Comments
Teddy Roosevelt notwithstanding, critics do count, or at least they should. Evaluating the performance of cabinet secretaries is not character assassination. It's a part of democracy.
Some of the complaints made here and elsewhere are addressed in this blog post.
http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-skeptics/reassesing-secretary-gate…
Bill M, I knew they were theirs which was why the sarcasm was so thick.
Agree with those who say containment of China is unnecessary and we have more than sufficient AirSea Battle tools already on hand or near fruition. No need to rape the already weary Army which was the biggest item they recommended for cuts.
But if instead of attacking the aggression (Taiwan and Chinese coastal targets), we start trying to fly well inland with all kinds of stealth bombers, any bad guy with nukes might get antsy.
Well, since some of the really smart people have spoken I'll chime in...Here's my take, thinking more locally than globally.
I think the outgoing SECDEF will be looked upon kindly by history in the coming years.
However....
His recent stance on cutting the military, benefits, and other things related to our collective checkbook are bothersome to me.
Perhaps it's just that I missed it. But, I never remember him saying previously that our military budgets needed to be curtailed. It's only recently as he's heading out the door. To me that's a bit cowardly. Why not speak up two years ago? I remember a time when I transitioned to a primary staff position when a guy came up to me wanting to renovate the building. He said it was "free" money due to the GWOT. Did the building need to be overhauled? No. Coat of paint and perhaps new carpet tops. Instead it was gutted, redone, repainted, re-equipped and so forth. Cost the tax payers about $250k or so more than it should have. All that's going to end soon. And, it was mostly never needed.
The budget isn't the problem. The problem is that people like the SECDEF never put in any sort of QAQC on this process.
When I entered the military almost 20 years ago as an enlisted guy, it was seriously badass if you got a Gerber. Today they litter our supply rooms. We used to issue green memorandum books that probably cost $1 each. Now we'll spend hundreds so we can hand out Rite in the Rain notebooks. Where was the SECDEF's message of fiscal responsibility when that was happening?
The worst part about this is that it's going to be the most important things that get the axe: pay and benefits and service member care.
A lack of foresight from the top is what set this in motion. Congress may have allocated the money, but the SECDEF didn't have to spend it. Now as he walks out the door he wants all of us to undertake the austerity measures and watch our pay and benefits become affected. Every Monday I walk into the shoppette and see a new Army Times and every week I see more doom n gloom, more pronouncements of pay and benefit cuts, manpower cuts, program cuts, etc.
I'm curious, in this coming age of austerity, how will Sec. Gates' pension and benefits be affected?
To add to the comments on containment - as Bill M says can we or should we even contain China? My additional question would be to ask what is the end state would we be trying to achieve by "containing" China? And then what are the ways and means we are going to use to really contain China. Are we going to attack and seize the "string of pearls?" Are we going to completely surround China with bases in Korea, Japan, the Philippines, perhaps in Thailand, Singapore, and Vietnam as well? Should we contest bases in Pakistan and should we shore up Afghanistan and the other Central Asian states to "contain" China? Will we prevent China from establishing lines of communication through north Korea and Burma? Should we prevent them from building port facilities in Sri Lanka?
Containment was a useful and effective strategy for the situation as it existed at the time in the Cold War and we throw around the term as well as put it on a pedestal as the example of our last great Grand Strategy. But it is not a one size fits all strategy and today's world is much more complex. So for all those that toss around containment, please try to articulate a balanced and coherent ends, ways, and means of a strategy that you would term "Containment." Somehow I think we have to develop a more sophisticated strategy in today's world but if someone thinks containment is what we need then please enlighten us as to the strategy.
Anon, the bulleted comments were quotes from the article. Bulleted comments below correlate to your comments, which in my view are unrealistic justifications needless spending that is not related to our national security.
1. 120 cruise missiles and strategic bombers will not contain China, and it is doubtful that we can or should contain China. The military objective is keep China from "threatening" other regional nations. Our main national effort will be competing with China economically, and we won't be able to do that effectively if we pursue overly ambitous, idealistic objectives that have little to do with our national security. If you compare us to a boxer, then the economy is our legs, if we lose our legs, we won't be boxing anymore.
2 and 4. Our recent efforts at building security that is sustainable by the host nation at best would receive a C-. We are terrible at this for a lot of reasons. Furthermore, there is much more to building an effective military (or police force) than simply equiping and training them that is beyond addressing here. The goal isn't wrong, we just don't know how to do it effectively or within our means. I think it can be done if we quit trying to bring them to our standard, but that still doesn't address their will to fight.
3. I tend to agree that our position in Afghanistan has allowed us to kill a lot of terrorists in Pakistan (primarily through drone attacks), but that doesn't require us to commit large numbers of forces to transform Afghanistan's culture. We can do that with a so called CT focused strategy (although I don't agree with dumbing our strategy to COIN or CT, that is just lazy thinking). The other side of this approach is that our occupation of Afghanistan will be a moral justification to attack the West, not only in Afghanistan, but elsewhere in the world, to include the homeland. No easy answers, but I doubt that many Muslims in the Middle East are comparing our Ring Road to the crack down against uprisings in the ME. Instead they'll see our presence in Afghanistan as more of a crusade (no matter how wrong that view is in our eyes or our intent). The turning point will be when Muslims raise up to fight their own extremists. It be argued either way, but I suspect that is more likely to happen if we reduce our presence there and take away the justification of fighting the crusader invader. Maybe, maybe not, but worth considering.
7. What exactly did Bush get right? Do you think our invasion of Iraq caused the Arab Spring? How? I would love for that to be true, it would somehow help justify the loss of so many brothers in that conflict; however, democracy in Iraq isn't exactly a model that others want to strive for. There are many factors that created the Arab Spring that are completely external to our military efforts, and furthermore there is no way of knowing at this point if the Arab Spring will lead to flowering democracies in the Middle East. We can continue to hope, but that outcome is far from predetermined.
9. I see no evidence that our humanitarian assistance efforts create more than a short term "we like America now" effect. I remain supportive of these efforts, but it is dangerous to assume that the good will effect is persistent. I do think it makes a difference, but I just don't know how significant that difference is.
The sole superpower does not have these and other responsibilities. That is a self imposed view, and superpowers (throughout history) that have overextended themselves financially have always fallen off their throne. We also won't be the sole superpower much longer if we continue to overextend overselves and don't correct our current economic challenges. Our might is directly tied to our economic welfare, so it is critical that our DOD spending and associated strategy are based on real national security priorities, not the view of fixing the world by employing our military to address every little problem whether it is related to our national security or not. We need to prioritize, we need to do things smarter (requires a reassessment of what works and what isn't), and we must get our economic house in order or suffer the fate of all the superpowers who fell before us.
Bill M, your numbers 1 and 3 are the same:
1) contain China;...economic interdependence with the U.S. trumps any value in invading Taiwan or obstructing the South China Sea. We already dominate on Air/Sea and it will become more lopsided without any continuing need for 11-12 CVN or an immediate next gen bomber. Didn't we just launch 120+ cruise missiles from subs/surface vessels, and couldn't B-52H/B-1B do the same? Won't we have thousands of stealth fighters and 500 KC aircraft?
2) transform failed states so they resemble ours;...Or instead, help build two failed states until their own militaries can defeat invasion and preclude the Taliban from retaking Afghanistan. If we just occupy and do nothing but lethal missions, we really DO look like occupiers
3) chase terrorists;...Or be in a location that attracts them to come to Pakistan to cross the border and attempt to kill our very well-protected troops vs soft U.S./Europe targets. We can't kill our way out of Afghanistan, but can kill many potential terrorists who are sufficiently zealots to travel there.
4) train various militaries to do so;...Too many to be trained by SF alone
5) protect sea lanes,...already occurring off Yemen and Somalia...no risk of terrorism there after all...or is it a twofer. Anywhere else is theory since China and Iran want to use the same sea lanes and we could cut theirs while retaining ours were they to try anything.
6) keep oil cheap;...and that is a bad thing? So what happens when we or Israel use air/seapower against Iran. Does oil stay cheap? Could we find all those TBM with air/seapower alone? Or would we need to take land around the Straits of Hormuz to keep the missile out...and maybe secure all the way north to Afghanistan (not over the Zagros). Hand it over to Pakistan and give them some more "strategic depth" in exchange for an assured supply, rail, and pipeline route.
7) democratize the Middle East;...looks like President Bush had it right. Except now all the ME nations are suppressing the Arab Spring which creates THEIR OWN internal insurgencies they must suppress. Kind of hard to be a state sponsor of terror when the natives are restless. Kind of makes our counterinsurgency look good by comparison. Some kill thousands in Syria, ISAF rebuilds the ring road in Afghanistan.
8) protect European, Asian, and Middle Eastern states from aggression and geopolitical competition that might require them to develop military power independent of ours;...or sell them F-35s, UAS, and $60 billion in arms to Saudi Arabia, and F-16s to Taiwan so they can do more of it themselves. Which U.S. industry is hardest to outsource? Defense.
9) popularize the U.S. via humanitarian missions;...Yeah I suppose if we hadn't helped Pakistan after its earthquakes and floods they would have been even more cooperative
10) respond to natural disasters at home and abroad;...isn't it called the National Guard and full spectrum operations at home, see 9 above. Think we might need some help when California experiences the big one?
11) secure cyberspace,...or we could let China raid all LockMart's F-35/F-22 secrets
12) and more...the price of being the sole superpower.
http://www.cato.org/testimony/ct-bf-07202010.html
Cole, good link, thanks for sharing. Ben makes some excellent points.
1. Arguments about defense spending are arguments about defense strategy. What you spend depends on what you think we ought to do militarily, which depends in turn on theories about what causes security.
2. Substantially reducing military spending requires reducing the ambitions it serves.
3.Because it can evade choice, which is the essence of strategy, the Pentagon suffers from strategic incontinence. The U.S. military is supposed to be a tool to contain China; transform failed states so they resemble ours; chase terrorists; train various militaries to do so; protect sea lanes, keep oil cheap; democratize the Middle East; protect European, Asian, and Middle Eastern states from aggression and geopolitical competition that might require them to develop military power independent of ours; popularize the United States via humanitarian missions; respond to natural disasters at home and abroad; secure cyberspace, and more. The forces needed to accomplish this litany of aspirations can never be enough. Hence, neither can the defense budget.
Defining security so broadly is counterproductive. Our global military posture and activism drag us into others' conflicts, provoke animosity, prompt states to balance our power, and waste resources.
4. Our principal enemy, al Qaeda, has no army, no air force and no navy. Some contend that we can be safe from al Qaeda and other jihadists only by occupying and transforming failed states where they seek haven. And so, countering terrorism is supposed to requiresomething approaching global counterinsurgency, a permanent war. That claim does not bear scrutiny.
5. Another argument for high military spending is that U.S. military hegemony underlies global stability. The theoretical and empirical foundation for this claim is weak. It overestimates both the American military's contribution to international stability and the danger that instability abroad poses to Americans.
I don't agree with all his recommendations, but it is good to know there is another voice offering a different view than those promoting the forever wars. The way we are fighting now is not promoting freedom or economic recovery, it is increasing animosity against us and draining our national treasure.
Before some start applauding this young-looking guy for his wisdom based on unspecified credentials (CATO PhD candidates trump Secretary Gates 45 years of National Service?), take a gander at his Congressional testimony proposed cuts to defense spending...$1.1 trillion over ten years.
http://www.cato.org/testimony/ct-bf-07202010.html
He proposes cuts in the size of the Army to 360,000, among other things.
An emphatic yes to both of the above.
Two salient points:<blockquote>"...I don't think that is possible with the current team in place who are anchored in many ways to the current approach."</blockquote>Including the current military senior leadership -- who need to take a long hard look at what they have NOT wrought...<br><br>
And the Congress. Same comment applies.<blockquote>"I think our "ways" are predetermined based on our skewed perception of how the world works (or should work), and thus we are limited to using Western-friendly ways in a non-Western world."</blockquote>While I believe that's correct, I suggest that we self limit ourselves in that respect. I also think even more strongly that we could continue to do so and turn that to our advantage with a little innovative thinking and accepting a little risk. If we can remember how to do those things...
We just need to do it the American way instead of the Western way -- we have never done well at slavishly copying others while loudly rejecting lesser included matters and materiel not invented here...
Great points, Bill M.
I'd add that not only does our strategy have to be aligned with our means (or is that backwards?), but it has to take into account our ways. I think our "ways" are predetermined based on our skewed perception of how the world works (or should work), and thus we are limited to using Western-friendly ways in a non-Western world.
So, although we have some really great means at our disposal, they are not aligned very well with our ways- and we assume (invalidly IMO) we can get to our ends through them.
I suspect this will be a divisive article for the SWJ followers, but I think it is a view that is also long overdue. Before I get to some of the author's points I want to clarify that I respect the Secretary (he inherited a mess from his predecesser and a challenging problem set), but I still reserve the right to disagree with many of his policies. It is important to disassociate the character of the person from the policy he supports. One is character assassation, the other is needed debate on policy. In the end, like most I suspect (or at least hope), I believe we all owe the SECDEF a debt of thanks for his service during very challenging times (in many ways he had significantly different challenges when he stepped into the position, to what he is wrestling with now, so no one can claim he didn't carry a heavy burden for our nation during his term). On to the some points I agree and disagree with that the author made.
The author blames the SECDEF for a continued bloated defense budget, but doesn't address the influence that Congress has on the budget. Government Defense spending is still in part driven by pork for Congressional districts, this is beyond the SECDEF's control. Furthermore, DOD proposes a budget that funds a defense department that is prepared to not only defend our nation, but to support our stated global interests, so one must also look closely at our national strategy objectives and associated foreign policy. I do not think our defense spending is out of whack with the current strategies, I think the national defense strategy is out of whack.
I do agree with the author that our focus on stabilizing the world is hubris and irrelevant to the war on terror, and that our focus on COIN is quite frankly a focus on best practices for fighting dumb wars. He is absolutely right in my view that our current policy is one of endless war that is not sustainable, and that it is hyperbole to consider AQ a greater threat than a nuclear armed USSR commited to global revolution. The Soviets could have destroyed America, while on the other hand AQ and their followers never will. At best they can attack us, and they will continue to try and they will be successful sometimes. Deploying conventional forces around the world to engage in stability operations and COIN won't prevent it, but good CT work can.
The first step to get our DOD budget reduced is to intelligently rewicker our national security strategy to ensure it is aligned with our means. That means making hard decisions on priorities. We also need to relook certain beliefs that have emerged since 9/11 that have resulted in the long term commitment of large ground forces (versus advisors and special ops) to forever wars. What do we really hope to accomplish?
Personally I hope the new team brings a new perspective to what we are doing now, and how we will go forward in the future. Spending more money on national defense to pursue flawed policies will not further our national security, but further undermine it. It is time we take a step back and look at this rationally, and I don't think that is possible with the current team in place who are anchored in many ways to the current approach. I think we can be more effective by spending less and right sizing these missions and our objectives.