Civil Affairs as a General Purpose Force: An Opportunity

I really appreciate this article because it has far reaching implications on how DoD and to a great extent USG agencies organize for future conflicts; and, it makes a great follow up to Col. Gregory Grimes Small Wars Journal article written back in 2009:

"CA should be seeking the mission of crafting that 'coherent response to stability operations. Doing so will require a sharpening of the Civil Affairs mission focus so it can be better explained, and the results better demonstrated, to the consumers of CA skills and products." Grimes

I think you echo some of the major concerns that many practioners of the "non-kinetic arts" have been observing concerning the demise of the CA mission, especially following the introduction of Commanders Emergency Response Program. It seemed that CA officers were being relegated to mere CERP project/program officers while dismissing the essential role you play in interacting with the populace and getting to the root causes of instability; a key ingredient for what I do as a USG stability officer. Some commanders placed a greater importance on spending CERP money and improperly asserting themselves in non-kinetic matters than on working through their CA teams to SUPPORT the USG Diplomacy, Governance, and Econ stability plans, making these commanders look more civilian than warfighter.

I think your article also indirectly touched on the greater problem of DoDs role as it relates to the USG agencies at the more tactical level. I applaud your efforts here to re-assert the proper role of CA in relation to the commander and the USG - CA is the centerpiece and an appropriate integrator. I think more should be done to strengthen civil military operations centers (CMOC). Additionally, the point should be made that there are essentially two inter-connected, inter-related bubbles at the sub-national level when we talk Whole-of-Government (a term which you did not mention in your article): security and governance (when I say "governance" Im including diplomacy and economic development; both civilian-led, DoD supported). Your article talked about unified action. However, the reality is that the different organizational cultures and the resource dominance of the DoD tends to draw us to a veiled Unity of Command. Properly trained CA elements in interagency operations would help buffer the disparate cultures, especially as USG civilians become more permanent in the combat zone. This is a point supported by DODD 3000.05, FM 3-07, the Quadrennial Defense Review, and the newly published Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review.

If unity of command between interagency departments is what commanders are after (which Ive heard intimated) then I think nationally it should be placed at the embassy and sub-nationally it should go through the Chief of Mission officers (DoS, USAID); or, even through National Security Council reps. But, not the DoD. Since 2003 in Iraq, Ive watched commanders behavior: "Im-the battlespace commander who will use CERP to dominate Diplomacy, Governance, and Econ Dev." I would argue that if this behavior is left unchecked it, will metastasize into bringing the military into the political sphere, dictating political objectives - an activity meant for diplomats and other USG civilian agencies. I think the Constitution guards against this and Generals McArthur and McChrystal lost their jobs over it. Your article shows some signs of a way to mitigate this problem and keep commanders focused on their core competency and mission: Security. Fortunately, some appropriators in congress are beginning to listen and hopefully soon CERP will be used primarily to provide "money shots" to USG governance teams "calling for fire" on local governance and econ development sources of instability rather than the whim or will of the commander; proper alignment of missions and resources.

In fact, I would go even further and argue that CA is more of a USG asset than the DoD. CA should be attached directly to support the USG in diplomacy, governance, and economic ops and keep only a CA CERP liaison/CMO planning team for the commander. We need the commander conducting: 1. Security; 2. Security knowledge transfer to the host nation security force; 3. Support to USG by creating the space for us to stabilize the host nation government at all levels; and 4. Information Operations. I know Ive oversimplified here, however this is the basic gist of all the manuals: FM 3-07, 3-24 and "Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction." After spending years in military non-lethal ops; four years (2003-2007) in Iraq working as: CA, a DoD civilian, and a USAID governance contractor; then, recently returning from Afghanistan as a District Support Team leader, I absolutely believe that the Whole of Government (Unified Action) approach works; there maybe some gaps, but it works.

Lastly, I wanted to mention your "civil node targeting process." It is similar to the USAID District Stability Framework methodology. DSF is a close variant of the Effects-based approach to military decision-making process (PAM 4) that you may find very useful and familiar. However, I had minor issue with the suggestion that its the commander who would be making civil targeting decisions. This is an integrated process. Though I have often heard the argument that "everything is security related"; not quite so. The commander would have to show how this civil node would unravel present security gains before he went ahead and potentially negatively impacted my "governance battlespace."

So, yes... Its cooperation and CA plays a very key role. I wish CA the best.

Nice article Major Reynolds. It is a little technical for me but well written. I also like the credits of the author.
I wish you the best at the Naval Post Graduate School in California.
I look forward to more articles.
Keep writing. Robert