This article (NY Times login required) about
Gene Sharp, already included in
today's SWJ Roundup, probably warrants a special look by our
community. It provides a brief intro to his body of work on the practical
application of nonviolent revolution (basically Mao meets MLK/Gandhi) and how it
touched the wave of change in Tunisia, Egypt, et al. Well worth the
sign-in hassle if you're not already registered with the old Grey Lady. Be
sure to look at "From
Dictatorship to Democracy" (more info, languages, formats
here) and his
other works at the Albert Einstein
Institution.
Comments
Hey I'm in the middle of writing a small piece mashing Jomini/Alinsky/Frederick/Hobsbawm/Clausewitz/Sharp. My timing might be a little late and, frankly, I'm struggling a tad. If any of you are aware of a worthy item on a similar topic please let me know. I think the Gene Sharp material is important, especially if taken in light of some other strategic theory. Sharp is suble and comprehensive (obsessive/compulsive?), recognizing that 'non-violent'requires some definitional liquidity, and that the non-violent stuff works its way into violence often. It's a good thing he indexes and paragraphs like mad, since I would never have the strength to read all of one of his books.
I have started a thread on SWC which foloows this theme: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=12546
Fair enough, Renascent. A cavalier comment that, as you pointed out, is imperfect. But certainly Mao's revolutionary concepts, albeit violent, were packaged up and made portable, expanding his already great influence. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. and Mahatma Gandhi are premier examples of leaders of non-violent movements, albeit not particularly packaged and portable. Add ice, shake it twice.
I remember when the book linked in the article above about the author Gene Sharp came out. I remember discussions with people who say that Unconventional Warfare in the classic sense of overthrowing a government, particularly a despotic or totalitarian regime, was a romantic notion of the past and no longer relevant, particularly in the post Cold War and post 9-11 world. Just like COIN after Vietnam, classic UW was no longer of value. Add this book to Hoffer's and Gurr's works and I think you have the basis for an Unconventional Warfare curriculum that has stood and will stand the test of time.