by Steven T. Brothers
We must prevent Qaddafi from more efficiently slaughtering his own people. This can be accomplished with intervention. Yet, we must carefully weigh the risks lest a hazy contingency plan creep into a muddling campaign.
As a military officer I know that no fly zones (NFZ) and air strikes are not easy to implement, nor are they necessarily effective. Libyan air defenses would need to be suppressed. We could lose aircraft. Combat search and rescue (C.S.A.R.) personnel deployed to save downed pilots could be killed or captured. Also, our laser-guided bombs would require soldiers -- on the ground --to direct them to their targets.
Those who say an NFZ would be "easy" point to Operation Northern Watch over Iraq as proof. Yet, much of Iraq's air defenses were destroyed in the Gulf war. Further, Iraqi air defenses were easier to find and destroy. Libya does not have such a capacity; what it has is more dangerous: scores of shoulder-fired missiles that are tougher to locate.
Complicating this is a dangerous absence of information about the opposition. Although Secretary of State Clinton said the U.S. is "reaching out" to the rebels we should be skeptical of any intelligence information provided to us. We do not need a Libyan version of the Iraqi informant "Curveball" feeding us false tips in order to further a narrow agenda.
Also, much of the opposition are former government employees which have not been paid in days. Should this drag on for weeks -- and this is certainly possible -- there is a risk of the opposition fracturing. Rival leaders might then capitalize on U.S. ignorance and seek support for personal power grabs.
Also, what happens after Qaddafi is toppled? Libya does not have the civil capacity and structures that Tunisia and Egypt have. Libya is -- dangerously so- more like Yemen. It lacks the mechanisms to provide basic services, which themselves can check the kind of hopelessness and desperation that feeds violence.
We also must determine how far we are —to go. When does a no fly zone turn into a no drive zone? Qaddafi's aircraft should be grounded but he also possesses equally efficient means: tanks, artillery, and gun trucks. Also, according to Human Rights Watch, the Red Crescent, and other relief organizations, there is a humanitarian crisis developing. Qaddafi's forces are sealing off supply routes. Qaddafi is using food as a weapon. If we plan on assisting here, this will require "boots on the ground."
Reminiscent of Somalia, our soldiers would face the difficult task of discerning allies from enemies. A sizeable portion of the opposition is former military, many of whom still wear the same uniforms and use the same equipment as Qaddafi's forces. This makes a corner stone of any military intervention - the rules of engagement - extremely problematic.
We have not adequately evaluated the political risks. Most Libyans would resent the presence of foreign troops. If we overreach, we risk alienating the next generation of Libya's leaders and the young people that will chart its political future.
If the opposition's supposed leadership asks for an intervention then they may lose legitimacy. Libyans see this as their revolution and want to emulate the Egyptian and Tunisian experiences with little outside help. The opposition has already appropriated dozens of tanks, attack helicopters, and the critically important anti-aircraft weapons. It may take a while but they might be able to accomplish this on their own.
Others have suggested inserting Special Forces teams to assist the rebels. An apparent rag-tag unprofessional gang, the rebels are led by a few professional soldiers. We could assist by sending teams to help train and lead them. Yet, this is also risky: A U.K. SAS team was captured by a faction of the opposition that considered them invaders. Also, the Libyan opposition is not the Northern Alliance of Afghanistan. There is no Ahmad Shah Masoud -- nor the legacy of a martyred one -- to rally around. We do not have a twenty-plus year history of assisting the Libyan rebels. There may be a leader in the making but they have yet to assert themselves.
There are more workable options. While the U.N. has taken measures to prevent more weapons from getting to Qaddafi what about personnel? The U.N., the Arab league and the African Union must pressure those countries that have supplied the mercenaries in order to prevent more from arriving. Also, the E.U. --although it has frozen Qaddafi's assets -- must also freeze those of the Libyan state. Until the opposition is in control of the treasury, this is an option worth considering.
Qaddafi's ruthlessness rivals that of Idi Amin, Charles Taylor, and Nicolae Ceausescu. Under his leadership, rebel soldiers are bound, gagged, shot, and set on fire while merciless guns for hire execute civilians. He must be stopped. Yet, before we rush to rattling our sabers, our policy makers must build a multinational consensus, weigh the risks, and always respect the wishes of the Libyan people.
Major Steven T. Brothers is an Army Middle East Foreign Area Officer and Graduate Student at the Center for Middle East Studies at Harvard University. His comments do not necessarily reflect those of the US Army, the US Government, or Harvard University.
Editor's Note: While we will present all options for intervention, SWJ does not maintain an official position. Rather, we want to facilitate the discussion.
Comments
Oops. Sorry about the underline.
At the upper portion, only the phrase "...prepared and willing to do all." should be underlined; I obviously left off the closing tag. Sorry.
Not sure how it got started at "To return to the reality..." No underlining from that point on should be there. I may have cut and pasted and missed the tag...???
<b>Carl:</b>
We can disagree on the all or nothing angle. We can agree that little we say here is going to affect what occurs.
This particular statement may serve to highlight our difference:<blockquote>"No matter which way we go, it ends up we can only do nothing because otherwise we will always do all."</blockquote>That's where I do not agree it's all or nothing -- we will <i>not</i> always do all, no way and there are numerous examples of that. What must be realized is that one must or certainly should be <u>prepared and willing</b> to do all. Thus my earlier metaphor of "Do not pull gun on anyone unless you're prepared to use it. We went to Korea, unprepared to do all -- we're still living with that 60 years later. We went to Viet Nam, unprepared to do all -- and in many ways, we're still living with that. The same applies to Kosovo, to Afghanistan and to Iraq. We'll have to wait to see how long it takes to put those at rest. My bet is that all three will be a drain upon us for many years in the future. I have a right to obligate myself, I even may have a right to commit others contemporarily -- I do not necessarily have a right to obligate my Grandkids, Great Grandkid or their friends...
The issue is not that we aren't able to provide more than two options, the issue is that currently international norms and our own laws do not favor other options. We have elected to not have those capabilities because we adhere to the laws and the norms -- other nations are not so meticulous but we happen to be, mostly -- I presume you would not wish to change that. I certainly would not.
I did not say we only had the capability to do one of two things, I did say we do not have the capability to provide a range of options that do not entail the <i>possibility</i> of your all or nothing. That is mostly due the laws and norms cited above but also because having such capabilities tends to result in their being used. That use would invariably pose risk. Risk aversion is not always unwise.
I think it important to note that the OGA employment you suggest is a commitment of the US to do certain things and as you say, it would allow a certain deniability -- employment of military forces, even as small as elements of SF can also allow some deniability but the potential of not being able to deny is going to exist and commitment of military force entails a willingness to go to war It also entails an obligation of some sort; that obligation IMO, and at a minimum, entails not just tossing lives away to make some people feel good about a series of events. That got us into Somalia...
Consider again the "do not pull a gun" metaphor. If you have done that in response to a threat to deter aggression and the person(s) you were trying to stop go right ahead and do what they intended all along and you do not fire at or halt them, you're going to make yourself look very weak and you and your firearm will have lost any deterrent value in the eyes of the person(s) and any observers. If that occurs several times, you will have no deterrent effect at all. That may or may not be an issue to you in the abstract but it is emphatically an issue with nations in the reality of using force. Fail a few times and you invite more attacks. As we in the US have seen since 1970.
Your ships offshore are tantamount to standing outside your neighbor's house and shooting into it. Well, except for the fact that you can hide in the bushes. The ships cannot hide and if they employ any offensive systems (or fire defensive systems into another nation) they are going to be seen and the neighbors will know. So will the Cops. If one gets attacked in retaliation, is significantly damaged and we incur a number casualties, what then? You may be willing to accept that and do nothing in retaliation. Will the bulk of the US be willing to do so? If we do retaliate will that retaliation be effective or not?
Your OGA effort can be done -- just as long as you realize that such a commitment may entail casualties, blowback and failure. You may be prepared to accept that. Should you be so prepared? Will the bulk of this nation agree?
As for the A Teams,like the ships, employing military force is akin to pulling that gun. No matter how good or how willing they are, you have effectively pulled a gun -- if things go wrong, you can throw it away but then you've merely made yourself look foolish and weak. In a bad neighborhood, being foolish or weak invites more attacks -- plus you lost an expensive weapon. OTOH, if things go well and you do not have to toss the weapon, you will have employed it to save someone (you know not who, they may dislike you a great deal...) and you can feel good. The issue is the determination you have to employ total and deadly force. If you are not prepared to do that, then best slink away in the dark.
To return to the reality of your Team, yes, they can do what you suggest. That's not an issue. The whole issue we're really discussing here is what do <u>you</u> do if they get into trouble. Or, more accurately, what will the US do...<blockquote>"There are no other countries like that. Sure as shooting not in North Africa."</blockquote> Interesting you mention that. I note the Arab League, based in Cairo, has asked the UN to impose a No Fly Zone over Libya. That when Egypt has a couple of hundred F-16s and Saudi Arabia has F-15s. Why aren't the neighbors reacting? Surely they cannot be avoiding risk and letting the folks from down the street be the bad guys. Why would they do that...
You can use warrior -- or any word you wish -- that's fine, just be aware that most pros do not like the term (regardless of the US seeming love affair with it...).<blockquote>"It is a matter of the political will and self discipline on the one hand, and, a big "and" in my opinion, the ability of the military establishment to get over their endemic risk aversion."</blockquote>Yes. That's the point. Wanting it to be different does not make it so.<blockquote>"We need to be able to do things like this, if not now then in the future. If all a country can do is "all or nothing" it will mostly do nothing until all is required and by then it might be too late to matter."</blockquote>I agree with the first clause. For the second, I again suggest that it is not 'all' -- it is the <u>willingness to commit to all if necessary</u>. We have shown a reluctance to do that and it has not done us any favors. A very valid argument that we are where we are due to our unwillingness over the past half century to use force properly -- that, BTW, is one very good reason why the US military is indeed risk averse -- and that has emboldened people to attack us in penny packets. Not least, both OBL and Zawahiri have said our failure to follow through is indicative of an inherent weakness.
Don't pull that gun unless you're prepared to use it -- and to shoot to kill.
Ken:
I still maintain that most of the arguments boil down to "all or nothing"; because almost everyone who pointed out there was a potential to escalate, did it in such a way as to say it will escalate, very little room for doubt as I read it. Because the escalation is seen as being inevitable it is advised against because the "all" that will inevitably be risked isn't worth the benefit. No matter which way we go, it ends up we can only do nothing because otherwise we will always do all.
Now if you say we can't do anything at all because we only have the capability to do one of two things, fill all the L-ships with Marines and hit the beaches on one hand or stand and watch with our hands in our back pockets going tsk tsk tsk on another hand; that is an argument, akin to saying we just aren't physically able. If that is the case my question is, What the hell is wrong with the American armed forces that that those are the only two options available.
My argument all along has been that we should do something to help the Libyan rebels. But we should limit our help to only a few things because the benefit must outweigh the risk. That is why I suggested the forces I did, which seem to me to able to exert maximum influence with the least risk.
The ships offshore I suggested because they have systems that allow them to control the air over the coastal road with small risk to themselves, not no risk, small risk. This can be one time where those very expensive systems can give some practical benefit in the here and now.
The OGA teams I suggested because this type of situation is exactly what that kind of arrangement is good for, you want to exert some influence without getting too deeply involved. If they can't manage that, why do we have them?
Those are my two main suggestions. The A-teams would be nice to have because they could help with organization and logistics. I specifically stated they would not be up front leading. There is still risk in such an uncertain situation but the unique situation as it exists would allow some assistance with logistics and organization to be of more than ordinary value. Limited risk for a potentially big payoff.
I used the word warrior for a reason and the word applied to both small groups of men who might deploy on the ground. I know the difference between a warrior and a soldier. Scipio spoke of that. The word warrior was used for its emotive value, what it said about the men I was talking about. Both groups are volunteers several times over to get in that position. Both groups are very determined groups of volunteers to be where they are. Neither group is where they are because they didn't know what to do after they dropped out of college and neither group is the 19 year old girl who does the ID card down at Brigade HQ. Both those groups essentially signed up because they want to get into the fight, if anybody would be up for this kind of a mission those guys would.
I don't think because we commit groups like that we are bound to wage war on the country. We have groups like that now in Columbia, the Philippines and we had an especially successful group in El Salvador. It is a matter of the political will and self discipline on the one hand, and, a big "and" in my opinion, the ability of the military establishment to get over their endemic risk aversion.
We need to be able to do things like this, if not now then in the future. If all a country can do is "all or nothing" it will mostly do nothing until all is required and by then it might be too late to matter.
When I said "we will act", I didn't mean we are going to do anything in this situation. I meant that the Americans on occasion will do something. You can easily conceive of the Americans doing something. That is why we talk about these things. There are no other countries like that. Sure as shooting not in North Africa.
<b>Tyrtaios:</b>
Your gun target line comment in that 11:16 PM post is accurate. The earlier comment:<blockquote>"Ships today steaming off what used to be the gun target line, don't impress nor intimidate anymore tin pot dictators anymore. : )"</blockquote>is ambiguous and could be right or wrong usage depending on how you meant it.
I was really trying to help Carl who unambiguously used gun-target line -- that line as you say between a gun and its target -- for Gun Line, a colloquialism used probably before your time when not just a random Can or two with 5"38s or 54s or the <i>Canberra, Newport News, Boston</i> or whichever with the 8" but rather entire Flotillas of cruisers and cans, 10-20 ships, would make circuits off the same short stretch of coast and fire for sometimes days on end. That circuit got tabbed as the Gun Line and it was well defined on the charts as you can imagine. Thus the Gun Line was parallel to the beach, the gun-target line for NG is generally perpendicular or nearly so to it. Gun Line never made it into the DoD Dictionary to my knowledge, Gun-target line is there.
Gun Lines may have happened in Viet Nam, my only two experiences with NG there were both single Cans offshore -- lotta star shells one night; we couldn't believe he didn't run out...
It happened a bunch in Korea -- where I got to see some 16" in danger close that 1st ANGLICO called in, that was impressive -- and in WW II.
As per my previous observations of such, Ken White is quite succinct in his response and I can find no truck in anything he has to say in his response Carl.
However, a minor quibble, just for fun: as a member of the Naval Advisory Group in RVN, providing support to the Vietnamese Marine Corps, I called in 5" and occasionally 8" NGF.
Although an over simplification perhaps, tt was always my understanding that my call for, and subsequent corrections as the spotter, went through the gun control officer, entered into the observer target line, that resulted in a gun target line - thus the term.
Again incidentally, it is too bad we didn't have the capability early on of firing several 8" star clusters over Tripoli to make our intentions known as serious.. .but it is a thing of the past.
<b>Carl:</b><blockquote>"The objections to helping the rebels in a small way are mostly to the effect of "all or nothing"; we land the Marines or we do nothing at all. The logic motivating this is that if there is an immediate critical national interest at stake, we do all and if there is not, we do nothing. A corollary of that position is that if we do anything, we will inevitably do all; all or nothing again."</blockquote>I think you're inadvertently misstating the argument on the Council Board. You posited the "all or nothing" thought and a couple of people pointed out that was not the issue -- the issue was that any <u>military</u> commitment had the potential to escalate -- it was further stated that, historically, that has occurred far more often than not.
You correctly say we should have other options and I agree. Unfortunately, for a variety of good and bad reasons, our options are limited. They are limited in one aspect due to international norms on the use of military force and in another aspect due to our organization, training and structure. We are quite good at some things but have no capability for others -- and low key, non-escalatory intervention in other states is one where we have a shortfall. We used to be able to do that -- did it with Marines here and there a century ago, as you mention -- unfortunately, that was a quite different world with different mores and attitudes. Heh. Even forty years ago it was quite different...
You're certainly entitled to believe that Libyan rebels prevailing is in the interests of the US. Others agree and and still others disagree. IMO it's too early to tell who's right. However, the issue either way is the determination of whether that interest justifies the potential costs (all aspect) to the US. It's easy for those of us without responsibility for that to make all sorts of declarations -- it is far less easy when one has the responsibility for the US lives that will be placed at risk to make determinations to commit or not. You may believe it desirable -- it then is up to you to convince the US Congress it is a sensible approach.
That OGA element you wish to commit entails committing the US to do certain things. Committing an A Team from an SF Group -- or several of them -- adds to that commitment a military element. SF guys are professional but they are professional Soldiers, not Warriors. Warriors may be experienced fighters but they are not Soldiers nor are they professional in most cases. Professional fighters may be Soldiers or Mercenaries.
That is not semantic BS -- each of those terms has a standing under law and international custom. If you commit the Soldiers of a nation into another country, you have, worst case, just committed an entire nation to wage war on that country. Best case you'll have an international incident on your hands, may be embarrassed and likely earned the enmity of many. So, you can do that if you wish but you better be sure you understand all you know about what you're doing...
To say "we will act" is easy, to get the Congress to agree to that -- or to be one of the persons involved in that act -- is not quite as simple -- or as desirable. John Kerry famously asked "How do you ask a man to be the last one to die for a mistake." He agrees with you that we should do something in Libya. I think the question to be asked today is 'How do you ask a man to be the first to die for a mistake...'
And it's colloquially the Gun Line -- the recognized and official gun-target line is a totally different thing.
Tyrtaios: The unique thing about Libya is that most of the people, towns and roads are very close to the sea. Because of this we can do something effective, relatively, I say again, relatively easily. The other places you mentioned are a long long way from anywhere.
You are right about the gun target line, though since we're on the subject of antiques, I think 8" cruisers are more cost effective. Could you put HIMARS batteries on ships, say a fast container ship? I wonder if that would work.
Carl, I believe Italy may still, or did, pay the crazy colonel reparations in some form or manner.
Some feel that when we actively participate, whether from off-shore, or overhead, sooner-or-later, more likely sooner, we also end up on the ground. We simply can't help ourselves.
Where was this drum beat and hubris at for intervention in southern Sudan, or in lower Africa, where events in Libya pale by comparison?
How has the equation changed?
Incidentally, although dated and out of the question, this is where an Iowa Class battleship and her 16" naval rifles come in handy. Ships today steaming off what used to be the gun target line, don't impress nor intimidate anymore tin pot dictators anymore. : )
I posted the following at the council and I thought it might be of interest here. When I mentioned ships offshore, that refers to Aegis cruisers or destroyers maintaining a no fly zone over the front line and Benghazi with their radar/missile systems.
"The objections to helping the rebels in a small way are mostly to the effect of "all or nothing"; we land the Marines or we do nothing at all. The logic motivating this is that if there is an immediate critical national interest at stake, we do all and if there is not, we do nothing. A corollary of that position is that if we do anything, we will inevitably do all; all or nothing again.
This puts us at a huge disadvantage when dealing with a situation that is a national interest, as I believe the Libyan rebels prevailing is, but is not an immediate vital national interest. In those cases we have to stand by and watch. However it may be a national interest that we be able to do something (there's that phrase, go ahead and run with it) in these kinds of situations rather than nothing. There is no reason we can't limit our efforts. We did it in the early part of the 20th century and we are doing it now in the Philippines.
The nature of the things I suggested might help limit involvement. Ships offshore (probably 25 miles) manned by professional sailors, shoulder fired anti-aircraft missile teams composed people employed by an OGA, A-teams composed of professional warriors. It seems to me that a situation like this is exactly why we have those types of forces, so they can be used in unconventional ways in order to limit the depth of our involvement. The ships are on the ocean, the OGA isn't readily visible and the A-teams would stay back in order to help coordinate a disorganized effort, not be up front leading. All are of great value but none are "all" nor are they "nothing".
An effort like that may not work out. But that is not a reason to try. If we have the self-discipline required to limit the effort we may gain much while risking little. The ability to do that is a valuable thing. If it doesn't work, we will have lost little. Ken made the point that they may be worse off for us having helped if they fail. That may be true, it is never wise to provoke the god of "it can't be any worse"; but I suspect, suspect mind you, that given the nature of the dictator, the rebels only options are to win or...."
Navguns: In order
Reparations are generally paid by the losers, if they are paid at all. Not so much anymore. In this case if the rebels lose they will pay reparations with blood, lots of it.
NGOs don't mind operating in places where security might be a little iffy, as they do in lots of places in Africa. They don't like operating in places where it is non-existent. If the rebels were to win, security might be iffy, I doubt it would be non-existent. If it was the oil companies wouldn't come back. They need those oil companies to go back.
I am guessing Libya is not an infrastructure basket case because oil companies have been operating there mostly unimpeded for decades and have been paying for the privilege. Also until about a month ago there hasn't been a war there. Things may get worse there with each passing day now that the dictator's air force is bombing the country. A no fly zone would probably help with that.
I read dozens and dozens of articles detailing the lack of electricity, bombed bridges, no running water, sewage in the streets, etc. etc in Iraq during the years you were there. I am very surprised you didn't notice.
Troufion: The unfortunate fact is we will act, they won't.
Kotzabasis: Good points.
Undoubtedly, NATO could establish a no-fly-zone at will over Libya. Qaddafi knows that as much as anyone. Losing control of his skies does not mean he'll be unable to achieve strategic surprise. Saddam proved that in 1991 with SCUD attacks on Israel. The Serbs proved that in 1999 with an accelerated ethnic cleansing campaign in Kosovo. In both cases, intelligence resources were pulled off of other priorities to deal with the surprise. Qaddafi, if he has half a brain (and I think he does), is planning a response to the seemingly inevitable no-fly-zone that will surprise us.
Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) resources, including the exploitation and command & control centers around the world, are at maximum capacity with the "surge" in Afghanistan. A no-fly-zone over Libya will take those resources away from supporting troops there. Qaddafi's potential surprise will only pull more away.
That said, the risk of doing nothing may, in the long run, be worse than pulling resources away now.
If NATO decides to use military force, it needs to do it with decisive force (surging SOF, drones, and other ISR resources) otherwise there will be a risk of dragging it out and providing time for a strategic surprise...which will ultimately have a damaging effect on Afghan operations.
In circumstances when the Gaddafi regime is too weak and unable to defend itself by its own military forces and is compelled to bring in foreign mercenaries to save itself, the U.S. does not have to invade the country by its own military forces but merely provide the insurgents with "antiaircraft systems so that they can enforce a no-fly zone over their own territory," as Stephen Hadley, former national security adviser to the Bush administration, has suggested. Also, it could insert special operations teams, as it initially did in Afghanistan that defeated the Taliban within five weeks, to give guidance to the rebels and render prompt information to U.S./NATO aircraft to bomb the Gaddafi military installations and forces. And as the destruction of Libyan air-defence radars and missile batteries might be required, this could be accomplished by using missiles launched from submarines and warships. Hence American footprints on the ground would be so tiny they would be hardly visible. And yet it would be the presence of this invisible American 'phantom combined with the threat of using U.S. airpower that could utterly determine the defeat of the Gaddafi loyalists and its international disorganized amateurish bands of mercenaries, and lead, with almost mathematical precision, to the overthrow of the murderous regime.
And as I have said in an article of mine only a few days ago, the remarkable weakness of the regime and its total inability to defend itself by its own armed forces, as a result of widespread defections both from its military and political ranks, and its last resort to employ mercenaries for its survival, makes its ever dwindling supporters highly vulnerable to psychological warfare. A declaration of U.S./NATO of a no-fly zone and a no-use of air-defences accompanied by a clear threat that in the event that these two conditions are violated by the loyalist forces of Gaddafi, then an unexpected decimating destruction would be unleashed upon those forces by the military might of the U.S. and NATO. This in itself could bring the crumbling of the regime. It could be the most sagacious and least costly involvement by the United States in efficacious regime change without firing a shot.
Have we learned nothing given the issues with both Irag and Afghanistan? We should not start another 'war' unless Congress declares such and all Americans actually contribute some sacrifice. As a minimum the cost should be born by all via a tax. No more under the table funding by Congress without declaring a real war. But of course that will never happen since the US public does not want a real war where everyone has to sacrifice. And where do we stop? Libya is not the only dysfunctional country that brutalizes its people. Back to Somalia anyone? How about some of the other African regimes? Korea? I used to be a hawk but I am tired of the US doing all of the actual heavy lifting while the rest of the world sits back and criticizes...and we wreck our economy and sacrifice our military families for very little real benefit to our national interests.
If Libyan stability were so important to warrant US intervention, it would warrant Egyptian and Tunisian first. Neighbors have a whole lot more to lose and gain than distant communities. Egypt and Tunnisia with their fledgling Democracy movements should realize the potential damage to their own movements if Qaddafi were to regain power. The Egyptian military in particular could handle Q's forces. there is no need at all for US involvment except perhaps in a support role.-T
Carl ...
taking away airspace, destroying assets (air/ground) or any aggressive action that result in loss of life is an act of war.
In war, things get broken. Those who break things are responsible for repair. As part of the repair, and in order to maintain whatever stability resulted from the military action, military and civilian teams reconstruct or pay reparations for what was broken.
NGO's do not operate where there is no security. Security only happens w/ boots on the ground. Revisit Kosovo, Iraq or AFG. Somolia fell apart when security collapsed.
How do you know Libya isn't the "infrastructure basket case Iraq was in 2003"? This is news to many military planners. At any rate, Iraq was not an infrastructure basket case in 2003. I did 3 tours in Iraq spanning 2003-2009. This was not an assessent made by anyone on the ground.
Exactly how and when does the US recognize a legitimate government in Libya.
I really don't believe that you understand what actions constitute war or the nature of Jihadsts.
Less than 2% of worlds supply of oil comes from Libya. Dictators come and go; there are plenty on the rampage in Africa today. The difference is that they don't have oil and are not as flamboyant as Qadaffi.
Facts don't change. NFZ escalates tension and will be perceived as an act of war. We have no idea who/what factions are slugging it out in Libya. We still have much unfinished business in Iraq and AFG. US/NATO/UN get's sucked into a war in northern Africa, where do the troops come from? Who pays for the military/civilain operation?
Bottom line; there is no National Interest or Security at stake in Libya.
KL:
This may not pass muster in the academic sense but I would say that the "who" behind the militarization of the protesters is nobody and everybody given how completely disorganized the rebels are. The why behind the militarization of the protesters is most likely that the dictator began to shoot them down in the streets.
Remember, not all revolutions are good. The Bolsheviks certainly proved that.
It seems an assumption is being made by a number of people that this revolution, if not good, is an improvement over the Gaddafi government. However, until things stabilize and the dust is allowed to settle, it will be difficult to determine who's behind the militarization of the protestors and what their motivation is.
What the U.S. Government needs to be extremely careful about is backing the wrong people. If we support the rebels in this conflict but it turns out their intentions are not democratization of the nation but rather they intend to impose a different but equally oppressive form of government, then there will most certainly be egg on our face; and we'll be spending the next decade and beyond learning and dealing with an entirely new set of problems in the region.
I am, of course, on the outside looking in. What I view as an assumption (that we're probably not sure who's backing the rebels and what their motivations are) may in fact be a solid fact for those directly involved.
Until we know for certain what the motivation of the rebels/protestors is, decisive military intervention should not be considered as an option. In my humble opinion, passive intel gathering and the continued use of the diplomatic, informational and economic instruments of national power should be our current course of action.
Navguns:
If the dictator were overthrown, why would civil military operations have to include the military part? It was needed in Iraq because the security situation got so bad the NGOs were driven out. If the dictator were to fall, he will have been driven out mostly by the efforts of his own people. In that case I am not sure the people wouldn't welcome, or at least tolerate, the assistance of NGOs. In any case, Libya is not the infrastructure basket case Iraq was in 2003, at least not yet. The longer the fighting goes on though, the worse it will be.
As far as a legitimate and recognized government being in place before assistance is given; if a legitimate and recognized government were in place, assistance wouldn't be needed.
A no fly zone, or other types of assistance, is not an inevitable prelude to more military action. That is a decision that can be made or not made. If 9-11 had not happened we still might have one over north and south Iraq.
I would be very surprised if the dictator and his hired killers would declare war on the US or the world.
Nothing will de-escalate the radical Jihadists in the region. They have their own agenda and it remains as it was regardless of what is happening in Libya.
The US national interest is the quick restoration of stability in the oil market, not a fashionable consideration but a real one. It is in our interest also to stop a mass murder that will ensue if the dictator wins. That is in humankind's interest also. And it is also in our interest to demonstrate that importing killers to slaughter residents is not a good idea.
I think if the dictator wins, he may just as well start sponsoring international terrorists again, just to spite the west. He is already pretty mad at us. Perhaps there is less chance of that happening if he were to be gone.
Maj Brothers comments framed the scenario well.
BLUF: We don't have nearly enough information to even begin planning for any sort of military operation that will evolve into nation building.
Problem #1. our armed forces, who are the vanguard of any type of humanitarian response, are running on fumes due to Iraq and AFG.
Problem #2. if the US/NATO/UN were to achieve any sort of initial success, there will be follow-on operations and requirements.
What do those requirements look like? How long do they last?
International assistance ultimately includes boots on the ground, as enablers to a larger Civil Military Operation (CMO). How well did we do in Iraq? How well is this going in AFG? What is the cost versus the benefit in either scenario?
Before serious discussions regarding CMO take place, some level of stability and some form of legitimate and recognized govenment needs to be in place.
This has not occured and it appears that the West is not wanted or needed in this critical stability/governance piece.
A single underlying question needs to be asked and answered w/ a straight face: What is our National Interest?
Finally, a NFZ is a prelude to follow-on military action. Any thought otherwise is foolish. Once there is an encroachment on airspace, destruction of air or ground assets or any loss of life; Libya will declare war against the US and perhaps the entire Western world.
No doubt a re-newed call to Jihad will follow. And no doubt Libya will feel justified in once again sponsering global terrorism.
A military COA in Libya does not de-escalate radical Jihadists in the region. It may create traction for Mulsim Brotherhood, al Qaida, et all, in other North African and Middle East nations.
We might be best served to moniter the situation, as we did in Egypt, and let the various stake holders in the region sort this one out.
I don't see where the juice is worth the squeeze.
Why would laser guided bombs require soldiers on the ground to lase the targets? We dropped bridges in North Vietnam with laser guided bombs in 1972 by lasing from the air.
If it were decided to actually help the Libyan rebels, no timely and effective option would be without risk.
The last two options MAJ Brothers suggest would entail much less risk, but they would probably have small effect and no immediate effect. Those are good options if we want to be seen as trying to help the rebels but don't want to actually do anything.
If we decide to act, we should actually act and act now.