The US in Afghanistan: Follow Sun Tzu rather than Clausewitz to Victory

Deleted.

I just complained about the Kaganites because I think they contributed to the process I mentioned in my comment below, all sides in the US system stoked fears of selling out despite the tough talk of surges and sticking around because of the way they talked about the larger region. Again, it had to do with the nature of trust and diplomacy, but what's the point? The so-called Kaganites have their mitts on another issue and are busy with that.

I mean, go look at how the Kaganites talked about the larger regional issues in AfPak and realize they stoked fears as much as the Cointras. Didn't understand the region, not well-read in the appropriate ways. They just are not interested in what they are not interested in. It's all smoke and mirrors.

<blockquote>....quantifiable conflict resolution that includes negotiating with moderate Taliban militia groups, as unpalatable as that sounds to military purists. </blockquote>

No, this has nothing to do with military purists. I spend a lot of time being a COINtroll around here, but, instead, I simply should have asked good questions and read original sources, such as the old journals I have been mentioning lately.

The issue is that there are other groups that needed to enter the negotiations within the Afghan system besides the Taliban and they did not trust outside diplomacy given the relationships between various NATO countries and outside supporters of the Taliban. They were afraid they'd be sold out by the Americans and the British on the moderate Taliban and our behavior in the larger context (AfPak) did nothing to dispel those fears. That is some of the problem with the circa 2009 COINTRA stuff, it had to do, not with insurgency, but in the nature of diplomacy and trust. The Americans, British, etc., have a history in that part of the world and there was suspicion from other camps that we couldn't deliver moderate Taliban, would be made fools of, or would sell out others in Afghanistan in order to tend to the Taliban, all while being outmaneuvered. It had very much to do with the fears of various camps, not simply the nature of the Taliban insurgency, much of which was filtered through American domestic lenses, left, right, military and civilian.

A good article though, I really miss the design guys around here even though I disagreed. I just liked the way they were open to the ideas of others. I miss the commentary.

And now we shall see if the government holds, because only the Afghans can do this.

There is lots of information here especially the comments. I think that people misunderstand what Sun Tzu and CvC tried to convey in their writings. People seem to rely on America's misinterpretation of CvC and say that Sun Tzu theory of war would be better.

The big problem is the bias the American military has before anyone read either CvC or Sun Tzu. Reliance on technology is seen as what will win the war when its the will of the people back home and the soldiers that win wars not technology. Also to mention air superiority is not technology based but based no opposing forces

Remember Vietnam we lost because the enemy imposed their will on us. We believe that if we grab the balls of the enemy the hearts and minds follow

American military theory emphasizes "Offense is the best defense" both CvC and Sun Tzu have a antithesis that offense and defense are two different things both in balance.

To break the will of the insurgents is not to plead with them or moderate. Its to find what they cherish and to attack it not to patrol around streets but to hide and attack when they don't expect it. if a strategy or tactic doesn't work use something else.

Maybe you should read Sun Tzu more often you obviously don't know your opponent.

I really love America and its military(except the Mattel-16) but teaching that doesn't work is allowed to blossom while what works is suppressed by all means is a travesty to all of us especially as Americans

Dave, yea that will work. Godfather II is best they spend a lot of time Cuba just before Castro takes over. Then when you want to find out how to win read Killing Pablo by Mark Bowden. It's kinda the Alabama version of "How to win friends and influence people!"

I remain interested in the trend where a crutch is continually sought to guide the conduct of recent insurgencies. Why not study widely and then analyse the current insurgency and create a custom intervention solution?

Early on in this analysis it would become apparent that no matter how much money or how many soldiers lives are thrown at the Afghanistan problem the corrupt and illegitimate Karzai regime will never be acceptable to the majority of Afghan people and therefore making the Afghan intervention a pointless exercise.

And you don't need Sun Tzu or Clausewitz to help you understand that.

Dave Maxwell, I don't know what Bill Laden reads either but he "acts" more like the old school Mafia than anything in CvC or SunTzu, just my opinion.

The Godfather is vanilla, watch the Sopranos, for what it is worth, it is a better depiction of the "this thing of ours" culture.

Why does it have to be either of these writers when it comes to explaining just how does the begining of an insurgency in 2003 (Iraq)explode into a full blown phase 2 and phase 3 guerrilla war in under three years that would have even surprised Mao with the short development spann especially if recent reporting is correct that foreign fighters (from both sides) are once again moving back into Iraq.

Regardless of all the debate here that question still has not been answered.

So maybe there has been a third way forward that many have not wanted to recognize that would go far further in explaining both iraq and Afghanistan.

The past does not necessarily explain the future and why do we tend to disregard newer developments in complexity science that in fact tend to explain the unexplainable. Is it our comfort zones that inhibit attempts to challenge complex issues that do not fit the old models of thinking and which if discussed in complexity science terms would force us into challenging our own individual thought models?

Am convinced we are seeing a third way forward that while the past helps to explain some of the indicators it cannot provide a total understanding and that is why it seems that everything is going around in a circle.

Think Mao would have be actually surprised at what is occurring.

"read one written by an insurgent" by RC Jones

Definitely, or watch and read the old news reports, such as the ones about Fidel Castro, one of the first prime time Revolutions. Also believe it or not Karl Marx wrote a series of articles form London about the American Civil War that were almost omniscient, of what was going to happen or could happen based upon pure economic analysis.

The Clausewitz versus Sun Tzu debate is interesting, but only part of the argument Ben is making here. I found the discussion on American strategic culture a more useful discourse than which dead military strategist to follow. Ben, are you saying that America has to abandon core principles that worked in previous military conflicts? Didn't we do that after World War II where we abandoned downsizing the military and we did not retreat into isolationism? Finally, it doesnt matter what nation you are, or what values you possess- if you occupy another country for any reason, the locals WILL see you as an occupier; especially if you are from a rival ideological model such as a non-Islamic society operating in an Islamic one.

Backward Observer:

Third way in simple terms.

While we argue over which version of COIN, which COIN author/researcher/think tank is correct, which version/idea of attack the network is in or out or which link analysis tool to use or social network analysis methodology to use the core issue is and remains exactly what two totally dimetrically opposed individuals have been writing about since 2004---Kilcullen and his "conflict ecosystem" and John Robb with his "open source warfare" theory. Even Mao would approve with his guerrillas swimming in the ocean of the people concept.

What has astounded me since 2005 has been the evolution of insurgency tactics, techniques, and procedures coupled with an evolutionary IED development process that has us playing catch-up since 2003 and to the tune of billions to counter and we still are not ahead of the IED development curve-we are simply playing catchup. Yes the US military has faced a massive IED fight previously in their history ie Vietnam which we seemed to have forgottten about but nowhere has there been any research into the evolutionary process in the development of IEDs in Iraq or Afghanistan. We seemed to have forgotten that IED development is as unlimited as the mind of a human bomb maker can be.

What is different and it is different is the ability of the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan to resist the killing or capturing of critical nodes ie leaders, bombmakers, financiers, suppliers or for that matter entire cells thus in fact bringing our Attack the network concepts to a plus minus zero in successes and the IEDs still keep coming as do the insurgent attacks.In Iraq we must now be in about the third or fourth leadership generation of AQ and they are still in the fight--we are at about the second headed to the third generation on the Taliban side with no impacts to be seen.

I keep going back to a document discovered in 2006 that was written by the leader of the Islamic are of Iraq indicating IED circuit board/cellphone trigger developments only two months after we were in Baghdad--Mao had made the same developments but maybe 5-8 years into his fight. So we are seeing a evolutionary speed factor of about 4-5 times that of previous historical developments thus the comment that the past is not pointing to reasons why things are happening in the future.

We need to truly relook the Robb "open source warfare" theory as now even AQ has accepted and is using virtually the same terminology as Robb uses and we need to rethink the Kilcullen "conflict ecosystem" as the tool for understanding that "open source warfare". what is nice is that both concepts are relatively straightforward and easy to explain--tghe singlew hangup is that it challenges current thinking in the COIN community. It is a sign that Robb might haved gotten it right when you enemy adopts the same terms as they feel it fits perfectly to what they are doing---that is not a good development.

So yes there is a third way forward but it requires a strong rethink on our part and a willingness to challenge previous concepts and admit that maybe we fact have gotten it wrong for seven years.

We are now in the process of shifting back to MCO with a little COIN in what many are calling a hybrid model for the future and that is not going to be pretty as the MCO skills have massively been degraded and how to you mix the two when in theory you have not gotten COIN right in the first place.

Backwards Observer;

This is evidence that the exisiting COIN concepts are simply not providing a way ahead.

Taken from todays' NYTs;

In a three month period ending 11 Nov SOF conducted 1572 operations, resulting in 368 insurgent leaders killed or captured, and 968 lower level insurgents killed and 2477 of them captured.

US SOF have targeted the bomb-laying cells giving the Marines a 3-4 week quiet phase until a new group moves in and attacks. "The SOF guys are getting alot of them, but they are regenerating almost as fast as we can kill or capture them".

1. It does not seem to be making a dent in the insurgency.

2. Open source warfare with the analysis tool "conflict ecosystem" would explain why the kill/capture is not making headway.

3. There is already complexity science research that explains actually the regeneration process in detail but it has been largely ignored until the last few weeks.

Backwards Observer---now do you see what I meant with the statement that I am convinced there is a third way that is occurring?

Backwards Observer;

It depends would be a response---your definition is getting to the heart but refer below to how I define it.

I see the Robb theory of open source warfare as the explanation of what we are seeing on the evolution side and the Kilcullen "conflict ecosystem" as the analysis tool to look at OSW.

There was a recent complexity research that in fact validated the OSW theory followed by the recent AQ statements using the exact terminologies so a merge in theories has occurred--it is just the IC is failing to understand the depth of that merger.

My definition

Ecology of an Insurgency:

The scientific study of the way that living "organisms" in this case "organism" is defined as an insurgency cell, group, or organization interact with their environment and predators (the counter insurgent).

Ecosystem of an Insurgency:

An insurgent ecosystem is a system whose members (members defined as being either an insurgent group or groups) benefit from each other's participation via symbiotic (mutually beneficial and self-sustaining) relationships.

The main goal of an insurgency ecosystem is to generate common ventures. It forms when many small and potentially diverse (origin, tribe, religious belief, etc.) insurgent groups join together to fight a common predator (the counter-insurgent or state).

Insurgent ecosystems attract and retain members (groups) due to network effects:

The benefits of the ecosystem (shared ventures) are so great that groups wont leave it (although temporary departures to avoid targeted pressure from counter-insurgents are possible).
The ecosystems features (i.e. immediate access to shared resources) make it easy for new groups to form and participate.
The growth of the ecosystem results in an exponential increase in benefits (i.e. more segmentation and specialization) for all of the member groups. IE Attacks by one group creates opportunities for other groups. The buying of resources (ie small arms, explosives) creates a market for groups to sell into and makes it easier for other groups to get access to the resources.
An ecosystem can have groups directly fighting each other through direct battles - but it can also have indirect fighting (or competition) between groups for access to resources (people, money, strategy etc).
Once an ecosystem is established in a particular region/area, it becomes very difficult for the counter insurgent to eliminate it. The presence of multiple groups means that the counter insurgent must divide its efforts. Operationally, a focus on one group leaves other groups to operate freely and success against one group yields very little overall benefit. Removing leadership does not mean that the group will cease to exist. The leadership may be replaced by other parts from the same group or other groups. Or a new group will move into the space left open by old group. Strategically, the diversity of the groups in the ecosystem (different reasons for fighting) means that it isnt possible to address a single set of issues or grievances at the national level that would reverse the insurgency (via negotiated settlement, repatriation, etc.).

Again sorry for ther wordiness--but actually the NYTs SOF operations article from Afghanistan was in fact verifying this theory in a very telling way.

Question is ---is the IC to late in understanding and can the ship of COIN thinking be turned around to address the reality--doubt it.

The Dead Carl Society sure jumped en mass to this subject cheering 'Hooray for our side. However they are wrong. The reliance of U.S. strategy based on Clausewitz failed to win in Korea, Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan. North Vietnam relied on Sun Tzu to defeat us. The Afghans have used Sun Tzu to beat both the Russians and us. Maos Little Red book is Sun Tzu Art of War and Maos strategy to win in China versus the Nationalists was pure Sun Tzu. The best thing for the U.S. would be to stop relying on Clausewitz; it is a manual for losers.

Like the Geico Commercial all the Dead Carl Fans should: Maybe chug on over to namby-pamby land where maybe they can find some self confidence. The American Revolution Southern Campaign under Nathaniel Greene and Dan Morgan was Sun Tzu not Mr. Attrition Warfare Clausewitz who was in diapers at the time. The entire Southern Campaign which includes such battles as Cowpens and Kings Mountain are brilliant examples of Sun Tzus strategy and tactics. Clausewitzs warfare is force on force attrition - much like game of checkers versus Sun Tzus tactics and strategy - much like the game of chess.

Robert Jones;

An ecosystem can exist even if the government is a first class loved government---so it is not ncessarily government that is the failure that is causing ecosystems to development that run counter to the existing government.

IE the 9/11 Hamburg cell existed in a country that some might say has an excellent form of governance--the French bomber group that wanted to blow up the main church in Strasbourg was in a country where the majority feel the governance is good---just not so sure the answer lays in good or bad governance.

All things aside, how can you really defeat an insurgency if they have safe haven, as they do in Pakistan? We are trying to break their backs, but we cannot kill our way out of this. Our enemy is attrition, and the muj know this. Its too tribal, the terrain is hell, human as well as environmental.

Here is an LSE master student's take comparing a Clausewitzian and a Sun Tzu based theoretical framework to understand the war in Afghanistan, entitled "The Enduring Wisdom of Sun Tzu and Clausewitz":

http://www.e-ir.info/?p=4383

Backwards Observer and other commenters on this topic;

I have often talked about the evolutionary development of Salafi insurgencies and pointed to John Robb's "open source warfare" as an explanation of the evoluntionary speed in their development and then I coupled it to using Kilcullens' "conflcit ecosystem" as the analysis tool.

I also would often write about a complexity science (quantum physics) research project that was relased about a year ago by the research team around Sean Gourley which if one read thoroughly with their 15 characteristics that they had discovered one would in fact assume that they had indirectly validated "open source warfare".

Needless to say the SWJ comments were never that positive about either concepts --now comes the interesting aspect.

A formal White Paper was submitted to both JIEDDO and DARPA integrating the quantum research with the "eoclogy of an insurgency" in response to several announced BBAs with absolutely no response---now much to my surprise the following article will in fact show a far deeper interest in the research and talk of the acceptance of power laws which had been discovered in 15 different insurgencies by the Gourley research.

If the article is half way accurate then in fact at least JIEDDO and the University of Maryland now have to honestly admit that the Robb theory of "open source warfare" is both valid and the curve has been truly missed since Robb briefed DoD on the theory between 2004-2006. Even worse that the concepts around Attack the Network may in fact have been totally wrong.

NOW can we get a formal discussion going on this topic as it is the third COIN way forward that I have also written about and it would go a long way towards understanding the staying power of AQI and the Taliban and it would go along way in explaining while COIN has basically failed.

http://www.miller-mccune.com/culture-society/the-physics-of-terror-2595…

A short quote taken from the above referenced link is extremely telling.

Like small companies, Clauset says, terrorist groups are made up of highly motivated people looking to make a product -- terror attacks. "Both of these face the problem that they need to grow, or theyre going to die," he says. With small groups, if a key member leaves, its a major blow; with a larger work force, one persons departure doesnt matter as much.

Thats why the U.S. decapitation strategy has failed to subdue insurgent groups, he believes. "Someone was joking a few years back about how weve killed the No. 3 al-Qaeda guy in Iraq 20 times," he says. "They keep replacing him with somebody else. We need to understand the phenomenon, not the network. The network is the manifestation of the phenomenon."

Just wish JIEDDO/DARPA had paid more attention to their BBA responses as the complexity research project was extremely well based and it did in effect answer/validate "open source warfare". We can laugh at complexity science as a answer to COIN, but in fact Kilcullen openly talked about it in his famous "conflict ecosystem" article from 2004/2005--strange how the world goes around.

"In case it helps understand the scope of this work within physics and beyond: The discussion of how teams of peacekeepers might be deployed, is a conclusion from the model that we developed, and was published in the following peer-reviewed physics journal: "Anomalously slow attrition times for asymmetric populations with internal group dynamics", Physical Review Letters 103, 148701 (2009); by Zhenyuan Zhao, Juan Camilo Bohorquez, Alex Dixon and Neil F. Johnson. The model and analysis for conflict and terrorism, was published in: "Common ecology quantifies human insurgency", Nature (December 17, 2009:); by Juan Camilo Bohorquez, Sean Gourley, Alex Dixon, Mike Spagat and Neil Johnson. Mathematical details of the model are given in the publication "Relating the microscopic rules in coalescence-fragmentation models to the cluster-size distribution", European Physical Journal 72, 289 (2009); Blazej Ruszczycki, Zhenyuan Zhao, Ben Burnett and Neil F. Johnson. Extensions are examined in depth in "Statistical Physics and Modern Human Warfare", in Mathematical Modeling of Collective Behavior in Socio-Economic and Life Sciences, Eds. Naldi et al., Birkhäuser Boston (2010), DOI: 10.1007/978-0-8176-4946-3_14 p.365; Alex Dixon, Zhenyuan Zhao, Juan Camilo Bohorquez, Russell Denney and Neil Johnson. Finally, the possible spread of influence within this model, is examined in the publication "Effect of social group dynamics on contagion", Physical Review E 81, 056107 (2010); Zhenyuan Zhao, J. P. Calderón, Chen Xu, Guannan Zhao, Dan Fenn, Didier Sornette, Riley Crane, Pak Ming Hui, and Neil F. Johnson.

Anonymous,

I will be happy to discuss it with you, but it is not new, watch this 8 part series below. You will here them talk about Chaos,Anarchy,Panic,Racial and religious exploitation and toward the end is an excellent section on System Disruption. I saw this at DOD Contractor sponsored hunting club in the late 1960's. I agree with you that nobody wants to talk about it and Johnn Robb does a great job of how it works but it is NOT new. Some of the technologies are new and the tactics have advanced but the general theory of Revolutionary?Guerrilla war and it's various forms are not new. And as the Title suggest It is "More Deadly Than War"

Adult Warning Label:This is not for faint of heart.

http://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=More+Deadly+Than+War&aq=f

slapout9;

You are correct guerrilla warfare is not new even newer forms of terrorism and revolution are not new but if we look at the evolutionary processes then in fact they are totally new.

If we go back to say the 70s and start with the BM German group that split into June 2, through the Red Brigades, through say the Nov 17 Greek group and then focus on the Habash/PFPL, Black Sept on to the PKK they all demonstrated similar organizational techiques and they shared their tactics via newpapers and flyers/handouts distributed at major European universities and they were totally political in nature---jump forward 40 years and yes there are new insurgencies, terrorist groups and malcontents, BUT it is the speed at which they respond and the pressure they can bring to bear either on a major country such as the US/UK France/Germany, a semi failed country ie Yemen/Iraq/Afghanistan or a failed country such as Somalia and it is the speed that they share on their successful TTPs that has us constantly in a reactive mode coupled with the ever evolving IED technology that has us spending billions to counter a 600 USD trigger device coupled with a regenerative power not seen previously in the older guerrilla wars. It has reached a point that in the recent FEDEX/UPS bomb shipments that actually failure of the attack is being viewed as a major success by AQ---which is totally opposite of the older guerrilla wars which were all about winning against the state.

That is indicating to at least me that the current COIN and COIN techniques ie attack the network etc. are failing---ie the recent SOF kill/capture stats for Helmand province can only give the Marines a respite of 4 weeks before the next IED cell is in attack mode--that cannot be explained by older guerrilla experiences thus the need to rethink the causes of what is being seen. I experienced first hand the decimation of VC units in VN only to see them backfilled by NVA---that is not the case currently in Afghanistan or Iraq where regeneration is out of dicontented ranks of hundreds if not thousands of willing supporters all kept in the know via modern technologies.

Therefore the third way is actually upon us since 2004-it is open source warfare and I am sorry but many still think it is a crazy concept. Because to actually purport to support an open discussion on OSW would in fact challenge the core elements of 3-24 and our training for the last five years.

Anonymous, what you are seeing is/was predictable and some did see it coming. Advanced global communications and global transportation systems and global finance are indeed accelerating the effects of private and or non-state guerrilla units. And yes they will regenerate their losses from the population just like a military chain of command except these folks don't wear uniforms.

This network theory that you just shoot the number 3 guy and the whole network will collapse is crazy....who is it that even thought that up? I share your concern but they can be beaten but and again I agree with you not by the general COIN theory as it stands now.

slapout9;

This network theory that you just shoot the number 3 guy and the whole network will collapse is crazy....who is it that even thought that up?

Answer---JIEDDO/COIC and the concept of Attack the Network.

Backwards Observer;

It's not Chinatown---it is Left and Right of the Boom if I recall.

Anonymous,

There is no number 3 guy IMO. You are dealing with a social/people system not a machine. If you wanted to do it that way it would be more like shoot the number 3 guy and his enitre bllodline all the way around him....would get pretty messy.

Backwards Observer;

You are entirely correct---when all commenters who are now starting to really question COIN theories hear the phase "open source warfare" they run for cover using comments like "cussed, discussed, and found of no interest" but then you see the big guns JIEDDO/MITRE/University of Maryland start pouring consulting funding into the quantum research that has in fact validated the theory-then what does make the group of commenters and their fluff off comments?

The issue is serious and it appears that we as a society seem to run lately from responsibility---what ever happened to the old fashion concept of if it is broken then fix it---guess that got in the way of defense contracting greed which in fact would be seriously theatened by a group of University researchers and a former AF SOF/software geek. While Rome burns military personnel/civilians are getting killed because we cannot fix it.

If the theories concerning tank warfare in the 30s had not been published and Patton had not read them and tied them to history we would not have had a Patton if I followed the concept of "cussed, discussed, and found of no interest".

Just my pointless opinion.

Anyone have anything more on this recent report from Aviation Week;

From Aviation Week (courtesy of Tigerhawk):

Chinese advisers are believed to be working with Afghan Taliban groups who are now in combat with NATO forces, prompting concerns that China might become the conduit for shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles, improved communications and additional small arms to the fundamentalist Muslim fighters.

A British military official contends that Chinese specialists have been seen training Taliban fighters in the use of infrared-guided surface-to-air missiles. This is supported by a May 13, 2008, classified U.S. State Department document released by WikiLeaks telling U.S. officials to confront Chinese officials about missile proliferation.

China is developing knock-offs of Russian-designed man-portable air defense missiles (manpads), including the QW-1 and later series models. The QW-1 Vanguard is an all-aspect, 35-lb. launch tube and missile that is reverse-engineered from the U.S. Stinger and the SA-16 Gimlet (9K310 Igla-1). China obtained SA-16s from Unita rebels in then-Zaire who had captured them from Angolan government forces. The 16g missiles have a slant range of 50,000 ft. The QW-1M is a variant that incorporates even more advanced SA-18 Grouse (9K38 Igla) technology.

So far, there has been a curious absence of manpad attacks on NATO aircraft in Afghanistan. One reason is that the Russian equipment still in place is out of date and effectively no longer usable, the British official says. Another may be that the possession of such a weapon is a status symbol, so owners are reluctant to use it. However, the introduction of new manpads could change that equation.

Although there have been no attacks using manpads, "we act as if they exist," notes the British officer. "We know they are out there," he says, alluding to the proliferation of increasingly advanced missiles on the black and gray markets.

In fact, NATO officials know they exist, at least in Iraq, according to the classified U.S. State Department document. U.S. officials were instructed to provide the Chinese government with pictures of QW-1 missiles found in Iraq and ask how such missiles were transferred.