Maria Costigan asks Jill Hazelton, Research Fellow at Harvard's Belfer Center, in a recent interview.
BLUF We have a conventional wisdom on counterinsurgency right now, which is counterinsurgency as state-building - the development of healthy, participatory, well-governed states will defeat insurgency. But this process is very long term and it has actually never been done. It's an ideal. The ideal involves building the civil arm of the state to serve popular interest, to gain the broad allegiance of the populace, including instituting broad reforms that affect the lives of the people the state in fundamental ways. And it involves limiting the use of military force in order to prevent the alienation of civilians by causing unintentional causalities. And all of those things are powerfully appealing to us. They make sense normatively as what we want and what we like and what we think states should do for their citizens. But, as I said, this model has never actually been put into effect. And that's important because the United States is shaping a great deal of its foreign policy around this type of counterinsurgency - in Afghanistan particularly right now, but also in some other weaker states, where jihadi violence or support for jihadi violence has been a problem- Yemen and Somalia, for example.
Much more at the Belfer Center.
Comments
To possibly state my case a little better:
Counterinsurgency as state-building often does not work because it is based on the sometimes illogical belief/assumption that the conservative, the elite and the most respected/revered members of the population -- and much of the population generally -- will be happy with policies implemented by their local government, which are designed to see their present political, economic and social system gone, and a foreign political, economic and social order installed and implemented in its place.
Whereas, such a course of action might appeal to fringe elements of certain populations (those who achieve their status, wealth and livelihood via a relationship with and dependency upon foreign entities), it often does not appeal to the vast majority of the population -- who find and achieve their way and place-in-life via different means.
Because of these factors, when such an impasse has been encountered in the past, it has often required that the foreign power(s) decisively defeat the population and, thereafter, stand on the subject population's throat for an extended period of time -- so as to achieve the required state and societal transformation.
In other instances, the foreign power often makes the determination that the possibility of a successful state and societal transformation is unlikely -- or that such a development can only be achieved by unreasonable means and/or at too high a cost.
In these latter cases, the foreign powers are left to find a way to disengage and withdraw, and to, thereafter, consider and explain why their perceptions and calculations re: the subject population's willingness to abandon their political, economic and social order -- and adopt foreign ways -- were so far off the mark.
<blockquote>Attacking insurgents merely goes after those who actively complain today, and does nothing to address why they complain. It places all blame on "ideology" or "malign actors" and is very much rooted in the Colonial perspectives of the guys who wrote the COIN books our doctrine is based upon.</blockquote> - Robert C. Jones
I agree with much of what you say but one quibble: liberty is an ideology, so that when you say populaces are animated by liberty (your interesting populace-centric paper linked here earlier) they are animated by ideology too.
Ideology matters and we should talk about.
I know he's controversial (and there are good criticisms of his work) but for discussion purposes only:
<blockquote>As the dictator of Haiti for decades, Papa Doc Duvalier had good reasons--tens of millions of them--to praise international aid agencies for their generosity. As a former analyst in the World Bank system that coordinates such generosity, Easterly thinks it is time to start listening to people other than corrupt dictators and self-congratulatory bureaucrats in assessing international-aid projects. Though he acknowledges that such projects have succeeded in some tasks--reducing infant mortality, for example--Easterly adduces sobering evidence that Western nations have accomplished depressingly little with the trillions they have spent on foreign aid. That evidence suggests that in some countries--including Haiti, Zaire, and Angola--foreign aid has actually intensified the suffering of the poor. By examining the tortured history of several aid initiatives, he shows how blind and arrogant Western aid officers have imposed on helpless clients a postmodern neocolonialism of political manipulation and economic dependency, stifling democracy and local enterprise in the process. Easterly forcefully argues that an ambitious new round of Western aid programs will help the suffering poor only if those who manage them wake up from the ideological fantasy of global omniscience and begin the difficult search for piecemeal local approaches, rigorously monitoring the results of every project. Proffering no blueprint for bringing poverty and disease to an end, Easterly does set the terms for a debate over how to give foreign aid a new start.</blockquote>
From the Amazon blurb to: The White Man's Burden: Why the West's Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good
And, yes, this has everything to do with the topic at hand because it is a key aspect of "hearts and minds." We build capacities (translation, aid of various sorts) and your country stabilizes. End of insurgency. Voila!
Good interview above, btw.
I still don't understand why we think building capacities via international development aid promotes long term stability or has any kind of durability at all.
Some of our largest international aid recipients are merely rentier economies where the main benefactors oppress their own people in order to maintain favored access to Western developmental or military aid.
Isn't that the larger American foreign policy assumption and one that goes far beyond our military efforts in Afghanistan and the current popularized notions of COIN? As an outsider to all of this, it appears as if the military is now intellectually "poisoned" by the World Bank hype and mentality.
When we decide to nation build, or "nation-stabilize," we work with in-country elites by shoveling aid money their way in order to build various "capacities." Sometimes we try and work around that by working with in-country NGOs but once the cash awards get big enough, the shenanigans begin. And the poor continue to suffer and our enemies continue to plot....using our money for the weapons and plotting.
Egypt, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and who knows, Libya next? What has been surprising to me is how vigorously foreign armies are defended as long as they have once worked with our own military (or have been our clients in the past in some way.)
We help build these armies, we train them, and then their ideas about the world and respective regions intellectually taint our own institutions. Bureaucracies internalize some cockamamie mission and get used to the cash. Is this what you all call rice bowls?
We've got the biggest case of clientitis on the planet. American foreign policy as clientelism....that's nation building. An elite to elite money transfer. No more, no less.
I also don't understand why Afghanistan is a pure insurgency. We knocked out the Taliban, put Karzai in place and are attempting to cajole the Pakistani Army/State (same same) into being something they are not: an ally.
But no one will ever say anything because that's not the dogma. The dogma is that if we give enough money or military training to a country it will prevent future disaster and it will make them an ally. And all we started out to do was kick Al Q hard and catch bin Laden.
I don't get it and never will.
At any rate, I'm sure William Easterly has said this all better than me.
A fundamental flaw in our approach to counterinsurgency would seem to be our belief that the conservative elements of a society -- and much of the population generally -- will stand idly by, or will actively support, our installed or supported local government's policies and efforts, which are designed and implemented so as to undermine and eradicate the political, economic and social order of the subject country/society, and replace these with a foreign/alien political and economic order that are more to our liking.
It would not seem possible to win "hearts and minds" by such an approach (thus, the lack of success?).
Rather, such approaches would only seem to garner enmity.
Thus, if the goal is to "modernize" a state and society -- such that it will cause us fewer problems and be a better "fit" for the modern world -- then one must come to understand that this will often have to be undertaken "against the will" of the population and, accordingly, will often require the use of harsh measures to effect the desired changes.
This is a good article and I hope to see more in the future that collectively begin to challenge the mythology we embraced regarding COIN, nation building, etc. It is sadly comical how we continue to cling obediently to failed ideas. Just try harder, we'll get there....
The mytholodogy that shapes our current COIN doctrine has much deeper roots than FM 3-24, it is also shaped by the prevailing American political correctness movement (which resembles a Nazism and Maoism in its demand for conformity to one set of ideas).
It is no surprise that after repeated failures we still continue to spin the merits of our current approach at great costs to our national treasure, because it is a belief system, one you must embrace or you are publically shamed for not getting it.
The sad fact is we prolong wars indefinitely by failing to act decisively. The desire to have a "kind" war based on lofty moral principles and the assumption that all people value what we value has simply resulted in more bloodshed and suffering so we can feel better about ourselves.
The war is either worth fighting (and all the ugliness that comes with fighting), or it isn't.
Lights in dark places, nor a thousand small successes, nor three cups of tea will lead to success. FM 3-24 has considerable merit, but not if it and its related politically correct interpretation is accepted blindly. We now have self appointed political correctness czars in each unit (just like the Soviets) ensuring we don't deviate from the accepted group think.
Our military needs to relearn true American principles and welcome debate, not conformity.
Gentlemen,
All great points - much appreciated. I certainly understand the frustration and I don't mean to jump to the defense of 3-24. Now that I've moved from practioner the past few years to instructing in a formal school environment I have the chance to take a deeper look into things. I honestly didn't interpret the manual quite as authoritatively or directly - rather as a good, general introduction to the subject matter.
I'd actually be interested to know how many people actually read doctrine and do not simply cherry pick from it, rather than taking in the concepts as a whole. Seems to me that if you want a new idea, read an old book (hell, read doctrine) you might be surprised at what you find.
I do agree that staffs, more often than not, will not take the time to challenge their assumptions. Perhaps this is something the operating forces ought to borrow from the intelligence community and use some time tested analytical techniques such as key assumption checks, red cells, or other contrarian methods. So perhaps an effect is our dogmatic interpretation of 3-24 - but the underlying issue is our failure to be thinkers.
I agree with Grant, we have no structure or intellectual climate to question the assumptions and theories that underpin pop centric coin. Instead as Grant argues we have dubious theories that have been turned into statements of fact. Shoot, even the president has used theory in the form of fact when last year at west point in his Afghanistan speech he said that the additional brigades would be clearing, holding, and building, as if that is what actually happens when they operate.
Moreover, we have yet to have a wide ranging debate in the army over coin. Anybody who says that we did in 2006 when 3-24 was being written does not appreciate what a wide ranging debate really means.
For example between 1976 and 1982 over 110 articles were published in Military Review that fundamentally challenged the doctrine of active defense. But over the last four plus years with 3-24 the articles in Mil Review for example largely tell anecdotes of how this unit or that unit conformed to 3-24 or Galula, or Thompson, etc in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Is it possible, for example, with regard to the rules of American coin, for a field army to learn and adapt its way out of doing population centric counterinsugency to something else?
Bottom line to it all is that 3-24--aka hearts and minds coin--has not worked in practice, as Jill's interview makes clear. So in a sense with 3-24 in Afghanistan we are dancing in the dark. Yet nobody, especially the Armys general officer corps, seems to worry about such things and instead can only regurgitate the next coin principle or maxim and then state as a matter of fact that we are doing such things in Afghanistan.
gian
I think the "real" issue is we just don't have a structure that makes it conducive to question assumptions- especially underlying assumptions. So, for instance the assumption that "the lack of good governance is contributing to the insurgency and therefore the presence of good governance (based on the model that is being built) will naturally undermine the insurgency"- is not questioned- it is seen as a fact.
We don't seem to question whether we can build the model that has been approved, whether the model being built really equals good governance, nor whether the insurgency will still thrive with "good governance" due to it possibly springing from other sources.
I think the issue of 3-24 is that it states theories and assumptions as incontestable facts. So, just a small set of examples:
- "Long-term success in COIN depends on the people taking charge of their own affairs and consenting to the governments rule."
- "Leadership is critical to any insurgency."
- List of COIN "Principles"
- "Effective COIN programs address all aspects of the local populaces concerns in a unified fashion."
- "A plan based on LLOs unifies the efforts of joint, interagency, multinational,
and HN forces toward a common purpose."
- "Successful achievement of the end state requires careful coordination of actions undertaken along all LLOs."
- "Success in one LLO reinforces successes in the others."
- "Progress along each LLO contributes to attaining a stable and secure environment for the host nation."
- "LLOs should be used to isolate the insurgents from the population, address and correct the root causes of the insurgency, and create or reinforce the societal systems required to sustain the legitimacy of
the HN government."
I could go on, but these are mostly assertions stated as either facts or directives. "Should", "requires", "principles", and statements written as facts do not lend themselves to critical thinking- these are commandments!
Since they address the fundamental nature of how to do COIN and assumptions about insurgencies, this makes up our underlying approach to COIN. If these assumptions are wrong- and many have made the case they are- then our underlying approach could be wrong.
Perhaps I am missing something but having had the pleasure (or displeasure) of reading FM 3-24 cover to cover I don't really see where it specifically recommends do one thing vice another. I interpreted it as a guide or a survey of insurgency theory / counterinsurgency theory rather than a lock-step method to guarantee success in doing counterinsurgency. Maybe it was interpreted that way by some - but then the issue really isn't a particular FM, rather lack of critical / creative thinking of leadership?
For instance, FM 2-01.3 tells me about the steps involved in IPB and certain considerations to be aware of - but ultimately I have to decide what is applicable and what is not to a given situation (I'm doctrinally sound, but not doctrinally bound).
So back to the case of Ms. Hazelton's article -what is the real issue? That we've adopted a set of templates to use regardless of the situation? Or, that we fail to actually try to understand problems and adopt courses of action that we think are the most politically viable? Something else?
It is always a good idea to question the status quo, lest untested theory become accepted wisdom in the absence of proof. Therefore, the motivation underlying Jacqueline Hazelton's work is both laudable and intellectually sound. However, if this interview is representative of her work, it seems that her desire to be iconoclastic has eclipsed her knowledge of Islamist extremism and has produced a dangerous, and potentially disastrous, conclusion about how to approach the current conflict in Afghanistan. Hazelton argues that counterinsurgent forces can and should deliberately target civilians in order to destroy the enemy's support base. Historical examples, ranging from the sack of Carthage in 150bc, to Shermans March to the Sea during the American Civil War, to the Allies firebombing of Dresden during the Second Civil War, demonstrate that such countervalue campaigns have found success in past military conflicts, and extending the argument to encompass contemporary insurgencies seems logical at first blush.
Unfortunately, adopting this approach in Afghanistan would play directly into the jihadist worldview. Islamist extremists argue that Western powers are modern-day Crusaders, who wish to conquer Islam and subjugate all Muslims. Adherents to this perspective interpret inadvertent civilian casualties as evidence of an American-lead extermination campaign targeted against Muslims. Islamists market this viewpoint using a host of websites in languages ranging from English, to Spanish, to Arabic, to Bahasa Indonesia. The message often hits home.
Many Muslims view themselves as members of the ulema--the community of Muslim believers--before they view themselves as citizens of a nation state. Consequently, foreign fighters often wish to intervene in military campaigns happening thousands of miles away. This is why Arab and South East Asian mujahideen fought against the Soviets in Afghanistan during the 1980s, and why foreign fighters participated widely in the Bosnian war of the 1990s, to say nothing of foreign involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Because jihadists see little, if any, distinction between governments and the civilians that elect those governments, this same community ideal often offers justification for acts of terrorism far removed from the battlefield. Indeed, while allocating to terror charges for his failed attempt to bomb Times Square in 2010, Faisal Shahzad rationalized his actions by stating that American civilians were legitimate targets because US and NATO forces "attacked the Muslim lands." In his words, "the people select the government. We consider them all the same." If undertaken in Afghanistan, a deliberate campaign against civilians of the type Hazelton recommends would surely enrage Jihadists the world over, leading not only to increased foreign participation in the Afghan insurgency, but also to additional attacks on Western civilians living thousands of miles away from the conflict zone.
Because it neglects to consider the role of the opponents ideology, Hazeltons argument remains unconvincing. If she wishes to extend her argument to include Islamist-motivated insurgencies, then she would do well to actually analyze some Islamist-motivated insurgencies. An examination of (1) the Dhofar Rebellion, a conflict motivated by the Sultan of Omans economic exploitation of the comparatively fertile Dhofar region, (2) the Vietnam War, a contest ultimately won by a communist insurgency, and (3) the Salvadoran Civil War, a contest which communist insurgents ultimately lost, is simply not suited to making inferences about a conflict with religion at its core.
In the end, Hazelton needs to recognize that insurgency is an inherently complex problem. Simple, universal solutions, such as always targeting civilians to force the end of the conflict, are ill-advised. Motivations matter. Afghanistan demands solutions that take the conflicts specific religious context into consideration.
Grant,
That is because smart people can quickly learn FM 3-24 and related works, and can also competently follow the orders of their superiors that this is good and right and to go forth and implement it.
Coming to an understanding of insurgency is a far different matter. This requires a multi-disciplined approach and thoughtful consideration of a wide range of factors. What your design effort I am sure was attempting to get to. You faced what one always faces in Design, is the powerful drag of the inertia of what the participants "know."
This why I often say, "Don't tell me what you know, tell me what you understand." If I get a "WTF does that mean?" response, I realize I have a powerful agent of inertia on my hands...
Many people "know" FM 3-24. Few people "understand" insurgency. My own understanding grows and adjusts daily. It is a journey rather than a destination; and insurgency will always manifest in unique ways based upon the situation it develops within. Every snowflake is unique, but they all form and melt though the same fundamental process. FM 3-24 is a study on the melting of snowflakes without really ever seeking an understanding of why and how the form in the first place.
Bob
While I read the blurb above of Ms. Hazelton's, I couldn't help but think that every one of the assumptions she identifies were treated as facts when we did Design efforts in Afghanistan. When anyone questioned the logic, they were looked at like they were from outerspace. This led me to believe we really did think they were facts as opposed to political pressure killing any other COAs. The more I think about it the more I tend to agree with COL Gentile that 3-24 has become a belief system within the Army- but I wonder if "belief system" is too weak a word: I've met more folk in church that will question their religion's doctrine than I've met military planners that will question our COIN doctrinal assumptions.
Grant Martin
MAJ, US Army
The above comments are the author's own and do not reflect the position of the USAJFKSWCS(A), US Army, or DoD.
Gian,
I recognize that am in the minority position that believes that causation for the vast majority of true insurgencies radiates outward from government in the form of domestic policies and how they are implemented. Various groups within the populace perceive these "signals" differently, thus one may have stability in one group, a low level insurgency employing a communist ideology in another group, and perhaps a robust insurgency employing religious ideology elsewhere.
That said, I too am a hard critic of "state building" as a COIN technique that is every bit as flawed, for different reasons, as "insurgent defeating" is. The problem that both share is that neither takes on making the fundamental changes in government necessary to reduce the causative effects of its policies and how they are implemented.
Attacking insurgents merely goes after those who actively complain today, and does nothing to address why they complain. It places all blame on "ideology" or "malign actors" and is very much rooted in the Colonial perspectives of the guys who wrote the COIN books our doctrine is based upon.
Nation building has become a welfare/bribery approach. It too pointedly avoids going after making the hard changes in government policies and how they are implemented; and instead attempts to buy off the populace through various "effectiveness" programs. In essence it gilds the cage.
I have no problem with either of those approaches as vital supporting efforts; but the main effort must identify and target aggressively those aspects of governance that are the primary source of causation in this particular group. Historically those are higher order perceptions on Maslow's model, rather than the low hanging fruit perceptions that nation building efforts tends to go after.
For the US, the example is our approach to the Civil Rights movement. Attacking the resistance movements with rule of law would have pushed the movements into greater violence and insurgency. Bribing that aggrieved section of the populace with various handout programs would not have carried the day either (note, we did and to a degree continue to do both as supporting efforts). Instead President Johnson wisely made changing government policy and how it was implemented his main effort, targeting critical higher order issues (civil rights, voting rights, housing rights), and took the steam out of the insurgency.
Another example is Malaya where the British finally submitted to granting suffrage to the ethnic Chinese populace and relinquished their control over Malayan government by granting their liberty and removing the High Commissioner. But for that, the insurgency most likely would have reignited. Perhaps with communist ideology, or perhaps some other message may have taken root.
We are still blinded by the perceptions of our colonial past when it comes to understanding insurgency and in designing effective COIN. (Oh, and making it a military problem is a drag as well, as it tends to hold those civil official who broke the stability in a harmless status, and converts the problem to one of "warfare" to fix).
Cheers,
Bob
No argument with Jill here, I think her conclusions are spot on and they match my own with regard to hearts and minds Coin in Malaya, Vietnam, and Iraq: in neither of these three cases did it work. But a powerful narrative--to the point of it becoming a belief system for some--has been constructed to make it seem as though it did.
gian