How Afghanistan Ends

Robert, I would agree with all you say about Afghanistan but disagree about Pakistan. I think an American withdrawal from Afghanistan will lead to renewed vigor on the part of Pakistani Islamists and the civil war inside Pakistan will get worse OR, the army will switch sides and go back to the full-spectrum mullah-military alliance, in which case there may be no civil war (some purge of "westernized anti-Islamists" will no doubt occur) but external relations will take a definite hit. You underestimate the seriousness of the Islamist/Jihadist project in Pakistan.
But then I have the thought "I know Pakistan quite a bit, I dont know Afghanistan at all, and I am agreeing with you about Afghanistan and disagreeing about Pakistan...this sounds fishy"..

I must add that as an American, I would have to say "so what" to the Pakistan scenario I sketched out. It looks like win-win for America. No money or men to waste in Afghanistan and no money to waste in Pakistan either (aid cutoff would presumably kick in the day after the last troops leave Afghanistan).
There is no constitutional requirement for the US to pull Pakistani liberals and leftists ass out of the fire..

From Linda Robinson's 1991 New York Times book review of Stephen Kinzer's "Blood of Brothers" (link at my last comment above):

"Early on, Mr. Kinzer saw that Sandinista policies were alienating ordinary Nicaraguans ... in trying to transform (the political and economic order of Nicagarua) ... so completely and so suddenly, they (the Sandinistas) were underestimating the deeply ingrained conservatism of the Nicaraguan peasants." (Items in parenthesis are mine.)

Is the United States today, in its similar zeal to "transform" Afghanistan -- and various other states and societies of the world -- likewise underestimating the deeply ingrained conservatism of the Afghans, the Pakistanis, etc., thereby, as in the case of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, jeopardize its (the United States') mission to establish a new political and economic order throughout the less-integrated world?

Ms. Robinson asks us, in her re-focusing comment above (Dec 10, 1:22 PM) to concentrate on addressing ideas re: a formula for a political settlement in Afghanistan/Pakistan.

Accordingly, and in consideration of those matters addressed immediately above, should we not start such a discussion by acknowledging the potential fatal flaw in our approach, to wit: that:

a. Just like the Sandinistas in Nicaragua,

b. Likewise with the United States initiative to transform various states and societies (establish a new political and economic order therein),

c. We have focused much too much on our (seemingly) self-serving and enthnocentric ideas ("universal values, etc.)

d. And much too little on the "realism" of societal and cultural conservatism in the less-integrated world?

I do not believe the term "civil war" is appropriate for the current state of the historic friction between the largely Pashtun tribes in the mountains, and the largely Punjabi people of the Indus River.

My understanding is that historically there was an unwritten agreement, that the Punjabi government of Pakistan would stay primarily in the valley and allow the Pashtuns to be largely atonomous and self-governing. Along with this, there was certainly official, yet covert, leveraging of Pashtuns to support Pakistan national interests in regards to India. This included promoting instability in the Kashmir and in Afghanistan. This is my understanding.

What I then see is the US disrupting this balance by creating a conflict of interest for Musharraf. He had one interest of maintaining good relations with the US, particularly with the growing relationship between the US and India. He also had the interests of his Pashtun allies in keeping Afghanistan from becoming a stable, independent state, but rather one that Pakistan could exert influence over. We created the conflict of interest when we demanded that he go after his own covert operation and their popular base. This, I think, is the primary source of the current level of instability.

It is my belief (and my expertise is not on Pakistan, but rather on this dynamic in general) is that once the conflict of interest is resolved, the old tenouus stability will return. That the US best achieves it's stated "vital interest" of a stable Pakistan by leaving them well enough alone. They have a system that works for them.

(Additionally, every senior Pakistani military leader I have had the opportunity to talk to has routinely demonstrated a far more sophisticated understanding of insurgency than any US peer that I have worked with. They get this, its not new to them, it is a matter of day to day survival and has been forever.)

Robert,
I think you are completely mistaken about the dynamics of the civil war within Pakistan. It is NOT a pakhtoon versus punjabi civil war at all. For 20 years (starting in General Zia's time) the army leadership connived in the creation and sustenance of multiple Jihadist organizations (not just in the pakhtoon areas, in fact, more in rural punjab..tribal areas were used as suitable bases, but recruitment was heaviest in Punjab, look it up). I am from rural Punjab and I do not know of ANY village from which boys did not sign up for jihad. The largest organizations were headquartered in Punjab as well (LET in Muridke near Lahore, JEM in Bahawalpur and so on). Many of the training camps were in Mansehra and Kohistan, well away from the tribal areas. It was this network that was partially shut down starting in 2001, under American pressure. But every step was grudging and half-hearted and the network survives. Sanctuary in the tribal areas was a natural choice. Those sanctuaries are now being targeted in some fashion (I incline towards thinking the targeting is real, my Pakhtoon friends are 100% convinced its a show). The "civil war" is between those loyal to the full jihadist agenda (no longer considered compatible with foreign aid by the enlightened high command) and the army. This war has obviously heated up (and started in the first place) because of American pressure, but it will not stop with American withdrawal, EXCEPT if the army revives the full spectrum military-jihadist alliance (in which case the civil war damps down, a purge of liberals will be carried out and then the problem of what response is launched by India, NATO and even China to increasing jihadist activity will have to be sorted out).
You are paying too much attention to what the "senior Pakistani officers" are telling you and not enough attention to some of the glaring inconsistencies in that picture (of unfortunate loss of "equilibrium" due to American intervention). Having said that, I will agree that the US has shown itself incapable of interfering to positive effect and should pull out and play with these theories in war colleges and war games instead of trying to make sense of Pakistan and Afghanistan in terms of "pakhtoon autonomy versus punjabi settled areas"....My apologies for being a bit irritable, but that is how it looks to me.
PS: I urge you to think again about why jihadi militants were raised in such numbers all over the country, why the networks of "activists" were planted everywhere, what social and political agenda they were supposed to serve (forget about kashmir, this is not about kashmir, it is about social and political transformation IN Pakistan...it was about Kashmir for "secular" (and moronic) army officers who paid no attention to the other dimensions of their brilliant force multiplier strategy, but the jihadist faction was ahead of the game and knew what they were up to and they still do)

The title of Ms. Robinson's 1991 review of Stephen Kinzer's book "Blood of Brothers" -- re: the 1980s conflict in Nicaragua -- is "The Sandinista Decade."

If today Mr. Kinzer were to write a book about the current conflict in Afghanistan, Ms. Robinson might easily entitle her review of this book "The American Decade."

In her 1991 review about the Sandinistas efforts in Nicaragua, Ms. Robinson noted the following:

"Yet Mr. Kinzer's own critique of what he calls the regime's "colossal misjudgements" suggest that the Sandinistats policies were not just tactical responses to outside aggression but reflections of their deep political convictions."

Can the same not be said re: American policies in Afghanistan and elsewhere in the less-integrated world, to wit: that these policies are not just tactical responses to outside aggression but reflections of our deep political convictions?

If so, is the potential for "colossal misjudgment" also possible re: our similar approach?

Could an understanding of this problem allow us to approach crafting a political solution in Afghanistan from a somewhat different perspective?

If A-stan is to be stable, it takes a measure of security. We are not even close. We may NEVER get it. This is a tribal "country" and never had a strong central gov. Karzai is corrupt, a thief, erratic, and the only game in town. Bringing the less radical elements to the table is possible, i do believe the SF raids are giving the hunted second thoughts? You come to the table or you die. This has been a real push, a surge that has to be taking its toll on talibs/AQ. We need to bring these people into the fold somehow. Omar, we would not be there if it wasn't for Mullah Omar's refusal to hand over OBL. I know the custom for guests so thats a negative. Its also pretty obvious P-stan is helping the talibs, its their strategic reserve against India. Pakistan has spawned a terror network bent on "jihad". IF there is another catastrophic attack on US soil, and if its traced back to "Jihadistan" the consequences are scary. This kind of "zealotry" combined w/ WMD may end it for all of us.

r.bryan

Well put. I like how you have blown away all the philosophical and mental gymnastics and cut to the chase.

Ryan, you too seem to think that Pakistan army's bright idea of using Islamist terrorism to advance foreign AND domestic policy objectives is understandable and even acceptable as long as there is no new catastrophic attack on the US. This seems to me to be a short-sighted policy. Even if you think that the the US routinely uses terrorism or whatever for its own purposes, it is better not to regard this as justified practice for all nations. The correct thing would be for the US to stop using such tactics AND discourage its putative allies from doing the same.. Accepting it as "part of the game" is a short-sighted policy.

Robert C. Jones:

You made the following two statements in various posts above.

"That the US best achieves it's stated "vital interest" of a stable Pakistan by leaving them well enough alone. They have a system that works for them."

"...that the Taliban will work with us (hell, we should offer them Karzai just as he offers them us) and deny AQ sanctuary; that Pakistan returns to stability once we stop disrupting their internal dynamics to support our CT operations; all of this will settle down to "normal" Afghanistan."

What I basically understand these two statements to mean is get out of the way of whatever the Pak Army/ISI has been doing or wants to go back to doing and all will be well. For whom? The system that works for them does not work for the rest of the world. Afghanistan will continue to be a warring mess with all the suffering that entails for the Afghans. India will still be subject to Mumbais. The people of Pakistan will still be thralls to misty eyed visions of the generals and we will have subordinated our national interests to a bunch of senior officers who "get this". In addition, by deferring to the General sahibs (Omar, I like that phrase so much I take every chance to use it) we would basically be choosing sides between India and Pakistan. I don't want to choose sides, but if we are forced to, I say again, if forced to, we would be fools to choose Pakistan over India.

Also, what evidence of any kind is there that the Taliban would deny AQ sanctuary? We went into Afghanistan because they wouldn't give up AQ. They perceive themselves to be winning. AQ has helped them in their efforts and are ideological soulmates. Where is the evidence they would turn AQ out?

Carl,

First, I refuse to participate in the dangerous practice of looking granting governments amnesty for the acts of "rogue" elements of the government (Pakistan and the ISI/Army; Lebanon and Hezbollah; etc.). Such thinking creates functional sancuaries for bad actors and relieves weak actors from their responsibilities. I am far more likely to excuse a nation for the acts of a rogue government (Iran, NK).

By destabilizing Pakistan with our actions in forcing the government to turn on their Pashtun agents; by denying Pakistan of the confidence that they could always employ Afgan turf in a conflict with India; by bringing Indians (like a trojan horse) into Afgahanistan to help us with our efforts there; WE HAVE ALREADY TAKEN A SIDE. We have place Pakistan in a very tough situation, and then we publicly abuse them for the not dealing more effectively with the mess we have put them in.

This is more than just Afghan and Pakistan insurgency, and AQ CT at stake here. There are also two nuclear armed traditional enemies sharing a common border in this mix, and we act like that is the least important element that just needs to "get over it" and support our COIN/CT agenda. We risk triggering a nuclear war with our meddling, and need to keep that idea on the top shelf, not hidden in some drawer in the basement.

As to Afganistan and the Taliban, it is my understanding that Mullah Omar was quite open to throwing AQ under the bus given the opportunity. The problem was that we had our blood up and wanted, needed, to kick some ass; and it was far easier to do that on Afghan dirt than Saudi or Pakistani dirt.

The world has changed a great deal over the past decade. Including the Taliban into the Northern Alliance-based government we created and protect is smart. Neither side will like it. Hell, our own Democrats and Republicans don't like sharing either. A good constitution keeps any one party from neutralizing the other; and protects the populace from the government as well. This is the COG in Afghanistan. A good constitution and shared governance that represents the entire populace. The rest well fall in place.

On the other hand, us packing up and leaving India to watch the current store behind us is a recipe for Nuclear War.

Bob

Robert, I don't want to sound shrewish, but I think you are missing some points made by other commentators.
You are saying that the region will become more peaceful if the Pakistani army (not "Pakistan", the interests of the two are not necessarily synonymous) is allowed to revert to its policy of strategic depth in Afghanistan. You are also implying that the policy was entirely defensive (a hedge against Indian domination of Afghanistan) and helped to maintain peace. I think you have not studied the policy and especially its background assumptions, in depth. Or you fail to see what is perhaps obvious to a person with a more devious mind. The army's zero-sum conception of relations with India and its determination to change the status quo in kashmir by force is itself the destabilizing factor in the region.
For the background, may I suggest that spend some more time with paknationalists.com (not a fringe website, but the intelligence agency approved source of pro-army views in Pakistan, supported by an entire web of publications, websites and news agencies, all notable for being willing to change their views on anything except absolute loyalty to the current occupant of GHQ); see:http://criticalppp.com/archives/30628)

I suspect that to a conventionally-tuned and reasonable American or Englishman, the thought that smartly turned out men in creased pants may really believe this insane crap probably seems ludicrous. But I assure you, many of them believe it while the rest seem to recognize the usefulness of maintaining this mindset. Some may indeed be ready for change, but that change of heart may not survive the victory celebration after the Americans leave.
A better constitution in Afghanistan would be great, but the constitution will not protect itself. The state has to have enough of a monopoly of violence to maintain such a constitution. As the late lamented Chairman Mao (wrong about many things, but maybe not about this) said: Power grows out of the barrel of a gun....The people with more guns and more will to fight will not let a constitution stand in the way of victory...

I was so intrigued by the comments made in this thread that I have decided to break my promise of no longer commenting on it.

I think the question of nuclear deterrence in South Asia is a complicated and interesting one.

On the other hand, us packing up and leaving India to watch the current store behind us is a recipe for Nuclear War. - RCJ

I don't disagree. It is one possible scenario. However, there are other plausible scenarios. And does the history of the region support the above assertion? Out of my depth on this.

India, Pakistan, and the Bomb: Debating Nuclear Stability in South Asia (Contemporary Asia in the World) by Ganguly and Kapur.

From the Amazon review:

"Ganguly and Kapur are scholars who disagree about whether nuclear weapons have stabilized or exacerbated the long-running tensions between India and Pakistan. Ganguly, representing the optimist camp, argues that because both India and Pakistan now possess nuclear weapons, recent flare-ups over disputed territories (the 2001-02 crisis, for example) have stopped short of all-out war in large part due to the familiar cold war logic of nuclear deterrence. Strategic pessimist Kapur claims that holding nuclear weapons actually functions as a shield of sorts, escalating regional disputes by permitting the parties (Pakistan in particular) to take especially aggressive actions that would otherwise provoke stronger retaliation."

http://www.amazon.com/India-Pakistan-Bomb-Stability-Contemporary/dp/023…

And the following book examines the Kargil war from American, Indian, and Pakistani points of view (from the description, I have not read it.)

http://www.amazon.com/Asymmetric-Warfare-South-Asia-Consequences/dp/052…

"The 1999 conflict between India and Pakistan near the town of Kargil in contested Kashmir was the first military clash between two nuclear-armed powers since the 1969 Sino-Soviet war. Kargil was a landmark event not because of its duration or casualties, but because it contained a very real risk of nuclear escalation. Until the Kargil conflict, academic and policy debates over nuclear deterrence and proliferation occurred largely on the theoretical level. This deep analysis of the conflict offers scholars and policymakers a rare account of how nuclear-armed states interact during military crisis. Written by analysts from India, Pakistan, and the United States...."

I'm sorry if this detour is a bore for some of you. I still don't understand how one knows for sure. The arguments are based on what data?

My basic point, lost in the midst of all of those excerpts, is that despite having "full" strategic depth in Afghanistan during the time period of the Kargil War, a conflict occurred between the two.

Robert C. Jones:

I agree with the first paragraph in your post of 0832. However as far as foreign policy goes, the Pak Army/ISI is effectively the government of Pakistan and they should be held accountable. That is why I am always careful to say Pak Army/ISI rather than Pakistan or the Pakistani government. The Pakistani man on the street and the civilian gov. don't have much to do with it.

As far as your second paragraph goes, is it your position that the United States should endorse the desire of one sovereign country's army, Pak Army, to use a neighboring sovereign country, Afghanistan, as it sees fit whenever it feels like it? That seems a bit unreasonable to me, maybe to some Afghans also who may not be so keen to see the Pak Army free to use their "turf". It also seems unreasonable that a desire not to see that happen is viewed as de-stabilizing Pakistan. It seems unreasonable to me that standing in the way (or pretending to, we haven't been very good at it) of this Pak Army/ISI ambition is seen as having picked India over the Pak Army. We haven't reduced mil aid to the Pak Army. We haven't imposed any important sanctions. We haven't pressed them hard about Mumbai and we haven't complained when they all but pull the trigger themselves on our forces in Afghanistan. It seems to me we have bent over backwards in a way that future historians will marvel at in an attempt to keep them happy.

You mention our triggering an nuclear war with our meddling. I don't believe occasionally refusing to be lap dogs for the general sahibs constitutes meddling. The Pak Army/ISI's position in this respect reminds me of a criminal holding a gun to the head of a hostage and telling the negotiator "If you don't do what I want, I'll kill this person and you will be the one responsible." No. That isn't how it works. The criminal is responsible. The Pak Army/ISI is telling us that if we don't let them do the kookie things they want to do we will be responsible for the consequences. That is a criminal talking.

Please cite your reference for Mullah Omar being willing to give up OBL. I just checked my Rashid book and all I could find was that MO refused for years prior to 9/11 to give him up and refused after 9/11. In fact Mr. Rashid suggested that the ISI urged MO not to give up OBL. Given the history of the last more than a decade, I find it impossible to believe Taliban & company nor the Pak Army/ISI will give up OBL.

As Omar said, the most perfect constitution imaginable will not protect itself nor enforce its provisions. This is Afghanistan we're talking about here. Seven year old boys are hanged. People get stuffed into shipping containers. Girls on their way to school get acid thrown on their faces because they are on their way to school. The guys who do all these things are not likely to be restrained by a sense of Afghan civic duty, no matter how good and representative the governance is; not to mention the Pak Army/ISI hovering in the background, jealous of their "strategic depth".

Speaking of strategic depth, I've asked this question several times in the past but have yet to receive an answer. How exactly would this strategic depth be used? Who and what would employ "Afghan turf" if there were a conflict with India? What would they hope to accomplish there? When would they go there? This has never been explained beyond saying the Pak Army/ISI needs strategic depth because they need it. Why?

Carl,

Is Pakistan more stable today than it was before the U.S. created the conflict of interest by changing our position by 180 degrees on the Mujhadeen?

In 2002 I was struck by the words in a report from our guys present with the first Pak military push up into the FATA:

"I was working in the basement of the Pentagon, and a large portion of my duties were to read the daily reports from our deployed Special Operations Forces, distill key points, and capture them on PowerPoint for the Senior Army Leaderships morning brief. The words of an elderly Pakistani village leader will haunt me for the rest of my life. An element of the Pakistani military had left the relative security of the Indus river valley, and had pushed up into the fiercely independent and pro-Taliban mountain region bordering Afghanistan. A small element of U.S. personnel was accompanying them, and the team leader captured this sage observation from the village elder, "We do not like the government forces coming up into our territory, you understand, for they have no purpose here. You Americans, on the other hand, we do not mind. You are here for revenge, and revenge we understand."

We did not understand the dynamic of the problem or the region, so we pushed for a "US/western" solution of forcing Pakistan to exert their sovereign duties as we defined them. We see the results of that today.

Robert C. Jones:

We are going to have to acknowledge our point of fundamental disagreement and leave it at that. I believe Pakistan is in the mess it is in because the Pak Army/ISI's machinations led them to this and it will only get worse. You believe that the mess is because we forced the Pak Army/ISI to change their carefully thought out scheme. So be it. I would add though that we forced them to do something (temporarily) they didn't want to do because one of their clients had just killed nearly 3,000 Americans. I would add also that Pakistan's stability is probably not our primary concern in all this, a concern, but not the primary one.

I would be obliged though if you could elaborate upon how Afghanistan provides, in a practical way, strategic depth for the Pak Army/ISI.

I will have to agree with Carl. I think Robert, like many good people, really cannot believe that all those smartly turned out officers could possibly have had the ideas I think they actively pursued for years.
The eye cannot see what the mind does not know...
In my version of events, matters were not in equilibrium in 2000. A significant jihadi network was being incubated and activated all across Pakistan and beyond into Afghanistan and India. It was hosting some of the craziest terrorists in the world. If 9-11 had not happened, some other attack in Russia, in China, in India, in Iran, in a dozen other places, could easily have happened and been traced back to Pakistan and Afghanistan. At that point, the "equilibrium" would have shifted, one way or the other..

Pakistan wants some place to run, if India attacks them again. You know what happened on 16 December 71, India took her revenge in the shape of dismemberment of Pakistan and we got independence.
India is a "revisionist state" and that Pakistan understands well. When Pakistan says strategic depth, it is mostly due to lack of finding a proper words. Actually they want to avoid a TWO FRONT WAR in future!

Munzur, This is a completely incoherent reason on which to base such a far-reaching policy. Is Pakistan a person who will run into the outhouse if the main house is being "invaded"? Why would India invade Pakistan in the first place? What is the plan that is thought to lead to an Indian invasion? This is NDC-level bullshit allowed to become national policy. That is exactly why we need adult supervision of the armed forces..

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How Afghanistan Ends

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