Mexico: A Mosaic Cartel War

It's sorta a start. In Paul's case he's leaned so far right he's spun completely around and gone a little left--the bill is intended to move the legalization/decriminalization issue down to the states.

I did like this quote by the Office of National Drug Control Policy: "The facts are that marijuana potency has tripled in the past 20 years and teens are using the drug at earlier ages." MISSION ACCOMPLISHED!

Congressman Ron Paul and Senator Barney Frank just introduced legislation to legalize marijuana(have not read the bill yet so I don't know details). Probably want go anywhere but the trend is towards that direction IMO.

motorfirebox, I hope not as well.

"But a couple of IED's well I think the American people will call for action."

God, I hope not. There will be no fixing anything, then.

Here is a great line from "No Coutry For Old Men" one of the best drug/criminal movies I have seen......." If the Rule you followed brought you to this.....of what use is the rule?"

ALCON,
Mexico is a failing state and a war exists and has for several years. What type of war, there are several different kinds it can fit into. What are the reasons? As many as a feild of grass has blades. What can be done? Short of intervention. The ATF and media can stop lying about where they get their weapons. We can and should track the money and grab it when we can. And we can hold the line at the border. I think Americans will think differently when we have an IED on the US side. Murders are already happening, mostly to cartel members on our side of the border. But a couple of IED's well I think the American people will call for action.

Hi, Fnord,

Tracing drug money is exceptionally difficult for precisely the reason you identified--there's so much of it. There's a great line by a fictional detective in the TV series "The Wire": "If you follow the drugs, it'll just take you to one of two places--the user or the dealer. If you follow the money, it'll take you to all sorts of places you probably don't want to go." A few years ago, Colombian authorities discovered that the national drug store chain--Drogas de Rebajo--was owned by a cartel member. It would be the equivalent of finding out that all the RiteAids in the US were owned by the mob. Colombia still had trouble finding all the profits related to that scheme.

Decriminalization is also a complex issue. Again, I think there is room for discussion and debate. It may be worth keeping in mind that decriminalization may create more use and, with supply being illegal, the price will still create societal costs such as criminal acts to support an addict's habit. By one estimate, a heroin user commits 200 crimes a year in order to supply his or her habit. According to another study, meth abusers regularly commit identity theft to acquire funds to pay for their addiction. I'm certainly not making the argument that addicts or recreational users all need to be chucked in jail, but the second and third order effects of decriminalization should also be considered.

Okay, thank God caffeine is legal. I need my afternoon boost.

Paul

Paul that's easy..Secret Agent Man....sing along!
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H-NBoUF7eAc

The Man from UNCLE is very cool. This leads me to something completely unrelated to our discussion--which TV crime/spy show had/has the best theme music?

My vote is Hawaii Five-0.

Paul

At the risk of sounding like a broken record. Stop thinking about fighting Countries and recognize you are fighting a system. We are fighting a Trans-National Organization. That requires a Counter Trans-National law Enforcement Organization. But I would not hold my breath that it will come about. We need the Man from U.N.C.L.E. The first world wide law enforcement agency.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PZuErXLfQlM&feature=related

Yeah, the war on drugs has exacerbated the cartel issue into a problem that our great-grandchildren will have to deal with. It's really prohibition all over again, only the violence in this case is largely exported, making a change of heart like the one after the Valentine's Day Massacre less likely.

The rise of violence with regards to illegality of supply has, I think, a lot to do with demand and a lot to do with how illegal the supply is. Legality/illegality isn't really a binary division; as I said, drugs and drug use are still illegal in Portugal, it's just that they're not prosecuted in the same way we prosecute them. The same principle can be applied to supply. We can make it illegal to grow marijuana but stop short of paying local police stations extra money for making pot busts, for instance. To some degree, reducing violence related to illegal substances means reducing the prosecution of illegal substance production/sales/abuse--if we stop paying cops to make pot busts, there will be fewer pot busts but probably no fewer pot growers.

The decriminalization and legalization issue is a fascinating one; I could talk about it all day (as some of my poor students have discovered).

The Cato Institute had an interesting report on Portugal's decriminalization--the findings were that usage didn't change and the fear of "drug tourists" showing up in throngs in Lisbon didn't materialize. I don't remember if the report included anything on how much money the government is saving by focusing on treatment over incarceration. On the other end of the spectrum, The Netherlands and Sweden have recently tightened their drug use laws.

I think the link (if any) that drug control policy has to reducing the power of Mexican cartels is the more specific issue. RAND did a study looking at how legalization of marijuana in California would affect the cartels. The findings were surprising. Although it is estimated that 70% of cartel profits come from trafficking pot, eliminating this profit would likely create MORE violence in the short term as cartel "employees" who were let go would likely fight over diminishing spoils. Additionally, the main issue of contention amongst the cartels is territory in the form of smuggling routes (plazas) into the US rather than fighting over product. (Of course, there are also turf battles over ports that receive Colombian cocaine and precursor chemicals and retail markets in places like Acapulco.) The RAND study also recognized that members of cartels and gangs are not exactly prime examples of long-term, rational strategic thinkers.

Another question that I have is whether the existence of an illegal market necessarily means violence will follow. Mexico (and Canada) have helped supply Americans insatiable appetite for illicit substances, yet the violence in Mexico has spiked in the early 1990s and now in the 2000s. Is it possible to lower the levels of violence while still keeping drug supply illegal? I don't know.

More questions on a Sunday morning as the coffee brews.

Thanks again for the discussion,

Paul

Crap, forgot to fill in the fields. The above was me.

Well, hold up a sec. Like I said, decriminalization and legalization are different things. There are some wacky hippies seriously crusading for legalization--the actual writing into law that the substances are legal--but it's not a serious movement, possibly because people recognize it's just not all that likely to happen.

What is more popular is decriminalization. The best available model for this is Portugal, which decriminalized drug use in 2001. Drug use is still illegal, it's still against the law, and if you get caught doing it you'll be arrested. But you won't go to jail. You'll be brought before a council that will either let you go with a warning, make you pay a small fine, or ask (or possibly mandate, not sure) that you complete a rehab program.

Drug traffickers and dealers are still subject to fines and jail times, though I believe those punishments are significantly less than sentences for equivalent crimes in the states.

And decriminalizing or even legalization isn't necessarily an across-the-board measure. Say we jump in with both feet and legalize marijuana on terms similar to alcohol. That doesn't mean we would also legalize, or even decriminalize, cocaine use.

I'm trying to stop myself from writing a novel here, but we could even start with steps short of decriminalization. There is <a href="http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487036483045752123826123317… funding available</a> for local police departments that make pot busts. I can't help but think reallocating that funding to more severe crimes, like maybe jaywalking, would vastly improve lives and cut into cartel profits.

This is a fascinating discussion. I too have been torn concerning the legalization of "drugs". I had not thought about the issues Paul Kan posted concerning "legalization of supply". Not that it helps convince me one way or another, in fact it makes an informed opinion even more complicated, but it does point out yet more considerations concerning legalization that one should be aware of concerning the "debate".

Hi, mototfirebox,

To be honest, I'm really torn. I think there is room for decriminalization of usage, rather than just throwing users in jail. This has been an utter failure as usage rates have not fallen since the declaration of the "war on drugs". Some suggest we need to fight the "war" even harder. But in places like Singapore and Malaysia where they will kill you for possession over a certain amount, drug use still happens.

The tricky part is the legalization of supply. So far, no country has gone that totally in that direction. Does "legalization" mean "commercialization" in the same way as cigarettes and alcohol? Companies are in the business of getting their product in as many hands as possible, not in as few hands as possible. Plus, look at the various laws that circumscribe the smoking of cigarettes....something that is completely legal. Would we freely legalize the use of meth, but constrain the rights of smokers?

Honestly, I don't know what the right balance is. But I'm open to hearing all sides of the debate.

Thanks again for making me think more deeply about the issue.

Paul

Your point about the lasting power of organized crime groups is well-taken, Mr. Kan. I don't see the cartels collapsing the day after, say, marijuana is decriminalized or even legalized (I'll point out that legalization and decriminalization are very different creatures, and that there's a wide range of possible gradations within each, but the specifics are a discussion for elsewhere). But I think such action would make the war in Mexico winnable. I'm not sure there can be a strategy that makes Mexico winnable--by Mexico or anyone else--that doesn't include some sort of reduction in the prosecution of drug offenses.

Mfirebox,

Your skepticism about starting with a better trained police force is rightly placed. However, I think the point is to END with a better trained police force, especially in light of the continued illegal (rather than "legal") status of narcotics. I don't foresee that status changing any time soon. In fact, I haven't met a legalization advocate who wants the first legal crackhouse next to their home.

In addition, even after the end of Prohibition in the US, organized crime didn't go away or become less violent. They merely shifted their proficiency in using violence to muscle into other schemes--prostitution, gambling, cigarettes, concrete, toxic waste, etc.

Just more food for thought on a hot Saturday afternoon...

Paul

I don't think a better-trained force in Mexico can possibly be considered a good starting place. Granted, having a better force is always handy, but the problems in Mexico have nothing to do with training and everything to do with money. Mexico already has a very highly-trained counterterrorism force which has been used to great effect against the cartels. What they're a little more famous for, though, is for 40 or so of them switching sides and becoming those lovable, huggable Zetas we hear about in the news so often.

The reason Los Zetas exist is because the cartels have money. The cartels' money comes from the value of the illegal substances they pedal. The high prices for cartel drugs springs pretty directly from their legal status in the US and the world at large. It seems as likely to me that troops can "fix" Mexico as that they could "fix" Wall Street.

Perhaps, Ryan Brim, author of This is Your Country on Drugs, puts it best:

"in reality, there is no such thing as drug policy. As currently understood and implemented, drug policy attempts to isolate a phenomenon that cant be taken in isolation. Economic policy is drug policy. Healthcare is drug policy. Foreign policy, too, is drug policy. When approached in isolation, drug policy almost always backfires because it doesnt take into account powerful economic, social and cultural forces."

Paul

Bill M. and JC--

These are good points about the nature of US law enforcement--we don't have a national police force. Mexico does have the Federal Police and I think there are other nations that have police forces that could help Mexico's reforms. For example, Canada's RCMP is excellent at tackling money laundering; Italy's military and carabinieri train together (could be a good model for the Mexican military and Federal Police); Brits had some policing successes in Northern Ireland during some very violent years. From what I understand, Mexican police departments in high violence cities and towns do not even use aggregate software such as ComStat techniques (as controversial as they are) to track crimes. I hear that the Federal level may develop a national data base, but I'm not sure how this helps the local cops.

In short, I think the situation in Mexico needs an "all hands on deck" approach.

Paul

Speaking of Mexicos Police and its "disorganized" nature with a Federal/State/Municipal structure one of the few places in the world that youll find a similar structure is here in the US, except of course for our multitude of agencies at the Federal level (85-125 depending on whos count youre using).

Hate to say it when one considers our own law enforcement structure and the "success" weve had at creating policing organizations overseas we might be better off contracting out the job to the Columbian Policía Nacional or the Spanish Guardia Civil.

When talking about "reforming the police" it should be noted that Mexico has approximately 310,000 public security officers at all of the various levels and our (US) usual "blow in on the cheap" with an 6 week initial training program and no field training and evaluation program type assistance could wind up doing more harm than good. (Some of the initial members of Los Zetas were US trained before they deserted and went over to the other side.)

With the high intensity nature of the situation Mexico is probably going to need unified structure at the state level like the police in Germany or Australia and at the Federal level a gendarmerie, an investigative agency, and a domestic security intelligence organization.

HI-LE is more about re-orienting Mexico's approach than designing a specific, new type of organization. Mexico is undergoing significant reforms to its judiciary and its federal police force. These reforms are by no means perfect and are still subject to reversal by Mexico's politicians.

I might add that HI-LE is not an argument to turn Mexico into a police state or to turn it into a state full of police. Calderons strategy of using the military as a substitute for federal police which, when trained in the right numbers, will take on core policing responsibilities in the most violence prone states and localities is logical. However, local police forces constitute 90% of Mexicos law enforcement personnel and have been viciously targeted. Local police forces also have low educational standards. Most municipal police have elementary level education. Of the 58 police academies throughout Mexico, only 25 have started to implement educational standards for applicants.

The number of police in Mexico is also not a problem; their distribution is. With 366 officers per 100,000 people, Mexico is better supplied than the US, Britain, France and Italy. However, their distribution is uneven and provides significant gaps in law enforcement. With over 2,000 municipalities, Mexicos municipal police exist in only 335 municipalities. Of these 335 municipalities, 87 utilize 69% of the resources and manpower, leaving the remaining municipalities with only 30% of resources.

Perhaps re-organizing is more the issue than re-financing the effort.

Paul

Who is going to pay for such a HI-LE force?

Hi, everyone,

I'm thrilled at how this discussion has bloomed; it certainly has made me plow more deeply into my own thinking about the situation in Mexico. So, I very thank you for all the comments.

Robert, thanks so much for your thoughts. You've raised some important points for me to consider in constructing "high intensity law enforcement". I describe it broadly as providing multifaceted, multilayered and focused public safety in a complex environment of law and order while doing so within strong constitutional boundaries. Rather than a military strategy that focuses on killing or capturing the enemy or a population-centric counterinsurgency campaign to secure the population from irregular fighters, the focus of high-intensity law enforcement is to bring criminal offenders to justice and prevent crime in the future. Your description of what that might entail or what it should avoid fills in some needed gaps for me. (By the way, I assign your article on the five views of Mexican drug violence that you published here to my elective students. They dig it!)

An important portion of high-intensity law enforcement (or any approach) is a renewed look at Mexico's strategy. I suggest three possible adjustments: a mosaic strategy that deals with each major cartel with a different goal; a heartland strategy that focuses on the six northern Mexican states; or a Zeta-first strategy to go sequentially against the cartels, starting with the most serious challenger.

As John said, we need something like COIN, but that can somehow avoid what Robert describes as hunter-killer teams of police. I think there are some dangers in turning police into what Bayley and Perito term "little soldiers". We do need a place to "game" this out or to flesh out all of our ideas more thoroughly.

I agree that high intensity law enforcement may be sugar coating, but I think policy makers may need some sugar to swallow what might be a very bitter pill. I really think 2012 will be a pivotal year (not just because of that pesky Mayan prediction) because of our presidential election and Mexico's. Depending on who wins here and there, things might break badly.

Bill M., I'll be submitting another piece to SWJ that addresses US policy in the face of what appears to be, at the very least, a stalemate in the Mexican cartel war(s). Hopefully, it will be published here and we can keep the conversation going.

Let's keep this ball rolling,

Paul

Paul, Rober, et al:

I believe the proper force structure for addressing the "cartel wars: is "full-spectrum policing." That would involve the range of police capacity from community policing, through counter-gang operations, through counter-insurgency (criminal or otherwise). The gendarmerie (or constabulary) model would augment traditional urban or civil police (CIVPOL). I have described this as "Expol" or expeditionary policing in prior articles here at SWJ. This would address the "intra-conflict" policing requirements needed for "high intensity crime" or "criminal insurgency." (For the record, as you both already know, I believe both are present in Mexico's inter-locking conflicts (i.e., "Mosaic wars"). Building such a capacity will take a great deal of effort.

The Mexican Federal Police are effectively operating as a "gendarmerie" (i.e., formed police force), but without an effective community force to transition day-to-day capacity that is not enough. There is a need to build capacity at neighborhood (colonias), municipal, state, and federal levels--not-to-mention building effective transnational or cross-border capacity North and South!

There is a need for a serious wargame or conference on this need. Perhaps we can generate some interest! COIN (per se) is close, but not complete. some of the COIN-like capacities currently employed in Brazil's favelas are germane, but I suspect we really need to develop counter-violence, beat policing capacities that can be augmented by formed-forces capable of operational level synchronization.

More research and debate is needed in these areas! let's keep the ball rolling!

JPS

Paul,

I'm wondering what "high-intensity law enforcement" would look like in Mexico. I don't
think it exists in the US-- even a city like Los Angeles with its well developed SWAT capabilities would have a rough time taking on a company sized Narco Commando unit of armored SUVs/Cars/RPGs/50 cals/Assault Rifles/Tube Launched Grenades-- though LA SWAT/LE would prevail by sheer numbers (with lots of losses).

We seem to be in that gray area with "low-intensity military" operations vs "high-intensity law enforcement" operations. Police arrest criminals, engage in community policing, etc., do we want police engaging in firefights and meeting engagements in Mexico and basically going in as "hunter-killer" teams?

Now of course we could be talking about utilizing "militarized-police" in Mexico-- maybe that is where you are going re this. I'd think they are operating in that fully blurred "crime-war operational environment"-- but calling it "high-intensity law enforcement" is sugar coating it I think. Should Mexico use/develop military-police brigades?

As it stands right now the local, state and federal police on their own have "0" chance vs the cartels/gangs (note also the LE corruptions issues compound this)-- take the Mexican military out of this and it is game over. I'm looking forward to your thoughts Paul-- as you know I greatly respect your scholarship/works-- and also the insights of the other SWJ readers.

Well Mr Kan if you ever write about Hugo Chavez and Hezbollah and maybe the growing influence of Islam in Latin America I would like to hear what you have to say. Do you have a mailing list, if so how do I get on it.

I do try to keep up with politics in Mexico, July 2012 is coming fast and there election will impact the U S. Mexico is our third largest trading partner, what happens in Mexico is in our national interest.

POKEY

Hi, JC and Pokey,

Thanks for your comments. JC, I do generally take the view that the situation in Mexico is a crisis of law and order and not an irregular war. Organized criminal syndicates and gangs can fight wars though, but these are not the sorts of wars that have familiar contours. Although many who work in law enforcement tackle wars over turf, leadership and product all the time. In my book, I describe the need for "high-intensity law enforcement" rather than COIN or CT. A large part of the COIN and CT approach is linked to reconciliation and even re-integration of the irregulars. As you correctly point out, absent the political/ideological context, I'm not sure how that could be done in Mexico. Would Los Zetas be welcomed back into the Mexican armed forces; would the drug thugs be granted amnesty for their homicides? What would be the shape of any "deal" between the government and the cartels?

Pokey, I'll need to read more about Hezbollah and Chavez. I do know that certain alien smuggling organizations (ASO) have separate routes for taking Mexicans and for taking those who are from "countries of concern" into the US. I've heard quite a bit about Somalis getting arrested along the border. I'm not sure what that's all about. Chavez is an interesting cat. He supports criminals all over the region, especially in the Caribbean, and then gives loans and grants to those governments who need the cash to fight the criminals he is supporting! He's building quite the constuency. However, if I'm not mistaken, Caracas has the highest violent crime rate in the world.

Thanks again for your comments,

Paul

Thanks Paul, my understanding of the situation in Mexico is somewhat elementary and can be quit confusing. I know from my own experience's how some reports about the border and Mexico can be way over blown making a clear understandable picture of the situation in Mexico very difficult for the average man to obtain. I would like to see a essay on the impact, if any, that Hugo Chavez and Hezbollah are having on Mexico.
I have read "Hezbollah, Radical but Rational" from STRATFOR.

Thanks
POKEY

Mr. Kan,

Coming from a law enforcement background I believe you hit the nail on the head with your description of the current situation in Mexico as a "mosaic." It fits most of the organized, semi-organized, and disorganized crime that we see simultaneously occurring on a daily basis in the same geographical area here in the US.

Unfortunately most pundits try to frame the discussion what is going on in Mexico using military terminology such as insurgency or irregular war, which does not accurately describe what is occurring and the motivations of the various players involved. (Its going to be tough to seek a traditional political solution to the conflict when the other side isnt ideologically motivated and generally could care less about politics.) Your term "High-Intensity Crime" is a more appropriate term for what is occurring.

Keep up the research and looking forward to the new book.

JC

Hi, Mr. Lairsey,

The debate over root cause or source of Mexico's mosaic drug war is the subject of deep debate.

My take is that the issue is not uni-directional, but dialectic. There is a mutually reinforcing dynamic that is fueling the violence in Mexico which is spilling over into the US. The limited amount of economic opportunity in Mexico and the compromised nature of its political system have created a ripe environment for the cartels to take advantage of Americans longstanding desire for illicit narcotics. Americans spend between $18 billion and $39 billion annually on narcotics coming northward. Meanwhile, the power of the clandestine economy has undermined Mexican governmental institutions. Only five percent of crimes in Mexico are solved while only one to two percent lead to conviction or jail time.

The question of what to do about breaking this dialectic is exceptionally thorny. Many have argued that legalization of drugs is the answer. I'm deeply skeptical of that approach and will likely lay out my skepticism in a future piece.

You've touched on one of the key questions in the debate over policies and strategies regarding drug violence in Mexico and the spillover into the US--namely, how do we break the mutually reinforcing dynamic before an issue of public safety becomes a concern for national security?

Thanks for your question.

Paul

Paul do you believe there is a source or root cause that is perpetuating the existing conditions in Mexico?

Hey, John,

My manuscript is due to the publisher on 1 October, but I'll send it to Potomac books by the end of this month. I'm already contracted with them so I'm guessing that it'll be out in a year or so.

I can send you an advance copy of the chapter on geo-criminality for your perusal. If you send me your email address at [email protected], I'll send it along.

Take care,

Paul

Thanks Paul, Looking forward to your book! it will help my research, especially the chapter on "geo-criminality." When will it be released? John

Hey, folks,

Thanks for the kind comments on my piece. This is a slice of what I discuss in my forthcoming book, but I wanted to join the conversation on the importance of drug violence in Mexico and what it means to the US.

Thanks especially to John Sullivan and Robert Bunker who have been at the forefront of the issue. My work owes a huge debt to them and their thinking. John, I hope our paths cross again soon.

Mr. Lairsey, I think narco-culture incorporates many aspects of Mexican culture already; I don't see them as necessarily distinct. For example, Santa Muerte (Holy Death) is venerated by traffickers and gangs, but this appears to have been co-opted from the practice of many ordinary Mexicans. There was an initial push to remove Santa Muerte shrines in an effort to combat narco-trafficking. But as one writer commented, "it's a bit like outlawing tattoo parlors in order to stamp out the Hell's Angels." Pamela Bunker and a few others wrote a very good article on narco-culture in a special edition of the journal Small Wars and Insurgencies (can I mention the competition without getting banished from SWJ?)

Steve, that is a great idea about a stakeholder map. I know that David Danelo wrote a great piece on the political/criminal geography of Mexico in Orbis. The article is called "The Many Faces of Mexico". I have a chapter in my book in "geo-criminality" which explores how criminal power is derived from territory.

Thanks again for the comments. Let's keep the conversation going!

Warm regards,

Paul

Paul,

Very elegant essay! I agree this is something new and agree with much of your characterization. This type of conflict, which I term "criminal insurgency," has the potential to have a profound impact on the nature of states. ("Insurgency" not because it simply seeks to overthrow the political leadership or state, but because it has the potential to profoundly alter the nature of state relations, power and social relationships.) You are absolutely right to emphasize the central role "networks" play in this conflict scenario. Thanks for a solid contribution to the discussion.

John P. Sullivan

Mr. Kan what are your thoughts on a fourth front in the conflict in Mexico that places the traditional Mexican culture against the narco culture?