Tell Me How to Do This Thing Called Design!

COL M: Sir, I've heard that adage and agree!

David: The PRT example you gave is very intriguing, not the least of which is because I think in places like Afghanistan the "mini-experiment" teams in my mind would look more like PRTs than most anything else we've come up with.

In my experience the tactical level folks already do a lot of what Design calls for: adapting and learning- due to them dying if they don't. But, without the synchronization, identifying the "wins", and resourcing accordingly at the higher levels- I'd submit that it results in "2 steps forward, 2 steps back".

Lastly- I'd say that a PRT "approach" is what is needed in the ministries as well, but, unfortunately we mainly have military-dominated (or unilateral) "teams" making up the ministerial advisory efforts.

Grant, Chris,

Reference "unlearning" in the military - eminds me of the old adage: "The only thing harder than getting a new idea into a military mind is getting an old one out."

Chris-

Great point. I think that in my mind Senge's description of a "Learning Organization" was one that would naturally always question assumptions- especially that what they have learned was right and that the logic/causality trail was correct. Most likely they would (if they were truly an LO) assume from the get-go that they would always be at least a little off, and therefore constantly need to "unlearn" what they thought they "knew".

I do agree, however, with what I think you are pointing out: that we in the military don't "unlearn" things very well...

Grant,

"I submit that building a "Learning Organization" is absolutely key to 'doing Design'..."

Well, there is a ying and yang to this. We also have to be able to "unlearn" rapidly. Which means we have to be both experts in what we know and know when we are not experts.

This gets to what some have termed "reflexivity" which to me is a higher state that just "learning." Reflexivity does not assume a progessive or positivistic view of knowledge. More important than individual reflexivity is INSTITUTIONAL reflexivity (which is almost oxymoronic, since "institutional" means "set in ways.")

A reflexivity process would explore the assumptive connections between the non-literal logics imbedded in extended and displaced metaphors that drive theory-construction in the institution. One (or a "rogue group") would have to be an insitutional deviant to show how the insitutional practices and theories were not working.

Individuals and groups that emancipate themselves through "subversion" of institutionalized logics (i.e. exercising deviance from "prevailing knowledge assumptions" PARADOXICALLY would have to be seen as laudable instead of punishable.

Is this possible??? history shows us institutions routinely punish, not reward deviance/divergent forms of knowledge.

Great quote that illustrates this:

"Most original ideas are bad ones. Those that are good, moreover, are only seen as such after a long learning period; they rarely are impressive when first tried out. As a result, an organization is likely to discourage both experimentation with deviant ideas and people who come up with them, thereby depriving itself, in the name of efficient operation, of its main source of innovation."

--James G. March and Thierry Weil, On Leadership

One of the "secrets" to design is to "see" paradox.

Mazzara-

That concept (commander's visualization, etc.) was already in our doctrine. We forced the round peg of Design onto the square hole of our doctrine.

Just some little known history: According to primary sources I've talked to- the description of Design being "a commander's visualization, description, and direction" was inserted over the protests of the majority of the authors of the initial (and current) Design doctrine. Indeed, much of what ended up in doctrine was inserted after the initial drafts and contradicted much of the literature's concepts. This was supposedly done because it was "too complicated for the average Army officer" and "didn't have enough of our current doctrinal concepts in it".

So, for instance, the idea that the discourse of a group (think: staff)- unburdened by a commander-centric and authoritative hierarchical structure- would get at a better description of the environment (and thus address complexity better) made some a little nervous: commanders issue orders and take staff input as needed in our culture- Design literature seemed to demand that commanders work with their staffs as equals. Military doctrine and culture assume that experience, our promotion system, and longevity make commanders the "all-knowing" at the end of the day. Design literature says the opposite: that relying on one person's view of the world and the environment in front of him is very dangerous. In short: "groupthink" is the antithesis of Design.

The purpose of Design IMO should guide the way more than the "definition": how we can address complex situations more productively. So, for instance, if our structure, personnel system, over-valuation of rank and experience, etc.- actually make us less productive in complex environments we shouldn't try to address complexity with our legacy structure, traditions, and culture.

The "definition" of Design- that actually would be much harder to nail down, since it should naturally differ for each situation one finds oneself in. In some environments it could mean resourcing a lot of mini-experiments, identifying those that work, and then resourcing those, repeat- a la "evolution". In others it could be different. Ambiguity, while something we don't like, is something required by the real world.

@ Grant Martin:
<i>I think we are talking apples and oranges in terms of the word "informed". My point was that an informed practice of Design would mean that the practitioners understood the philosophy behind it and applied it completely. I wasnt using the word "informed" as it pertains to the environment- which I am sure many in the past have been both informed of their complex environment and used some Design principles because of their natural utility.</i>
That makes all the difference in my understanding what you wrote. Thank you. We were definitely talking sideways on that term. And informed defined as you put it, means I have to agree with you on that one assumption as these theories are all relatively new.
<i>I also dont believe that individuals can "do Design": I think the literature and philosophy make a strong argument that it requires both a group and that group to be interacting closely with the environment.</i>

I think whether or not individuals can 'do Design depends on your definition of design. I personally like this one: Design is a commanders visualization, description, and direction. Does the definition of the term design need to be any more complex? I even think this is too ambiguous. Why not use something a little more aristotelian, like a genus and specific difference that gets to heart of what we're talking about when we say "design?"

NB: To avoid being called a centralizer, and too commander focused, of course there will be some groupthink involved in design, any commander worth his salt will consider the ideas of his staff/subordinates.

<EM>Mazzara: It would seem that just like in the business world, there are individuals in the military who have very much practiced design. Take the example starting on page 44 (appendix b) of John Schmitt's paper found here:
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usmc/mcwl_schmitt_op_design.pdf
This is an example of the 1st Marine Division's Design for Complex Operations in Western Iraq, 2004.
I can also hardly imagine German and Allied Generals toward the end of WWI not using some form informed approach to operating in their very complex environment.</EM>

Mazzara- I think we are talking apples and oranges in terms of the word "informed". My point was that an informed practice of Design would mean that the practitioners understood the philosophy behind it and applied it completely. I wasnt using the word "informed" as it pertains to the environment- which I am sure many in the past have been both informed of their complex environment and used some Design principles because of their natural utility. That, based on my admittedly immature and incomplete appreciation of Design theory, is a key nuance and in the big scheme of things very important. If one does not understand the reasoning behind why Design is important and- tied very closely to that understanding- what types of things they should be doing and, perhaps more importantly: what they shouldnt- then it isnt an informed approach (and thus would not be as successful over the long-term).

I also dont believe that individuals can "do Design": I think the literature and philosophy make a strong argument that it requires both a group and that group to be interacting closely with the environment.

I tried to download the paper at the link you provided, but it was taking a long time loading. I will continue to attempt to find that on-line, but suffice it to say that I would be very surprised if the 1st Marine Division WASNT applying some of the concepts I make the case for here- but Id also be very surprised if it was both an informed application and a complete one.

<EM>Bill C.: Thus, we would not seem to be overly concerned with complexity (having reduced all problems into the "root cause" concept identified above) and, accordingly, do not seem to be overly concerned with evolution or the need to be adaptable (same argument/reasoning).</EM>

100% agree. Id say our overreliance on technological solutions and our infatuation with "U.S."-centric ways of doing things are increasingly blocking our mostly well-meaning intentions. Unfortunately, I havent seen much evidence to suggest that Design fundamentals- which would critically question those "solutions"- are having much of an impact on the way we do things.

<EM>Robert C. Jones: Design is to think, to question, to seek to understand important things both unto themselves and how they relate to other things. Repeat as necessary in s journey of discovery, finding ideas and perspectives that will both validate and invalidate what one previously believe to be "truth" or "fact."

Just know, that there is no finish line or objective, but that it is the journey itself that matters.</EM>

I think Design proponents and the literature would strongly agree with your last statement! As to the first: I would only add "to act"- although I think you captured that in "journey of discovery". Although it would seem critical to "act" in order to "discover while journeying", all too often I found folks attempting to "do Design" from air-conditioned rooms totally cut-off from the environment. Thus I feel the need to get us away from talking about Design as if it is something that only intellectuals do in the rarefied atmosphere of the headquarters or at universities and colleges. Some think the Santa Fe Institute (complexity think-tank) is only about thinking and questioning and not about actually "doing". We must fight that tendency and push Design out to the folks that "do" in my opinion. If that means emptying out our headquarters, then I think that would be GREAT!! But, I also think it means we have to push Design down to the lower levels as well.

<EM>Mazarra: Im fairly certain that landing at Normandy was a complex operation, the complexity of which was fully recognized. The planning did take over a year, had to take into account everything from nature and its tides, to tactics and how to assault a shore, to stakeholders and their egos, like Patton, Montgomery, etc.

My definition of informed: having or prepared with information or knowledge. Again, I dont quite see how we dont take an informed approach considering the Militarys intense desire to know every facet of the situation, from social relationships to weapon system details to culture.</EM>

100% agree with you: most great undertakings have been by their nature complex (although some would argue "tides" and "how best to assault a shore" is more <EM>complicated</EM> and scientific than <EM>complex</EM>). Regardless, again- I think using an informed Design approach is different than simply being informed of the complexity one faces and/or the environment one faces. Interestingly, your point on the "Militarys intense desire to know every facet of the situation" is perhaps most in conflict IMO with an informed Design approach! That kind of informed approach- or at least the way the military goes about informing itself- directly contradicts many Design fundamentals. I spent the better part of a year feeding and grazing myself off of an information-overloaded juggernaut of a headquarters- but very few of us were ever actually able to get outside of "the wire" and really attempt to get at your use of the word "informed", much less Design Theorys use of the word.

<EM>Chris P: We cannot and will not find a new logic of war. What we should find is there is not a single logic and never was.</EM>

Love how you worded that, Chris! War hasnt changed- but we've never described it correctly, so for all intents and purposes it has changed if we're looking at it correctly for the first time...

To all: with this paper I attempted to offer a slightly different take on Design than one might get from the doctrine: instead of it mainly dealing with planning and theory I tried to offer a take on Design that was more action oriented. If it takes an evolutionary-type force to be successful in many complex environments, then the "action" part of Design is much more important than "environment frame-problem frame-solution frame, plan, re-frame"- which is what you usually read in the doctrine. How best to "act", however, is something we so far only get in the literature- it seems to be missing in the doctrine except for a few sparse comments imploring us to build "Learning Organizations". I submit that building a "Learning Organization" is absolutely key to "doing Design" and Id also submit that we are about as far from a Learning Organization as defined by Senge as I can imagine.

Mazzara,

"I dont believe in a variable nature of war. I think the nature of war has remained as constant as the nature of man. You could say, the nature of war is as constant as the rules of rational thought. The idea we have to learn a new system of logic? I hesitate to embrace that idea if it is a radical departure, and not some sort of organic outgrowth of what is already known."

I disagree with your assertions about the state of war-as-a-stable-science.

What history tells us is not positivistic forms of lessons learned, or best practices, or even principles, but that each day, each minute in war is different from the others, let alone different from other wars. What we here from the pundits of war are more like proverbs.

We cannot and will not find a new logic of war. What we should find is there is not a single logic and never was.

Design means more about trying out different logics and pragmatically seeing what seems to be working. There is the logic of systems engineering, logic of natural science, logic of "complex adaptive systems," logic of improvisational music and dance, logic of storytelling, and so forth.

The only science of war is one of "muddling through" (in the words of Charles Lindblom).

@Ben Zweibelson
"1. What if a complex environment required action to transform it to the future state that your military organization desired, but that action could NOT include you performing the roles that you prefer (or are in your mission essential task list METL)?"

You mean, like satisfying a provisional infantry companys mission as an artillery battery? Or Marine Corps Female Engagement Teams, made up from a whole swath of technical MOSs, but acting as cultural diplomats for the sake of our cause in Afganistan? I might be wrong, but I dont remember "build a nation," being a part of the pre 9-11-2010 METLs.

"2. What if a complex environment required the same action to be conducted, but could NOT include your organization at all- it required a rival branch. So if you are the Navy, the solution required the Army, Air Force, or SOF instead?"

I dont understand this question. The Navy has a relatively limited role in Afghanistan, and Iraq compared to the Marine Corps and the army. Not including your organization is not a decision left to the various military heads. They can vie to be included in an operation where they have no business, but vying to not participate would be weird for any military force. Thatd be like a Spartan saying, "No, Im not going to volunteer to do this Thermopylae thing, theyve already had over 300 volunteers, and besides, Im not as good as most of those guys."

"3. What if that complex environment required your organization to violate a core tenet, value, or principle that defined your culture, your society, or your organization?"

It depended on what the tenet was. Core values for the Marine Corps are "honor, courage, and commitment." I am hard pressed to think of a situation where violating any one of those would be a good idea. Ditto with leadership principles, and basic warfighting principles.

"4. Lastly, what if that complex environment required your organization to recommend to your superior that they must take another action altogether- one that was not military, but economic, diplomatic, or otherwise?"

Why does the military have to do the State Departments job for them? Economic, diplomatic, or otherwise is all part of foreign policy, policy that can be pursued by other institutions other than the military.

"We bound our solution within certain rulesets- thus our decisions are not INFORMED as to the complextity of the system, but within the interiority of our web of values, self-relevance, institutional pride and bias, and set within the logic of our western world that employs theoretical concepts such as Clausewitz, Jomini, reductionism, mechanistic approaches, and linear causality in an attempt to recognize the world."

Im fairly certain that landing at Normandy was a complex operation, the complexity of which was fully recognized. The planning did take over a year, had to take into account everything from nature and its tides, to tactics and how to assault a shore, to stakeholders and their egos, like Patton, Montgomery, etc.

"1. We fight the way we prefer to define ourselves. Look how much a stink the USMC had over the Army gaining OPCON over them in OEF."

Not to stir the pot or anything. Thats because we, indisputably, fight better. Im also a Yankees fan. :^P

"4. When we get a mission, we take it. We never toss the option to our superiors that perhaps this is a DoS mission, or something for the UN instead. That goes against our warrior mantra- that violates core tenets."

We never toss the option? How often has the DoS, OGA, or the UN not done something before weve sent the military in? Furthermore, I suggest it would not be a good thing to have a military that disobeys its civilian masters. Civilian leadership is what defines who we are as a military.

"So, with all of these pre-requirements, institutional biases, boundaries on what is interior to us and exterior (outside- unknown), how can we really say the military ever takes an INFORMED approach of the complex system?"

My definition of informed: having or prepared with information or knowledge. Again, I dont quite see how we dont take an informed approach considering the Militarys intense desire to know every facet of the situation, from social relationships to weapon system details to culture.

"If we do not consider things outside the interiority that defines our military system of logic, we are not informed, but intentionally uninformed. We do what we know, the way we know it, the way we are expected to do it. Design challenges that in every regard."

I dont believe in a variable nature of war. I think the nature of war has remained as constant as the nature of man. You could say, the nature of war is as constant as the rules of rational thought. The idea we have to learn a new system of logic? I hesitate to embrace that idea if it is a radical departure, and not some sort of organic outgrowth of what is already known.

Design is to think, to question, to seek to understand important things both unto themselves and how they relate to other things. Repeat as necessary in s journey of discovery, finding ideas and perspectives that will both validate and invalidate what one previously believe to be "truth" or "fact."

If it leads one to create new names for old things (the SFA/FID example Dave cites); or causes you to believe the world is suddenly born anew, demanding concepts beginning in any of "generational," "asymmetric," "irregular," "global;" or ending in "ecosystem," "archepeligo," or "starfish" you have probably have not quite achieved the simplicity of enlightenment, but rather entered a dark cul-de-sac of complexity. At which point, do not write a book or submit yourself for a JSAM, but rather execute an about face, move toward the light and continue your intelectual journey!

Just know, that there is no finish line or objective, but that it is the journey itself that matters.

Ben:

I would l take exception to what you state here:

"1. We fight the way we prefer to define ourselves. Look how much a stink the USMC had over the Army gaining OPCON over them in OEF. The USAF fears 'penny packet' control of any CAS from ground CDRs, period. The _SOF and conventional doctrine fight over what is SFA and what is FID._"

Having been involved in many FID/SFA arguments I would like to point out that we do not need SFA (a reinvention of FID by another name) and we have wasted a lot of time and effort on trying to reinvent the FID wheel for the regular forces. Yes, FID is a Title 10 sec 167 designated SOF activity _insofar as it pertains to special operations._ BUT it is NOT a SOF EXCLUSIVE mission. SOF does not "own" the FID mission though it is the force that conducts it generally and traditionally most often. The doctrine has been consistent for many years - all services have to provide forces trained and ready to conduct FID. It is by nature and definition a joint and interagency activity but not a SOF exclusive activity.

My heartburn with SFA is that because FID is so associated with SOF someone felt they had to come up with regular forces specific doctrine. I had someone tell me that we had to come up with Army doctrine for SFA because there was no Army doctrine for FID. But of course there is Joint and Army doctrine for FID but again, these doctrinal manuals were associated with SOF, therefore were not read by or taught by regular forces. SOF doctrine is not proprietary and can be used by everyone - that is why the Joint Staff signs off on Joint SOF doctrine and the Army signs off on Army SOF doctrine. If anything, FID doctrine only needed to be tweaked to take into account the changing character of operations in the post 9-11 world but a reinvention of the wheel was not necessary.

I agree with your larger point on this and we should not be wasting our time on these petty arguments and reinventing the wheel.

Maj Martin,

Sir, you said this:

"A cursory study of how economics, for instance, is tackling complexity would show that although businessmen have long been innovative, used creative and critical thinking, and done "Design"-like activities, a truly informed and discipline-wide approach to complexity has never really been undertaken."

And then you established this as one of your assumptions:

"That the military has never "done Design", if that means taking an informed approach to operating in a complex environment."

I assume you mean the military as an institution/discipline (group of professionals studying the art and science of war)?

It would seem that just like in the business world, there are individuals in the military who have very much practiced design. Take the example starting on page 44 (appendix b) of John Schmitt's paper found here:

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usmc/mcwl_schmitt_op_design.pdf

This is an example of the 1st Marine Division's Design for Complext Operations in Western Iraq, 2004.

I can also hardly imagine German and Allied Generals toward the end of WWI not using some form informed approach to operating in their very complex environment.

V/r,

Mazzara