COIN in Mexico?

Robert Jones, point taken regarding COIN that is not COIN. I definitely agree that there are areas of overlap between COIN and Mexico, but I think to analyze the problems entirely or even largely within the COIN prism is likely to cause us to take our eye off the ball, as you seem to indicate in the second comment.

The problems with reducing demand, as far as I can tell are two: one, I'm not sure how realistic it is. If we could reduce the aggregate demand by half (which I don't think we can get anywhere near that, but just assuming), that's still, using your numbers, tens of billions of dollars a year for Mexican gangs, or more than enough to fuel a very large industry.

Second, and this applies more to legalization because it would presumably be more sudden than a reduction in demand, while killing demand for illegal drugs in the long term would make Mexico criminals far less wealthy and as a result far less powerful and threatening, in the short term, it just separates these gangs, which wouldn't disappear immediately, from their principal source of cash. I don't mean to harp on kidnapping and other like activities, but you could well see an uptick in things like that if legalization is not preceded by or if demand reduction not accompanied by a vast improvement in Mexico's institution.

For that reason, prescriptions need to focus first and foremost on strengthening Mexico's law enforcement institutions, and then we can debate the most effective strategy for deploying them. There is a lot of work that can be done on that regard, though from an American perspective, this is probably a bit frustrating because there's only so much we can do. We can help, but only on the margins; the Mexicans have to take the lead in reforming.

Robert Jones,

Make no mistake - I am not suggesting that the US military get involved in a large (or even small scale) COIN campaign in Mexico.

Mexican Armys counter-drug (CD) operations are making a limited impact on narco-trafficking in Mexico. SEDENA operations are currently centered along two principal lines of operation - source control (drug eradication/seizure) and HVI interdiction (arrest).

By weighting these two lines of effort, SEDENA operations are not focused on what is the key terrain in any counter-insurgency environment - the population. Additionally, SEDENA targeting efforts are not focused on attacking the critical vulnerabilities that directly affect the DTOs strategic COG - the revenues derived from drug sales.

If they continue their current CD tactics, they will not be effective in the long run because SEDENA is not approaching CD operations like a counter-insurgency (COIN) mission, nor are they effectively attacking the Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs) Center of Gravity (COG).

I only suggest that the US could assist the Government of Mexico with developing a comprehensive, whole of government strategy - with the US military role limited to assisting SEDENA and SEMAR to develop a Mexican military campaign plan to support this GOM strategy.

There is no lack of will among (most) of the Mexican military and they have a sizeable enough standing force to deal with their internal security problem. Technically and tactically, the Mexican military is a better fighting force than the DTOs - so there is not a need for significant security assistance to develop capacity. Mexican military CD operations are ineffective because they are re-missioning military forces to conduct traditional law enforcement and their lines of effort are not oriented on the enemy COG or they key terrain.

I acknowledge that Mexican DTOs are not insurgents, however I do believe that a Diamond model-like strategy is a more effective strategy for the GOM to employ against them.

I also wholeheartedly agree that no amount of change to GOM strategy or tactics will be effective against the DTOs unless the US undertakes a comprehensive effort to reduce demand for illegal drugs through a combination of selective decriminalization and treatment.

Thanks for the thoughtful commentary Sir. In enjoy reading your posts on the SWJ Blog.

Robert, I think your comments amount to a fair response, and I think readers can look at both pieces and see for themselves where they come down. A few things I might push back against:

"To assert that the DTOs in Mexico are merely an organized crime problem that can be successfully addressed with a "comprehensive law enforcement strategy" is absurd. The scale of violence caused by militarized gangs attempting to enforce DTO control over smuggling territory is far beyond the scope of the traditional definition of "organized crime.""

I don't agree that the second sentence qualifies as evidence that my assertion absurd. First, the scale of the violence alone isn't the determining factor in whether something amounts to an insurgency. Second, the scale of the violence is bad, horribly so in Juárez, but Mexico had a murder rate of between 15 or 20 per 100k in 2010, which is far less than many Latin American nations, and a fraction of what it was in Colombia in that country's worst years. If Mexico's murder rate makes it an insurgency, then the same situation prevails in Honduras, Guatemala, Colombia, Brazil, et cetera.

"I guess that Corcoran sees [kidnapping and extortion] as more significant threats that the wanton violence and undermining of every security institution in Mexico by wrought by the DTOs since he states "kidnapping and extortion are the criminal enterprises that most directly harm law-abiding Mexican citizens, and therefore should be of the utmost concern to authorities." Kidnapping and extortion... along with every other criminal enterprise that DTOs have branched out into beyond their core competency of smuggling drugs... are on the rise in Mexico because of the permissive environment that these criminal gangs have to operate in. The DTOs are not turning to kidnapping and extortion to supplement their income because their smuggling operations are being pinched by effective law enforcement."

I don't think you can draw a distinction between kidnapping and wanton violence; the first is a subset of the second. The comparison I mean to draw here is between drug gangs that merely traffic and gangs that extort and kidnap civilians as well. As to why they are heading in that direction, whether it's because of a permissive environment or because they are having a harder to time moving drugs northward, I don't think those two are mutually exclusive. A permissive environment is definitely a huge part of the equation, but there is plenty of anecdotal evidence of gangs turning to other criminal activities because of drops in their cash flow.

Lastly, that 70 percent of profits coming from marijuana has gotten tossed around for years (though I have seen it as 60 percent more often), but the most recent RAND conclusion (at most 26 percent) seems much more credible to me. I do concur that legalizing marijuana is a good idea.

http://www.rc.rand.org/news/press/2010/10/12.html

I guess that the central thesis of Mr. Corcorans article is that, since DTOs are not true insurgents then "fashionable ... counterinsurgency theory... is an imperfect fit for Mexico." Why is COIN theory an imperfect fit? Because the end goals of the DTOs (i.e. a permissive environment to continue their criminal enterprises) differ from the end goals of the insurgent? Is Corcoran asserting that the ways and means that the DTOs employ are SO different from the ways and means that insurgents employ that a totally different model from "COIN theory" be applied in order to be successful? To assert that the DTOs in Mexico are merely an organized crime problem that can be successfully addressed with a "comprehensive law enforcement strategy" is absurd. The scale of violence caused by militarized gangs attempting to enforce DTO control over smuggling territory is far beyond the scope of the traditional definition of "organized crime." So, while the vast majority of the Mexican population is solidly behind Calderons counter drug operations, and there is not a groundswell of popular opinion in Mexico favoring replacing the current regime with Sinaloa cartel leadership, the fact remains that the security situation is so poor in Mexico that the Mexican people have no choice other than to give in to the will of the DTOs.

It is true that SEDENA is cooperating with an inter-agency US effort to provide assistance to counter drug operations in Mexico. There is MUCH more that the US could do to assist the Government of Mexico with developing a comprehensive, whole of government strategy. SEDENA could allow the US military to do MUCH more in assisting them in developing a campaign plan to support this strategy. Currently, Mexico will only accept very small scale, low-visibility support focused on achieving tactical effects against discreet targets. More must be done to change the approach.

SEDENA and SEMAR must be commended for the sacrifices in lives and risks to reputation that they have made for taking a lead role in the war on drugs in Mexico. Sadly, the fact is their efforts and sacrifices are not producing lasting results. Despite some high profile interdiction efforts supported by US intelligence and advisors, the fact that 200,000+ residents have fled Juarez leaving schools and businesses closed is testimony to the failed efforts of SEDENAs main effort in the war on drugs. The population of Juarez that remains must be mobilized to reject the presence of DTOs in their community and support the governments efforts to restore order. To achieve this, SEDENA must apply COIN-like counter insurgency techniques that are part of an integrated, whole of government approach to defeating the narco-insurgency in order to be successful. Both Mexican and US law enforcement are ill-equipped to take on the lead role of developing a synchronized, integrated strategy and leading the execution of the operations.

The traditional law enforcement CD strategy is to focus on source control through eradication, interdiction and targeting kingpins for arrest. US law enforcement efforts consistently seek to satisfy US Attorney requirements to prosecute cases in court. While I agree that source control and law enforcement have a significant role in CD operations, the plain fact is that this current model has gotten us all where we are today. CD operations in Colombia and interdiction efforts in the Caribbean essentially displaced traditional smuggling routes/methods, such that most of the cocaine smuggled out of Colombia now comes into Mexico overland through Central America or via Pacific maritime routes. Hence the growth of Mexican DTOs and the current narco-insurgent state that Mexico is in.

A (significantly) disproportional amount of the Intel Community resources are devoted tracking the shipment of drugs into the US to assist in interdiction efforts. Sadly, interdiction does little/nothing to reduce drug use in the US. Seized loads of dope are a cost of doing business for the DTOs. A more productive use of IC resources would be to collect on and analyze the DTOs plans to smuggle bulk cash out of the US. Of course, smuggling the money out of the US is probably the most clandestine/compartmentalized operation that the DTOs conduct. Similarly, the DoJ should focus the preponderance of its resources on developing a source network inside the cash smuggling end of the DTO operation vs the drug smuggling side of the business.

I completely agree that simply directing our targeting efforts to interdicting the flow of profits from drug sales to reduce the war chests of DTOs is not a panacea. The demand side of the equation must be addressed too. Legalization of marijuana in the US would very likely serve to significantly reduce the revenue that DTOs realize from marijuana smuggling. Typically, approximately 70% of revenue flowing back to Mexican DTOs comes from marijuana smuggling. Attacking the demand side of the drug economic equation was not the focus of the article.

What is Corcorans solution? A "comprehensive law enforcement strategy?" What would this comprehensive law enforcement strategy target? Kidnapping and extortion? I guess that Corcoran sees these as more significant threats that the wanton violence and undermining of every security institution in Mexico by wrought by the DTOs since he states "kidnapping and extortion are the criminal enterprises that most directly harm law-abiding Mexican citizens, and therefore should be of the utmost concern to authorities." Kidnapping and extortion... along with every other criminal enterprise that DTOs have branched out into beyond their core competency of smuggling drugs... are on the rise in Mexico because of the permissive environment that these criminal gangs have to operate in. The DTOs are not turning to kidnapping and extortion to supplement their income because their smuggling operations are being pinched by effective law enforcement.