From Mars to Minerva: Clausewitz, Liddell Hart, and the Two Western Ways of War

For intheknow....good comments. Can't argue. We probably just disagree on minor points, based on our specific experiences naturally.
Just to be clear though....I think you're mostly on target about PME and people taking a break - but in my experiences it has differed. Perhaps a break is a good description but people often leave not feeling all that "better". I was speaking about TRADOC in general, to include the Drill Sergeants to BOLC Cadre, and PME students. I probably should have been more precise in my statements.

You make excellent points about good instructors. Very beneficial. They are worth their weight in gold. Many of the good ones don't want to go to TRADOC and teach. Takes them out of the fight, out of prime locations for good OERs, etc. Unfortunate reality. I believe there's a solid push to make instructor duty a prime position of importance. It's going to be a hard sell. Perhaps it should be, since we are a warfighting organization.

Personally, I really enjoy our retirees and their lessons learned. Not often these days when you get instructors with Vietnam and/or Desert Storm experience. Combine them with good green suiters and it's a good deal. When you speak with a retired CSM or LTC, COL, etc, and you look at the old FM 101-5 (or similar documents), and combine that with some reading of Biddle, Clausewitz, Soviet doctrinal studies, and so forth, it really helps put things in perspective and gives a good accounting for the evolution of our doctrine and strategic shifts.

I hope that as budgets are reduced, we don't lose our civilian, now-retired instructors. That legacy knowledge is very important in my opinion. For a lot of service members that were under 18 for most of the 80s, having some perspective like Ken White does with his comments above is very helpful. Most of us know the Army/Military that we're in and don't understand how we got to where we are.

Interesting comments from Ken White regarding AOAC, etc - really hits at some of the core institutional practices that have persisted for decades.

I believe there was a plan to rotate a BN or BDE within 1AD, and it would be the "test" unit for FCS equipment at Ft. Bliss. Perhaps such a plan is the way to get units/people a break: do the testing, do the learning, go to the field, stay with the same patch, and stay FORSCOM rather than having to PCS, go to TRADOC, etc....all while not going to NTC or deploying, so families and their Soldiers stay at home.

<em>Charles said: Do we need PME in order for people to apply themselves?</EM>

I found a lot of the discussions very educational- the sharing of information at ILE was invaluable. Preparing for class made those discussions even more invaluable for those that cared.

<em>I believe that personal development is viewed to be the most productive, by most people, while in the Force. There, they can do their respective jobs, conduct informal OPDs with mentors, peers, and subordinates. Real learning and real growth takes place, and it's measured with real variables.</em>

Although I'd agree that tremendous learning happens when you "do" something- I'd also submit that only learning by doing leads one to be limited to what one has experienced. We falsely believe that combat/COIN is relatively the same no matter the environment- and thus attempt to supplant templates from other places onto wholly improper places.

<em>I would disagree with your assertion about "taking a break". In my experience, and surveying the comments from many, it's not taking a break. It's frustration. TRADOC is rarely taking a break. It's boring, it's trivial, it's focused on the form rather than the function.</em>

I saw lots of guys with 3, 4, and 5 years away from the family using PME as a break- and although I think that was great they had the flexibility to do that- I think it was a kind of loss for the military- and I think some abused the freedom.

The stronger classes seemed to steer the instructors towards what was useful- and the really good instructors allowed their classes to go where the students found it to be most useful. So- although some idiotic instructors might have gotten in the way of some classes, I didn't see that as the norm in my experience.

<em> certainly understand your comment about the 'rear view mirror' and tactics. However, keeping it limited to FG & below...isn't that tactical world where they live? Is strategy really implemented by a MAJ working as the BN S-3?</em>

You're right- but that S-3 time doesn't last that long- after a few years you go to a higher-level staff and then, other than BN CMD you'll probably stay at those higher-level staffs the rest of your career. So- to me- getting ready for the strategic and operational is much more important; and I consider BDE and sometimes BN "operational" vice "tactical"- at least in the COE anyway.

From intheknow, that is a great point about applying one's self. I think that applies to virtually all venues. And, that strikes at the core of my discontent with the topic at hand. Do we need PME in order for people to apply themselves? I find that PME pollutes the waters with the mandatory TRADOC requirements to such an extent that a majority of the time does feel wasted. When faced with that, I think most people resign themselves to personal development, as opposed to looking forward to focusing on the 60 minutes or so of classroom time they actually find useful.

I believe that personal development is viewed to be the most productive, by most people, while in the Force. There, they can do their respective jobs, conduct informal OPDs with mentors, peers, and subordinates. They can truly exercise a problem-based modality in an outcome-based environment where the outcomes are at least real, and possibly measurable to painful extents. Real learning and real growth takes place, and it's measured with real variables. Not sure PME captures that to an acceptable level.

I would disagree with your assertion about "taking a break". In my experience, and surveying the comments from many, it's not taking a break. It's frustration. TRADOC is rarely taking a break. It's boring, it's trivial, it's focused on the form rather than the function.

I certainly understand your comment about the 'rear view mirror' and tactics. However, keeping it limited to FG & below...isn't that tactical world where they live? Is strategy really implemented by a MAJ working as the BN S-3? Is it even his lane to think strategy? I guess thinking strategically - yes, of course. But in the course of mission execution at the BN or BDE level, I'm not so sure it's going to be a critical, implied, or essential task.

So, I can't blame anyone for maintaining a tactical focus. However, a need to broaden is there, for sure. That said, I think the tactical and operational focus that most in the FG and below category have is well placed, given that we have two theaters open.

Overall, I find there to be (rightfully so) a rather large chasm between CPT/MAJ/LTC working at BN & BDE staff positions and those senior LTC/COL positions that are commanding at those levels, on the cusp of BG or at least moving to Corps and Div assignments, tackling strategy and larger pieces of the pie. To me, that's where the thinking needs to really start changing. And, most importantly, I think there's a lot of time to nurture that change. This is why I find that tactical focus to be just fine. I don't think it should be exclusionary, however.

This leads me again to venue. I don't think PME tackles the tactical development very well. I think it could, and it would in an ideal world. In order for that to happen, I think TRADOC will have to radically change. Either that, or TRADOC needs to be confined to entry level training, with FORSCOM taking over from there.

In answer to Charles' comment on PME being useless- I'd have to opine that what I saw in ILE was a choice: you could apply yourself or you could take a break. I'd argue that those who applied themselves got a lot out of ILE. Those that didn't got a break. Those that didn't often talked about getting back to the tactical army and didn't have much interest in reading or writing. Those that applied themselves talked about wanting to get back to the tactical level- but understood that the tactical level was mostly in a field-grade's rear view mirror. Staying stuck in the tactical and refusing to prepare oneself for "the other"- I'd argue is a fatal flaw of our officer corps: and one whose effects are playing themselves out daily in OEF.

I whole-heartedly agree with Vitesse: it is essential to know one's one mind. And I'd say we have failed in that essential task.

I don't think I have seen such a hatchet job on Clausewitzian thought since George Lakoff used his dubious rhetorical skills to deconstruct Clausewitz (once again, made into a hagiographic icon for the "western way of war") back in the run-up to Desert Storm. Sad to say, there are people in the West (and only in the West) who badly want to soften the hard hand of war - and those people don't intend to quit what they have been doing. That said,

The conflation of Liddell Hart's theory of the indirect approach and the Washingtonian conception of soft/smart power is deeply problematic. It implies that victory in irregular warfare is cheaply and reliably attainable, when in fact, the contrary is the case. The curtsy to Mahan and navalism was appropriate in the context of an emerging strategic consensus that will increasingly rely on this strategic pillars, and one gets the impression that the author would much like to eradicate the heritage of Clausewitz, as much as can possibly be done, before Clausewitz's ideas cost any more American blood and treasure. The author's dig at Mearsheimer and offensive realism, while actually funny, was only a partial expiation for a more serious blindness with repect to offshore balancing...if one cannot get ashore, there is no balancing offshore.

Now, the author's journey into the politics of the Prussian Kingdom were certainly interesting, even as much as his dismissal of Clausewitz as a military philosopher have a certain resonance - but in this minutia, would Clausewitz's card gaming with Hegel bring any different light on the subject ? Would Clausewitz's letters from the Rhineland and the Polish border make him less identifiable with Big Army interests ? Just askin'.

Deconstruction is not an explanation. While Clausewitz and Jomnini alike wrote extensively on war, from their own historic-analytical perspective, neither wrote everything that can be written on the subject. The element of Clausewitz's own military education - his own early induction to the Kriegsacademie - offers a possible solution to the dilemma the author poses. If the US Armed Forces are to raise the intellectual caliber of their officer classes, then perhaps a faster track for those so inclined is in order; that said, one might also heed the observation of Confucious that a man is not ready for philosophy until the age of 40, since it is from his own experience that he draws reflection.

Although any war college worth its salt will study the great classics of military history and science, in the context of the America's military leadership, some consideration needs to be made of the world view espoused by the American officer class - a world view that is characterized by philosophical pragmatism in the same way that Clausewitz was influenced by Kant's ratiocination and the Hegelian dialectic. It is useful to study the minds of one's actual and potential enemies; it is essential to know one's own.

This is a well-researched think-piece that curriculum developers should heed. I apologize up front for my random comments as follows:

If I were a betting man -- I wonder if Tony Corn's good work here was rejected by any of the Defense-sponsored journals? (I have personal experience there.) The established journals tend to be quite conservative.

SWJ has become one of the few, if only, place to strongly disagree with the "status quo."

Paradoxically, does this confirm Dr. Corn's theory about Clausewitz's inability to communicate "politically?"

Not sure I agree that we should pay most attention to Liddell Hart, et al. (indirect approach) though. I would be much more attracted to an unsettled, multiple-views approach (perhaps that associated with phenomenology or critical realism). Hart is still a sort of a utilitarian-behaviorist (realist). Would be nice to consider other ontological views (and their respective epistemologies).

I think the word "strategy" itself is an overused metaphor (paper to-be-published in Military Review forthcoming).

I especially like the idea in the paper that strategists are policy entrepreneurs (commensurate with John W. Kingdon's adoption of March & Olsen's garbage can decision-making theory)

Dr. Corn -- Well written!! I salute thee. (This should be a chapter in a book that you should publish!)

Where I admittedly fall short is in the depth of analysis of Clausewitz, Liddell-Hart, Biddle, and others. I'm reading...not there yet. Can't, with confidence, comment on their writings and impact. I do feel that I can comment on modality and venue.

Touching on what Ken White had to say: "There are new tools, not a lot of new thinking. Complexity and asymmetry are the norm, it takes a really good thinker to cut to the core and fight the 'right' way in a given situation. A good intuitive Commander -- or Strategist -- is worth their weight in more than gold."...A formulaic, mechanical approach is certainly easier than an intuitive approach. Perhaps that is an insurmountable dilemma. You can command in combat, sustain casualties and ask yourself if you screwed up. If you followed your intuition, that could be haunting. If you followed the formula then you did what you were told/trained. Easier to reconcile.

I happen to believe that Ken White is correct about the value of a good intuitive commander. That said, there is certainly a way for those intuitive ones to further refine themselves, and for those more mechanical to bring the pendulum of thought back in the other direction to broaden themselves.

Do we accomplish that with war colleges and similar venues, or is there a better way? I read this site as much as possible, I look for references mentioned, I save and print the comments - it's akin to a good sit-down with a mentor. For me, I find it productive and much better than a school house pimping the schoolhouse (instructor) message. From my position, I find my discussions with mentors, peers, and subordinates, as well as sites like this are better for my development and preparation to lead Soldiers in combat, as opposed to a TRADOC PME venue.

In reality though, is it better than the classroom? As mentioned, the inevitably sectarian influences from within the ivy towers of strategy making & teaching can lead one to defending one's teachings rather than searching for a "truthier" message.

I believe the issue of venue will have to accompany the discussion Dr. Corn brings up. Otherwise, a move in the right direction in so far as the teaching of strategy and thoughts about warfare will attain very limited effects.

Great read and a lot of food for thought as well as a lot of references mentioned that I obviously need to read or re-read.

However...it astounds me that anyone above the rank of LTC would even bother to comment about the lack of desire to attend PME. It is almost completely useless. I have not heard one CPT or MAJ say that a CCC or ILE environment was critical to preparation or success in command or as a BN 3, 5, etc.

Oh...what's the mission of the Army? To win land wars? Please don't tell me our leaders are upset we have officers wanting to stay in the fight rather than attend a worthless school while their cohorts are out getting the mission accomplished. The first part of this article alluding to that was irritating to read.

Given a choice between being with and leading Soldiers (even being on staff) in a combat zone, going on patrol, talking about, dealing with, and doing REAL things - and sitting in a classroom debating minutiae - what do you expect the choice to be? Our initial training for officers stresses command, command in combat, leading Soldiers in combat, getting into combat, staying in combat. Is it a surprise that CPTs, MAJs and LTCs adhere to that?

The remainder of the article was really excellent in my opinion. However, that opening part, that seemed to express shock as well as concern about war colleges and PME overall, was again, irritating. There should be no doubt and no surprise about where an officer's priorities are in a time of war.

That's just my not so humble and not-so-wise opinion. But I'm sticking to it.