Helmand and Farah Provinces, Afghanistan
15 February -- 15 March 2010
by Commander Philip Pelikan, CHC, USN
Download the Full Article: Mullah Engagement Program
"By order of the Commanding General, 2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB), Afghanistan, the Command Chaplain and a Muslim Chaplain (if obtainable), along with appropriate political specialists, governance advisors, and necessary security, were to engage with Islamic leadership in Helmand and Farah Provinces in discussions to enhance the relationship with key religious leaders and the communities in which they serve in order to convey the good will and otherwise positive intentions of U.S. Government and ISAF (International Security Assistance Force)/NATO forces operating in the region in conjunction with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) and its military and police forces."
This was the basic premise for the operation which subsequently took place between February and March 2010, and for which I was responsible to organize and carry out. Additionally, my responsibilities as the MEB Command Chaplain were to provide religious coverage, general pastoral care for the Marines and Sailors of 2nd MEB, and supervision of 15 chaplains.
Download the Full Article: Mullah Engagement Program
Commander Philip Pelikan is a prior-enlisted ('71-'75) U.S. Air Force Intelligence Analyst. He has been a U.S. Navy Chaplain for 21 years; 10 of which have been with the U.S. Marines. He is a priest in the Antiochian Orthodox Christian Archdiocese of North America and currently serves as the Command Chaplain for U.S. Naval Support Activity, Naples, Italy.
About the Author(s)
Comments
In response to TJM,
The "Reconciliation Program," announced by the Karzai administration, was something that was being made known by various Afghan government officials in many different community forums, and was being coordinated through the "Provincial Reconstruction Teams." Mullah Mukhtar was the only one in our group who would talk about it, which we would only know was even being mentioned because of the flowing translation from our interpretor. Although I knew about the program, as the chaplain, I had no need to know the specific details of it and did not bring it up in our conversations with the mullahs myself. Your questions about the details of the program might be better directed toward the State Department.
In response to Carl...
I believe I agree with Morgan Sheeran's comment about the indispensability of partnering with an Islamic counterpart in an operation like this, i.e., with an Imam. Ninety percent of what we were doing was "image," meaning that we were endeavoring to portray American religious freedom and cooperation between differing faiths in person as much as we were trying to communicate it verbally or with a simple one-sided visit. The perception of the Mullahs that the Imam and I were friends was extremely important, and one that could not be "feigned." They needed to look into our eyes and see that we were genuine; which they did. In one instance, my Muslim Chaplain friend was thought to be a "fake" by the leading mullah in one of the settlements we were visiting. He stated this to us afterwards, and that it wasn't until Chaplain "Salam" physically led them in the noon prayers that he knew he was "for real."
<em>"Mullah Mukhtar would start off our meetings with the requisite prayers and then preach to the mullahs gathered with us about the cooperative efforts of the Afghan government and the U.S. Marines, as well as the futility of continuing to support the Taliban. This was followed by a plea for those who actually were Taliban to reconcile with the Government of Afghanistan."</em>
What, specifically, is meant by "reconcile with the Government of Afghanistan"? What are the terms and/or the means by which this occurs?
If I may; this is not the first time such things have been worked. Afghan units often have a Religious Officer, a mullah in uniform who is generally well-educated and literate. These mullahs can engage the local mullahs and population in the same manner as in the article, but they are often not present due to staffing. When present, they are often not included to the extent in the article as well.
Commander Pelikan is obviously knowledgeable and calls upon resources such as Imam "Salam." Unfortunately, too many Christian Chaplains are simply not nearly as presentable to Muslim populations for a number of reasons, ranging from ignorance and prejudice to the extremes like the chaplain at Bagram who had Dari language Bibles delivered to him and exhorted troops to proselytize. Incidents such as those recorded at Bagram and unrecorded elsewhere make commanders very nervous about utilizing chaplains in such roles.
I personally taught chaplains as students in the COIN Leaders Course and found a mixed bag.
The short answer would be, "No, Christian chaplains cannot do this in the absence of Muslim partners."