Comments
There is something unsettling about a general serving in the field writing op-ed pieces, even if everything he says is accurate in every sense of the word (and I agree that the raw numbers presented here are misleading as to actual progress being made). On the other hand, I don't necessarily impute evil intentions. I think it's more a combination of self-deception and a desire to win. After all, one of the boxes to be checked in any successful COIN operation is "maintain public support". Since the media and politicians often work at cross-purposes to the military in this regard, it is inevitable that generals feel impelled to shoulder some of the burden by 'trumpeting' successes. It doesn't help that indicators of progress in COIN are sometimes counterintuitive. As for self-deception, it is difficult to grasp, until you've experienced it, how hard headquarters work to conflate activity with progress in COIN. Having enumerated their measures of performance and effectiveness, staff and commanders are routinely mesmerized by their own benchmarks. This is why COIN and nation-building are so insidiously destructive of military professionalism and conducive to militarism.
The problem I have with press statements/releases/opinion pieces such as these is that I think they tend to make the military lose credibility. This article does little more than trumpet the accomplishments of NTM-A and its commander while making it sound like things are hunky-dory and the mainstream media are just not covering the "real" story.
The truth is that ISAF is convinced that they have to show short-term results in order to continue support at home for the surge forces and the money flow. They and their subordinates cannot afford to work on long-term, sticky issues such as ANSF effectiveness or Afghan-lead because that would entail risk to positive-trending metrics, and thus endanger the continued flow of money and the dream that the politicians will allow us to maintain surge numbers past 2011. The military has ceased to be an "executor of public will" and now sees itself as a "shaper of public opinion".
Thus NTM-A's concentration on and trumpeting of numbers of ANSF (an ANSF "surge"). This ignores the quality peice of the ANSF, the issues with the Afghans sustaining what we are creating, their actual capability for what we would like them to do as well as what they will most likely be doing once we draw-down, the neglect of Afghan-sustainable systems and infrastructure, and the troubling attrition numbers- something you rarely, if ever- hear NTM-A talk about.
The sad truth is that NTM-A's plan is to pump out raw numbers of ANSF and hold that up to the US Congress and NATO in the hopes that it buys legitimacy for the effort- and then maybe one day we will get down to the dirty business of actually worrying about real progress once we secure "time and space". IJC's plan is to pump a few "key" districts full of an unsustainable amount of money, Coalition troops, ANSF, and GIRoA presence in the short-term in order to secure that same "time and space" they think the politicians are, at this time, unwilling to give them.
This has turned our efforts in Afghanistan dangerously close into what it looks like we did in Vietnam: try to sell our efforts to an increasingly-disenchanted public. If the end-game desired is a "mandate to continue COIN" (an actual quote from a recent COIN seminar), then we are reduced to little more than propaganda machines.
The question I have is when did the military turn into an organization that has it's own agenda? If our people and politicians aren't giving us a mandate to "continue COIN"- why is it in our purview to steer them in a different direction? It's one thing to give the "real" story. It's another thing when your base assumptions are 180 degrees from your people.
Most military I talk to believe in their heart of hearts they have to stay in Afghanistan and kill Taliban- or Bin Laden will be launching planes into US buildings soon. Most Americans I talk to do not believe that. Talk about a disconnect between the military and the people we serve...
K L -- I agree that it is a measurement of <i>something</i>, I'm not sure that any of it is a reflection of GIRoA effectiveness or efforts. When you throw the financial weight of the US Departments of State and Defense behind an effort, you're going to see <i>some</i> movement. As Jason Thomas's anecdote illustrates, just because there is movement doesn't mean it's in the correct direction.
Dan Niggles
You are so right. During a nasty incident at Kings Circle on the road out of Kabul to Wardak, I was pulled over by five ANP along with two plain clothes dudes. They were shaking me down at the end of their AK's.
This was not about a routine check point. They were insistent at checking every nook and cranny of my belongings, over any check point I'd experienced. They tried to confiscate my Passport.
It crossed my mind how our own taxpayers money had been pumped into training these guys to be more effective at terrorising innocent members of the population or foreign nationals travelling outside a military safety net. Once the US and ISAF overwatch declines, Afghanistan would be an even more precarious environment in which to work as a foreign national.
LTG Caldwell has certainly been instrumental in improving the training and pay for ANP recruits (an obvious incentive in Afghanistan)
The increase in pay may very well be the single biggest motivating factor (as with any cash-for-work project) and does not signal an increase in public confidence of GiROA.
While I agree that an increase in ANSF recruits is not a measure of effectiveness in a security-oriented line of effort, I believe a case can be made that it is indeed a measure of effectiveness in a development/governance-based line of effort. Depending on how these ANSF soldiers were recruited, the increase in numbers could very well be an indicator of an increased effectiveness of GiROA, ANSF recruiting and/or personnel management.
What this article is emphasizing (IMHO) is that the good news is there are actually that many Afghans who are willing to take a level of risk by joining the ANSF (for whatever reason) and fight to advance GiROA and stabilize the country. This fact, I believe, is an indicator that GiROA is gaining credibility and more people are choosing to take their side in this conflict.
Just my $1.05.
M.L. and Dan are on the right track. Sadly, ISAF/NTM-A's press appearances have been rather poor at presenting realistic pictures of the situation and have chosen instead to focus on impressive-sounding quantities ($100 million in aid! 20,000 ANP trained!) that are actually meaningless (or worse, representative of money and corrupt governance that is being used to fuel the insurgency).
We can train 200,000 security troops and it isn't going to improve a thing so long as the culture of corruption exists. As long as the Afghan troops and their leaders can be bribed, they can be manipulated by whoever has money. In the long run, we will be known as the guys who trained and equiped the security guys who are now shaking people down at checkpoints. I know our trainers are doing their very best at imparting technical and tactical skills to these Afghans, but our efforts are wasted because the corrupt environment and culture will cause the Afghans to mis-use what we have taught them.
We came to Afghanistan for revenge, but now we are stuck to the Tar Baby. It is time to break camp and go home. Let the Pakis and Iranians can squabble over the bones of Afghanistan. We can't go into Pakistan, in force, to hunt al Qaeda because we are in Afghanistan (the Pakis have us hog-tied logistically). Get out of Afghanistan and we will have Operational flexibility. We took a wrong turn on the Silk Road.
The size of the Afghan security forces is a measure of performance, not a measure of effectiveness. I could (theoretically) deputize 100,000 Afghans tomorrow and instantly grow the Afghan security force. Of course, without training, organization, equipment, etc. they would be of little use.
I don't mean to suggest NTM-A isn't training new recruits(obviously they are). It's just that the total number of police/soldiers produced does not really tell us much of anything. How many are getting paid? Fully equipped? Able to operate on their own? Logistically supplied by their own government? Or, even present for duty?
Moreover, how many of them are effective in their assigned areas? Has violence decreased? Is governance enabled?
These are measures of effectiveness which I do not see mentioned and have not seen.
It may very well be that the Afghan security forces are doing great work, however, LTG Caldwell's article doesn't really tell us that.