"This article assesses the startling and unsettling similarities between Soviet strategies and tactics in Afghanistan during their Afghan war of 1979-1989 and American coalition strategies and tactics in Afghanistan since October 2001. It concludes with the implications of this dynamic. These similarities are extremely disturbing and, we believe, should be the focus of national attention and debate. While numerous significant similarities exist, this article will center on just three of the most important."
How the Soviets Lost in Afghanistan, How the Americans are Losing.
Comments
ALCON,
The basic problem is that everyone seems to think the answer is complex. 1. Decide objectives. What is our requried endstate?
2. We are not going to install anything we would call a real functioning goverment in 10 days, 10 months or 10 years. They have never had one, and it will be up to them to get off there butts and decide that they are sick of living a substance lifesyle. 3. Hunt them down. Stop trying to do anything else until all Tailiban are killed or quite. Likely in the long run you will save more of our lives... And theirs. Stop thinking techology is the answer. Infantry digging them out of their holes and killing them is what is required. Realize that just like cockroaches you'll kill most, but they can come back from after "the treatment". Oh this will require our zero tolarance Army to: Conduct manuver warefare. Bottom line is that you are going to have to trust your people and stop quarterbacking from the CP. Use the survaillence platforms for that. Not so you can watch operations. 5. You are not going to get a "little US" out of all this, so what can we get? Minerial rights, drilling rights etc. If they are to dumb to use them to improve their condition, buy them so we can. 6. Stop asking NATO for anything. They stopped being relevant when the wall came down. 7. Doing this will also stick it to the Chinese. You can bet they are watching. China isn't doing invasions anymore, they are colonizing.
Reminds me of a chilling assesment by CIA in 1987...
Seven years later, the Soviets find themselves bogged down in a guerrilla war, the Soviet-installed regime in Kabul remains weak and ineffective, and the Afghan military remains incapable of quelling a resistance that has grown substantially in numbers, effectiveness and popular support. Soviet officials now privately concede that their leadership miscalculated the difficulties of achieving their goal and underestimated the long-term costs of their involvement in Afghanistan.
"The Cost of Soviet Involvement in Afghanistan", U.S. Central Intelligence Agency Estimate, February 1987, p. 10, accessed at: http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB57/us.html
Publius:
Are you suggesting that there might in fact be similarities between what we are doing in Astan to what the Soviets did? :)
thanks for clarifying the exact quote.
Although offering up S's rejoinder to history as a "pack of lies" doesn't help me in my arguments with Ken W! :)
gian
ps; drop me a line when you can
The relevant Santayana quote is actually: "Those who do not remember the past are condemned to repeat it."
Here's what he said about history: "History is a pack of lies about events that never happened told by people who weren't there."
And speaking of how we read the past and its relevancy to our present, I just caught the news about the five-month tunneling exercise in Kandahar that resulted in the escape of more than 500 Taliban personnel. Five months, 1180 foot-long tunnel, under a major roadway and some police checkpoint.
And nobody on the "good guy" side ever had a clue. Don't know if they ever encountered anything quite so bizarre, but I suspect the Russians would say this is not good news.
Except (and if I am not mistaken because I dont have a copy of "The Life of Reason" here with me to verfiy)
that Santayana actually said "those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it"
There is a big difference--both theoretical and practical--between "history" and the "past."
It is theoretically impossible for history to repeat itself, the past maybe, but not history.
gian
Ken:
Copy all.
I have a question, and I'm not trying to score a point. If we were to give up the Karachi supply line we would, of necessity, have to radically reduce our level of effort in Afghanistan. There would be many benefits to this but do you think it would help get us to the point where we would be assisting, not trying to run the whole show?
The most compelling similarity to me was the fact that both were seen as:
"Attempting, through puppet governments, to significantly change Afghan society from the top down."
Could one suggest a more anti-"hearts and minds" approach than this?
Such action would seem to alienate -- if not the vast majority -- then certainly a major portion of the population, and probably many/most of the more influencial and important players therein.
By subordinating their other goals in Afghanistan to this initiative (significant and fundamental Afghan state and societal change) -- and adapting their methods, etc., accordingly -- both the Soviets and the United States would seem to have doomed their missions.
Thus, in both cases (USA and USSR) re: their missions in Afghanstan, should we say that we/they were blinded by our/their respective ideology?
<b>Carl:</b>
Nah, Fatuous doesn't mean stupid -- and you aren't stupid. It does means several things: foolish, inane, unreal, illusory and I used it in the sense of those last two. It applies IMO to the statement(s) by whomever made. First because we've been there too long and done too much for it to really apply to words like abandon or bug out. It's not stupid,not at all, just wrong -- or illusory...
You and I have agreed before that our record of abandoning other peoples in out wars and interventions is not good and that the penchant to do that needs to be rectified in the future.
Your solution appears to be to intervene on the side of right and justice as you see it and stay until all is righted. As I believe we do not and will not do that at all well, we never have, my solution is to avoid foolish and unnecessary interventions that are to scratch a short term itch -- usually media or US domestic politically initiated -- but that are not in our long term interest. We've agreed to disagree on that.
Regardless of our differing positions, the fact remains that the populace of a nation or region is ultimately responsible for their own fate. I have no problem with assisting anyone who needs and accepts it but if our assistance entails meddling in their affairs and providing 'American' solutions as it usually does, we are not helping -- and are merely forestalling the time when they can truly take responsibility for their fate. Thus my belief we can best avoid leaving people in the lurch if we avoid intruding where we are only marginally helpful and my statement that we often do more harm than good...
Ken:
Hopefully you are right and we are not likely to bug out. My primary objection was to the phrase used in the article. The words used are objectionable because they seek to hide the real truth of the matter if it came to that.
As far as the phrase "Abandoning Them To Their Fate" (the phrase I actually used) goes: fatuous means stupid. You can use that word, I won't break. And the phrase may well be that. But it seems to me it is rather close to a phrase used in the original article to expand upon the "Declare Victory and Disengage" part. The phrase the authors used was "It may be that the only strategy worth considering is one that abandons Afghanistan to its own fate."
My phrase is pretty close to the one the authors used so I think it isn't so stupid. And it wouldn't be the first time we've abandoned some "them" or another, which is a tragic sadness.
<b>Carl:</b>
The difference in Refugees is less likely to indicate a great difference than it is a minor difference, we are slightly less destructive than was the USSR. If there is a major difference it is likely that most Afghans were less economically well off in 2002 after 20 years of warfare than they were in the early 80s and thus could less afford to displace.
As for "bugging out and leaving them to their fate." We are not likely to 'bug out' and have given no indication that we propose to do so. However, there was not and is not any question that we were never going to spend 60 years in Afghanistan -- those days are gone and folks should learn to accept that. As we were always properly intended to be there only temporarily, and we've been there for 10 years, there's no bug out involved.
"Leaving them to their fate" is a catchy phrase. It is also fatuous. <b>Bill M.</b> asks some good questions. Ultimately, the fate of the Afghans is theirs and we can have but little effect -- probably as much or more bad as good...
Both Ken's and Carl's points seem be on target to me. One point that neither addressed jumped out at me from the article (perhaps because I have looking for this particular statistic) is that the Afghan government's annual revenue is around $4 billion, and the U.S. requested $12.8 billion for FY12 to support Security Force Assistance. I suspect other nations are also investing additional funds into SFA for Afghan's security forces, so obviously the Afghan government can't sustain this level of investment in their security forces. This may be intentional so we can maintain influence over time, but if it is part of a disengagement plan I have my doubts it work. More spending doesn't appear to be equating to more effectiveness. There still must something at a deep emotional level that the Afghans need to believe in to effectively fight and risk their lives. Those opposing the occupation forces have that belief, and until we figure out how to counter that throwing money at the problem won't solve it.
Carl said the proposed strategy is simply bugging out and leaving the Afghans to their fate. Leaving people to their fate (cann also be called self-determination) shouldn't "always" be viewed in a negative light. To believe otherwise is to commit our forces to Afghanistan in large numbers for decades to protect Afghans from what they desire? Of course like most things in life this issue isn't black and white. Many Afghans enjoy the benefits provided by ISAF (education, business, corruption and other opportunities), while others strongly desire to see us leave and are willing to risk their lives to push us out. We're not going to buy these people off, or negotiate a settlement with them. We will have to kill them, or eventually leave the solution to the Afghans.
The bugging out issue is more complicated and more serious. We justifiably invaded Afghanistan to pursue AQ in response to the 9/11 attacks, then in many people's opinions foolishly attempted to remake Afghan society in oour image to prevent TB and AQ from returning. I think most agree that we must continue to aggressively pursue and kill AQ members, since they still intend to do the same to us. If that is accepted, then the strategy debate appears to be focused on the following questions:
1. Do we need a large presence of U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan to pursue and kill AQ?
2. Does it really matter if the Taliban resume some degree of control (strictly limited the "does it matter" to providing safehaven to AQ)? Why?
3. What happens if we "bug out"? If AQ returns, is it possible that would actually be better for us because we can kill AQ in Afghanistan, where we have a harder time doing so in Pakistan? Of course the strategic communications victory for AQ can't be debated, another super power defeated, so in some ways we're between the proverbial rock and a hard place.
Are these the right questions to discuss/debate? What other questions should we debate that are relevant to our initial purpose of going into Afghanistan?
This is s good, well written and interesting article, But it is most interesting for what it left out, the role of the Pak Army/ISI. Except for a passing reference to Pakistan as a sanctuary it treated the conflict in Afghanistan as if it discrete to Afghanistan. It did not address why Pakistan is a sanctuary nor did have anything to say about the Pak Army/ISI's role as the sponsor and supporter of Taliban & company. This is most peculiar. Maybe that is typical of the elite view and perhaps that is part of the article's value.
Two minor observations, the first being the current conflict does not seem to have produced the tidal wave of refugees the Soviet war did. That may indicate some great difference between the efforts.
Second, the phrase "Declare Victory and Disengage" sickens me. It is too cute by half and cynically callous. The course of action described by that phrase may be viable, but let's be honest and plain spoken about what we are really talking about "Bugging Out and Abandoning Them To Their Fate."
Fascinating that they end with this:<blockquote>"Otherwise, as George Santayana once warned us, "Those who do not learn from history are doomed to repeat it.""</blockquote>Interesting article. It confirms what anyone who paid attention to the Santayana quote should have divined long before either we or the Soviets committed to Afghanistan in recent decades, to wit:<br><br>
That these similarities they cite:<blockquote>"Seen meddling powers with other interests than those of the occupying power.<br><br>
Installed and backed a puppet government as part of the intervention.<br>
Attempted, through puppet governments, to significantly change Afghan society from the top down.<br>
Used military tactics that emphasized kill/capture missions as well as battalion-size (or larger) operations to seek symmetrical fights with elusive guerrillas.<br>
Featured different strategies for the north and south of Afghanistan, exacerbating the ethnic divisions from each region of the country.<br>
Struggled to defeat the insurgents who have access to cross-border sanctuaries (or safe havens) in Pakistan.<br>
Found the length, cost, and difficulty of their Afghan war corrosive to popular support, causing the war to become increasingly unpopular back home."</blockquote>can be applied not only to the current fight but with only minor modifications to most such previous interventions by others anywhere in the world. Including a few by us in bygone years. It's not like we haven't been down this road before...
They, BTW, left out the use of marginally trained military units and persons which are rotated at a pace that insures mediocre and hesitant performance, all due to poor strategic thought (also a recurring problem).
Of the three potential 'strategies' the Authors state we still might apply, the first two are proven to provide poor to mediocre and inconclusive results and the third is unpalatable and bears other potential hazards -- all are unnecessary. We cannot fix Afghanistan in any sense -- not that it was ever our job to try -- but we surely can and should be just a little smarter in the future.
Why we insist on continuing to use a flawed model of intervention and playing to the strengths of our opponents -- and others who are certainly not in sync with us or our 'interests' -- I cannot fathom...