Fighting the Right War in Afghanistan

Believe there are several unspoken needs to stay in Afghanistan until 2014,

Today's revelation that some in the ISI may have assisted Lashkar-e Taiba in the Mumbai raid should be no surprise since they also no doubt provide assistance against the Indians in Kashmir.

Add to that the long attack on the Pakistan Naval base, and we should be seriously concerned about both nuclear weapons security and the influence of Lashkar-e Taiba that potentially is an international terror group...unlike perhaps the Taliban.

Second, at some point we may complete our attempts to shift resupply efforts to the north avoiding Pakistan altogether. At that point we can take sides and favor the northern alliance ethnicities if the Pashtun don't want to play ball.

Still believe a Pashtunistan fits in their somewhere as a final solution to COL Jones often cited concern about sources of the insurgency,

Finally, if we eventually shift to more of a counterterror and strategic raiding/reinforcement of the ANA approach and give up on Pakistan basing and supply routes, we still need Afghanistan basing in northern provinces.

Also see value in having servicemember in a position to attract extremists so those same individuals don't travel to the U.S. and Europe to engage more vulnerable targets.

Bill,

The US is fighting, like all empires do, to sustain the status quo, not for "change."

It is people seeking change that provides the undercurrent of energy that fuels nationalist insurgencies and international non-state operations such as AQ.

We employ an ideology of "change" perhaps, but at the end of the day we are seeking to sustain the stability of the political relationships that we have nurtured over the decades. Just as AQ or the Taliban may employ an ideology of stepping back to simpler times when Islam was more "pure" and Muslims were not controlled by Western powers and Muslim leaders were not influenced by Western things to fuell change. A bit of Alice in Wonderland perhaps, but do not be lulled into thinking the US is waging war with the world to promote "change."

This all about far more fundamental human dynamics, such as "Liberty" "Justice" "Respect" "Legitimacy of government" and "Hope" for a better future. Any approach that co-opts the relationship between a people and their own government, and then offers these things underneath that perverted structure is not true liberty, nor is that government truly legitimate. That is almost like some form of "The Matrix" where it seems good and real, but if one really thinks about it they realize they are being mollified into not noticing that they are actually enslaved in some way.

AQ and the West are both making promises they don't really intend to keep for their own self-serving reasons. The governments in place over these populaces in places like Afghanistan and where Arab Spring is such a powerful force elsewhere are also disconnected from the people beneath them.

Ultimately the people will prevail. The best course for the US and the West is to devise an approach that correlates our interests in this region in line with the interests of the people of the region. THAT would be change.

Cheers

Bob

AQ didn't fill a gap in Afghanistan, they never did. They initially formed in Pakistan, and were protected by Pakistan to some extent so they could wage war on the Soviets in Afghanistan. Later the senior leaders resided in Sudan under protection of the government (not exploiting a lawless place). After a few cruise missiles they were invited to leave, and they went to Afghanistan where they were provided safe haven by the then ruling Taliban. They do not seek lawless areas to base out of, because they have no protection there. Yes, they support UW operations in some of these areas, but we need to keep this in perspective. The COIN fight is not a counter AQ fight just because there is some limited AQ support for a few of the insurgents.

Bill C. you may be right, it is the same strategy we used after WWII. The Marshal Plan was designed to pull States into our sphere of influence. The SECSTATE at the time said it was critical we that we kept Germany, Italy and Japan in our sphere (others were a given) because they would enable us to counter the Soviet threat if need me. It was a pragmatic strategy then, because our approach was feasible. Our transformational approach in Afghanistan isn't as pragmatic, and the not the result of good statesmen, but rather the result of some half baked ideas that were not thought through before they were implemented and now we are sort of stuck in a mess of our own making. The question is how do we get Afghanistan in our sphere of influence? That advantages I suppose by providing us bases in a strategic location, potentially denies a future base for AQ, etc., but perhaps more importantly it pulls Afghanistan out of Pakistan's sphere of influence (and there for China's), which gives the U.S. and India the strategic advantage should we ever go to war with China. Of course Pakistan doesn't want that, and a portion of the billions we donate to Pakistan support the insurgents in Afghanistan, so like you said where does that leave us?

Western Democracy was shaped by Western Insurgency. No government offered it to the people, it was the people who forced it upon the government.

Now, when I compare the Western experience 500 years ago to what is going on in the Middle East today, I hope that no one takes that too literally. The dynamic is the same, the issues are similar, human nature is common; but culture, history, values, etc are all very different. For Grant Martin, however, you need to review what really lead to the "de-radicalizing" of Protestants. If half that level of misery and violence desends upon the Middle East in the current globalized environment, the entire globe will suffer for generations.

I would never say we need to force Western values on anyone, and in fact, am a vocal advocate for the very opposite of that. I do, however, believe that we could benefit from a bit more empathy in regards to other people having no more tollerance for being subjugated under governmental structures that they have no say in and that are established and sustained by some powerful external force than we did. Some things are indeed universal. it is the triggers that vary.

I fear that history will not judge the US kindly for our current approaches. We proclaim too loudly the principles we demand for ourselves, that we are so quick to act to deny for others where we fear it might impact our interests. This is the Western model we inherited. I merely suggest that armed with our history and principles, we are the ones who can lead the West out of the era of Colonialism and control of others. It is an obsolete model, and we will either evolve from it, or be broken by it. That will be our choice.

To adopt "pop-centric" tactics over "threat-centric" tactics; while leaving one's boot firmly placed on the neck of the populace really misses the point of what was bad about the old apporach and what must change about new approaches. We argue tactics, and this is not a tactical problem.

Bob

RCJ

Always love your thinking.

Isnt one of the key differences in Afghanistan is that it is not an organic insurgency trying to overthrow a government?

The insurgency in Afghanistan is being constantly feed from the outside by people who have no interest in Afghanistan, overthrowing a government or governing themselves.

To Gian point, we continue to come at this from a Western democratic mind set. We forget that Western democracy has been developed over a long period of history, numerous revolutions and civil wars that eventually resulted in founding principles cemented in documents such as the Magna Carta, and the Bill of Rights of 1689, which followed the deposing of James II. And of course the oldest written constitution in the world, the United States of Americas Constitution 1787. Citizens in every local town in the United States have had over 220 years to recognise and respect their constitution within a free and open society.

Afghan tribes and villagers experienced democracy for the first time in 2004. Yet, this has not diminished the primacy of local power and authority in resolving disputes and negotiating local issues. It has not stopped the wave after wave of foreign insurgents. It could well be that because the introduction of democracy, constitution and rules of law to Afghanistan was through foreign intervention rather than an organic revolution; it will take even longer to cement a top down deontological approach to the rule of law.

The foreign Taliban demand adherence to no ethnicity, no nationality nor necessarily have the same reasons to fight.

In line with your paras. 5/6 the other difference is that there are views of the world that we fail to recognise should be left to their own self-determination.

"Americans [and other Western allies] tend to think that deep down we all have the same values. Americans believe that all these terrorists, if you scratch beneath the surface, are looking for religious equality and justice. That's complete and utter nonsense. Americans can't face the reality that different people have different values." (Ibn Warraq; Why I am Not a Muslim. 1995)

This doesn't mean another level of political correctness in how we fight and engage. It just means recognising that we will have only won over some of the hearts and minds until our money pump stops. Then there are others (China)eagerly waiting for the US to begin withdrawing aid to Pakistan.

Cheers

Jason

Although I do think we label things simplistically and with an unhelpful cultural bias- the problem I have with comparing Enlightenment-era Christians and current Moslem extremists is that many will think we just need to approach them the same- that some of the same civilizing influences that ultimately pacified the radical early Protestants will pacify Moslem extremists. I don't think that is necessarily true.

While I do appreciate looking at things from different perspectives- especially the "official lines" that are politically correct and meant to avoid offending anyone- I don't think we can simply compare groups of today to groups of yesterday and gain any insightful advantages. The "extremists" and the average folk alike today have a very different background, culture, and historical tradition motivating their current actions (or inactivity). I agree they are both agents for change and will fight for what they believe in- but beyond that I'm not sure other comparisons are useful.

US and Pakistan UW was a problem for the Soviets. I can't imagine how the US would react if we had several hundred aircraft shot down by Russian or Chinese weapons on top of our current situation.

For those who say that Pop Centric can't work and then point to Afghanistan as the example; I would just say if you want to see the same plan but with a heavy counterguerrilla / populace suppression arm, look to the Soviets.

Both worked and failed equally for the same reason: Both set out to establish and sustain a government of their chosing, and both therefore ignored resolving the revolutionary aspect of the insurgency and focused on attempting to suppress the resistance aspect. The problem is that the more one pushes against a resistance, the more it pushes back.

IMO the key is to recognize that there is a Revolution AND a Resistance; then to focus on resolving the Revolution first. This is largely political and demands that the US subjugate what we want for what the Afghan people want. But that means ALL Afghan people. We have an opportunity to get to something better than what we want if we are able to bring the Tajiks, Pashtuns, Hazara, Uzbeks, and various other groups together under a construct that allows them to learn to trust in a system where they cannot trust in each other; to be held in check by that system rather than by internal warfare. This is possible.

But first we need to stop the name calling. "Extremists" for the US today are the "Barbarians" for Rome. A label placed on those who dare to think and act differently than we do, and that are willing to fight back to challenge the place we have carved for them in the world. Certainly Christian Protestants were extremists when they were fighting for liberty from the oppression of the Catholic system of controls employed by the Holy Roman Empire. They calmed down to being the most boringly stable aspect of Western society today. "Extreme" forms of Islam are similarly amped up due to the mission they face far more than due to Islam itself or the people who are willing to fight for freedom from outside control/influence.

For American servicemen, we can look at each other and recognize that we are the 1% willing to shoulder any load, carry any burden, in order to keep our people free. The small % of Muslims we call "Extremists" are similarly that dedicated small slice of society willing to sacrafice for the whole.

Spartans can fight Spartans; or the politicans, diplomats and policy makers can recognize the flaws their approaches and address the root issues at work. This is not a matter of what tactics the Spartans apply, it is a matter of flaws of the political, diplomatic and policy positions the spartans are sent out to clash shields and trade spear thrusts over.

War is war and must be waged as such. What is going on in Afghanistan is a very different thing that we have opted to wage as war.

Bob,

I need to review my history, but I am not currently convinced the Soviet strategy was in error, and the government they left in place held for quite a while. If Pakistan didn't provide massive aid and fighters it may have held indefinitely. The Soviets were our enemies so we didn't assess their strategy or tactics objectively, we only looked for shortfalls and blew those out of proportion to support our case that the USSR was bad (they were), but now since they're going maybe we can look at their strategy from an amoral and objective view and assess whether or not it would have worked if they could have put pressure on Pakistan to knock off the UW? The various tribes and villages didn't represent the masses anymore than the government. The organizing force appeared to be the ISI. Different thoughts? I also recall that Soviets asked us to help stablize Afghanistan after they withdrew to keep the extremists out because they realized it was threat to both the USSR and the West as a whole. The U.S. obviously was anti-communist focused at the time and we didn't see the coming Islamist threat coming.

Gian, I agree that certain key influencers should be held accountable (not sure what accountable means in this context, other than saying publically they got it wrong so those who blindly follow them can be freed from their addiction of the COIN dogma). I recently had a fairly senior intell officer (with no infantry background) tell me we can't shoot our way of this, and yet he couldn't explain why, he was just mimicking the typical politically correct verbiage of the day. I told him he may be right, but on the other hand he should be able to explain his views and not simply repeat popular quotes.

I agree we are in a dangerous position as a force, because critical thinking is frowned upon and conformity is the key to career success. On the other hand, I think you take it too far sometimes, because there are times and places where a population centric approach can and will work. So in your own way you are promoting a dogma that is the antithesis of the current COIN doctrine.

I am at loss to describe exactly what we're trying to accomplish in Afghanistan. Maybe one way to gain clarity is to wargame it this way. Let's assume we pulled out entirely, then we assess what we think will happen after we pull out, and what if anything is a threat to our national interests. Then we develop a strategy to prevent those threats to our national interests. Overly simplistic, but an approach along those lines may help us develop some clarity and realistic strategy that is tied to our national interests, not just our national pride.

Bill,

You realize, of course, that what you describe was the basis of both the Soviet plan and the surge initiated under Gen McChrystal. Obviously both plans had some variations in terms of how they were applied, but the ops graphics and general concepts of the operation all match with what you propose.

Both had some hope of producing a "decent interval," but both also ignored the root problems driving the insurgency as a whole. No amount of foreign (Coalition and Northern Alliance) force effort against the Resistance movement within Afghanistan is likely to have much of an enduring effect so long as the overarching Revolutionary movement between the Northern Alliance government in Kabul and the Taliban government in exile in Pakistan is largely ignored and unaddressed.

While I agree with you in principle, until we are willing to recognize the dichotomy of this insurgency and the heirarchy of what must be addressed first, we are doomed to expend ourselves in pursuit of a temporary stalemate.

Likewise, those who argue "this is a rural insurgency" and want to put all of our energy into rural communities face the same problem that the "populace centers first" crowd face: Both are designed to ignore the overarching revolution and protect GIROA from her own populace.

Cheers!

Bob

I didn't detect an anti-COIN narrative in the article, but rather a do COIN where it makes sense to do COIN, and the author's point (right or wrong) is that Kunar is not the place. On the other hand he seems to be pushing a population centric strategy in other locations like Kabul. I can't find fault with that argument, and it falls in line with my previous arguments if you are going to do a pop centric strategy, then you must use the oil spot strategy, starting in areas that generally pro-government, and then "gradually" expand.

If the Afghan government effectively controls Kabul and Kandahar and the lines of communication between them, they control what is important. Progress in pushing out from these areas can be gradual (it can take years). Business will continue, deals will be made to allow transit along LOCs running to Pakistan to facilitate trade, etc. I was concerned that the author was going to recommend we ignore Kunar, which wouldn't work in regards to the other two fights, but he did state we need to continue direct action in Kunar against enemy targets to prevent it from becoming a safehaven, which is quite different than transforming the society there.

I think it is possible that if we focus on success in the major urban areas, that success will sell itself and the outliers will opt to join in time. First they need to see tangible benefits (more of a soft power approach). Our current approach of trying to force people to integrate with a government they do not trust will not succeed.

I always enjoyed history and did well at it in high school and below. Only at West Point, did the history and "military art" become dry and overly verbose and "scholarly."

So forgive my simple man's slightly different interpretation of the same article:

* Contrary to COL Gentile's first paragraph rebuttal, there is no mention of "surge" in Olivant's article. I also note no rejection of pop-centric COIN: "Instead, weak states should limit their reach while increasing their capabilities in areas they already control. They should develop more integrated economies in core urban areas and improve the schools near the cities and on the roads between them. Or as I once heard it put, lets focus on those who want to join civilization and leave alone those who are in active rebellion against it."

* Also in COL Gentile's first paragraph rebuttal, my "sucked at West Point history" reading comprehension differs completely. Retired LTC Ollivant implied in his last Op-Ed paragraph that isolated people who want to be left alone are not those likely to fly airplanes into Manhattan skyscrapers. There is no mention of converting Pech Valley into Manhattan...or Kabul.

I will leave it to others to find other errors in COL Gentile's misinterpretation of Dr. Ollivant's Op-Ed. As I read it, his article reinforces a pop-centric strategy. He implies that COIN achieves better results in areas most likely to be receptive to those efforts.

If I might be so bold, believe Dr. Ollivant was saying:

* COIN is fought differently in different countries and cultures, and the associated terrain they "choose" to live in.

* COIN works better in population-centric areas that tend to be in flatter, more easily accessed areas that host nations can better influence and defend.

Within Afghanistan, the cultures are multiple, the terrain varies extensively, and the COIN is different in:

* Kandahar/Arghandab,
* Helmand River valley
* Central east mountains bordering Northern Waziristan
* Kabul and surrounding area
* Kunar valley area and nearby more-isolated mountainous areas on both sides
* Central Hindu Kush inhabited by Hazaras and other non-Pashtuns
* Far north where our allies are based and the Pashtuns/Taliban are the fewest.