Afghanistan -- The Sun is Rising

Bill

You say that "The communists used their ideology to deny freedom to millions, and to kill millions who didn't concur with their ideology." Ok, I accept that as a fact. But it is also only half a fact.

By "communists" I assume you mean some mix of Soviets/Chinese promoted UW campaign to leverage nationalist insurgencies in countries where they sought to gain influence in their competition with the West? This is a game we both played, is it not? The US has a history of supporting the populace/insurgent if we don't like the government, or the government if it is one we believe will play ball with us, regardless of how despotic or what form of governance that government might apply.

Or by "communists" do you mean the various nationalist insurgencies that emerged to throw off long-standing oppressive regimes. From the Russian people rising up to throw off the Romanovs, to various Asian efforts to remove colonial powers or residual regimes consisting of those who rose to power in collaboration with their colonial occupiers? Saudi insurgents even attempted a communist ideological approach, but it failed miserably (but not surprisingly) among that populace.

Communism is an effective secular ideology for insurgency, so insurgents use it. It is not an effective ideology for continuing effective/good governance so it always morphs over time to become much more capitalistic in practice. The key point is that it is not the ideology that CAUSES the insurgency, it is merely a very effective tool often selected by insurgents to take on oppressive or illegitimate or discriminatory self-serving regimes. As we do not promote communism it is also typically a competing ideology to whatever we happen to be selling or backing. As we have been allied with colonial powers, or been the colonial power, or have been exercising colonial-like control for economic or containment purposes, we find communism to be a "threat."

Fact is, be it "communism" or "capitalism" or "Islamism" the ideology is not what creates the conditions of insurgency, they are merely choices the insurgent makes for how to best motivate a populace to take action to challenge a government. That challenge may be within the legal system as party politics where such activities are allowed; or as insurgency where such activities are outlawed.

As you indirectly point out though, a tool that is great for promoting change of governance is not also necessarily great for providing good governance after that change has occurred.

For America to move forward with our own security and our own foreign policy we must first shed some excess baggage that is holding us back, and one huge lump of excess baggage is that idea that ideology is the threat itself, rather than merely the tool employed to effect change where a significant and distinct segment of some populace deems change is necessary. Only then can we focus on the problems of governance that need be addressed as the real problem, too often that problem is us or related to us when the opposing ideology is either communism or Islamism. We don't handle that kind of criticism well, as it causes us to have to look hard in the mirror and see things that others see but that we prefer to ignore.

<em>Backwards Observer, I am still trying to decipher your post.</em>

Bill M, the VNQDD engaged in assassination and the murder of civilians. The French colonial administration used subterfuge and brutal repression to administer Indochina. The communists took it to the edge of the Clausewitzian envelope. My impression is that there was plenty of terror for everyone. Your general thrust on the use of the use of terror seems to be that it is confined to the 'other side', i.e. 'the bad guys'. There's nothing wrong with a monochromatic view of history if you feel that it serves your purpose.

I agree with your last paragraph, but don't follow your argument that ideology was never a threat? Ideology is very much a threat to our physical security and way of life. The communists used their ideology to deny freedom to millions, and to kill millions who didn't concur with their ideology. Not sure how that doesn't fall in the threat realm. AQ is using its ideology to justify the killing of thousands, and to promote attacks on the U.S., the West in general, and Arab states that are too secular in their view. Ideology is the motivation and justification for these actions that threaten us. Ideology in itself doesn't threaten us, but those who embrace and use hostile ideologies can and have been real threats.

Please explain how ideology is something we can discard as a threat?

Bill,

Actually containment began as a program to physically contain Soviet expansion, not communism. It was only after nationalist China fell in '49 and Mao made it clear that he did not see the US as an ally and friend that we modified containment to a much more idealistic program of containing an ideologically described threat rather than a physically described one.

This in turn drove us off of the moral high ground of promoting "self-determination" to a lower, more specific position of promoting "democracy." We actually became an opponent of self-determination at that point when we feared the local choice would align a nation with the Russo-Sino pact that threatened to dominate the Eurasian continent.

But ideology was never the threat, not then, not now. It was just the tool. I find this fascinating as I drill deeper into insurgency how it leads me to clearer perspectives on much larger matters. This is a primary reason why I believe we need to retire containment ASAP as a foundation of our foreign policy, as it is too controlling, and the ideological aspect of it never really worked to begin with.

"Ideology cannot be contained, Liberty cannot be denied." RCJ

At some point we have to ask ourselves what kind of nation we want to be. Leading the Cold War served the world well. Continuing Cold War polices 20 years hence only serves ourselves, and not very well at that.

Bob

Bob,

At that time (since 1947) containing communism defined our National Security policy/strategy, so it was very relevant in shaping our response.

Backwards Observer, I am still trying to decipher your post. Regardless it is important to note that Ho embraced and "converted" to communism while in Paris, and he was actually one of the founding members of the French Communist Party who supported him throughout his war with the French military. The French communist party was popular in France and was able to reject requests by the French military for more troops, etc., and allegedly they provided intelligence to Ho. When Ho eventually returned to Vietnam in the late 20s, he actually spent most his time in China (on the Vietnam border) where he organized clandestine political cells. The Japanese invasion enabled his initial success, just as the Japanese invasion enabled Mao's success. The USSR also provided a lot of support to Ho and Mao.

Not all politics are local, Vietnam is a perfect case of numerous foreign interests clashing and leveraging various local groups to pursue their ends.

Dang, I left out an interesting bit about the outcome of the strained relations over the attempt to install a Catholic emperor:

<blockquote>This prompted anti-Christian edicts, and in 1858, a French invasion of Vietnam was mounted, ostensibly to protect Catholicism, but in reality for colonial purposes. </blockquote>

From the same VNQDD Wikipedia entry above. Believe it or not!

<em><blockquote>His movement was NOT popular in Vietnam, but he effectively used terror (and leveraged the stupidity of French strategy and tactics) to gain support.</blockquote></em>

Some excerpts from the Wikipedia entry for the Vietnamese Nationalist Party:

<blockquote>The Việt Nam Quốc Dân Đảng (VNQDD), also known as the Việt Quốc and the Vietnamese Kuomintang, is the Vietnamese Nationalist Party, a revolutionary socialist political party that sought independence from French colonial rule in Vietnam during the early 20th century. Its origins lie in the mid-1920s, when a group of young Hanoi-based intellectuals began publishing revolutionary material. In 1927, after the publishing house failed because of French harassment and censorship, the VNQDD was formed under the leadership of Nguyen Thai Hoc. Modelling itself on the Republic of China's Kuomintang, the VNQDD gained a following among northerners, particularly teachers and intellectuals. The party, which was less successful among peasants and industrial workers, was organised in small clandestine cells.</blockquote>

<blockquote>***</blockquote>

<blockquote>French involvement in Vietnam started in the late 18th century when the Catholic priest Pigneau de Behaine assisted Nguyen Anh to found the Nguyen Dynasty by recruiting French volunteers. In return, Nguyen Anh, who took the reign name Gia Long allowed Catholic missionaries to operate in Vietnam. However, relations became strained under Gia Long's successor Minh Mang as missionaries sought to incite revolts in an attempt to enthrone a Catholic.</blockquote>

<blockquote>***</blockquote>

<blockquote>From 1928, the VNQDD attracted attention through its assassinations of French officials and Vietnamese collaborators. A turning point came in February 1929 with the killing of Hervé Bazin, a French labour recruiter widely despised by the Vietnamese people.</blockquote>

<blockquote>***</blockquote>

<blockquote>On February 10, a VNQDD member injured a policeman at a Hanoi checkpoint; at night, Arts students threw bombs at government buildings, which they regarded as part of the repressive power of the colonial state. On the night of February 15-16, Hoc and his remaining forces seized the nearby villages of Phu Duc and Vinh Bao, in Thai Binh and Hai Duong Provinces respectively, for a few hours. In the second village, the VNQDD killed the local mandarin of the French colonial government, Tri Huyen. On February 16, French warplanes responded by bombarding the VNQDD's last base at Co Am village; on the same day, Tonkin's Resident Superior René Robin dispatched 200 Gardes indigènes, eight French commanders and two Sûreté inspectors. A few further violent incidents occurred until February 22, when Governor-General Pierre Pasquier declared that the insurrection had been defeated. Hoc and his lieutenants, Chinh and Nguyen Thanh Loi, were apprehended.</blockquote>

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Viet_Nam_Quoc_Dan_Dang

Bill

But remember, "communism" was never the threat, it was the ideology applied by the threat.

The threat, per our vital national intrest, was a Eurasian land mass dominated by a nation or coalition of nations that was not friendly toward the US. The fact they employed a communist ideology is, and was, moot.

Bob

Distortions of history lead to wrong conclusions. Ho spent many, many years out of Vietnam roaming Europe (and working on ships). He joined the communist party in Europe before he started his movement in Vietnam. His movement was NOT popular in Vietnam, but he effectively used terror (and leveraged the stupidity of French strategy and tactics) to gain support. There were no less than three other nationalist movements in Vietnam that were more popular. As for the OSS, some authorities claim they were the most communist penetrated U.S. organization in history, and they were frequently manipulated by communists who were more savvy politically than the OSS agents helping them. This is understandable since there were communist resistance groups throughout Asia and Europe who were fighting the Axis, and while the OSS correctly identified that the Vietnamese people wanted independence from the French (which the U.S. supported initially), they didn't understand Ho's intentions. On the other hand, if we didn't support the French it is possible that Ho would have been defeated by other nationalist groups. Who really knows.

Shoe,

The people of Vietnam (besides those who were in bed with and profiting from the old colonial system, or those who in some wild rural areas were likely largely apolitical) wanted an independent liberty. I would never promote that the wanted the form of controlling communism government and ideology adopted and applied by Ho and gang to achieve that larger end. What we will never know is what form of government Ho would have adopted if we would have taken the recommendaitons of the OSS team that worked with Ho to fight the Japanese in WWII and if we would have honored our commitment to a self-determined liberty to the people of that land. One of those great "what ifs." What if Truman, rather than Mao, had stepped up to empower Vietnamese liberty.

People overly fixate on the ideology and govenrance tools applied by the insurgent to effect change rather than on the despotic/illegitimate systems in place that drive such radical approaches to popular reform of government in the first place. Blame shifting. We see the same thing in many places today where people are turning to AQ for support and in turn, the ideological form of Islam they apply to fuel their movement. Once again we have a choice, an opportunity, to support the people IAW our espoused principles, or let twisted perspectives of our national interests drive us to act counter to our espoused principles and side with sitting regimes regardless of how bad/evil they might be.

This is the lesson we need to learn from Nam.

If a lack of strategy is the overarching reason for a lack of success, then what is to be done in areas like Afghanistan where the decentralization of the drivers of conflict by definition prevents any holistic strategy from being effective? I guess decentralizing the government would be a good start? Focus on border control, and destroying the sources of external support, consequences be damned? Is the overall reaction to this article a call for a windfall change, or complete disengagement? Is ISAF a victim of the philosophy of "focusing on what you can control"? If so, where are the policy makers? The "outsourcing of grand strategy" idea is troubling. I hope they (the people in charge of policy) read some of your responses.

All of those questions are serious questions I'm asking for my own personal understanding.

Comrade Bob,

In fact the communist Chinese and at the end of WWII, and the Imperial Japanese, provided much material and training support to Ho and his merry men of terrorists to fight the French (unfortunately he fought more than the French, the VC also brutally murdered any Vietnamese who were also nationalists, but opposed Ho's communist vision). Once Mao assumed power in China they continued to provide support to Ho for several years. That relationship changed and we apparently missed it, but one can understand why our leaders suspected Chinese support. As for suppressing the insurgency in the South, I think it be argued it was defeated, since it never had real popular support. The VC gained support via terrorism/coercion, which also unfortunately is effective.

There is no doubt that Vietnamese wanted their own nation, but a lot of Vietnamese (maybe even most) didn't want to be nationalists under Ho's regime. Ho's victory was a not a phase III Maoist insurgency victory. The conventional army in NV at that time was a much of former guerrillas (except senior leadership) that rolled over and became conventional soldiers (that transition happened long before the NV regulars rolled into S. Vietnam with Fighter jets and Soviet provided armor).

There are a lot of myths on Vietnam, both from the left (I would argue your view on this particular topic) and from the right. Ho was a not a popular figure outside of Berkley, CA. He was a ruthless murderer who considered himself an elite and wanted power. This is a debate that go back and forth for some time, but the S. Vietnamese fought hard to defend their nation because they believed in it. They all didn't see it as being as rotten as many in the left like to portray it. If you want to see a rotten government, one only needed to look north at the time, and then look at the fiasco in the south with the massive refugee problem after they were "liberated" by the north.

I'm not arguing that it was right for us to get involved in Vietnam, especially the way we went in, which was helping the French defend one of their colonies, but I also think we take the argument too far when it is argued that Ho had a successful Maoist revolution that conquerored the South. He defeated the French using Maoist tactics and conquerored the North that way. It was a different war that defeated the South.

The relevance to Afghanistan is limited, and I suspect the only direct tie to it is it is impossible to develop sound policies and strategies when we both intentionally and unintentionally distort the truth. If your comment is right about ISAF really believing this article, then that is frightening.

So, gentlemen, why not raise the stakes on what's really at issue here?

http://www.lineofdeparture.com/2011/06/17/general-knowledge/

McLaughlin is just doing what he was hired to do. They wanted a media expert on the COIN Advisory and Assistance Team, and training, experience and understanding of Insurgency was not a high criteria for the position. Essentially a PAO, don't think about what you are putting out, just put out what we tell you to in a professional manner. PSYOP/MISO think about what they put out.

This piece is a window into how ISAF actually thinks, that should be scary enough. I actually wish it was a PSYOP piece, but I am pretty certain it is sadly the reality as it is widely perceived at that HQ. For those on the outside looking in, this article itself is a far better metric than any of the stats listed in the article.

(Though as a side not to brother Bill Moore, to view the history of the Vietnam war through the equally rose colored lens of that HQ leads to equally flawed perspectives. We saw that as a state on state conflict, coupled with a VC insurgency in the southern state. The North simply saw the south as a theater of action for a continued revolution, one they waged with three categories of revolutionary forces: the regular army, the regional forces, and the militia and self-defense forces. Yes, we suppressed the militia forces in the southern theater, but that in no way hindered the regular forces from transitioning to phase III operations and ending the revolution in favor of the North. We must be honest with ourselves first if we are going to be able to share the truth with others. The US has yet to come to grips with the reality of our role in Vietnam. We believed our actions necessary to prevent Chinese influence from spreading into SEA and that belief was reasonable at the time, but it was wrong, the Vietnames had no more desire for Chinese influence over them than French or US. We read it wrong then, and then wrote it wrong in the history books.)

Bob

I didn't mean to say that the piece itself was PSYOP/MISO soup, but it was a facetious suggestion that the MISO TF develop a line of persuasion as part of a series to degrade the morale/support of the enemy. I should know better than not clarifying. My bad.

Dave, that is a great way to sum it up, and in my view it sums up why our strategic comms is ate up, and that is because our strategy is ate up. The focus on fixing our strategic comms should be redirected to fixing our strategy, we're trying to fix the wrong problem (and spending a lot of money doing it).

Anonymous, the only parallels between Saigon and Kabul is the U.S. Government's attempt to fool its own people with overly positive claims, which in fact distorts the truth, undermines their credibility and destroys the message. There were good things happening in Vietnam, and there are good things happening in Afghanistan, but they need to be put in a context that accurately describes the total picture.

Chris,

The Vietnam conflict is complicated to say the least, and of course we can see it much clearer in hindsight than the policy could see it then. That said there were experts who accurately predicted what would happen if we got involved and recommended we didn't (even if we did eventually defeat the VC). That is my concern about design. I have no doubt design would provide better insights that "should" inform decision makers, but if those insights are not politically popular they'll be discarded.

Also thanks for the link to Carl's article/post. It was very well done and great counter to "The Sun is Raising". I think Carl would agree that the Taliban can be defeated, but it would require a change in strategy and conditions. The strategy change is addressing the safehaven and support in Pakistan. If we don't do that the Taliban can't be defeated, at best we can prolong the stalemate. The condition change is that the Afghans are actually willing to fight the Taliban (and there is a lot that needs to happen for that to happen). As Carl points out indirectly, even if the Taliban is defeated, Afghanistan is still a failed State that survives on foreign aid, corruption, war and illegal drugs. I guess the question is if we defeat the Taliban, then what?

Since this paper was a strategic communications effort and not PSYOP/MISO (e.g., to influence the behavior of foreign target audiences) I thought I would offer these thoughts (or musings) I recently had on strategic communications and our quest to get our message out or control the narrative:

"Strategic Communications can only be effective when you have an effective _Strategy_ with balance and coherency among ends, ways, and means. If _THE Strategy_ is feasible, suitable, and acceptable and the ends, ways, and means can be simply and clearly articulated not only to those who have to execute, but also to Congress, coalition partners, and the people, then and only then can you conduct effective strategic communications.

If you do not have an effective _Strategy_ then you cannot conduct strategic communications because no matter how much lipstick you put on a pig, it will still be a pig.

And the irony is that if you have an effective _Strategy_, the need for strategic communications is diminished by the level of effectiveness of _THE Strategy_. But strategic communications becomes critical when assumptions and conditions change and _THE Strategy_ must be adjusted or adapted and thus explained."

How does "reinvigorated their initiative" translate into Pashtu? Get the PSYOP guys on the horn. Tell them how to bring these Taliban bastards down! I seriously thought I was going to learn another one of those cool Pashtun proverbs by the end of that sentence. The unintentional comedy of such a lackluster phrase being jammed into a spot reserved for a memorable ending is amusing. I can see the author now, hitting the backspace key repeatedly looking, searching, recalling his whirlwind tour for it. Found it!

The only value to come out of this article is the ire-filled but intelligent discourse generated by you gentlemen, and others, in response to it. If that was the point of it, then touché Mr. McLaughlin. Your team just acquired the talent of several folks free of charge. Now collect up the pro bono ruminations and do some analysis.

Enough said:

http://www.lineofdeparture.com/2011/06/15/hello-to-gollywood/

Bill M

On your Vietnam comments:

I read a book recently that pointed to the irony of Vietnam -- that today it resembles the nation state that we probably would have been quite happy with at the end of our intervention (that is, the "desired end state" is pretty much there). So who won (over the long haul)?

What this may teach us is that these sorts of interventions are like physicians' iatrogenic treatments -- all well-intended yet the patient is harmed more than if he were to stay out.

Military adventures to change foreign societies should always be highly suspect and we should examine attempts as "social engineering" in the Herbert Spencerian way.

The deeper question might be -- should we have ever intervened in Vietnam in the first place? An interesting book of late is:
Yuen F. Khong, Analogies at War: Korea, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965 (Princeton: Princeton University, 1992). The thesis is fascinating in that we arguably go to war based in uncritcal examination of metaphor (the "dominoes" of communism, etc.).

Peter, I think quite a few people tried to tell the SECDEF, CJCS and others that their plans were too expensive, unsustainable, and most importantly ineffective, yet the mindless banter (but beautifully wrapped) coming from CNAS and other such organizations continues to give decision makers enough cover not to challenge their brilliant strategy. The fact that our President asked for options from the Joint Staff and he didn't get any is telling. As you stated earlier they can randomly cherry pick little success stories endlessly to further justify the current course we're on. I see this group think at SOCOM and the COCOMs also. I would hate to see the return of the leftist protestors during the Vietnam War, but that doesn't mean we shouldn't have debate on the war. Being a patriot in America doesn't mean saying yes sir, three bags full. Leave that mindset for the communists.

A few disconnected observations on the topic:
-How is it that these people expect other people to believe and trust them when officers in their own organization can't?

-It amazed me how many plasma screens running propaganda videos and display cases full of propaganda materials are on every corner of the Pentagon. Inside. Preaching to the converted. To keep them converted. It's like mind control.

-Every commander needs to watch daily the Sopranos episode where Carm tells Tony, "Of course they laugh at your stupid jokes Tony. Your the boss." Or something like that. Then later on, he says something and everyone laughs and it goes slow motion and he looks around and you can tell he realizes how they're all falling all over themselves to laugh at his stupid joke. Everyone lies to you when you're the boss. Find people who will tell you when your ideas are stupid, your comms are tone deaf, and your plans aren't working.

It isn't totally worthless. I find it fascinating that this is what passes as STRATCOM from our HQs still. It amazes me that we really don't understand how we come across and are incapable of putting ourselves in our audience's shoes. Perhaps this is educational in the sense of it telling us where our efforts at "messaging" are. Of course, the assumption is that somewhere someone is learning from this...

As a study on what the folks on the inside may really be believing, I think it speaks volumes.

I toasted Small Wars Journal when they landed the comic stylings of Doctrine Man!!

Now that you've obviously are sharing copy with The Onion, I applaud twice as loudly.

Congrats!

Publius,

While some debate this, it seems evident to me that in fact we did defeat the VC (after LBJ left office). It also seems evident that the communist insurgency was far from being a popular nationalist movement. In fact thousands of Vietnamese hated it (tens of thousands fled N. Vietnam because they wanted no part of Ho's vision). Ho effectively employed terrorism to neutralize more popular nationalist movements that the people in large part did support (of course the French were anti-nationalist period, so this created a lot of problems that led us into the war, I often wonder what SE Asia would have been like if the French weren't so damn arrogant and oppressive).

Our media and universities still like pumping the illusion that the VC won (they didn't), and that the communist victory was the result of a popular movement, it wasn't. As Anthony Joes stated in his excellent book, "Victorious Insurgencies" it took the largest conventional invasion since N. Korea invaded S. Korea to actually defeat the government in S. Vietnam.

The communist victory (not an insurgent victory) was two fold, first they strategicaly
manipulated our media and academia who in turn created the myth that Ho was righteous and bound to win. A few million Vietnamese would disagree with that assessment. Second, after they isolated S. Vietnam from U.S. support, they launched a major ground invasion.

While I can't excuse many of terrible tactics, and it was true we were slow to learn, I think we tend to take away the wrong lessons from our involvement in Vietnam. It was not only winnable, we did win (much like the French in Algeria), but we managed to ultimately defeat ourselves with disinformation.

In no way am I defending the article above, but simply offering that overly rosey assessments and overly defeatist assessments both can gain momentum regardless of the reality on the ground based on group think. LBJ was wrong when he mentioned the light at the end of the tunnel (when he said it), and the author above, well nuff said on his article already. I think he killed his credibility with this article, although in the end he "may" very well be right.

Here-here, Bill. Agree. At some point the parent has to let the child go. Terribly condescending metaphor from the Afghan perspective, perhaps- but I think we do see ourselves as the parent...

Jason, you are quite the poet, I really enjoy your writing style. Good comments.

Peter, I remain suspect of the overall tone of the article (it definitely isn't balanced), but agree there have been several successes at the tactical level. These successes may very well accelerate when we start downsizing. I don't think we will see success or failure coming, but rather there will be a series of events (that we can't foresee) that will gather momentum for one side or the other. In other words the outcome remains uncertain at this point.

I personally think we can win this (reach an acceptable conclusion to our large involvement) quicker by disengaging our conventional forces sooner rather than later, and allowing the Afghans to define who should govern their country rather than blindly reinforcing Karzai. In the end Karzai may turn out to be the best person to run Afghanistan, but that isn't our decision, that is the Afghan people's decision. If he is the right guy, we're killing his legitimacy by leading all the combat operations and keeping his Army subordinate to ISAF. It will be hard to take a step back (not out), but that is what we need to do in my opinion.

We can keep a few strike forces in place (air and ground) to counter any significant Taliban operations (if they mass), and the Afghan Army calls for assistance, but we must put an Afghan face on this conflict and truly transtion from an Army of occupation to one of advisors and providing assistance to those who will ultimately win or lose this conflict the Afghan people. Afghans can engage Afghans more effectively than foreign troops.

If the U.S. was occupied and I joined the U.S. Army that was being formed and trained by the occupier due to promises of liberation, yet year after year I see that I'm not involved in the daily planning, the plans are kept secret from me (because they don't trust me), my people are getting killed and their deaths are referred to as collateral damage, and I can sense that the occupiers are condescending I may think about jumping ship and joining the other side who is also promising liberation.

My point is the Afghan Army has not yet been forced to raise to occassion, and a lot of people are benefiting from the status quo. A real downsizing would force needed change. All good military strategies assume some risk, this one is no different, but I recommend downsizing based on my current understanding.

Until the constitution/laws of GIRoA are rewritten and district and provincial officials are elected or appointed NOT by the central government, IDLG, or the president, but by the local people/tribes/shuras; until the successes have nothing to do with our intervention of CERP/AID money or international security forces; until we can stop the flow of millions of our dollars from Kabul into the pockets of Afghan elite and to their resorts in the UAE, please dont tell me about 130 meters of canal turning into 500 as a template for success in Afghanistan.

I'm going to write a puff piece and submit it. Now excuse me, I've got to go watch some old care bear cartoons for some citations.

The chorus is growing. The corner is being turned. I'm not there anymore, but from the number of reports I'm seeing from different places and people, it may be true. The problem is, these are tactical COIN successes at local levels. What our tacti-gy has never considered is how, once you've made these successes at the local level, you lash them all together and step back without it falling apart because there's nothing to hold the "nation" together. That would require something more than slogans such as COIN, democracy, sunrises, and rainbows. And his bio is almost longer than his article.

"Now, as a media production advisor in General Petraeus Counterinsurgency Advisory and Assistance Team, nine years after I thought we had won this war, I can again contribute to winning in Afghanistan."

Given all the superb papers published on SWJ this would have to be the most self serving.

It is as if the conflict in Afghanistan is now just peaking to a beautiful cinematic finish. I feel like I missed something.

Time and time again we are presented with commentary about Afghanistan from well meaning intellectuals who are darlings of the media who misrepresent what is happening on the ground. Most of the time it is well intentioned. A commentary for the chattering class. They string together beads of isolated experiences as reflective of the nation as a whole. Opinion is put forward fait acommpli.

While it is important to recognise everyone can make a contribution we should be determined in our mission to ensure a realistic, frank and direct description is put forward - regardless of how well intentioned

Jason

Sadly, the CAAT has devolved in many ways into being cheerleaders for, rather than advisors to, the senior leadership at ISAF.

While it may not matter that that the Media expert on the team has little to no expertise in insurgency or counter-insurgency, it does make it hard for him to produce fair and balanced products when he is unable to place the information he packages so well into any kind of realistic, balanced context.

The sun is indeed coming out in Afghanistan; and as the primary drivers of insurgency radiating outward from the Karzai government remain untouched, the Taliban once again come out along with it.

We target sypmtoms of insurgency and throw a mix of suppression and development at the Resistance aspect of the insurgency in Afghanistan (making it resist more while enriching Karzai's cronies in the patronage ponzi scheme created by the constitution); and do little to force resolution of the real, and critical issues driving the revolution between the current regime we helped create, and the old regime we helped expel.

Cheers!

Bob

I'll have a pint of whatever Brian's been drinking. Make that two.