What Happens When We Lose the COG
by Jeremy Kotkin
Download the Full Article: The Strategic Risk versus Tactical Safety
GEN Petraeus' COIN Guidance is published and on the bulletin boards in hundreds of staff offices in Kabul. As the vanguard of this new policy, Afghan Hands have a charter to operate under the COIN Guidance in concert with the mission statement developed for the program: "to build long-lasting, positive partnerships with GIRoA, Afghan entities, and civilians, in order to demonstrate the long-term commitment of ISAF to build capacity and capability within Afghanistan and deny support among the Afghan people to insurgents." These two concepts, the COIN Guidance and the Afghan Hands Program intent before it, should operate in perfect harmony, each reinforcing the other. Afghan Hands, through eyes unencumbered of 9 years of standard operating tactics and procedures, should be allowed the professional scope to "get the job done" in ways which no other individual augmentee can.
COMISAF's COIN Guidance, especially when wielded by Afghan Hands, should be the combination to take this war in a new, winning direction. It will, unfortunately, not take hold in an environment more concerned about tactical and shortsighted personnel safety and standard operating procedure where attempting to follow the strategic intent and spirit of the new guidance is met with UCMJ punishment. The strategy operationalized by the Commander's COIN Guidance is failing in Kabul, the most visible expression of GIRoA's power, to the perceptions of the center of gravity (the people) and this carries an unacknowledged risk to the entire campaign plan.
The current COIN strategy can be a winning one. Whether it is enacted by Trinqueir's quadrillage, Marshal Lyautey's oil-spot, or a modern version of the USMC's Combined Action Platoons on a massive scale, ISAF is conducting a classic Galulian three line of operation plan focusing on security, the economy, and development. This, coupled with the Afghan Peace and Reconciliation Program and US anti-corruption efforts, are what Afghan stability desperately needs to germinate. The nature of Afghanistan and its history, however, should very strongly caution us from forgetting about the capital; yet, this is exactly what we are doing. Our strategy, focusing on the population centers in the outlying areas of the Key-Terrain Districts (KTDs), is leaving Kabul to the corruption of the central government and allowing the insurgent/guerilla to reoccupy spaces once cleared due to our own policies which segregate US/NATO Forces from the capital. The vacuum created by our absence is marking an easily followed path for the population to turn away from their government. Kabul, as the center of gravity's (the population's) capital, should be the most important oil spot; it should be the geographic center on which everything depends; the point against which all our energies should be directed. What we are doing through our own policies is voluntarily ceding this ground to the insurgent not because of his direct action, but because we are forcefully separating ourselves from the people and, in turn, creating a wedge between the people and their government.
Civilians in Kabul see our lack of effort; see a lack of economic assistance within easy reach yet kept behind hescos; and in a culture distinctly centered around bravery and honor, see us as cowards afraid to interact with them in their own largely stable and secure cities. Our actions speak louder than our words. We do not travel "outside the wire" (truly, the most pathetic line to hear from soldiers in Kabul bases; but it's not entirely their fault -- it's the mindset they're being inculcated with) and live up to our own Population Centric (PC)-COIN theory. Afghans realize this. In that realization, we cripple their trust in the very government we are trying to support. If people are the center of gravity, and the capability we are trying to promote is stability and trust, what does it say that we don't even apply the Commander's guidance here? Why do we think the Kabul bubble is immune from their youth being radicalized....by our very own actions no less? Basic COIN theory would have us separate the insurgent from the population. What we have done in Kabul is separate the population from ourselves. This has marked effects on them psychologically, economically, and civically.
Download the Full Article: The Strategic Risk versus Tactical Safety
Major Jeremy Kotkin is a Functional Area-59, Strategist, and assigned to ISAF through USFOR-A. In 2009, he was selected to become a member of CJCS's Afghan Hands Program, attended Dari language training, and subsequently deployed with the first rotation of Afghan Hands in theater. He is currently embedded full-time in GIRoA's Office of the National Security Council in Kabul. Previously, he published R.I.P. Mr. Charles Wilson, Father of the Taliban and Is the War in Afghanistan in the Interests of the United States and its Allies? for Small Wars Journal.
The comments and opinions are the author's own and do not constitute the position of ISAF, the US Army, or DoD.
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"In my experience, many Coalition "BSOs" are some of the worse people to make valid assessments of the threat in their AO- instead equating taking risk with a threat their "combat command OER"."
I agree with both Grant and Kyle....spot-on with the concern about "command OERs".
Not sure how to make people worry less about their OERs and career progression.....do away with "up-or-out"?
<em>Administrators note: this comment was originally posted by the user at 09:25:21 on 2011-01-08. Its current timestamp is when we recreated it after a technical glitch.</em>
"My .02 on who should assess the threat and forcepro requirements: the "real" BSOs- the Afghans. If your counterpart is competent (in your estimation) and has a certain SOP/FORCEPRO policy, then you should adjust to that. You should always be able to assess your counterpart as incompetent and either not travel with him or up your own FORCEPRO level. But- NO Coalition "BSO" should be able to dictate how a coalition partner travels with his counterpart- in my opinion. In my experience, many Coalition "BSOs" are some of the worse people to make valid assessments of the threat in their AO- instead equating taking risk with a threat their "combat command OER"."
I absolutely agree with this. Perhaps a better suited term would have been "Commander" or "OIC" when determining who should determine force protection levels. One of the strengths of the U.S. military in the past was the ability of lower-level leadership to make key tactical decisions. If we re-visit this fast-dissapearing (or already gone) trait, perhaps we would begin allowing those leaders to determine, based on S2 assessments, Afghan partner recommendations, etc. what force protection is necessary for each situation.
<em>Administrators note: this comment was originally posted by the user at 05:12:34 on 2011-01-08. Its current timestamp is when we recreated it after a technical glitch.</em>
I have a problem with the term "battlespace owner" in a COIN environment by foreign forces. I often wondered how the Afghans took that term. I know it implies ownership of coalition units going in and out, but it still can seem like we own space that should technically be "owned" by the sovereign nation's forces that are stationed/live there.
One example:
Mentors from one command accompanied their Afghan counterparts to an area outside of their normal AO. The Coalition "Battlespace owner" (BSO) found out they were traveling with the Afghans and not with a Coalition convoy. BSO orders them to wait for air. Mentors sit in a terminal for 2 days waiting for a flight to a location that it took the Afghans 2 1/2 hours to get back to. The mentors not only were embarrassed to tell their Afghan counterparts they couldn't travel back with them because the BSO didn't trust the Afghans to provide for their safety, but they also lost 2 days of partnered time with their counterparts.
Another "favorite" conversation of mine along this line:
RC Planner: "You guys are the ones who piss off the BSOs when you go through their AO without telling them."
Adviser: "If we tell the BSO, then they won't let us travel with our counterparts."
RC Planner: "You're right. If you die, who will have to fill out the report? If you aren't in a coalition convoy, they'll hold the BSO responsible."
So, it all comes down to paperwork and CYA. Who's thinking about partnering, COIN, and building rapport with the Afghans??
My .02 on who should assess the threat and forcepro requirements: the "real" BSOs- the Afghans. If your counterpart is competent (in your estimation) and has a certain SOP/FORCEPRO policy, then you should adjust to that. You should always be able to assess your counterpart as incompetent and either not travel with him or up your own FORCEPRO level. But- NO Coalition "BSO" should be able to dictate how a coalition partner travels with his counterpart- in my opinion. In my experience, many Coalition "BSOs" are some of the worse people to make valid assessments of the threat in their AO- instead equating taking risk with a threat their "combat command OER".
Grant Martin
MAJ, US Army
The above comments are the author's own and not the position of the US Army or DoD.
Move forward wrote:
""On 26 June, insurgents ambushed a Coalition convoy in the Tangi Valley of Wardak province and tortured, killed, and mutilated three American National Guardsmen. The Coalition responded with an offensive operation to find the insurgent group that committed the brutal attack."
Is the risk of captured Americans roaming Kabul unarmed, worth the strategic headlines and subsequent diversion of military assets to search for those Americans? Have you just announced the means that at least one higher profile American uses to get out and about?"
Comparing tactical risk in Kabul to that in the volatile Tangi valley does not work. Walking unarmed through Tangi will most likely result in an isolated personnel event and have major implications. Kabul, however, is not as dangerous as Tangi. I have not yet had the opportunity to go to Kabul; but it seems that one of the ideas MAJ Kotkin is getting after is this: that we are behaving as though all regions of Afghanistan are equally dangerous when, in fact, they are not. Perhaps we should allow individual battle space owners the freedom to assess the threat and determine the force protection requirements that best enable the local units to achieve whatever line of effort is most essential in that area.
Jeremy,
1-It is an excellent article and you are extremely perceptive about how population groups react to large groups of people in strange uniforms with guns.
2-Again you are very perceptive about the population in understanding how critical it is for the CAPITOL to be safe. If the Capitol isn't safe then the population will psychologically radiate that insecurity throughout their society, probably through their relatives and friends.
3-Taxi services are a great way to find out how societies work and to find out what is going on locally and what the people think.
4-Your plain clothes detail could probably carry concealed firearms without causing any civilian uproar,which would give them some means to defend themselves, reliable portable communications would be best.
5-Again I complement you on your human/crowd perception skills.
MAJ K,
Great article, but it raises several questions. The Wanat study states this on page 83 when describing why scarce ISR assets had been diverted:
<I>"On 26 June, insurgents ambushed a Coalition convoy in the Tangi Valley of Wardak province and tortured, killed, and mutilated three American National Guardsmen. The Coalition responded with an offensive operation to find the insurgent group that committed the brutal attack."</I>
Is the risk of captured Americans roaming Kabul unarmed, worth the strategic headlines and subsequent diversion of military assets to search for those Americans? Have you just announced the means that at least one higher profile American uses to get out and about?
Isn't the whole idea to let the ANA and ANP take over security and perform the COIN face-time themselves? If we can't rely on ANSF to do that on their own in Kabul where it is relatively safe, where can it safely occur?
Again, bravo for the article's intent of proposing application of COIN doctrine. But maybe it would be better if lesser armed Americans were escorted by better armed Afghans performing their country's security and COIN work?
If the command climate is preventing implementation of the Commander's Guidance, the commander should be relieving some subordinate commanders.
The commander is responsible for the command climate, not the subordinates.
Perhaps subordinates fear the reaction of their superiors to the implementation of the guidance per Maj K's recommendations.
Alas, we seem to lack the moral courage to make the tough decisions. I have had commanders tell me they are not willing to lower force protection requirements b/c of what they feared would be a reaction from congressional leaders.
Another idea that might help in implementation is to do what the Afghans do, or used to do, and require all commanders Regt/Bde and above, to meet once a quarter with SR Commander to discuss strategy, tactics, problems and solutions.
There perhaps COMISAF can gain the trust and confidence of his subordinates to provide the top cover they need to implement.
Its clear from CONUS, however that the emphasis is not on the Afghan government nor the people of Afghanistan, its about killing and coming home with as few casualties as possible. Why else do we need tanks?
As the senior adviser to 201st Corps 2007-2008, I did not allow MRAPs to be delivered to the Adviser Command in RC-Central. I did not wear sunglasses. I did not wear FPE when in a Shura, meeting with Afghans, or a provincial meeting. (Another example of how directives were implemented: During one provincial coordination meeting with ANA, ANP, Governors and other local leaders, I accompanied the Corps Commander inside the meeting room. While we were having tea with the governor, the battlespace commander burst into the ongoing meeting, late, in his full battle rattle, with M4 flagging all in the room like he was a trooper conducting forcible entry into a contested room) Any guess as to the consequences of this immature and risk averse activity?
But I did not have the moral courage to violate the orders of the ARFOR requiring certain numbers of vehicles on convoys, b/c I did not have the confidence in HHQ to trust my judgment and decision in case of ambush or accident.
BL. The commander must make it easy for his subordinates to comply with his guidance. If what he directs is not being implemented, then its his problem. And if he is not taking corrective action, then he either doesn't see the problem or he really didn't mean for his guidance to be implemented or is leaving it up to his subordinates to interpret how to implement it.
Really? The misspelling is symptomatic of the general level of thinking in the article. First, about the Afghan Hands program (and I deal with members on a daily basis). There is no greater group of posers in Afghanistan. Well, except for the Human Terrain people. Anyway, no one in their right mind would let the vast majority of them do anything but sit in desk jobs, lament they're not leading JSOC missions, and pretend their language ability is much better than the 1+ (maybe) they actually scored on the DLPT.
I'll spare you my usual rant about the typically mediocre careers escaped through the mechanism of Afghan Hands.
While I agree with some of the points (Get off the Damn FOB! should be the ISAF rallying cry), the Afghan Hands and a Kabul-centric development program is not the way to win this war.
and here I was considering the AfPak Hands program myself. Not sure if I really want to hang out in the NSC in Kabul.
In any case, MAJ K seems to be one more voice (of many) advocating that we get off of the FOBs. During my time in Kabul (ETT out of Phoenix), several of us noted the difference in the guidance received at Funston and Phoenix - living with the Afghans/ ANA - and the reality of sheltering ourselves from them as much as possible. Pretty weak given the danger level in Kabul...and I agree that the locals & ANSF probably see us as cowards as result. Kinda hard to accept advise & assistance from p**sies afraid to walk down a fairly safe street without IBA.
I'm curious....does anyone read SWJ? Anyone with rank, I mean. Lots of people have posted on here about the hyper-risk aversion typical of our Army/ leaders but no one seems to be fixing it. This is not a new issue.....folks in Kabul know this is a problem, and has been for a while. I know someone with rank reads this stuff. MAJ Gant was diverted from an Iraq deployment and went straight to Afghanistan as a result of his posting on here.
When did it become our policy to go to war with the primary purpose of not getting hurt? Did I miss a memo somewhere? "By God!! We're going to deploy to combat and stay on the FOB!! Salsa night for ALL!!"
I say get rid of most of the staff wankers in Kabul/ Eggers/ Phoenix/ Bagram, push the remaining FOBBITs down to tactical units and off the FOBs, live off of the local economy, in the local communities where the enemy also happens to be living, and kill those punks (the bad guys, I mean).
Actually embed advisors in ANSF units, bases, & outposts. Establish a KATUSA-like program where select (and vetted) ANA are embedded in US units, look at establishing (for lack of a better term) "irregular" Afghan units led by US leaders (officers and NCOs) not as advisors but as the actual leaders. ANSF will learn by example what a meritocracy looks like VS listening to our "advice" about it.
There's my rant. Happy New Year!!
A couple of replies to points made (and thanks for the replies),
Morgan:
- "<i>Kinda hard to accept advise & assistance from p**sies afraid to walk down a fairly safe street without IBA.</i>" If that p**sy came with a check for $10 BILLION a year to grow/develop the ANSF, I'd listen to whatever he had to say <i>and</i> even give him a reach-around. Whatever GIRoA or ANSF thinks of us, we're paying them too much to have them complain too loudly about us being cowards on the FOB.
- "<i>..push the remaining FOBBITs down to tactical units and off the FOBs, live off of the local economy, in the local communities where the enemy also happens to be living, and kill those punks..</i> While I agree the FOBs in Kabul are disgustingly bloated (mil and contractor alike), see COL Jones' excellent papers regarding Threat vs Populace-Centric Engagement. As much as I find fault with COIN "strategy," we all know we can't (unfortunately) kill our way to victory. Corruption in Kabul and differing national interests will lose this for us long before Taliban body counts tally up in our favor (and yes, for those who thought we lost that metric along with the Whiz Kids in the '60s, we do track *daily* body counts nationwide).
Move Forward:
- <i>"Is the risk of captured Americans roaming Kabul unarmed, worth the strategic headlines and subsequent diversion of military assets to search for those Americans?</i> Again, I think it goes back to the larger strategic risk we face. We can't fight a COIN battle by hiding behind hescos and zipping around in convoys. When I get stuck riding in an uparmored SUV in battle-rattle, the look on people's faces on the street is one of utter hatred; you can see it in their eyes when they look through the bullet-proof glass at you. One of the most uncomfortable looks I've ever gotten. When I'm in a taxi, they pay me no mind and if they do, it's usually a smile and curiosity. If anything is going to change, we need to be out in the city, improving their local economies with our mid-month paychecks, and building (economic) relationships to foster our own security.
- "<i>Isn't the whole idea to let the ANA and ANP take over security and perform the COIN face-time themselves?</i> I think unfortunately the only face-time Kabul residents get from ANP might be a shakedown at a traffic stop or at the very least, local cops making their daily commutes hell while they're forced to screw up the traffic patterns at every traffic circle in the city to direct our convoys through (who are not overly shy about using sirens, horns, and offensive driving skills to get where they need to go).
Slapout9:
Great points, number 3 and 4!
Elias:
I just have honestly no idea what you're talking about and will leave it at that. Sorry.
Jeremy,
Don't want to get in a fight with you, nor do I believe you don't know what I'm talking about.
Lots of the APH are working outside their area of expertise, and have language skills that are simply nowhere near sufficient. Many are essentially career dead-enders. How many early promotes do you see around you? I know almost no one in the program left the language school with a two...DLI minimum for graduation.
On the army side, virtually no combat arms. On the Navy side, virtually no one with applicable experience for supporting a COIN fight. There is no real GIRoA AF, so I'm not sure what expertise the AF members bring, generally. There are some good people, some real stars, a few SOF, but most (and this is the consensus of everyone exposed to them) bring little but an attitude that they are there to save the day. We don't need more strategic thinkers....we need more workers.
I think the concept of Afghan Hands is good, but, like the HTTs, the usual mistake was made of trying to grow big way too quickly.
Elias,
First, you show me a COIN 'expert' and I've got a bridge to sell you in Brooklyn. I'd submit there is no such thing as a COIN expert because it's 100% situationally dependent on disparate environments (political, geographic, ethnic, tribal, economic, etc etc etc)...and we've continuously read the environment in AFG wrong up through the current day and that's not going to change. Second, do you think Afghanistan needs Navy or air force or Combat Arms expertise? Hint: they don't. They need a minimally-corrupt functioning government that satisfies the people's needs. They don't have that so that's why there's an insurgency. Branch expertise isn't going to solve any of that. If there's any reason why we're still in AFG in 2011 it's b/c the there's no force-wide grasp of what the problems are and what we can do about them with what tools. Finally, we can't drag a host nation to do something they don't want to do. I never said APHs can fix any that on the macro scale and if there are any that are out there that do think that, then you're absolutely right about them but I honestly haven't come across them here in Kabul.
But if there's one thing that APHs can change, it's being able to give ISAF a little breathing space by 'greasing the wheels' so to speak, and building personal and professional relationships with the populace, ministries, and NGOs that we should be partnered and embedded with. We should be helping to cement the people to the government by prodding, teaching, mentoring the gov't to deliver to the people's needs. But by and large we're not and that's the problem. As we're not, we're only widening the gulf between the people and their gov't by our policies in Kabul. That can't go on forever. Currently, none of the APHs in any of the Kabul HQs really does what the initial intent of the program was. Beyond that though, all of the NTM-A advisors should be embeds. APHs should be a fleeting good idea because if it was worthwhile, the entire trainer/mentor/advisor command would do it as SOP. But they don't because PC-COIN isn't bought into. Contractors and mil advisors spend maybe half a day at a ministry a few times a week then shuffle back to their powerpoint boxes. We seem to have forgotten (or never really learned?) that in a PC-COIN fight we might actually have to spend some time with the Afghans, god forbid. We're so focused on ANSF growth numbers and chasing organized crime and government failure around in the provinces (and calling it "Taliban") that we're losing the country to corruption in Kabul and a steady and growing gulf between what GIRoA wants and what we want.
As far as your other points:
Language: we didn't go to DLI and fluency was never the benchmark. But I completely agree with you that the program's intent was ridiculously optimistic to have us graduate after 4 mos with a 1+ and expect us to be any kind of effective in a working environment...even with a full year of follow-on, self-paced lang. training in-country. But that's OBE because very few of us ever leave the base to actually use what little language skills haven't atrophied by now. It would have been nice if they sent us to DLI for the full course but they wanted the program to start up fast, cheap, and good....well, they got 2 out of 3.
Career dead-enders: I don't know what the HRC rates are by branch but I expect there are similar BTZ rates as a percentage of the APH population compared to the larger Army. And as far as cohort 1, I'd say that most were voluntold into the program for whatever reason without choice, especially from the army side. I haven't seen any slugs in the program, but I've seen the program and the system we're deposited into suck the living soul out of any good we though we could do when we showed up here in early '10.
Areas of Expertise: of course we're mostly being used outside of them...all we are are individual augmentees that are used to fill billets in HQs, RCs, and units. Some of us are lucky and placed in a job commensurate with our branch/functional area; others not so much. But again, this war isn't going to be won because we've got awesome tankers, artillerists, helo pilots, etc....it just needs people to try and understand Afghan problems from Afghan perspectives. We're woefully short on that and that is what APHs were supposed to help with, regardless of branch. SOF is critical to that but they're obviously in a class and a mission by themselves. APHs are certainly not intended to fill any SOF or SOF-type roles (even though there were a handful of SOF in the 1st cohort, SOF can be APHs but not vice versa. No one thinks that).
I'd also agree with you that the program grew too big too fast. Implementation began before the program was even fully figured out. It's still not fully figured out and I'm almost done with my 1st tour. But I'd caveat 'too big' though; 5 or 7 yrs ago, 500 or 1000 APHs might have made a difference. In 2011, 300 of us will make no difference whatsoever. When you consider the forcepro attitude across the force, there is little reason for many of us to be here anymore since most of us can't use any of the training for any of the reasons we were sent here for.
Finally, I desperately disagree with you that we don't need more strategic thinkers. What we've largely had is 10 years of tactical thinking with no overarching strategy balancing ends, ways, and means. I'm not at all saying APHs are intended to fit that bill (we're peppered throughout the battlespace from the strategic down to the tactical) but our effort in AFG is in some definite need of anyone who can see the big picture and tie it into what we've got to work with.
Good conversation.
Cheers,
MAJ K
I agree with both MAJ K and Elias- I think it is a travesty that action officers across the board are constrained as much as they are and I also think the Afghan Hands program might not be 100% filled with folks best suited to the task.
My "favorite" quotes from my tour that have to do with this subject:
LTC, BN Commander and senior mentor to Afghan unit: "I will not have anyone from my unit going anywhere with the [Afghan] commander or his staff." (due to the movement/FORCEPRO policies). My thought: "then leave the country!"
Senior Coalition officer: "If someone dies, Europe will stop sending troops." My thought: "they are already not sending troops, missing pledges by more than 50%! Are our assumptions valid regarding Europe and what we lose from being so risk averse?"
ANA general officer, after being told that his adviser couldn't go to dinner with him because of the short suspense/FORCEPRO and movement control policies in place: "Even though we like you Americans better, at least the Russians would go to dinner with us."
Coalition field-grade officer who hadn't been outside of the Green Zone except to go to IJC a few times: "If you go down Chicken Street you'll get your head cut off." My thought: "how the hell would he know?!?"
Red-headed U.S. College kid from Wisconsin on summer break: "I walk down Chicken Street all the time alone to eat lunch. Why are you Army guys so scared of walking around downtown?" My thought: "Maybe the reason we constantly have to remind ourselves we are 'warriors' is because we aren't..."
Field-grade officer calling a subordinate field-grade officer on his cell phone: "Where are you? At the embassy? You haven't been at your desk for two hours. You need to let me know the next time you are going to be away from your desk for more than an hour." My thought: "this guy has got to be the highest paid babysitter in the world."
Movement control policy being interpreted to staff members: "If you walk to the ministry, you have to walk with someone else, but you can go without body armor. If you drive, you have to go in an up-armored vehicle. If your mentored counterpart offers to give you a ride back to the camp, you cannot accept due to him most likely having a soft-skin vehicle, but you CAN walk next to his vehicle on the way back."
Senior Coalition officer: "We don't have time to include the Afghans in our planning effort. And we don't want them to see our plan until we agree internally on what it should be." My thought: "We aren't doing COIN. We are doing unilateral CT/nation-building disguised as COIN."
I personally think that the dynamic in Afghanistan- not just Kabul- but all of Afghanistan- should be one in which Colonels have to hold their guys back from going out with their Afghan counterparts so much instead of the other way around- Colonels fighting with their guys every time they want to go hang out with their Afghan counterparts. I think folks involved with internal information management should be kicked out of country- we can do 90% or more of that stuff from CONUS. And I think that we should really question a lot of our assumptions- I hear them stated as facts too often.
Grant Martin
MAJ, US Army
The above comments are the author's own and do not represent the position of the US Army or DoD.
"I think folks involved with internal information management should be kicked out of country- we can do 90% or more of that stuff from CONUS."
Agreed. Even in-country, most leaders "manage" via email....so why waste tax-dollars in combat pay for these people when they can exercise the same bureacractic inertia from CONUS?
For the APH program and/ or TTs (advisors), deploy only those that are willing to spend time with their host-nation counter-part, aren't terrified of going "outside the wire", are willing to do so without 80 lbs. of stuff hanging off of them while buttoned up in a rolling bomb shelter, & are willing to interact with the local nationals on a daily basis. We'll probably see a far more effective COIN/ advisory effort and less hyper-risk aversion.
Morgan,
Re: your last point - that's the whole issue. APHs are in the program to do exactly that. This was M4's original intent, that's how the program was sold to us, and that's how we were promised we'd be used. The problem lies in utilization once in-theater by commands who have neither the conceptual understanding of PC-COIN or are intentionally sticking their strategic heads in the sand until we can pull out in 2014 anyway (not wanting to lose anyone until then).
Don't let me totally dissuade you; if you love high-content fecal dust in the air, a war with questionable military strategy to match the civilian policy, and eye-watering corruption and waste, Afghanistan is DEFINITELY the place for you! ;o) Plus, we just got diet Pepsi back in the DFACs!
The above comments are the author's own and do not represent the position of the US Army or DoD.
Target.
I helplessly watched the backlash of a supposed "failed Force-Pro policy" that resulted in death. It was the result of two individuals who purposely deceived the chain of command (with assistance from their first and second-line leaders) and exceeded their lanes by a wide margin. Result? A witch hunt that saw a career ended and a new "team" of leaders involved.
Changes made that resulted in a pronouncement of the "problem" being solved? Abolition of the "no hat" area, minimum numbers of vehicles for convoys and the carrying of loaded weapons for the 600m (gate to gate) walk from one American enclave to another within the confines of a major ANA installation... as well as requirements for at least one long weapon being carried on PT runs on the ANA camp.
VIOLA! Discipline returned, all is well.
Of course, Camp Dubs was still working to complete the stone wall to replace the Hesco walls while simultaneously shutting down communications with the ANA garrison commander to the bare minimum. Starting with Georgia's 48th BCT and continuing into the 86th BCT's deployment, radical upgrades to force protection on the camp located in the center of a large ANA camp were made. As a 1LT from Georgia informed me, "You can't trust these Afghanis. You never know what they might be thinking." Interpreters and ANA personnel were also banned from the DFAC without prior approval of the camp mayor.
More than one commander going through the COIN course would announce loudly in small groups that they would not order their troops into harm's way.
A paradox of COIN: The safer to try to keep yourself, the less secure you actually are.
Small war... I'm sure that I met MAJ K when the first iteration of APH came through CTC-A and I'm pretty sure that I met Phil when he was in RC Central.