time back about CNAS, its funding, and issues of transparency. As I recall, CNAS declares its sponsors. Again, from there on, the reader has a responsibility.

Plus, whatever you may think about working relationships, there is a <em>lot</em> in that article to discuss.

Well sure it is their blog and they can do what they wish with it, and use their judgment when they feel the need to cut certain posts, no argument there.

But on this one, I think they launched counterbattery fire unnecessarily. To be sure there have been other times when I agreed with their judgment (last week there was an angry, personal attack against Bob Cassidy and they removed it). But this one, I still disagree.

For example, not only did SWJeds remove my first post, they also removed a post by an "anon" who brought to light the fact that Ms Robinson worked for a senior defense contractor very recently and may even have been involved with the writing of a significant piece of military doctrine on irregular war. Again, this is not personal, but is an issue that affects the public interest and should be discussed. On certain issues as much as SWJeds would like to keep in line with Michael Corleones mantra of keeping it "business and not personal," it is hard to do so because these very individuals and their work are a mix of personal and "business" interests.

I mean really, the issue of individuals who start off as journalists and claim that sobriquet, then move to think tanks or defense contractors hewing to specific policy lines and making arguments as an expert/analyst, should not this issue and the individuals involved be up for discussion (with careful and prudent oversight) on this excellent blog?

thanks

gian

Publius:

On the very narrow question of deleting comments, I must disagree. At times in the past some of the comments have gotten so vicious or off the wall that I didn't want to read them. They severely detracted from the discussion and I requested SWJED remove them.

In this case, the comments all seemed to discuss the contents of the paper, then a jarring switch to credibility of the author. Perhaps that should be saved for a different place. In any case, I am content to defer to the judgment of SWJED.

< snip >

Your blog. Do whatever you want.

< snip >

<i>Edited by SWJED with a reply of okay.</i>

Brother Mac, see what I posted above to Gian. Hope all is well in your part of the world and looking forward to our next bull session at the Globe and Laurel.

Gian said <i>I understand your desire to keep personal attacks off of this blog...</i>. Yep, that is why and it is a judgment call on my part. I'll let your latest stand. You of all people should understand the tight-rope we walk at <i>SWJ</i> in attempting to sift through legitimate dialogue and personal bias. I do my best here and you know that. I've given you more than a fair share of a sounding board - even when we disagree on issues.

Dave D.

Dear SWJ Editors....

I concur with Gian's appeal for clarification as to the journalist - adviser relationship...

Gian, the consummate mentor is presenting us with a learning opportunity in unconventional and irregular warfare. What appears at first glance to be an ad hominem attack on a defenseless journalist turned active acolyte... is in actuality an attempt to challenge an imposed status quo.. Ladies and Gentlemen... this is irregular warfare at its finest and most sophisticated... and a learning opportunity for one and all... Applied knowledge is power (my LLCs motto)...

Gian's inquest (play on words... inquests are usually conducted to inquire into an unexpected death... such as attempts at inquiry... not funny?) actually targets the "keepers of strategic culture" and its elites... While a given strategic culture may provide useful intellectual and policy-making tools to analyze how and why the strategic culture and its elites must remain subject to a competitive marketplace of ideas... Especially since it is the strategic elites that presume (to assert that something is true without complete evidence) for themselves the role as the primary keepers of the strategic culture and purveyors of the common historical narrative...

Attica, Attica, Attica...

Seriously....

r/
MAC

SWJ Ed:

Why was my post removed? It was a legitimate inquiry into the conflicts of interests presented by Ms Robinson and her work as a journalist and now with her work as an advisor to a war fighting commander? It is a fact that as a journalist Ms Robinson wrote a glowing portrayal of General Petraeus in "Tell Me How this Ends" and now she acts as an advisor to his command and writes analytical papers designed to show how the current approach in Afghanistan can work and how it will end.

I understand your desire to keep personal attacks off of this blog, but again my post raised a legitimate point of inquiry into a topic relevant to the public interest, yet you censored it. Please explain why, if you dont mind.

gian

Anyone every read Chapter 1: The Strategic Context, of the US Army Stability Operations Field Manual (FM 3-07)?

(My copy, the University of Michigan Press Edition, 2009).

For info on the Modern Silk Road (item referenced in this paper):

http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/docs/silkroadpapers/1005Afghan.pdf

(Note endorsement by both President Karzai and General Petraeus.)

Lied about last comment.

Scratch the "not a terrible idea." It's a pretty terrible idea. Ditto the last part of what Publius said.

Jeez. Even if you are trying to be self-aware, the mission creep aspect sucks you in, doesn't it?

<em>The continuing presence of the United States and other members of the international community in Afghanistan can be framed and structured to balance Indias role and presence to allay Pakistani concerns about an Afghanistan dominated by India.</em>

Last comment in this thread, promise!

This is the second most interesting part of the paper. The United States in Afghanistan as an indirect "peace keeper" between the two nations. Wonder if that will work? Wonder what sorts of nonsense we will be drawn into?

Goodness.

Not a terrible idea, though.

The best part of the paper is on the local defense forces. I've always appreciated the links and papers around here that deal with that topic. It's the most concrete example - for me, as a layperson - of how we may leave and what we will leave in place. Theoretically.

It's an interesting paper in that it appears to summarize the intellectual status quo - an explanatory of the current thinking of decision makers.

I found it quite useful in that sense, but perhaps I am reading too much into it? It is hard as a layperson to understand the competing public claims around such complicated issues.

A few points on the summary:

1. Mission-creep seems to perenially infest large parts of our foreign policy apparatus. We enter a system previously closed to us, introduce what we will, and then orient our responses to the irritants produced. Can't be helped, I suppose. Or can it?

Specifically, I am talking about large sums of money and the resulting complaints of corruption. What did we think would happen? It happens here in the States, too. Look at your local papers: block grants and TIFs and all that.

2. Half-way through a task, we change core assumptions. Nothing wrong with that. Reality intrudes on all planning. Specifically, I am talking about our tendency to intellectually hyphenate geographical regions of the world instead of thinking more globally.

3. Finally, we shouldn't make promises that we may not be able to keep. Making promises about lifting textile tariffs or providing new civilian nuclear deals to Pakistan is not fair to Pakistani decision-makers. We have constituencies in the States that may not care to have tariffs lifted for more than a short period of time (whatever you or I think). Regarding civilian nuclear deals, there are proliferation worries given past behaviors. Are our allies, however putative, supposed to be stupid? Can't we explain to them that we have worries and concerns and realities all of our own?

4. The left hand doesn't know what the right hand is doing. I suppose that is entirely the result of too many committments and the many "cooks in the kitchen."

At any rate, I thought it a good paper for the insight it gave into how we are to "leave." However, given the mission-creep, perhaps we are not as focused on the tasks at hand as we should be?

*What's this about?

<em>The title headlining the Pentagon's announcement was sober -- "Pakistan Army General Headquarters recently approved a U.S. Office of Defense Representative (ODR) and Coalition presence at the Pakistan military's 12 Corps HQ in Quetta" -- but it's clear that the new building was designed to symbolize the recent progress in the U.S.-Pakistani relationship. The city of Quetta, the capital of the province of Balochistan, has long been a bone of contention between Washington and Islamabad, and the Western intelligence community community believes that the top Taliban commanders known as the Quetta Shura have been living there with the tacit permission of the Pakistani state.</em>

Is this about fighting an insurgency, or fighting an insurgency while trying to hang on to an old strategic "asset"? As usual, I'm confused. As usual, I'm sure it's me. I don't like all the counterfactuals that are part of the foreign policy world, but what are you all supposed to do? You have to make the best of it. Good luck! Sincerely!

<a href="http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/12/02/the_pakistani_backlash_…;

Slapout9,

I have met LTC Mark Grdovic. He is a good man.

The handbook is good stuff... it prepares the practitioner to challenge a tyrant that has consolidated his power. Explains the role of grievances, weaknesses and resistance and describes how to initially organize resistance organizations, those sub-sets of much larger social movements, by either infilling advisers or by extracting, training and reinserting appropriate personnel... and much more.

It is a highly recommended read...

v/r
MAC

Bill C.: "Transforming the state and society of Afghanistan would, indeed, seem to be important to the regional and global economy. In this regard, consider just the benefits that might be derived by such economic powerhouses as China, India and Russia, for trade and transit purposes, being able to safely and swiftly access, and fully utilize, an efficient and friendly "Modern Silk Road."

The Robinson paper seems to be pretty much a regurgitation of material we've seen from various "experts" for some time now. I admit my eyes were glazing over and I was unable to pay attention all of the way through, so it's entirely possible that I missed some new insight. I doubt it, but it's possible.

Everybody knows the problems and it seems that everyone's solutions all involve an open-ended commitment on the part of the U.S. Unfortunately, although they may have vast knowledge of the target, none of these experts seem to give any consideration whatsoever to whether the U.S. will be actually able to achieve nirvana. I think not. We are a broke, wounded giant and we just can't afford to continue these bleeding sores. But wait! There's hope. You ask me if I think we can continue and I'll say, "You bet. Bodies are seemingly cheap to you. But money is dear. So all you have to do if you want to continue your grand adventure is cancel the Marines' EFV (should be done anyway), cut back on F35 procurement, tell the Army to live without their new Ground Combat Vehicle and tell the Navy to forgo modernization. You can fund a whole lot of "making the world safe for democracy" if you do that. Ridiculous? Hey, folks, we're fast approaching the point where defense dollars are going to be a zero-sum game.

So far as Bill C.'s input is concerned, it appears he agrees with the author that a modern "Silk Road," built on the blood and money of Americans (and Afghanis, of course), will benefit China, India and Russia. This makes everything OK, I guess. It translates into a "win" "win" "win" for Afghanistan, the region and the international community. The U.S. doesn't need to benefit just so long as those "economic powerhouses," which last I looked were in competition with the U.S., benefit from the U.S.'s sacrifices.

Modern "Silk Road." C'mon. Dayuhan says it: nobody cares about Afghanistan. Nobody ever cared about Afghanistan. That it's become a U.S. client state is the result of 9/11 and amazingly stupid U.S. policies in the years following. All of the "experts" pontificate about strategy going forward, but what they don't tell you is that the so-called strategy merely represents desperate scrambling on the part of all players to make lemonade out of lemons. And another major factor is obvious: lots and lots of people are making lots and lots of money out of this mess. And it's also unfortunately the case that they profit from prolongation of the mess.

I'm with Ken White is finding this: "Re-organize and re-configure these outlier states and societies such that become integrated into their regional/the global economy," to be dangerously wrong.

Anybody familiar with decision algorithms? Try applying one to Afghanistan using no-nonsense benefits to the U.S. as the go-no go factors, the gates that drive the decision. Make sure you include AQ and the entire issue of terrorism. Don't use Afghanistan. Don't use Pakistan. Don't use the "international community." We don't care about them as beneficiaries. Focus on the U.S., the entity paying for this. If you do that, I think you'll find that any logical decision process would have led to an entirely different approach to the problem. One seriously doubts it would lead to hundreds of thousands of Americans making friends in Afghanistan.

The problem is not Afghanistan or Pakistan. The problem is security of the United States. And a modern "Silk Road" doesn't cut it for those of us who value what we have always quaintly thought of as the "American way of life."

Dayuhan:

Transforming the state and society of Afghanistan would, indeed, seem to be important to the regional and global economy. In this regard, consider just the benefits that might be derived by such economic powerhouses as China, India and Russia, for trade and transit purposes, being able to safely and swiftly access, and fully utilize, an efficient and friendly "Modern Silk Road."

The potential benefits to the state and society of Afghanistan itself, to its neighbors and to the international community as a whole would also seem to be of enormous value (internal peace and prosperity; no adverse external spill-over).

Belief in this "win" "win" "win" concept (for Afghanistan, for the region and for the international community) would seem to be what drives this foreign policy direction described more specifically by this paper (re: Afghanistan), and more generally (re: outlier states and societies as a whole) by my comment above.

<b>Bill C.</b> may be correct with his assertion in sub paragraph a, above. However, I suspect that view is a minority position. I certainly hope it is as the view can lead to dangerous misapprehensions, not least trying to 'fix' something that is not broken and leading some to arrogantly interfere with what people must do for themselves -- and in their own way...

The thought expressed in sub-paragraph b, OTOH does appear to be held by a slightly larger and more influential minority -- but they're still a minority. They're also wrong. Badly so.

"While Afghanistan is now and will remain for the near term heavily dependent on international assistance to achieve its state building goals, the objective is to channel that assistance into productive investments that galvanize self-sustaining economic growth, regional commerce, infrastructure, development of natural resources and investment from China, India and Russia -- three of the world's fastest growing economies. Efforts are underway to create a detailed roadmap for Afghanistan's development and a mutually beneficial process of regional economic integration. (Note reference to Afghanistan ultimately becoming a "Modern Silk Road" at the footnotes)."

Thus, we view Afghanistan -- and the solutions proposed in this paper -- as representing a classic example of how we see (1) the world's problems generally and (2) how we hope to go about solving these problems:

a. Overall Problem: Various states and societies are not ordered or configured such that they might become integrated into their regional/the global economy.

b. Overall Solution: Re-organize and re-configure these outlier states and societies such that become integrated into their regional/the global economy.

This, we believe, will cure -- not only the internal problems of these outlier states and socieities -- but also the spill-over effects derived therefrom; which can (and in some cases have) adversely effected both their region the rest of the more-economically integrated world.

I appreciate the robust and informative comments from the SWJ community, which is precisely why I chose to submit my paper here.

MAC, you spot an imprecision in my point that centralized security forces have never reached down to the local level in Afghanistan. True in the past, but will it be true in the future? I would hazard a guess that some local community watch or defense groups may be needed for quite some time. The current MOI-backed ALP program envisions 5 years. If these groups are tied into local legitimate structures that may be adequate "institutionalization" in the short term to prevent them from becoming rogue entities, is a legitimate concern. Over the longer term I think AFG will have to come to terms with the cost of the ANSF and how big a centralized security force it can actually afford.

I do not claim that this piece is entirely "new" thinking, but I reached three conclusions that I do not think have received sufficient attention or emphasis from the analytical community (both official and nonofficial):

1. To succeed the effort must be much clearer about what can be done in the short vice long term;

2. If one accepts that wars such as this one require political solutions, much more must be done to forge a political-diplomatic strategy and lash it up with the ISAF campaign plan;

3. It is likely to be a very complicated political solution that involves both local conflict resolution and national reforms and understandings (that inter alia address Pakistan's core security concerns).

This last point is really the heart of the paper, which intends to spark debate rather than present the exact formula of a settlement. Some deals are better than others, and some mechanisms are better than others. I do not think that the Bonn II process provides the AFG actors enough control over the outcome, but a deal brokered by Karzai alone will likely fail to generate the needed consensus. I admit to being influenced by my time covering Latin America and in particular the important roles that diplomacy played in ending the Salvadoran and Nicaraguan wars (U.N. envoy Alvaro de Soto playing an important role in the former and the regional process led by Oscar Arias in the latter).

I would invite further critiques by suggesting how difficult it will be for the US and AFG to agree on a negotiating approach and for Karzai to embrace the benefits of a neutral facilitator. Another Achilles heel is the degree to which this optimistic scenario depends on the success of the bottom up approach. The final section does not address key questions about a small COIN structure, including its span of control. The primary observation here is that we need to think about small footprint COIN (or FID for the purists) approaches in AFG and elsewhere.

My quick sketch of what the final phase would look like - a post-COIN security and assistance program is meant primarily to argue for productive develoment assistance vice the kind of perpetual self-licking ice-cream cone that Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart diagnosed so acutely in Fixing Failed States.

Let me clarify that this paper is my own research and writing; it represents no one and nothing else. I noted my advisory affilation to the AFG PAK COE in the interest of full disclosure. (I have supported the COE in its first 18 months to help build its capacity for multidisciplinary analysis, which I see as an important attempt to embody some of the best learning practices developed over the recent years.)

I understand that personal attacks on one's credibility and integrity are part and parcel of the internet era; I appreciate SWJ's efforts to strike the right balance between free speech and slander. In the very unlikely event that I would ever submit anything "official" for comment, I will most certainly identify it as such. Let the debate continue!

Ms Robinson:

There was no, NO, personal attack on you so please do not construct such a pernicious straw man. Nor was there any slander at all. I initially pointed out the possibility that there might be a conflict of interest with your work since you started off as a journalist who wrote a glowing portrayal of General Petraeus, then you worked for a major defense contractor and apparently had a hand in writing a significant piece of Coin doctrine, now you work as a senior advisor to a war fighting command. I thought that these points were important inquiry for the public interest. Other reasonable and balanced commentators on this blog (Maxwell, McCallister, Publius) thought so too.

So please, no straw men of accusations of personal attacks and slander because they did not happen.

gentile

"Second, and MAC made me think of this; what if the ISI did something completely unconventional and put OBL and every AQ person they could get their hands on into gunny sacks and then delivered them to the deck of a US carrier." by carl

Sounds good to me!

Gian,

As I commented earlier here, I made a judgment call when I removed your post. It's basically OBE now as the issues you raised have been restated in subsequent commentary.

In fairness to Linda Robinson, prior to her post above I told her that I removed two posts that I thought were personal attacks. One was yours and another by an anon. I take responsibility for that and the issues those deletions raised here. I think enough has been said concerning this. If you'd like to take it offline that is fine.

Dave D.

R.C. Jones, I would get list of Bill Laden's relatives and start working my way through them with a .45 until I got the answer to the question "Where's Bill?"

Omar:

I don't think you are raving. I think you're right. That's the reason I asked the question about the ISI giving up OBL and the rest of AQ in Pakistan. If they did that it would solve all their "strategic thinking", "strategic depth" problems because there would go our primary reason for being in Afghanistan. Realpolitik would demand that they do that-"Off you go Osama old buddy. Just business." But the Pak Army/ISI don't do that which, to me, is very strong supporting evidence that ideology, Islamist ideology, is the, or at least a very strong, driver in this whole thing.

There. Now there are two of us raving.

Fair enough Dave.

I just felt compelled to respond to her accusastions of personal slander against her, of which there were none.

mission complete

gian

"Matiullah's men scrambled up the ridge, grabbed these guys and brought them to him. One carried the message out to advise others to be a bit more repectful..."
Posted by Robert C. Jones | December

Bob, thats our whole problem IMO....Rodeny Dangerfield syndrome.... we don't get no respect!

Also,good for Matiullah Khan!

I think its time the International Community (IC) stopped talking in terms of invalid assumptions. No-one I know who is looking out to 2014 seems to entertain contrarian views, but here's an attempt:

In 2014, I assume:

- Entities within the Pakistani government will continue to support the parties they support now for all the reasons everyone knows about: obsession with India, regional politics, historical ties, personal/parochial interests, etc.

- Several groups of insurgents will still operate along and across the borders of Afghanistan and contribute to instability within Afghanistan

- Insurgents cleared from areas will continue to migrate to other areas or go underground, waiting for the main effort to move and then return. Short-term success in RC-S/SW and in key terrain districts will not be sustainable after coalition forces leave and Afghan forces back-fill

- GIRoA continues to disagree with the way IJC/ISAF is prosecuting their COIN. As ISAF transitions to GIRoA-led, these differences will become very apparent and either ISAF metrics will take a dive, or the Western Press won't notice since Coalition soldiers aren't dying anymore- and then the West's politicians just won't care that metrics are worse.

- The majority of Afghan forces will continue to be non-Pashtun, making it impossible to connect with the people in those areas once Coalition forces leave. The police in those areas will do what they have to to survive- and this will result in negative metrics for ISAF.

- The Afghan government will still operate to some degree in a corrupt system (individuals will have to operate corruptly to survive), and no amount of progress towards doing away with corrupt figures will translate into less insurgency (legitimacy of the government does not equal less insurgency in Afghanistan).

- Less corruption will translate into weaker individuals and systems in the current climate, and that will not change by 2014. In essence, Western anti-corruption efforts will de-legitimize Afghan officials and cause them to lose influence in the current system and most likely be replaced by more corrupt individuals.

- In many (most?) areas of Afghanistan, the local insurgent/warlord/corrupt police chief/mullah/chief elder, etc. will continue to have more legitimacy than the central government and although that may result in bad metrics for ISAF, it won't necessarily mean more instability/insurgency perceived by those on the ground.

- Negotiating with the Taliban, while perhaps feasible in some instances, will not be a magical bullet that solves all problems and ensures Afghanistan never again becomes a safe-haven for terrorists. This negotiation, while encouraged by some, will be anathema to the Kabul government.

- The IC will continue to shy away from attempting to influence too much a sovereign national government. Any attempts to may actually backfire and cause the government to be seen as more of a puppet of the West than they are now.

- Continued military operations by forces foreign to the local areas (Coalition and Tajik-heavy forces) will only enable forces who would profit from instability. In the short-term ISAF's metrics may improve, but nothing long-term will be gained.

- There continues to be no obvious connection between anything ISAF or GIRoA does that translates into long-term stability. Stability will be a locally emergent event that small teams of outsiders with diverse skills may be able to enable in a small way, but most times it will be internally-driven and many times look like a "bad metric" to ISAF.

- Development will happen when security is established- and most likely, like in our own country, without government/international community (IC) direction.

If some or all of these assumptions are more valid than the ones we are currently tracking, then I think we have some problems if we think working towards "transition" in 2014 will work. The problem as I see it is that I don't think we are willing to question any of our assumptions- so even if some or all of these assumptions I have listed are right, we'd never be able to admit it.

I'm still not really sure why that is, although one theory is that we are so bureaucratic that we are an "irreversible momentum" unto ourselves of invalid processes and systems that cannot do anything differently once we get going (i.e.- we are the furthest thing from a "Learning Organization" as possible as defined by Senge).

Grant Martin
MAJ, US Army
NTM-A/CSTC-A

The views expressed are the author's own and do not represent the position of NTM-A/CSTC-A, the US Army, ISAF, or DoD.

<em>I think its time the International Community (IC) stopped talking in terms of invalid assumptions.</em> - Grant Martin

Everything in your comment makes perfect sense. Sadly.

@ Carl, Omar, others:

I've taken my comments on this thread too far off of the main points, so I will stop after this (really):

From <em>Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions since 1947</em> by Sumit Ganguly:

<strong>"It is virtually an article of faith among members of the global and, in particular, the American nuclear non-proliferation communities that the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests have made the region more prone to war. Indian and Pakistani decision-makers, on the other hand, have, with almost equal force, argued that the likelihood of full-scale war in the region is now highly unlikely specifically <em>because</em> of the emergence of a crude form of nuclear deterrence.

Both propositions are open to question."</strong>

Kargil represents one "data" point to study - and a complicated messy one at that. How to interpret the event, especially given that there is a lot of fuzziness around it?

1. Outside powers intervened to prevent the thing from going further because of fears of the use of nuclear weapons. Is that deterrence?

2. The presence of weapons didn't stop an aggressive action. Is that an example of failed deterrence?

How to interpret such events?

Interesting how a conversation about a specific "small war" has morphed. Perhaps those that say "war is war" are the most correct. Every single thing is irritatingly connected (at least, it seems so to this easily confused layperson.)

Thank you to all of the commenters for the insights.

RCJ:

<i>What we all need to keep in mind is that what the Taliban could get away with 10 years ago when few people cared about what went on in Afghanistan and what they could get away with if allowed to legally compete for participation and even leadership in the government of Afghanistan today are two very different things.</i>

Do you really think the Taliban have any interest at all in being allowed to "legally compete for participation for participation and even leadership"? They don't acknowledge any such legal framework in any event, or anyone's right to "allow" them to "compete". They want power, the same complete power they had before, and the only way they can get it is to seize it. Legal competition isn't really an option for them, because if they have it, so do others. That's not what they want.

<i>The challenger did not create the conditions of insurgency. The issue is how good or bad the government is, as they are the ones that create the conditions of insurgency in the society.</i>

I don't think how good or bad the government is matters at all. What matters is who the government is. The Taliban leadership will fight any government that isn't composed of them and only them, no matter how "good" it is. I doubt that they have any interest at all in peacefully or "legally" competing for power or sharing power.

<i>At the core of the problem is the Constitution. Fix that first and the rest will begin to fall in place. </i>

I wish I could believe that, but I don't. I don't think any Constitution would make a difference. A document is a good starting point, but it's only a starting point, and governance needs a whole lot more. Any system and any structure can be corrupted.

I really wish I could believe that the Taliban and all the other Afghan factions really want to have a peaceful and orderly competition for power and a nice western-style system of protections and checks and balances, and if only we could install the right system everybody would fall into line and be peaceful. I don't think that's the case, though.

We removed the Taliban, creating a power vacuum. We declared that vacuum filled by the Karzai government, but that declaration was pretty much irrelevant to those being (rather nominally) governed. Groups of people are fighting to fill that space, and they will keep fighting until one group or another wins. The winner will take all. They don't care about good governance or bad governance: all governance options are bad, the contending parties want bad governance by them and in their interest. None of these groups care about the populace. Whoever wins will proceed to squeeze the populace for all they can and stomp whoever objects. The populace doesn't see itself as the arbiter of victory, they're trying not to get shot and trying to avoid being on the wrong side of the eventual winner. No document or system of government is going to change this.

Not a pretty or orderly picture, but it's what I suspect is there.

On April 7, 1991, in a New York Times book review of Stephen Kinzer's "Blood of Brothers," Linda Robinson noted that the book described "a graphic account of a country torn in half over the Sandinistas' effort to build a new political and economic order" in the country of Nicaragua.

http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9D0CE3D91F3CF934A35757C0…

Today, it is the United States that risks seeing areas of the world being "torn in half" as it seeks, both in Afghanistan and elsewhere in the less-integrated world, to establish a new political and economic order.

As Ms. Robinson noted in the case of the Sandinistas initiative in Nicaragua, and as might be similarly discerned in the present case of the United States in Afghanistan et al, efforts which require that a population give up central tenents of its present way-of-life -- and adopt central tenents of a foreign way-of-life -- this, by its very nature, tends to alienate the population.

This, I beleive, is what we should focus on when we discuss "the root cause of the rebellion and/or insurgency."

It would seem to be less important to discuss (1) what methods and (2) which actors might make this initiative, to fundamentally, rapidly and radically transform a society (especially against its will), more easy to achieve.

RCJ:

<i>Also, remember we did not create a power vacuum in Afghanistan, we enabled a transition from the Taliban to the Northern Alliance. There is a significant difference.</i>

We enabled a transition in nominal authority, not a transition in power. Not the same thing at all. We may have put the Northern Alliance in nominal authority, but power remained with us, and we will eventually leave. That leaves power up for grabs.

<i>One of my major take-aways from my time in Afghanistan is the black and white / all or nothing nature of power and patronage. This is Afghanistan, and I suspect it has always been this way. Is it arrogance to think we can break this cycle? Perhaps. But the world is changing, so perhaps not.</i>

I agree completely on that... and I don't think we can break that cycle. The Afghans can, but I'd expect it to take generations. If we see that there is internal momentum building toward that kind of change we may, at certain points, be able to help, with a very light touch (anything else would likely do more harm than good)... but to think "we" can simply break that cycle in our interest at a time of our choosing is, yes, arrogance.

<i>But at least we must recognize and appreciate this cycle, and if unwilling to break it, we should get out of the middle of it. There are no existential threats to the US in Afghanistan; and the oft named vital interests of defeating AQ and a stable Pakistan can best be achieved without the anchor of "fixing" Afgahnistan around our neck</i>

Again, agreed, except that I see it as a matter of capacity, not will. I don't believe that we should ever have tried to govern Afghanistan, directly or by proxy.

Bill C:

<i>
efforts which require that a population give up central tenents of its present way-of-life -- and adopt central tenents of a foreign way-of-life -- this, by its very nature, tends to alienate the population.

This, I beleive, is what we should focus on when we discuss "the root cause of the rebellion and/or insurgency."</i>

Where is anyone being asked to give up "central tenets of their way of life"? As long as people don't attack us or our allies or shelter those who do, nobody anywhere cares about their way of life. Even where such attacks have produced intervention, the way of life is simply not an issue... nobody is trying to shove globalization down anyone's throat.

In most of these marginal states the "traditional way of life" is in any event long gone, a casualty of war and intervention. Traditional tribal governance structures are under pressure from local warlords, foreign meddlers representing government and non-government actors. There are very few places left where populaces are fighting to hold their traditions, more often the fight is over power and the position to exploit power to gain wealth. Do you really think the populaces of Zimbabwe, Chad, Somalia, or the DRC are desperate to sustain their current way of life?