The fiscal year 2012 defense budget request is a break from the past ten years of budget growth, but it does not go far enough to rebalance defense spending priorities given the fiscal pressures and threats the United States faces, according to this policy brief. The Sacrifice Ahead: The 2012 Defense Budget recommends that the Department of Defense (DOD) pursue additional efficiencies savings and make modest reductions in its base budget to help shore up the U.S. economy, the core of America's global and military power.
In The Sacrifice Ahead, author Travis Sharp calls on government leaders -- including the next secretary of defense and members of Congress -- to address the budgetary challenges that threaten U.S. national security: The Pentagon's need to further streamline its operations and America's growing debt.
"The FY 2012 budget requested by DOD will enable the U.S. military to defend the nation against many perils. But it will do little to stymie a threat that may ultimately prove more dangerous: America's growing debt," writes Sharp. "Over time, the economic consequences of indebtedness may crowd out investments in a U.S. military that undergirds international security; may render the United States more vulnerable to economic coercion; and may erode America's global stature and soft power. Relieving U.S. indebtedness demands preventive action by American society and government -- including DOD."
Comments
<i>Policymakers should not set an exact numerical target for budget reductions without first conducting a strategic analysis of security risks and tradeoffs. A base budget reduction of approximately 10-15 percent over the FYDP would serve as a benchmark because it corresponds with DODs approximate share of total federal spending.</i>
Dont those two sentences crash into each other? As Secretary Gates himself would say, "thats not strategy, its math."
The FY 2012 budget request contemplates base budget spending of $2,919 billion over the FYDP (FY12-16). A reduction of 10-15% is a reduction of $292-438 billion over this period. In context, those sums are equal to the departments entire procurement account for roughly 2.5 to 4 years, a half a decade of research spending, 15-20 years of shipbuilding for the Navy, 17-26 years of aircraft purchases for the Air Force, and so on.
When proposing "benchmark" cuts of any given amount, analysts should be willing, perhaps obligated, to also discuss what associated strategic risks they are willing to accept as a consequence of their proposals.
In addition, we should assume that on current trends the global bond market, the kind stranger upon which the U.S. Treasury is now so extravagantly dependent, will on short notice force policymakers in Washington to become quick experts at swallowing geopolitical risks. Geopolitical disasters are never cheap but they are usually avoidable, at least for states with the status of the United States.