Deciphering Shades of Gray: Understanding Counterinsurgency

Good comments and I appreciate the feedback from Mr. Munson and Bill M. I'll be looking forward to Bill's comments in the council section.

I'll address the negative effects of rapid promotions separately in the counsel, because it is an important topic that needs to be discussions. I think both of you are missing the key points.

This is for Bill C., who claims globalism is new. Globalism is about trade (economic integration), and it isn't a new concept.

http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/27c/492.html

""Most 19th century wars were over trade. When the U.S. invaded Canada in 1812, Andrew Jackson declared, "We are going to... vindicate our right to a free trade, and open markets... and to carry the Republican standard to the Heights of Abraham." In 1839, Britain demanded China accept its opium and attacked when China said no. When Thailand refused British trading demands in 1849, Britain "found its presumption unbounded" and decided "a better disposed King [be] placed on the throne... and through him, we might, beyond doubt, gain all we desire." ""

And for the conspiracy theorists, the root of globaalism is (and this started long, long ago):

http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=-515319560256183936#

The powers of financial capitalism had a far-reaching plan, nothing less than to create a world system of financial control in private hands able to dominate the political system of each country and the economy of the world as a whole...Their secret is that they have annexed from governments, monarchies, and republics the power to create the world's money..."

Charles,
The people responsible, at least initially, for the strategic and operational conduct of these wars, not the tactical level, attained their positions before the timelines were accelerated, so I think that it is a red herring. I also think that those who were accelerated have far more tactical and operational experience than those who went before, compressed or not. And the garrison stuff does have bearing for a well rounded officer, but it does not/should not impact combat operations. They have far, far more combat experience than earlier cohorts until you get back to the Vietnam generation.

Finally, I am not denying that careerism is alive and well, but I just don't see how people can see rank, at least to LtCol, as an indicator of success as virtually all you had to do up until this year was not get a DUI or caught with your fly down to make major, and little more than that to make LtCol. Col is a different story, but still you have to march in lock-step with everyone else to get there, at least in the Marine Corps, and I think the Army. I know the Air Force fast tracks people more.

Mr. Munson,
My comments weren't directed at yours. Rather, they were just random since the topic came up.

To your points though...your argument has merit. In my experiences though, I have not seen the cramming of experience to be very helpful. For instance, I've seen some company commanders that just didn't understand garrison things such as property accountability. However, that doesn't take away from the merit and logic of your statements. I can easily see it going both ways.

Tracking that timelines were adjusted to fill slots, not a benefit.

I'm not sure it's illogical to argue that a lack of experience can lead to faulty operational or strategic understanding. I think a lack of experience is the first causal factor that should be explored. Whether it is, in fact, a causal factor is up for debate.

I agree with your last statement. However, I don't think many others do. I see the careerist mentality all the time. I believe many, many officers think of rank as signifying success. To think they are altruistically looking for rank in order to be taken seriously or attain peer status within a billet is being extremely generous to their motivations. Again, I do agree with what you're saying - just don't think many others do, even if they would be hesitant to admit that.

Charles,
I don't need stars or birds to signify success. Most likely, I, like many of my peers, won't stay around to roll the dice for those ranks anyway. My point was not to advocate for heightened careerism, but was to attack the red herring argument that earlier promotions have somehow led to the phenomena discussed here. While promotion timelines may have moved up somewhat, I'd argue that those being promoted have far more experience squeezed into their time in grade than their predecessors did prior to 2001. The argument can be made that it is not varied experience, but can one truly say that exercises and humanitarian interventions are really better and broader experiences than multiple Iraq and Afghanistan tours? Point is, trying to say that accelerated promotion timelines have caused inexperience and that inexperience is causing faulty operational or strategic understanding is an illogical argument.

Second, timelines weren't accelerated as a bennie. They were accelerated because billets had to be filled.

Thus, finally, it isn't a matter of rank signifying success, it is a matter of rank being required to be taken seriously or as seriously as others in a given billet.

Good comments by all and thanks to Bill M. for the response.

I didn't comment on the promotion timeline previsouly. I would agree that promotions were adjusted too far to the left. A lot of officers are preoccupied with promotion, OERs, and so forth. I realize it's a requirement to stay in. But, I'd have no problem if the promotion timelines were pushed back to the right. A little more experience will not hurt me. I don't need stars or birds to signify success.

Peter and Charles,
You both make sound arguments (a few minor points of disagreement with a couple), and I agree with anon who basically said my rant was misdirected at the younger officers. The real culprits are those longer in the tooth who should be mentoring and developing those officers. The MAJ who challenged the committee at CGSC that the students (and instructors) need to study Mao and Sun Tzu wasnt wrong if he met to add these works to our studies, but I think he was off base if he was proposing that all future wars would like the ones were in today. You asked would have students have even known what Maos three phases were 11 years ago? They were in our doctrine, so if they were encouraged to study the full spectrum of war, yes they would have known. If they were discouraged from studying this spectrum of war, then probably not. I feel fortunate to have worked for some great officers and NCOs over the years who were truly mentors that facilitated patient learning. I also worked for many who were simply poor leaders.
While a personal view that rubs against an American cultural norm, I believe excessive ego and its partner arrogance is a trait that undermines learning and military leadership effectiveness. It is not a trait limited to few young officers who think their vision of the future is unquestionable, but a trait that has polluted our ranks throughout history. Our best leaders are open, humble, listening and constantly learning, and they teach/mentor their subordinates to do the same. Im not convinced our personnel system reinforces this, I think it favors those who look good on paper, but Ill save that for another discussion.
My point on valuing history is we tend to cherry pick it (a couple of key texts that is interpreted in a certain way supports our doctrine) to support our arguments, instead of encouraging debate by demanding we read books/articles that present counter views, and then debate these. That will better prepare our officers for critical thinking than what I believe our current approach is. Im not as anti-COIN doctrine as I sometimes come across, but I am anti-blind faith in a doctrine that may or may not apply to a particular situation. As a matter of fact, I railed against the fact that CGSC had an "elective" on COIN years ago, and didnt make it mandatory. You cant ignore a spectrum of combat just because youre not comfortable with it. However, I feel were in danger of the doing the same today, and our focus on COIN is our new Fulda Gap. We must remain full spectrum war fighters to the extent possible. I strongly agree with this statement,
"I'd also argue that these mentors were unprepared for the complexities of combat, and thus formed some strong impressions. The bottom line here is that their mentors failed, and those mentors were in turn failed by the institution." And you added, "The institution is not flexible and dynamic. It does not promote for those qualities. Our senior leaders promote like-minded individuals and the cycle continues."
All agreed, and I think our senior leaders are trying to change this, but change is hard in established cultures. The culture can wait the leader out unless he implements very aggressive changes, and many times those back fire and become simply check the block processes, instead of real change.
Regarding rapid promotions, there is no easy or even right answer where one size fits all. However, I still think we would all be better off if junior officers were allowed to be junior officers longer in the tactical ranks. I also believe many junior officers said they were getting promoted too quick, and that was one reason they were leaving. We still need to find a way to reward the best and get rid of those who dont perform well. The personnel system is problematic to say the least, and obviously not easy to change. Im not going to touch the strategy issue right now, it is an emotional hot button for all of us, and youre probably right in your implication that we have a poorly designed strategy that our junior officers know is flawed, thus creating all sorts of disconnects.
There is no boogie man, these are hard problems to solve and the truth will remain a moving target. I know most are trying hard to do the right thing.

Peter and Charles,
You both make sound arguments (a few minor points of disagreement with a couple), and I agree with anon who basically said my rant was misdirected at the younger officers. The real culprits are those longer in the tooth who should be mentoring and developing those officers. The MAJ who challenged the committee at CGSC that the students (and instructors) need to study Mao and Sun Tzu wasnt wrong if he met to add these works to our studies, but I think he was off base if he was proposing that all future wars would like the ones were in today. You asked would have students have even known what Maos three phases were 11 years ago? They were in our doctrine, so if they were encouraged to study the full spectrum of war, yes they would have known. If they were discouraged from studying this spectrum of war, then probably not. I feel fortunate to have worked for some great officers and NCOs over the years who were truly mentors that facilitated patient learning. I also worked for many who were simply poor leaders.
While a personal view that rubs against an American cultural norm, I believe excessive ego and its partner arrogance is a trait that undermines learning and military leadership effectiveness. It is not a trait limited to few young officers who think their vision of the future is unquestionable, but a trait that has polluted our ranks throughout history. Our best leaders are open, humble, listening and constantly learning, and they teach/mentor their subordinates to do the same. Im not convinced our personnel system reinforces this, I think it favors those who look good on paper, but Ill save that for another discussion.
My point on valuing history is we tend to cherry pick it (a couple of key texts that is interpreted in a certain way supports our doctrine) to support our arguments, instead of encouraging debate by demanding we read books/articles that present counter views, and then debate these. That will better prepare our officers for critical thinking than what I believe our current approach is. Im not as anti-COIN doctrine as I sometimes come across, but I am anti-blind faith in a doctrine that may or may not apply to a particular situation. As a matter of fact, I railed against the fact that CGSC had an "elective" on COIN years ago, and didnt make it mandatory. You cant ignore a spectrum of combat just because youre not comfortable with it. However, I feel were in danger of the doing the same today, and our focus on COIN is our new Fulda Gap. We must remain full spectrum war fighters to the extent possible. I strongly agree with this statement,
"I'd also argue that these mentors were unprepared for the complexities of combat, and thus formed some strong impressions. The bottom line here is that their mentors failed, and those mentors were in turn failed by the institution." And you added, "The institution is not flexible and dynamic. It does not promote for those qualities. Our senior leaders promote like-minded individuals and the cycle continues."
All agreed, and I think our senior leaders are trying to change this, but change is hard in established cultures. The culture can wait the leader out unless he implements very aggressive changes, and many times those back fire and become simply check the block processes, instead of real change.
Regarding rapid promotions, there is no easy or even right answer where one size fits all. However, I still think we would all be better off if junior officers were allowed to be junior officers longer in the tactical ranks. I also believe many junior officers said they were getting promoted too quick, and that was one reason they were leaving. We still need to find a way to reward the best and get rid of those who dont perform well. The personnel system is problematic to say the least, and obviously not easy to change. Im not going to touch the strategy issue right now, it is an emotional hot button for all of us, and youre probably right in your implication that we have a poorly designed strategy that our junior officers know is flawed, thus creating all sorts of disconnects.
There is no boogie man, these are hard problems to solve and the truth will remain a moving target. I know most are trying hard to do the right thing.

After reading through again and some more thought, I think the "straw man" accusation above rings even more true. Their black-and-white characterization of operations in theater probably misunderstands the nuance and flexibility of what is really going on there as much as they accuse their students of misunderstanding history and its lessons. Operations are certainly not perfect, but are also certainly not as single-minded and inflexible in many cases as they purport.

Furthermore, in quoting Maj A, I think they misunderstand Maj A's place in life and their role in the institution. Maj A is moving from the tactical world to the operational/tactical seam, not to the realm of strategic policy-making. He doesn't "get it," but that's why he's at CGSC at that point in his life. They are there to teach him and educate him in how to educate himself. I wonder if students there 11 years ago would have even known what Phase I, II, and III were? Most probably would not. As a control, I'd imagine that they didn't know any more about Clausewitz or Jomini either. I wonder what their impression is of the officers at the end of CGSC? If it is more favorable, then the system is working, although I'm sure it could work better.

Finally, I think that a lot of officers are reading the books they suggest at the end.

Caveat, this is not to defend the COIN arguments or to say that there are not any problems, just to point out the weaknesses of some of the arguments which are, as was said above, the "nuking of a straw man" which doesn't say much for the scholarship.

Bill M.,
You state "Another issue (and this can explain the lack of perspective and context) is we promote our officers and NCOs too quickly." First, from what I can tell, the two august and lettered authors of this paper are younger than most of the officers and NCOs in question, so IF they "get it," why can't we? Granted, they are full time academics and we are not, but perhaps if people balanced CrossFit and other things with a deeper professional study, the institution started valuing such study more explicitly and got rid of other things that waste our time, and there were better syllabi than the armchair reading lists out there, we would be a more academically grounded officer corps. It can be done on one's own, but the institution could make it easier.

Second, it seems that the "middle management" as I was recently referred to is being accused of making "strategy." Perhaps if these academics and their cheerleaders did a bit more reading and chose their words more carefully, their charges would understand that the majors and lieutenant colonels that they teach have no role, or should have no role, in crafting strategy unless in an advisory role to much senior policymakers. And therein lies the rub. There is no unifying strategic vision, or if there is it changes every 5 minutes, so the middle management is making it up as they go at the operational (somewhat) and tactical (much more) levels. This is why there is no cohesion in worldviews, leading to the Tunnell-type debates.

So, if, over the longer term, there has not been consistent strategic guidance, and if strategy should be made at the highest levels of the realm by people very long in the tooth wearing multiple stars, then how is it the fault of the middle management (officers and SNCOs) that are "promoted too quickly"? I'd argue that experience is important, but the stultifying effect of staff officers that are around only because they stuck around is more the culprit than promoting people to fast. I'd argue that promoting SOME people FASTER and others not at all would be a much better solution than making the experience argument, which often leads to very experienced dolts who have outlasted their more nimble peers and have not learned the lessons of experience they should have. The institution is generally good at keeping these dolts away from command, generally, but they can be just as harmful in staff billets, if not sometimes more.

Bill M,

Not that you make any bad statements but I'd like to caveat two, just briefly. You stated:
"The second point (the main point) is our officers dont value history as much as used to, and are unable to look at the current conflicts in context. This is apparent when they harp on "complexity" and how it is somehow different this time. News flash, it is different every time, and each situation has its own context that is unique and there is no cookie cutter approach to achieving our objectives......................The authors summed it well when they wrote, "it appears that at least two respected authors on theories of war agree that the current fight demands flexible and dynamic leaders, a theme continually heard by military and political leaders over the last nine years. The problem however, is that todays COINistas are kidding themselves that they are building a comprehensive understanding of the variations and nuances of insurgencies."

Youre right about valuing history. However, most of these officers were junior officers with the GWOT started. So, the importance of history should have been enforced by their mentors. This impression that our two current theaters have ushered in a new era of complexity was developed from their mentors, from watching their mentors, etc. I would speculate that many of their mentors were taken by the "complexity" and as such considered it something new, different, and separate from what theyd find from studying historical battles. I'd also argue that these mentors were unprepared for the complexities of combat, and thus formed some strong impressions. The bottom line here is that their mentors failed, and those mentors were in turn failed by the institution. We all realize that war is much more complex than running through a pipeline of schools to attain uniform bling, a formation run, or scripted STX lanes. Yet, those were the metrics used to assess leadership. How could any of those officers come to any other conclusions about the complexity issue, given the above?
As for flexible and dynamic leaders... .where to begin. The institution is not flexible and dynamic. It does not promote for those qualities. Our senior leaders promote like-minded individuals and the cycle continues.

(Pet Peeve three: early morning typos when I am rushing to get out the door to work! Sorry!)

Ok, having read the article, Pet Peeve #2: Those who belabor how "complex" something must be simply because they themselves, being smart, do not understand it.

I once failed Calculus integration. It was complex as hell, totally overwhelmed me with its complexity. Every problem was differnt.

Then one day, as I finally gained mastery of the basic geometry and algebra and reduction formulaes required to work the problems, a veil was lifted as I suddenly gained an understanding of the concept of calculus integration itself. I realized that beneath all of the uniqueness and apparent complexity there was a very simple common core of principles at work, and that once one understood that, and had also mastered the various mechanics, that Caluclus was actually very logical, and I earned the high score in my class the following term.

Insurgency is a lot like Integration Calculus in this regard. If all one does is study and attempt to solve the many variations of problems, they are likely to only see complexity and grow frustrated at how hard they are to solve. Much of our COIN history is a study of problems and efforts to solve them.

Sadly there is not much out there on insurgency itself, one has to decide to go on the journey to go hunt for and think about such things, no one is going to hand it to you.

Personal opinion? The authors of this article are correct that the COINdinista crowd is missing the point and is out in left field. Unfortunately they are making this case from there own deeply entrenched position out in Right Field. Come in from the field, boys, we need to talk about this. (seriously)

Insurgency, like Integration Calculus, is in fact quite simple. But damn, those problems can indeed be complex, particularly if one is attacking the problem, rather than working to solve it.

Cheers!

Bob

Pet peeve: Study, execution, debate of COIN by those who have not first studied insurgency.

The entire COINdinista movement lacks a foundation in understanding insurgency.

So too does the Harry Tunnell school of COIN (and I served with Harry during his command tour in RC South. I will say this, rare indeed for a US Army BDE Commander (or PL for that matter) to vigorously disagree with what the generals over him were telling him to do and believe).

Insurgency is a multi-discipline bit of human dynamics, of which only a small portion occasionally dips into activities that look like warfare. The military has made a an entire career field over analyzing, attacking, developing, cajoliing, etc, etc, etc, that small aspect of the dynamic. Kind of like a bunch of smart, mission oriented types who have never seen a cat before looking at the tip of a tail prodruding under a door way and debating what the best way to solve that tail tip is. Whether you pet it nicely or smash it with a hammer, you are still just attacking the tip of the tail of something you can't see and don't understand very well.

Hint: Open the door, and try to understand what is on the other side.

Neil,

First off apologies to the many fine officers we have. My rant doesn't apply to them, but to the many where my rant fits perfectly my points stand.

You appropriately identified a larger problem regarding our professional education system, which is largely based on attending designated schools at designated times to check the block; learning is optional. Several senior Army leaders have aggressively tried to fix this well known shortfall, but they can't readily change the cultures in these schools, and in my opinion the focus should be on professional development, not professional education. Education is a key component, but we can't afford to make our schools longer (especially based on the noted return on the investment), but we can change the culture in the Army over time to embrace professional development (beyond the bumper sticker). That means encouraging officers and NCOs to be self critical, it means units develop mandatory reading lists followed by professional discussions in the units among leaders, and most importantly it means applying those lessons correctly in combat or in training (this is the self critical part). Schools can only do so much.

Another issue (and this can explain the lack of perspective and context) is we promote our officers and NCOs too quickly. Combat rotations alone don't equate to professional maturity, it still takes "time" to develop it. If possible, we need to slow the promotions down to O4 to allow our junior officers to mature in the tactical arena to the extent possible where they can master training and leadership through repeated experiences (trail and error), but for this to work that means they need to be empowered to make decisions at their level. A junior officer is still an officer, a combat leader who carries considerable responsibility on his or her shoulders, and they don't need a LTC holding their hand and making all their decisions for them. They do need that LTC to provide mentoring and guidance. Once they make MAJ, then those who demonstrate exceptional potential can be promoted quicker. Our current system is not designed to develop a military officer who is a war fighting professional. Those skills and knowledge are honed during the muddy boots time.

For our national security we must put the M back in DIME. Other agencies need to evolve appropriately to support diplomacy, development, etc.., but we shouldn't change our core competency just because we believe other agencies aren't doing their job (which often isn't true, that is just our perception and our efforts at doing them haven't been overly successful).

Reviewing our history, I'm not convinced we ever got our professional education right, so there did seem to be a greater appreciation for the holistic nature of warfighting. Post Vietnam (perhaps sooner) there seemed to be a noticable shift to the bumper sticker mentality and the total focus on one scenario and its associated tactics, whether it was the Fulda Gap scenario, Peace Keeping, or now population centric COIN. Let's get back to studying the principles of war and warfighting. We can't afford to have officers graduating from CGSC that don't understand COIN (as it was in the not too distant past), anymore than we can afford to have officers graduate that don't understand higher end warfighting. War has always been the most complex endeavor man has engaged in, it can't be can't be reduced to a bumper sticker.

The authors of this paper were much more tactful than the Young Turk CPTs and MAJ COINdistas have been in their strident attacks on anyone that questions their faith, but then again the COINdistas are dogmatic and dogmatic folks arent very tolerant of those who dont view the world the same way they do. A simple case in point, when this LTC was flabbergasted that COL Tunnell didnt drink the Kool-Aid and wondered why the 3-24 Church didnt burn him alive.
"the former battalion commander under Tunnell, Lt. Col. Richard Demaree, commented in a recent article "Everyone knows Tunnell openly disagrees with counterinsurgency philosophy, but no ones doing anything about it."4 There are two things wrong with Demarees statement, first, population-centric counterinsurgency is not a philosophy, but a specific theory available to soldiers. Second, Demaree implies that someone in the Army should have corrected Tunnell. The question becomes, why does Tunnell need to be corrected?"
Apparently it has come down to believers and non-believers, so instead of an intellectual discussion debating the merits of our approach to COIN, we either simply believe or we dont. If you dont believe, you cant get in the church and you wont go to doctrine heaven when you die. Despite the evidence that their approach has failed and continues to fail they profess continued blind faith in their good book and damn those who dont.
The two key points that article covered that I think are worth surfacing is the Army dont value self critical officers. Every officer that deployed to one or many of the several OEF theaters was a success if you listen to their stories. 10 years later theyre still successful, but the situation hasnt changed much. Something isnt adding up, and we need to reward (or at least not punish) those who offer positive criticism after their operations. Did you learn anything, or were just good?
The second point (the main point) is our officers dont value history as much as used to, and are unable to look at the current conflicts in context. This is apparent when they harp on "complexity" and how it is somehow different this time. News flash, it is different every time, and each situation has its own context that is unique and there is no cookie cutter approach to achieving our objectives.
You dont hear officers outside of select SOF units talk about it, but it is a truth as old time and authors captured it, "Lord Wolseley in Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice, the "first object should be the capture of whatever they prize most, and the destruction or deprivation of which will probably bring the war most rapidly to a conclusion."6 Regardless, the focus is on the enemy or what the enemy holds most dear." You dont do that by building schools and roads, those may achieve other objectives, but not military objectives. The fact that were expanding Civil Affairs instead of investing more in USAID tells us that a lot of key leaders are drinking the Kool-Aid that were somehow going to bribe the population to love us, and then love their U.S. approved government. Keep drinking and hoping.
We all this intuitively, but the authors one again remind us, "Whether emphasizing the enemy or the population, these schools of thought need to recognize that both foci are necessary."
They accurately described the current state of play when they wrote,
"Lacking the time to build a deep and rich understanding of history and insurgencies throughout time, COINistas tend to produce synthetic solutions, which fail to recognize seemingly infinite number of variables influencing an insurgency. The need to acknowledge and accept that a single general theory is not the solution."
This is the is the argument we have all heard, and it almost as inane as the argument a CPT working at West Point made when he claimed that Al Qaeda didnt even understand their own doctrine, so of course we could beat them? The authors wrote,

"Take for instance an experience where Major A went on a rant during the first bloc of History instruction at CGSC about how "todays Majors" need to understand Sun Tzu and Mao Zedong and not the fundamental underpinnings of the "Western Way of War." Completely dismissing the significance of understanding Napoleons troubles with guerillas in Spain, this COINinsta failed to comprehend that although al-Qaeda in the early 1990s used Maoist language to make a broader appeal for followers, the reality is that having an understanding of Mao and Sun Tzu actually provides little insight into the operational abilities and strategy of al-Qaeda. In fact, the soldiers simple understanding of Maos lead him to conclude that al- Qaeda is in Phase II and needs to be stopped before they reach the conventional war phase. Our question is how is this helpful in understanding the enemy in a deep and meaningful way? We offer it is not."

Of course we should study Mao and Sun Tzu, and many do, but to assume that AQ is following Maoist doctrine is overly simplistic. They may extract elements of it that they like, but they actually have multiple doctrines they borrow from and doctrine they have created, and they adapt readily to changes as required. Even if the Taliban did move into phase III (wouldnt that be nice from our perspective?), this has little to do the larger issue that COIN doesnt correlate to the protection of our homeland, so another argument could be made not only is our COIN doctrine faulty, it is the wrong war as Bing West stated.

The authors summed it well when they wrote, "it appears that at least two respected authors on theories of war agree that the current fight demands flexible and dynamic leaders, a theme continually heard by military and political leaders over the last nine years. The problem however, is that todays COINistas are kidding themselves that they are building a comprehensive understanding of the variations and nuances of insurgencies."

There is no H for history in METT-TC or PMESII-PT or ASCOPE or OAKOC or any other battlefield mission analysis tool.

Afghanistan in 2002-2005 per Dr. Mikolashek's history book has little bearing to Afghanistan in 2008-2011, or Afghanistan before the Soviets, or during the 60s, 70s, 80s and 90s. The COIN manual did not yet exist during Milolashek's period of Afghan history and the surge in Iraq and Afghanistan had not yet occurred. The one in Afghanistan is less than a year old in terms of actual boots on the ground.

Al Qaeda today has little resemblance to that of yesteryear, nor does Lebanon, Syria, Israel, Egypt, Iran and so on.

So while I see his point, I would add that historians tend to grossly exaggerate the lessons history can provide to current conflicts whether supporting or discounting a course of action be it COIN or something else.

Did agree entirely with them when they said this:

<i>In reality however, since al-Qaeda only co-opted Maoist language to build their initial following, the misidentification of their adherence to this model could have significant implications. Not to mention the fact that the dime-store understanding of Mao completely overlooks the ideological foundations of militant Islamist ideology.</i>

The religious extremism of those practicing militant Islam is completely unique compared to communism or any other reason for an insurgency. A slash and burn second enemy-centric "Crusade" would hardly relieve Islamic insurgency and would incite more hatred...particularly in the culture of Pashtunwali where Taliban and madrassas amongst 28+ million Pashtuns are safely in Pakistan.

Nor would any extreme enemy-centric operation carried over into Pakistan exploit current unrest amongst worldwide Islamic populations. Perhaps that is one telling lesson of history....