Comments
Jason,
Bottom up approach is great tactics. The problem is the hard constitutional lid/barrier at the District level that blocks any of that goodness from rising above. So we can spread our inkblots horizontally in two dimensions below the District level, but have no hope of expanding that goodness vertically between National, Provincial, District and Local due to the firm lock GIRoA has on that dimension through the constitution; and the complete unwillingness/inability of ISAF to recognize the magnitude of that political problem.
The only thing we do above that lid is build the capacity of National Level Security forces, so that they will have the capacity to keep the lid in place once we withdraw.
So in effect, Karzai created a functional prison for his populace, compressing their ability to impact their own political and economic lives down to the local level; and then ISAF comes along and dedicates itself to making that prison as nice as possible, while ensuring the Guards are prepared to keep the people in it once we leave. That is the current ISAF "COIN" plan. If this was 1820 and we were the British Empire with their goals and challenges, I would say "Good Job."
We're not, however the British Empire, we merely employ their tactics without adjusting them to the realities of the modern world and our own goals and challenges.
We can do better than this.
Just a jolt of reality to bring things back into perspective.
As per JIEDDO in the article just released that they are failing in the IED war--as long as the Taliban are killing and wounding US personnel in an ever increasing IED war---it begs the question as to who is winning or losing.
We are still paying the price in blood and the question then becomes just how much longer will the US public opinion hold?
I strongly believe that the local "bottom-up" approach is indeed the appropriate approach... but we also need to acknowledge that the creation of local security coalitions are best case a love match; worst case a shotgun marriage. While not exactly the same, we should remember the growing pains involved in fostering the "Anbar Awakening" that established the Abu Risha as a power player in the Dulaymi Confederation... and then sponsoring the Dulaymi Confederation as a viable partner of the Maliki government. We can also learn from how the "Sons of Iraq" program worked itself out... the good, the bad and the ugly. Finally, lets not forget the Maliki government's tribal council (role, function and intent) initiatives in the Shia south.
I personally can not imagine an accurate survey of the population's opinion outside of any major metropolitan area in Afghanistan... but then I am a bit suspicious of all opinion polls...
While I am very interested in assessing what WE are doing... I'd also like to know what the Karzai government is doing to exploit the segmentation, patronage and territory operating codes? I've found little difference between the way the Amir Abd al-Rahman III who ruled Cordoba in Al-Andalus from 912 to 961 C.E. governed and the way the Karzai administration seeks to embrace, build and manage coalitions of "sovereign" groups. What is even worse to all of us modern folk... there is a relatively small difference between our current bottom-up approach and the networked governance of the Amir Abd al-Rahman III.
r/
MAC
The article appears to be a brief commentary, setting out what we already know.
There is no doubt that with the combination of a pro-active ROE by US marines and the aggressive SOF raids, the Taliban are under the most pressure since 2001.
While the epicentre of the Taliban is in the South it is always left out of commentary like this that there are many other Provinces that continue to live under the shadow of the Taliban or are at best 50/50.
The local "bottom-up" approach is spot on, however, please correct me if Im wrong, but the local police programs were started in places like Wardak under the direction of the US. Karzai opposed the expansion of these.
Just as importantly, and given the article is measuring success in Afghanistan as a whole, it neglects to mention the "top-down" part. This remains a quagmire with the potential to inflict harm on progress made elsewhere.
I always love the population surveys that come out of Afghanistan. Can anyone who has operated in Afghanistan, outside of Kabul, imagine undertaking acurate surveys of the population's opinion.
What the article neglects to acknowledge is that not a single District, let alone Province, is being provided with security without the US military teeth and the backbone.
Jason
<b>Bob, MAC:</b>
I'll leave the esoterica to you guys but on the practicalities, while Bob is indeed correct and I'm sure the guys and gals on the ground are doing their best, the point is they are being both handicapped and channeled by the policies of those echelons above reality Bob mentions.
Two things pop out of this subthread I think we can agree upon:
"Higher's assumptions" are indeed flawed and their rules add to the potential for errors and problems on the ground -- that's Afghan specific.
Our personnel system is in significant need of overhauls, plural -- that's generic and for the future, though it's never too late to start, even for Afghanistan.
Carl, Karl, Bob,
... one more so than the other... The street vendor wants more traffic since he is less concerned about customer loyalty. The sale is important. The neighborhood store owner less so since he seeks a loyal customer base and long-term relationships. The relationship is important.
Ken, reference para 3... yes.... and I do not dismiss your valid point of view concerning learning curves ;-)
Bob is absolutely correct... our guys and gals on the ground are performing well and achieving the objectives that they have been tasked to achieve... but it might be about time to reassess the facts (highers' assumptions).
... so, could Seth's piece be a trial balloon or am I spending too much of my free time sniffing airplane glue?
r/
MAC
Ken,
In all fairness to our guys on the ground, the problems we have are not rooted in the experience or inexperience of the guys and gals on the ground. Are they perfect? No, we can always do better at what we do, and more persistent engagement may help that.
The problem is at a much higher level. The white house, the congress, The outer ring of the Pentagon, the top floor window offices at MacDill AFB and other such places. Also in the basements of those same places where armys of intel guys stoke the fires; and at think tanks where experts (yes, me too) extol the merits of their pet theories. We cling to a very flawed concept of the problem and have shaped an equally flawed operational design that has been converted to the plans our guys and gals on the ground are executing.
Even if the executed the current plan with perfect understanding and execution it would still fail, because it is focused on the wrong things. Which brings us back to Seth's (biased, as he is very much a professional stakeholder in the current approaches that SF is focused on) assessment. The guys and gals on the ground are performing well and achieving the objectives that they have been tasked to achieve. A measure of performance.
He then leaps to the bold assessment that rests wholly upon the extremely shaky assumption that our planning assumptions are correct, and that performing these taskes in these districts of Afghanistan will achieve the effects we seek. As I said, "maybe." But there is a giant break in the logic trail.
Bob
<b>MAC McCallister:</b>
Re the Draft, even I am not that old. It was gone before I retired. With a son who's had multiple deployments and varied jobs, I'd certainly be aware of the multiple tour factor even if I couldn't read.
While I certainly appreciate your erudition, service and efforts, the fact remains that due to flawed personnel policies, my comment was accurate. Most folks do indeed get multiple tours -- doing different jobs in different TAORs. Being an Armor Bde S4 in Iraq and a Cav Sqn Cdr in the 'Stan two years later and after a tour on a large CONUS staff contributes to a certain lack of continuity. It is also true the GOs stay longer -- but they aren't the actual daily doers.
As you mentioned the ten years in a derisory mode, you must have noticed <i>something</i> about learning curves to generate the thought... ;)
I've been inflicted with too many complaints about that factor and its impacts from too many people over the past ten years to dismiss it as not a problem. You, of course may do so as you wish. Hopefully though, for the future, the Army will not just dismiss it out of hand and will give it some thought.
Carl, Ken,
... but Pak Army/ISI will not give up Quetta Taliban so as to maintain a trump card to pressure, if required, the Afghan government not to push a Pashtunistan agenda too far... yes/no?
How about Pak Army/ISI maintaining ties with Quetta Taliban so as to exploit this relationship if need be against rival kith and kin networks in tribal areas further east... too conspiratorial?
Food for thought... a couple of ways of looking at the Karachi supply line from a merchants perspective. First... imagine merchants who manage the supply line as street vendors who are only interested in making the sale. Street vendors are not interested in a long-term relationship with the customer. Usually means the vendor is selling cheap and shoddy merchandise. Second, imagine the supply line as a neighborhood store. A generational fixture on the block that services a specific neighborhood. Proprietors are interested in occupying a permanent location and creating a loyal customer base... this would also imply a certain amount of quality assurance. Both imaginings provide courses of actions...
Carl, you are probably correct in your assessment that the Karzai administration seeks a longer-term U.S. presence... but I'll have to default to my previous comment that Seth's short brief might be a trial balloon. A trial balloon to tests the notion that the time has come for the Karzai administration to assume responsibility and management of the local security coalition we established so we can depart with a semblance of our frontier prestige intact... I am probably wrong but this conspiratorial thinking is fun.
Ken, I get what your saying... but we are no longer a drafted military... Folks have been deployed and have experienced a number of operational areas numerous times. I personally experienced, participated, monitored and assessed tribal dynamics in Iraq for the last 8 years... and have studied Afghanistan since about 1979... I know that I am not the only one to have done so... if the endless debate as to what course of action is most appropriate is any indication :-)
r/
MAC
MAC:
Now I must apologize for being imprecise. No way I am advocating going into Pakistan. What I mean to say is the Afghan gov might be able to get along without our forces if Taliban & company were ejected from their physical sanctuary in Pakistan and forced to operate and hide solely in Afghanistan. The only people who can deprive them of that sanctuary are the Pak Army/ISI. And we have no leverage with the Pak Army/ISI if we are not willing to give up the Karachi supply line. My personal inexpert suspicion is there would be more leverage there than people think because a lot of Pakistani elites would stand to lose a lot, a lot of money if that supply route was shut down.
I expect none of the above to happen so the Afghan gov is going to depend on our presence for a long time. If they didn't have it they would be essentially in a war with Pakistan by themselves.
Carl,
... so let me get this straight. Are you recommending expanding the ground effort into the tribal areas in Pakistan so that Afghan gov forces may stand alone without the assistance of our forces? If so, awesome; finally the creation of a greater Pashtunistan (inclusive Pashtun tribal areas in Pakistan) under the control of an Astan government so that Afghan gov forces don't have to worry about bad men scooting across that inconvenient Astan-Pstan border (Durand Line).
Reference your comment "the Pak Army/ISI is using us with the drone strikes". That is exactly what I was alluding too... badly... when I wrote "(c)onspiracies abound as to who actually benefits from these air strikes... is it this or that Taliban commander?"... It all depends on who compiles the target list (if it is indeed the Taliban friendly segment of the ISI), does it not? Assassination bureau indeed.
I hope you are wrong in regard to a lack of human intel sources in those tribal areas... but you are probably correct... This after ten years into an active shooting war... and many more years of diplomatic and economic relationships in the region (how about contacts in the diaspora?)... but then... we do have some of the best technical gadgets in the world to help us sort it all out.
Sad isn't it.. After almost ten years we still have not learned how intrigue, conspiracy and outright lying (DIME spin) works... and no leverage with the locals...
Short recap... we stay until the Afghan government (physically or indirectly?) controls the tribal areas in Pakistan so that Afghan gov forces may stand alone without assistance of our forces... did I get that right?
I am just poking the bear... the recap is an example of sarcasm... but I am still confused as to what you are actually advocating...
Man-hugs,
MAC
Grant:
I can see your points. My inexpert opinion is that tailoring an argument for the audience too much, is not a good idea. That woman's studies class in never going to see it anyway but their way no matter how you approach them and I think you run the risk of losing credibility if you try too hard to please them. I think it best to be as factual as possible. Still speaking of the woman's studies class, you won't win the class over but you will impress individuals with your professionalism that is important. That what I think anyway.
MAC:
The "in" part was the important part of my comment. If Taliban & company have to exist in Afghanistan, not partly there and partly in Pakistan (the high leadership all being in Pakistan), then we can leave the Afghan gov forces to stand alone without assistance of our forces. Money is still going to flow hither and thither anyway. The critically important part is the physical sanctuary in Pakistan. The Afghan gov forces might be able to handle them if there couldn't scoot across that border. That is what I meant. I don't expect any of that to happen soon.
I don't think we can subtlely (sic) influence anybody in the Pak Army/ISI. They are 10 times better at intrigue than we are. They influence us. We could get them to move, I think, if we creditably threatened to give up the Karachi supply line, but short of a big thing like that...
I think, in my little civilian observer way, the Pak Army/ISI is using us with the drone strikes. I figure we probably have next to no human intel sources in those tribal areas. What we get we get from the ISI. So the ISI uses us to whack the "bad" Taliban. They will throw us a mid or low level members of the "good" Taliban or AQ to keep us happy.
I am sure the ISI will be happy to assist us in whacking bad men with cruise missiles in your hypothetical. Of course they will be the only ones with human sources so we will have to take their word for who the bad guy is, where he is and why he is a bad guy in the first place. That would sort of turn us into the ISI's assassination bureau which I consider a bad idea.
Carl,
I agree with the premise that things are going fairly well today but that they might not go so well tomorrow... So what does this mean? Do we need to stay around until tomorrow and if so, how many more tomorrows after that? Or, is Seth's short brief an attempt to explain that we have done all we can to consolidate state control and are now ready to depart with a semblance of frontier prestige intact? In other words... to allow the locals to stand or fall all by their lonesome.
Your "how about when Taliban & company stand all by their lonesome in Afghanistan" comment is interesting. Are you saying that we should stay in Astan until all funding and support, local, regional and international, for the Taliban is minimized or stops? Who actually supports and finances the Taliban? I presume that you are alluding to members in Pakistan's intelligence services, international Islamic philanthropic endowments (awqaf), local and regional merchant families, criminal entrepreneurs, and individuals who wish to participate in jihad but are too busy living normal lives? No organization is an island... and I have to wonder why efforts to target the various funding streams have been less than a resounding success.
I also wonder what exactly we are doing to "influence" select members of Pakistan's intelligence services who are actively supporting select Taliban associations. I would think that our negotiations with members of Pakistan's intelligence service who support the Taliban have evolved into giving up "foreign" AQ fighters rather than local Pathans... but if the Taliban friendly ISI are not giving up the locals then who in the hell are we whacking in the tribal areas? Conspiracies abound as to who actually benefits from these air strikes... is it this or that Taliban commander? Don't we know where the Commander of the Faithful sleeps at night... are we not listening to his cell phone conversations and reading his mail?
Makes your head hurt!
Short recap. Afghan Local Police program connects local allies (segmentation) with district and provincial government (patronage); protects communities (territory) from Taliban incursion in Helmand, Kandahar, Uruzgan and other provinces. It is now up to President Karzai to maintain and manage the coalition of local security programs... as we depart with a semblance of our frontier prestige intact... I recommend that we maintain and continuously update contingency plans (many implied tasks associated with this approach) to whack the bad men every now and then as required (cruise missile, punitive expedition diplomacy).
r/
MAC
Carl: "... it makes me a bit uneasy when you talk about the military trying to figure what the will of the American people is when formulating and presenting plans, advice etc. I think that is best left to the elected representatives. The military stuff is plenty complicated without getting into divining the national mood too."
My only point on the "converse" stuff was I'm not sure the logic that 'if they are concerned then we are good' is necessarily true. Could be- but I'm a bit skeptical. I think they've been worried to a certain extent since 2001. I'm more interested as to what them being worried means in terms of what they will do based on that feeling.
On the STRATCOM: I guess I'd phrase it in this manner- if you were to speak to a Women's Studies class at Berkely you probably wouldn't explain to the class that the reason women shouldn't be in combat arms is because they aren't as capable as men. You'd probably structure your argument based on the audience. With 80% of our people "tired" of the war- then maybe we should make sure we don't come across as totally disconnected from that fact- which I think we sometimes sound like we are.
So, for instance- don't give the President 3 choices in which none take into account the obvious will of the people- even if you think you can change it with the perfect STRATCOM campaign. Don't plan short-term objectives that ignore long-term requirements. And don't sugarcoat things in your public outreach. Etc. (all hypotheticals, of course)
Mac:
I read the article 3 times in order to be certain and Dr. Jones did not say all is well. I believe he said some things seem to be going better and he offers reasons why he thinks that is so. The caveats don't negate the observation. They are there, I think, in order to caution people that if this thing is going fairly well today it might not tomorrow.
As far as when the Afghan forces can stand all by their lonesome in Afghanistan, how about when Taliban & company stand all by their lonesome in Afghanistan.
MAJ Martin:
You lost me with hypothetical converses and such. It just seems to me that if the other guy shows concern with what you are doing, you may be doing something effective. Simple enough. Of course he is going to try to counter you. That's obvious. Otherwise it wouldn't be a fight. It is hopeful that will MO and the boys have to adapt to something we did.
I think what you mean by STRATCOM is strategic communications. I think Bill M's comments about that are good. Also, it makes me a bit uneasy when you talk about the military trying to figure what the will of the American people is when formulating and presenting plans, advice etc. I think that is best left to the elected representatives. The military stuff is plenty complicated without getting into divining the national mood too.
If the Afghans were to be left completely on their own after 2014 the whole thing would come apart. If nobody questions that assumption it is because nobody believes that is going to happen. Sort of like Gitmo closing.
First off my apologies for trying to post from my blackberry above as anon, but signed Bill. I didn't have my glasses and obviously pushed some wrong keys.....
Posted by Grant
"If the Taliban IS worried- then we should also be worried because that most likely means they are adjusting... and since they are more adaptable than we are- if we aren't MORE worried (STRATCOM pronouncements aside), then I'd submit that we are wrong.
Here are two metrics we routinely ignore in the military:
1) Our populace's feeling towards a military action.
2) Metrics that would falsify our assumptions."
First I don't completely discount the author's view on this, but in simple Maoist terms insurgents retreat when the enemy is strong and attack when he is weak. "Temporarily" owning the ground doesn't mean much, and I suspect we're blind to the Taliban's clandestine infrastructure that is still in place and in some areas "probably" still influencing the population. Also this winter I believe the Taliban were more aggressive than any previous winter lull, so I'm not sure we saw the lull that the author suggests, but I don't have those stats.
Second, I think your comments about the Taliban adapting are among the most important in this discussion so far. They'll adapt and we'll be fighting yesterday's fight for a long time, because we tend to fall in love with our plans and create narratives to paint the perception of success by focusing on plan friendly metrics, and ignoring metrics that may be more telling. We did the same thing in Vietnam.
Third, I don't think our population's perception of this war is decisive. In Vietnam it was because they were violently against the war, now the population is just tired of the aimlessness of the war. If someone articulated a meaningful strategy I think they would turn around.
I think the perception of the Afghan people is more important, and equally important is the link between the Afghan people and their security forces? Will the security forces work to protect their citizens and propel the nation forward, or will they brutalize them as representatives from the State? Will they hold the line when we're gone?
... there actually are a number of us who have publicly questioned the ANSF sustainability assumption... no takers.
... the implication... if history is a lazy-man's guide... It should take about 7 years (more or less depending on the reigning President's ability to manage his coalition) for some challenger to seize power and hang the deposed President in Kabul's Aryana Square...
The greater the future unfunded ANSF size, the greater the future threat of warlordism.
Depressingly yours,
MAC
If worry of the enemy is a good metric, is the converse also true: if you're not worried about the enemy they are doing the wrong things? Following that logic one would have to conclude that since we were "comfortable" prior to 9/11, AQ was doing all the "wrong" things...
I'd submit that when the enemy ISN'T worried- that that is a more meaningful metric than when they are. Not being worried could just be complacency. Being worried means you recognize the constant need for change. It may mean nothing at all about what your enemy is doing today- but what you think he MAY do tomorrow.
If the Taliban IS worried- then we should also be worried because that most likely means they are adjusting... and since they are more adaptable than we are- if we aren't MORE worried (STRATCOM pronouncements aside), then I'd submit that we are wrong.
Here are two metrics we routinely ignore in the military:
1) Our populace's feeling towards a military action.
2) Metrics that would falsify our assumptions.
Our STRATCOM, to me, signals a 180 degree disconnect from what our populace is signaling: that they are not supportive of the effort. We can either engage in trying to change that (a highly unlikely effort) or we can take our populace's will into account in our efforts, advice, STRATCOM, and plans.
Many of us truly believe in what our STRATCOM says and believe that our assumptions are actually facts. This makes us blind to the possibility that we are chasing our tails. One HUGE assumption: that the systems/force we are creating within the ANSF are sustainable WITHOUT future Coalition funding past 2014. I never did see this assumption being questioned, nor what the implications would be if it turned out to be false.
Grant Martin
MAJ, US Army
The above comments are the author's own and do not constitute the position of the US Army or DoD.
Carl,
How is this for a simple design to track what is going on...
1. Segmentation - Local forces allied to the Afghan government.
2. Patronage - Government encourages local families (kith and kin networks) to participate.
3. Territory - Local control of a growing number of areas in the province.
Example: Afghan Local Police program connects local allies (segmentation) with district and provincial government (patronage); protects communities (territory) from Taliban incursion in Helmand, Kandahar, Uruzgan and other provinces.
"Beating Back the Taliban" explains that all is well... BUT.... and with the simple conjunction "but" negate all that came before. It is one thing to laud the effort and quite another to caveat that the Taliban have demonstrated an uncanny ability to regenerate, take advantage of local grievances against the Afghan central government and that the Taliban can't wait for the spring fighting season to commence.
When are we going to allow the locals to stand or fall all by their lonesome?
v/r
MAC
Bob:
I would prefer to keep things simple so I can keep track. I said ideology motivates some, maybe many, of Taliban & company to action. This was in response to your comment that insurgency radiates from gov actions. That is true; but that ideology motivates action of some is also true.
That the malign Pak Army/ISI is acting upon its' goofy view of what its' interests are is also true; as is the fact that the General sahibs acting upon those interests help propel the conflict, a thing from the outside acting as a partial causation of the problem inside Afghanistan.
I am mainly interested in what works. The article indicates that something we are doing is working well enough that it worries Taliban & company.
The UW actions of AQ, the ISI or even the good old US of A in our many opertions to motivate others to insurgency, only work if there is already in place a populace ripe for exploitation.
You express the position of the counterinsurgent. Defeat the insurgent, or deter the UW host from action, and one wins. Never happens that way though.
Sure, there are great examples like the current one in Sri Lanka where the Tamil Insurgents were defeated, but the underlying conditions left unaddressed. We'll have to wait about 20 years to fairly assess that one.
Or the more mature example of Malaya, where the communist insurgent was defeated, but concurrently the British removed their dominion over the government and ensured suffrage to the previously denied ethnic Chinese populace. When the remnants of the insurgents came back in from the jungle the found that they were no longer needed, and neither was their communist ideology.
Every successful insurgency demands an effective ideology, but the ideology is a tool to guide the fire and keep it burning, not the fuel the fire feeds upon.
The fact is that the ISI in no more evil than ISAF. Both are merely government organizations doing their best to advance the intrests that their respective governments believe to be vital in Afghanistan. This is what governments do, they jack with each other to gain or hold onto advantages. Governments waging UW and self-serving insurgent leaders alike are much like the Scorpion, and dissatisfied populaces are not unlike the Frog in the fabled "Scorpion and the Frog" with the government or the insurgent Scorpion enticing the populace Frog to act against their better judgment to carry the Scorpion's cause forward. Only a frog who wants to get to the otherside themselves is apt to buy in to such a line of ideolgy from the Scorpion. In the end they both suffer.
But our doctrine buys into more of the Pied Piper theory, where some malign actor employs his magic flute of ideology to lead the happy satisfied children (populace) to their doom. If those kids followed the piper, its because they wanted to leave. (probably tired of being "controlled")
Cheers
Bob
Bob:
The point of the Huk comment was to illustrate the pointlessness of cocktail party bon mots and the exchange thereof. I could have just as easily used the German General Staff in 1943 or the Malayan Communist Party in 1952 or whomever.
I do understand the concerns of others. I did not address those concerns. I pointed out the simple thing that if the enemy is worried about what you are doing, perhaps you are doing something right and you should note this for future reference. That simple thing was not noted by others so I drew attention to it because I think it important. Doing that does not obligate me to address every point raised in the article and the comments. And not addressing every point in the article does not diminish the importance of the point I made.
Radical ideologies may be a fairy tale but if they motivate people to action, then they are of import. The ideology of many members of Taliban & company motivate them to action, hence that fairy tale should probably be recognized. And if the sprites and fairies of legend actually provide arms you can touch and money you can spend, as the Pak Army/ISI does, then believing in pixie dust might be an advantage.
Carl,
We all understand the author's point very well; and yours.
From your comments, however, one draws a sense that you don't understand the concerns of others over what appears to be an article that has some problems:
1. Stating that "control of the populace" is key (trying to remember the last time I woke up thinking "God, I hope the government exercises control over me today so that I can be a happy citizen"!) A flawed premise at best.
2. Pointing out control over territory as an indicator of control over the populace; (a very shaky nexus that history shows us many a counterinsurGENT has drawn comfort from, while at the same time losing the counterinsurGENCY).
3. And lastly asserting measures of performance as measures of effectiveness. EBO may be dead, but one still must actually achieve desired effects, not just accomplish planned activities.
Lastly you wheel out the Huk rebellion as an example, and actually shoot down your own argument in the process. There has been virtually continual insurgency in the Philippines since the first Europeans exerted there dominion over that fair land. Many groups emerge and fade, many ideologies are applied that work on a specific group, time and place. But the end fact is that while many insurGENTS have been defeated or suppressed in the Philippines, the larger insurGENCY has been alive and well for hundreds of years. (here's a metric for you, if you can list at least one major insurgency per generation born and "defeated" in some country, then in fact the insurgency has never truly gone away). The Philippines and Algeria are two poster children for such a history of enduring insurgency and intermittent suppression.
We may well achieve suppression of the insurgent in Afghanistan as well, but little of our current operations are well tuned for addressing the causation of insurgency itself. Insurgency causation radiates out from government, not inward from some "malign actor," on the back of some "radical ideology" from the darkness of some "ungoverned space." These are largely fairytales developed by various colonial powers over the years to rationalize why anyone would ever dare challenge the wonderfully effective governments, civilization and rule of law that they have brought to enlighten some backward people or land.
People are funny like that, on both sides of this equation.
Cheers,
Bob
Bob, it isn't just we employ phases, but how we employ phrases to shape our narrative. The scary patr is we start believing this, so it ends up shaping policy and we never get out of the rut. U.S. Success is irrelevent in the long run, what happens when we leave will ultimately determine how successful we were. Bill
... speaking of winning phases ... reminds me of the exchange in the movie Mr. Baseball staring Tom Selleck....
Jack Eliot (Tom Selleck): I'm a World Series MVP!
Skip: That was four years ago, Jack. Last season, you hit .235.
Jack Eliot: LAST SEASON, I led this team in ninth-inning doubles in the month of August!
To recap... We have won in phases 1, 3, 7, 13, 29, and in the whole month of October... we anticipate winning phases 32, 59, and 357 and in the months of October AND January.
I am all for winning... but how long do we have to continue winning every battle? I just can't take all these pronouncements of victory serious any longer and fear that all is actually lost in the south because those dang Taliban just don't understand that we are serious... "we've been up that same hill X times (Hamburger Hill, 1987)"...
What is needed is a new and improved conceptual schema, design, frame, and imaging for observing the behavior of Taliban men (and women) in groups and their interactions, intentions, etc, etc... or maybe not.
Realistically and increasingly depressingly yours,
MAC
Gian,
What you describe is in many way linked to how we employ "phases" and then tend to equate progress in those phases with progress in a COIN campaign.
It is not what phase the counterinsurgent is in that matters, it is not even what phase the insurgent is in that matters, what matters is what phase the insurgency is in, and that is a subjective measure of where the support of the populace truly lies.
If the counterinsurgent marches lock-step from shape to clear to hold to build; he sees powerful changes in the territory where he executes those steps, and it does indeed look like progress, (and as I conceded in my first post, may well be progress). But this is only truly progress if the conditions of insurgency within the insurgent element of the populace shift toward the government.
One must act objectively, but one must resist the urge to measure success objectively as well. Success in such matters is highly subjective. Efforts to get to "Build" in one community may well drive the populace even further from supporting the government in that and surrounding areas. This is the elusive problem that GEN McChrystal wrestled with as he worked to change "how" such operations were conducted to increase the positive subjective effects.
But it is also important to remember that what phase the insurgent is in is moot as well. Mao described three logical phases, and the insurgent can "win" in any of those phases. Moving the insurgent from phase II in some area back to phase I is no true measure of progress. Insurgencies always ebb and flow, both seasonally and situationally.
We need new, subjective, metrics that indirectly assess where the populace's support lies, and use those rather than current measures of ground cleared; insurgents killed; fertilizer, drugs or weapons captured; or markets open, to assess our progress and to fine tune our efforts.
I dont know Bob, I have a much more pessimistic view of the piece than you, even though you do rightly highlight the problems and inconsistencies with it.
Jones's piece reads like more coin-perception-creation than anything else; it has the usual bromides that progress in certain areas is being made, local governance is being established, more coalition troops are improving security, etc etc etc.
Reminiscent of Vietnam, he makes the same mistake that experts and military officers did then: he assesses progress and momentum through the prism of our own programs and procedures and co-opts the language and goals of the American field commander on the scene.
Yet in the conclusion of the article he says the Taliban still has the capacity to fight and resist, and robustly too.
So at the end of the day where does that leave us? Nowhere, we are in a rut, and seem to be stuck there for a long time. I imagine in 2014 Jones will be writing similar pieces suggesting we need to stay and just try harder because we are almost there.
gian
First, I hope Seth is right on this. Certainly the Coalition has tactical momentum and has made the most of the annual winter lull. The Marines continue clearing operations up the Helmand, the Army continues clearing operations around Kandahar, and the Special Forces Village Stability programs continue to create oases of goodness and stability in critical locations across the countryside. As Seth says, "The Taliban have definitely lost territorial control in parts of Helmand, Kandahar and Uruzgan, and other Southern Provinces."
But then he follows with: "Neither captures the combatants' primary goal: control over the population."
So, he proclaims progress based upon control of dirt, and then later emphasizes that true success in measured in control of people. Seth, you probably need to clarify that for us.
Beyond that, I would argue that "control over the population" belongs in the 'half right' dustbin of COIN clichés, along side of "sanctuary is ungoverned space"; "insurgency and COIN are subsets of complex warfare"; and the belief that it is ideology that "radicalizes" a populace and leads to insurgency.
It is the support of the populace that the government and the insurgent must compete for. The difference between a populace offering their support to some government and one being controlled by some government is significant. It is the difference between effective COIN (good governance) and effective suppressing of insurgency (poor governance).
(The other two items I will cover elsewhere, but "space" is the least important aspect of sanctuary, and it is outrageous government action rather than clever insurgent messages that radicalizes a populace).
But I hope Seth is right in his assessment, even though I fear he measures the wrong things with the wrong ruler. Our operational design for Afghanistan has limited us to only engaging those things Seth describes, and we have placed the things I see as most important in a sanctuary of our own making in Kabul. Currently our guys are doing a very good job at the only things we will let them do. I hope that is enough.
Cheers,
Bob