by Mike Fowler
Download The Full Article: Philippine Counterinsurgency Strategy: Then and Now
Shortly after the end of the Spanish-American War in 1898, an insurgency campaign began against the US occupational force in the Philippines. In less than four years, the counterinsurgents were able to claim victory as the last of the major insurgent leaders surrendered. As of 2010, an entirely different insurgency campaign in the Philippines dragged into its fifth decade. This analysis provides fresh insights into effective counterinsurgency strategy while offering a heavy dose of caution to the transferability of lessons learned from one counterinsurgency to the next. While this study confirms many key factors of a successful counterinsurgency strategy, the findings of this study also indicate that lessons cannot be universally applied in all counterinsurgencies due to wide variations in insurgent strategy.
This study is a comparative analysis of two periods of major insurgency in the Philippines: 1899-1902 and 1969-2009. The analysis compares both insurgent and counterinsurgent strategies between and within the two periods. Although there is no "recipe" or checklist that will ensure a successful insurgency or counterinsurgency, there is significant overlap among the best practices recommended by both academics and the military. From this overlap, this study employs five factors to analyze insurgency and six factors to analyze counterinsurgency.
Of the five key factors for insurgency, arguably the most important is the insurgents' primary objective. The primary objective varied widely among the insurgencies from social and political revolution to local autonomy and independence. Knowing the objective is an important part to understanding how to defeat the enemy or negotiate a path to victory. Second, the insurgencies' tactics were an important contribution. While several relied upon guerrilla warfare, some dabbled with conventional operations usually with disastrous consequences. Third, the insurgency's level of external support influences the groups' ability to secure weapons, supplies, and funds.. In the case of the Philippines, insurgencies received only limited supplies, weapons, funds, and ammunition from foreign partners. Although Philippine insurgencies generally lacked foreign support, several were able to create a safe haven sanctuary, the fourth factor. A save haven is a critical portion of ensuring insurgency survivability and longevity. Without it, the overwhelming conventional firepower of the state will generally win out. Finally, the study analyzed each insurgency's efforts to attempt to gain the support of the population. Support of the population provides insurgents a key logistics hub and intelligence network.
This study used six factors to analyze counterinsurgency strategies in the Philippines. Gaining the support of the population is just as important to the counterinsurgent as to the insurgent. The support of the population both denies logistics to the enemy while extending the counterinsurgents human intelligence network. Second, just as it is important for an insurgent to have an enemy sanctuary, counterinsurgency strategy requires the elimination of a save haven. Third, separating the insurgents from the population both provides security to the population while denying resupply of the insurgents. Fourth, victory can come through negotiation. A willingness to concede something less than total annihilation of rebel forces is a common trait among successful insurgencies. Fifth, capture of key leaders is often important to breaking an insurgency. Many insurgencies revolve around charismatic figures that depend upon allegiance based on the leader's personality. Without the personality, the cause can flounder. Finally, targeting the enemy's logistics is a common method of forcing insurgents to capitulate.
Each of the factors above was subjectively analyzed based on historical data. The study is organized into three main parts. The first section analyzes the strategies employed during the 1899-1902 Philippine War. The second section covers 1969-2009. The final section compares the various strategies and summarizes with some insights for the counterinsurgent strategist.
Download The Full Article: Philippine Counterinsurgency Strategy: Then and Now
Lt Col Mike Fowler is a 17-year Air Force intelligence officer. He received his Master's Degree in International Relations from Troy State University and his PhD in Security Studies from the Naval Postgraduate School. He is currently researching the effects of violence on state political development.
About the Author(s)
Comments
I think you underrate the extent to which this article is purely and simply wrong, on a basic factual level. Balangiga is not in Batangas, to cite one among many, and while each individual factual error may not have much bearing on the overall conclusion, in sum they suggest very poor research. Part of the superficiality might be traceable to trying to cover too much history for an article of this size, but that doesn't excuse the outright inaccuracies or the very shaky conclusions drawn.
I think you overrate the extent to which geostrategic issues are relevant to Philippine insurgencies. There's been a bit more willingness to see a US military presence here and that can be traced to the China situation, but there's no real increase in US influence and that has little to no bearing on the insurgency situation. The insurgencies are purely over local issues, and the US is a bit player.
At least in the Philippine sense, I'd say it's not accurate to say that "we simply were no longer perceived as necessary by many of the populaces of the region at our Cold War level of presence". Our presence little or nothing to do with any perception of the populace; it was a consequence of deals struck with (some would say imposed on) the elites in power. Nobody asked the populace.
EC,
This is no more or less accurate that virtually any other published account of insurgency in the Philippines. It is not that people are "wrong" or "lie", it is simply that it is complicated and most Western standards assess the suppression of violence as a COIN victory, regardless of how attained or how temporary.
From my perspective the Philippines have been in pretty much a continuous state of insurgency at least since the first Spaniard set foot on their soil. The intensity, motivations, ideologies, locations, populace group, etc all vary over time but the challenge to governance is a constant rumble.
The curse of the Philippines is their perceived geo-strategic importance and their relative vulnerability compared to the powerful nations of every era, be that Spain, the US or China. I see no change to their location or vulnerability on the horizon, so I suspect this internal poor governance and popular discontent, along with external meddling of varying degrees in efforts to establish some degree of influence or out right control to continue.
For the US I believe we are beginning to see what I call "the lesser of two evils effect" across South East Asia. While their was a dip in US influence post-Cold War that was exacerbated by our early frantic pursuits of anything AQ; there is a resurgence of US influence. Not because people like us more, not because we got smarter or better looking. But simply because we are so far away, and with the rise of China are perceived by many as being the lesser of two evils.
We had the opposite of this in the Middle East following the Cold War. With the demise of the Soviets we found ourselves as "the evil." Not because we had gotten more evil, or people liked us less, or we had gotten dumber or less attractive. Equally not because of AQ, bin Laden or Islamist ideology applied by AQ and similar organizations. We simply were no longer perceived as necessary by many of the populaces of the region at our Cold War level of presence, influence and activity. We had worn out our welcome. The governments who relied upon the US for their own power and status wanted us to stay, but it was the people who began to push back, against us and against those same governments. I don't see us becoming once again "the lesser of two evils" in the Middle East anytime soon, so we need to continue to refine our presence their to more tollerable levels and better approaches to securing our interests. Similarly we need to recognize that as others open more doors to us in the South and South East Asia regoins, it is not because they like us, it is because they fear a rising China more.
Cheers!
Bob
"Shortly after the end of the Spanish-American War in 1898, an insurgency campaign began against the US occupational force in the Philippines. In less than four years, the counterinsurgents were able to claim victory as the last of the major insurgent leaders surrendered."
This is an incredibly irresponsible and poor piece of journalism. Do you mean by the "insurgency campaign" the Philippine-American War, in which the already-beleaguered Filipino people tried to defend their country against the American invading army? There was an important discussion in the States during that time about U.S. imperialism, as that is precisely what the four years of war was all about. This is not my opinion; it is a known fact. And do you mean by the "counterinsurgents" the U.S. Army personnel who massacred a significant percentage of the civilian population?
The "victory" you write of was the defeat of the Filipino people, the decimation of the population and the definite end of their hope, following the Philippine Revolution against Spain, of gaining independence and the freedom to govern themselves. I cannot imagine how anyone can conceive of this war as an "insurgency campaign." Does this publication not employ fact-checkers?
Robert C. Jones did a good job of linking Chinese aid to the Philippines. I will now submit some supporting material to my assumptions based on operating in the Philippines since 1977 and actually having lived there for twelve years after retirement.
On corruption of the AFP:
http://www.philstar.com/Article.aspx?articleId=652387&publicationSubCat…
On Political Dynasties:
The List of the Filipino Political Clans & Ruled Provinces & Cities in the Philippines - Part 1
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lXzM7H6LJ6I&feature=related
The List of the Filipino Political Clans & Ruled Provinces & Cities in the Philippines - Part 2
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HviEUZ_IiLw&feature=related
The List of the Filipino Political Clans & Ruled Provinces & Cities in the Philippines - Part 3
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gDdJ1TSp6jE
Dealing separately with history...
Throughout the Philippine/American relationship policy statements have invariably dealt with high-minded matters of liberty and responsibility. The reality has generally been a lot more down to earth, and generally relates to financial, commercial, and geopolitical conflicts and concerns.
Tydings-McDuffie had little or nothing to do with liberty or benefit to others. The colonial venture was never profitable, and the colony cost far more to maintain than it produced in business. Before the Depression that was tolerable; with the Depression and the general isolationism of the 1930s prevailing, the islands were seen a liability that needed to be spun off as soon as possible. At the end of WW2, of course, things had changed: with US commerce on the rise and the Cold War looming there was suddenly pressure to continue a presence in the Philippines. There was actually some agitation to retain the colony, and a brief move to retain Mindanao as a US colony. These were rejected in compromise deals that retained US bases and extensive US privileges. In each case the decisions were made on the basis of the perceived interests of the day.
I do not think the Huk rebellion was caused by a rollback of American commitments to the Filipino people. To some extent you might blame MacArthur's efforts to restore "the right people" - his buddies from the pre-war aristocracy - to positions of power, but in all probability that class would have taken the driver's seat no matter what we did. The red hysteria of the early Cold War didn't help, but the Philippine elite needed no encouragement to suppress agrarian unrest. The decaying feudalism of agrarian central Luzon combined with the arms and experience of guerrilla warfare that the peasantry gained during WW2 probably made that fight inevitable; I doubt very much that any US action would have prevented it.
If anyone still believes the comment in the original article to the effect that the US never intended to keep the Philippine colony... I'll offer an excellent price on a quite lovely bridge in Brooklyn. Historically a quite fascinating period, though generally misrepresented, as so much of our history is.
I don't think anyone is discussing bases any more, permanent or temporary. Port visits, shipyard access, certainly, but not full basing. Pretty much a dead issue.
The hysteria over AQ in SEA has pretty much died down. I think most realize now that it was overhyped from the start (Kilcullen once referred to SEA as the "swing state" in the GWOT) and that the influence of global Islamist movements here has steadily declined from even the limited level it once had. There will still be conflict over local issues, and there is still a globally connected extremist fringe that can and will carry out terrorist attacks, but overall AQ's effort to bring SE Asian Muslims into a coordinated <i>jihadi</i> movement on a large scale has to be seen as a huge failure.
I really don't see much justification for a continued US military presence here, beyond training and a bit of "capacity building". Long-term resolution of the various insurgencies will require internally generated political reform, and that's not something any US policy can accomplish. Suppression and civic action projects were never more than band-aids, and they aren't going to accomplish much more than they already have.
I do think there are things we can do to help. I would love, for example, to see the US embassy here draw up a detailed report on corruption, the history of collusion and cooperation between government units and insurgent/terrorist/bandit groups, and arms leakage from the military and police, naming names and describing specific incidents. It would be quite reasonable to recommend that military cooperation be suspended until these issues are addressed. That document could then be stamped "secret" and indirectly released to Wikileaks. That would cause a great uproar, and there would be demands that we withdraw (which we can do with no pain at all to us); it would not solve the matters but it might help to pull things into the public eye that really need to be there. The shell of immunity that has protected the military, police and local petty tyrants is still in place, but it grows thinner all the time. The best way to attack it is to keep it in the public eye: the Ampatuans indirectly did the nation a great favor by fixing the nation's attention on the abuses of politically favored local warlords; the more these matters are kept in view the more the government will feel the heat from their own people, which is where it needs to come from.
I don't think US diplomatic pressure has accomplished or will accomplish anything at all in terms of concrete reform.
In short: there is certainly no point in a policy based on desire for bases and a fear of the Muslim peril. Neither is there any point in a policy based on trying to reform Philippine governance: that's not our job and our interference is likely to hurt as much as it helps. Our side has a very limited grasp of the core issues (witness USIPs very messy involvement in a poorly designed and horribly executed "peacemaking" effort); we are easily manipulated by self-interested individuals and groups and we often create as many problems as we solve. Far better to step back and deal with the Philippines as a sovereign nation that's dealing with its own problems in its own way. We might have a role to play providing a little support here, a little encouragement there, a bit of help and a bit of pointing out matters that need to be dealt with, but if we try to wade in and play saviour we are only going to make a mess.
"The U.S. Congress then successfully passed the Tydings-McDuffie Act, in March 1934 (known as the Philippine Independence Act), establishing a ten-year transition period beginning in 1936, with independence to be established in 1946. US naval bases were to be permitted only through 1947. The bill found favor among the Philippine leadership.
On Dec. 9, 1935, the University of Notre Dame sponsored a special convocation in honor of the new Commonwealth of the Philippines, and awarded President Roosevelt an honorary degree. During his acceptance speech, Roosevelt stated that America had "chosen the right course with respect to the Philippine Islands. Through our power we have not sought more power. Through our power we have sought to benefit others."
http://www.larouchephil.com/content/fdr-tradition-philippines
Of course WWII came along, and disrupted the growth of the Philippines as a modern nation; and then Roosevelt's death resulted in a major rollback of his commitments to the Philippine people following the war (the denial of veterans benefits, etc) giving rise to the Huk rebellion, which we in turn helped suppress.
Once Nationalist China fell in '49, and we realized that the PRC was not in fact the friendly ally on the Asian mainland that we had naievely assumed them to be, it really spelled the end for FDR's goal of abandoning the British Colnial model in our own operations, and turning back the post-WWII efforts of European nations to reclaim their colonial possessions.
It is time to return to FDR's perspectives on these matters. Our current COIN doctrine remains a bastard child of British Colonial COIN doctrine; and our approaches to policy issues in the Philippines are dominated by our own concerns with possible Islamist terrorist sanctuaries in the south and the need for bases in the north (even if just temporary use in time of crisis) to contain the PRC.
It is time to worry less about these matters of US interests that are serviced in the Philippines, and more on the original pre-requisite that FDR set for relinquishing US sovereign control over these people and their nation:
"On March 2, 1934, President Roosevelt communicated to Congress a request that the Hawes-Cutting Act be amended. His message characterized the history of U.S.-Philippine relations, and his perspective for the future.
"Over a third of a century ago, the United States, as a result of a war which had its origin in the Caribbean Sea, acquired sovereignty over the Philippine Islands, which lie many thousands of miles from our shores across the widest of oceans. Our Nation covets no territory; it desires to hold no people against their will over whom it has gained sovereignty through war.
"In keeping with the principles of justice and in keeping with our traditions and aims, our Government for many years has been committed by law to ultimate independence for the people of the Philippine Islands whenever they should establish a suitable Government capable of maintaining that independence among the Nations of the world. We believe that the time for such independence is at hand."
Dayuhan,
I always look forward to your comments on the Philippines. I would offer a different take on this comment you made above:
"..when key Khalifa associate Abdul Asmad was killed (set up by the rising criminal element within ASG, as was Khaddafy Janjalani after him)..."
I am not sure of your point on this. Kaddafy Janjalani was killed in September 2006 in the Tugas area of Jolo during Operation Ultimatum when a Philippine Marine Battalion Landing Team attacked ASG dug in positions (there were more than 60 fighting positions many with overhead cover in the dense jungle). As an aside 19 Philippine Marines died in that battle. I am not sure how he was set up by the rising criminal element in the ASG.
But I still enjoy your comments and find them worth thinking about always.
<i>We walk on eggshells and avoid the tough stances required to drive the degree and nature of political changes required in Manila to address the policies and actions radiating out from that capital</i>
The US does not have the capacity or responsibility to change Philippine governance: that's something Filipinos need to do themselves. We might possibly be able to help, but not to any great extent: we don't have that kind of influence and it isn't our role to play.
I don't think it's entirely accurate to say that the problems radiate out from Manila. We deal here with deeply entrenched patterns of local governance that Manila has been unable to affect. The solutions might raditae out, if manila ever discovers the will and capacity to bring local government and the military/police apparatus within the rule of law, but the problems are very much local.
In at least one case - the inevitable tension between the Muslm populace of Mindanao and the introduced Christian settlers - today's government is reaping a whirlwind sown generations ago. Very difficult thing to resolve, and recent efforts have done more harm than good.
China's loans to the Philippines typically involve the Chinese Government paying Chinese companies to do work here, with the Filipinos ultimately paying the bill. No real surprise, that's common (we do it too, as do the Japanese). China has bought commercial entry points and influence (often transient) with individuals, but it would be inaccurate to say the Philippines is "turning to China" in any geopolitical sense. There's still enormous distrust and hostility toward China, over the Spratly islands, over China's perceived territorial aggressiveness, and over well entrenched dislike: as in Indonesia, the Chinese have a mixed reputation here.
I'd actually say US influence has held up pretty well in SE Asia, not because we're loved or because of anything we've done, but because there's a great deal of suspicion of China (unlike Africa, we're in the neighborhood) and the US is seen as the only viable counterweight.
ASG, in brief, began with real and direct AQ sponsorship (not via JI), which continued until 1994, when key Khalifa associate Abdul Asmad was killed (set up by the rising criminal element within ASG, as was Khaddafy Janjalani after him). By '98 AQ was completely out of the picture and ASG was a criminal enterprise with a very nominal Islamist agenda. Since then it's wandered a bit: US efforts at suppressing the criminal elements actually prompted a turn back to a more Islamist/terrorist agenda at one point. Overall a very interesting story, often badly distorted (lot of nonsense written) but not one with any great bearing on the GWOT.
Like a Pre-WWII US (they study our rise to power closely, copying what we did well, and seeking to avoid our mistakes), China places no overt condtions on aid. They are merely buying access and influence now, and will wait (as we did) for leadership situtions and foreign influence to change; and be prepared to step up when they do.
The U.S., on the other hand, is overwhelmingly constrained by concerns over the China-Taiwan relationship, and our self-imposed role in the middle of that dynamic in every decision we make in the Philippines. We walk on eggshells and avoid the tough stances required to drive the degree and nature of political changes required in Manila to address the policies and actions radiating out from that capital that keep conditions of insurgency smoldering at relatively high levels in various communities and groups across the nation.
As to the ASG, they are largely a criminal organization, (kidnap for ransom, etc) that associated with J.I. more to lend themselves a perception of religious/nationalist legitimacy with the populace. MILF and MNLF are politically driven insurgent groups in the South. We go after these guys due to their loose affiliation with AQ through JI; but we don't go after them too hard so as to avoid pissing off the government in Manila whose support is so critical to the China-Taiwan issue. (Much like in Pakistan, US GWOT policies create conflicts of interest for the government in a manner that contributes to internal instability due to the variance in US national interests in their country and their own)
As to China's efforts to build their own influence in the Philippines, in addition to the nearly $1B Northrail project in Luzon that is so justifiably a focus of controversy (where is the money going, why is no progress happening on the rail, etc), they have expanded "no-string" aid dramatically:
"From a miniscule US$60 million in 2003,
Chinese concessional lending to the Philippines
surged to US$460 million by 2004 and has more
than doubled to US$1.1 billion as of 2007,
making China the fourth biggest development
lender after Japan, the Asian Development Bank
(ADB), and the World Bank (WB).
Chinese loans for the Philippines were poised
to triple to almost US$3 billion if a kickbacks
scandal over Chinese telecommunication
firm ZTEs contract to supply the National
Broadband Network (NBN) project did not
prompt Arroyo to scuttle talks for several
Chinese loans, including US$1 billion for the
Laiban dam, another ambitious project to
increase drinking water supply in Metro Manila,
the capital, by half."
More broadly:
"between 2002 and 2007, the amount
of Chinese aid money for Southeast Asia rose
from only US$36 million in 2002 to US$6.7
billion by 2007. Globally, Chinese aid surged
from only US$51 million in 2002 to US$25.1
billion five years later."
http://www.realityofaid.org/userfiles/roareports/roareport_452449c76e.p…
US GWOT policies and actions have put a heavy drain on US influence around the globe, but few places more heavily than in South East Asia, and the PRC is pushing hard to fill that void.
It's an exaggeration to say that "Every barrio, town and city has a family which represents the local dynasty and maintains a hold on their power through corruption, intimidation and murder", but this pattern of neo-feudalism is common and well entrenched in many parts of the country, typically (and not surprisingly) the areas in which insurgency flourishes.
I do not think this is a particularly good historical perspective: it's drastically oversimplified, forced into categories that are not always appropriate, a great deal is omitted and there are a number of significant inaccuracies. I also suspect that there was not a great deal of field experience involved in its preparation.
I do not at all agree with the conclusion that "The Philippines seems on the verge of victory of its counterinsurgency campaign". I see a continued cycle of ebb and flow in the insurgency, with none of the core issues being addressed and negotiations pushing through a long-established cycle of ineffectual talk interspersed with periods of fighting. In the case of the NPA at least the government has the benefit of a remarkably inept antagonist: the Philippine left's entrenched attachment to 70s-vintage mantras and refusal to allow political or doctrinal evolution have prevented it from effectively exploiting an environment that ought to be tailor made for it.
I see no evidence at all that the Philippines "has leaned more and more to China", as suggested above.
I could dissect this in detail, but it would require considerable space and more time than I have to spend at the moment. Several omissions struck me as particularly glaring, though. One is the absence of any mention of the functional and effective sanctuary that the ASG long enjoyed as a consequence of mutually profitable arrangements with military, police, and local government officials, all of whom have have had closer ties to the ASG than AQ. It's also quite remarkable that the author refers to "ready availability of transportation, weapons, ammo, and training on the global market" without mentioning that the dominant source of the weapons and ammunition used by Philippine insurgents, criminals, and private armed groups is and has long been purchases from the police and military.
The role of civic action projects in achieving popular support in Basilan and Jolo is, I think, consistently overstated. In the long term these projects are band-aids, and will have no lasting effect without significant reforms in local governance, which are not in progress.
There's a substantial open question remaining over the future of insurgency in the Tausug, Samal, and Yakan areas where the ASG flourished. This was once MNLF heartland, but the MNLF is fractured and largely dysfunctional. An expansion of MILF influence would seem logical, but the MILF's leadership is predominantly drawn from the Maguindanao/Maranao aristocracy and has limited appeal farther west, particularly among the dominant Tausug. The ASG is best understood as a failed attempt to create a regional jihadi organization, and while the name will resurface in connection with various criminal and terrorist acts the "organization", very loose for years, is unlikely to achieve significant political influence. That leaves a bit of a vacuum, and it will be very interesting to see what emerges to fill it. It ain't over, or close to being over.
What is conspicuously left out of the article, which leads me to believe that the study was based off existing documents and not actual experience on the ground, is the rampant corruption that permeates every fiber of Philippine society. Every barrio, town and city has a family which represents the local dynasty and maintains a hold on their power through corruption, intimidation and murder. So the insurgencies will continue to thrive, but in their current morphed form of "Bandidos," mirroring their government leaders, not in the sense of any idelogical insurgency.
The criminal justice system is corrupted on all sides and the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the weakest in SE Asia, has no desire to see these insurgencies end, as it would put a stop to the continuous foreign aid, especially from the USA, which continues to provide the senior Political and AFP leadership with very handsome retirement packages. As the Philippines has leaned more and more towards China, watch for them to continue to straddle both sides of the fence, in hopes of double-dipping into the foreign direct aid pot.
Overall a good historical perspective...
The article on the COIN operations in the Philippines was appreciated because I served in the USN in the early 1960's in that region and nearly lost my life when I mistakenly wandered too far into the jungle outside of the village of Olangapo along with 2 other sailors. We encountered 8-10 Huks who did their best to hack us up with machettes. It was a truly dire struggle and 2 of the 3 of us shed a little blood before we beat a hasty retreat. Navy Intelligence interviewed us and called them Huks so I could not help but wonder why your authors failed to mention the Huks, who were the original communist insurgents on Luzon in the 1950-1960 time frame?
Yes, and then Lansdale took what he learned to Vietnam where he was instrumental in the decision to cancel the nation-wide elections that were predicted to put Ho Chi Minh in place as the legitimate leader of a united Vietnam by a landslide.
He then worked diligently behind the scenes to expedite the migration of thousands of Catholic Vietnamese from the North to the South; and to set up the framework for separate "South only" elections where Diem won nearly 100% of the vote across the South, and miraculously, 130% in Saigon proper, as I recall. He was very good at his job. We should consider naming the Vietnam war after him.
As to this history of insurgency in the Philippines, it is a good collection of facts, but I would challenge the conclusions as they are based on what I see as a flawed understanding of the nature of insurgency. At the heart of all these many insurgencies (and this has been largely continuous and multiple in nature, grievance and location since the times of Magellan, varying in intensity over time as well), has been one illegitimate (and typically narrowly focused and ineffective) government after another.
The cure to insurgency in the Philippines is in Manila. They are slowly getting better, more inclusive, with broader legitimacy over the centuries. Foreign interventions have slowed this process more than they have helped. The current approach by the Americans is far healthier than historic ones, but it is still an intervention driven by U.S. national interests. Getting far less press is the growing efforts of China to build their own influence among these people and over this government.
Historically, when superpowers wrestle for influence in someone else's house, things get broken. The Philippines have always been key terrain, which is their blessing and their curse.
Key to remember is that insurgency is not created by ideology, malign actors, or insurgent groups. All of those are things that naturally occur among a populace as perceptions of the relationship between the government and the governed go south. That is human nature. The details are tailored by all the facts and circumstances of each unique situation. Governments tend to go out and address these symptoms, which by definition will be illegal; while the government's actions are typically legal. It's not so much about a "monopoly of violence" as a "monopoly of law."
The Philippines are a great case study for insurgency, and colonial intervention both. This is a good contribution to that study.