Making "Non-Traditional" into "New Traditional" for the JTF Commander
by Martin J. Lindenmayer
Download the Full Article: Civil Information and Intelligence Fusion
Since the publishing of MG Mike Flynn's controversial admission that current intelligence programs, policies and doctrine did not meet the needs of Commander's fighting today's conflicts, there has been an attempt to point to ongoing efforts in Afghanistan and elsewhere while to defend the status quo. The problem has become that several innovative and agile senior leaders and front-line organizations have instituted piece-meal changes that address immediate issues without fully developing long term, programmatic changes to or development of, new doctrine. Just recently the ISR Task Force was directed by the SECDEF to refocus on developing non-material solutions to providing intelligence to ISAF commanders and to slow down the acquisition and deployment of the disparate ISR platforms, intelligence data collected and processes that have been "home grown" within the tactical forces to process, exploit, integrate, aggregate, fuse and report/disseminate the data; and this is only the usual intelligence gathered from standard intelligence disciplines (SIGINT, IMINT, MASINT, GEOINT, HUMINT, etc.) Meanwhile, the necessity and demand from commanders at all echelons for information on the civilian populations, organizations, governments, institutions, specifically socio-cultural data on the tribes and clans that our forces are encountering have grown exponentially. At the same time that the intelligence community has been expanding its intelligence databases, Civil Affairs and other information gathering organizations have been developing and expanding theirs. The all too predictable problem that this article and the CIFC are looking to address is that Commander's, while receiving "more" intelligence and information, still aren't consistently getting a single, layered view of the environment that integrates for both types of data. Service, Joint, military and civilian doctrine needs to evolve to solve this issue, before we end up replacing one set of problems with another. The CIFC is offered to both provide a view towards the goal and a potential path to get us there.
Download the Full Article: Civil Information and Intelligence Fusion
Martin Lindenmayer is a Senior Intelligence Officer with the Defense Intelligence Agency and a retired Navy Captain specializing in intelligence support to Special Operations. During his 32 years of government service his assignments have included USSOCOM, USEUCOM, USSOUTHCOM, NATO/IFOR, Operation Northern Watch and prior to his assignment at JIWC he served as Chief, Collection Operations Group and Collection Manager, USAFRICOM. Since 2001, Mr. Lindenmayer has had numerous deployments to Iraq, Afghanistan, several countries in Africa including CFTF-HOA, Philippines and other areas in support of OIF/OEF and has served in a variety of SOF and conventional organizations supporting technical collection operations against CT and COIN targets.
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Kind of a rock and a hard place situation. Do we have large staffs with disparate functions or smaller staffs where numerous people hold several billets. We now apparently require billets such as non-kinetic fires, IO, CIED, etc. But I have to wonder to what extent creating these additional billets has really helped in the conduct of operations. Further, these billets have now spawned a plethora of working groups..."well, I've got to get to the CIED WG now followed by the IO WG, so I'll see you in about 11 hours". Perhaps instead of spending pre-deployment time learning about why you need to hold an IO WG, CIED WG, non-kinetic and kinetic WG - perhaps we ought to train staff planning... Rather than having 34 different WGs - why not weekly problem framing / mission analysis sessions?
Curious how an article about creating "another" cultural intelligence center boils down to basic tenents of planning and C2.
"It seems to me the issue is beyond whether intel needs fixing or not but rather are we good critical and creative thinkers? And just as importantly - if we are what do we do with it? I forget where I heard it first, but the saying "It's easy to be hard, but hard to be smart" still resonates with me."
You may or may not, depending on your individual experience, be surprised to find that there are a lot of folks who are trained to attack problem sets in very linear ways and do that very well, but don't have the depth of knowledge to think critically enough. For example, is there any justifiable reason for having an officer dedicated to managing the Lines of Operation or focusing on non-kinetic ops, and not simply making the Operations Officers manage that aspect of operations like everything else? Why should non-kinetics cary the stigma that it does?
A unit might make the excuse that it assigns billet duties like that to ensure that the non-kinetic effort gets the attention it needs, but I think that often it is a lame cover-up for the fact that the guy who is "just right for the job" simply happens to do "odd things" like read articles from the Economist, Foreign Affairs, and the SWJ. He has that depth of knowledge because he either finds it interesting to be in the know about that sort of stuff, or he realizes how important it is to grasp the concept and issues. Meanwhile, the guy who should be the officer tasked with managing the non-kinetics, right alongside with the kinetics, could care less about the dynamics of food distribution networks, shortalls of education in the AO, or the impact of migrant labor on social/tribal networks, and prefers to spend more time reading the box scores of his favorite CONUS sports teams from the online edition of ESPN.
We tend to say, "man, that guy really gets it," about the former, but the latter, so long as he can process an operations order, manage the confirmation brief, and prioritize the fire support provided during a TIC, remains to be held to the expectation that he be conversant with all of the "soft" stuff. In the combat arms community, we need to get better at finding some parity between the two extremes, and a means of training both individuals to be able to handle the wide range of tasks, whether it be controlling fire support or conducting stability operations.
Long answer to your rhetorical question...yes, we have a dearth of critical thinking.
@Anon 5:26
I generally agree with what you're saying. My point is that perhaps more can be done to train commanders / opso's etc about intelligence so that requirements can be a bit more definable.
In terms of two groups of analysts coming to different conclusions - agree. But I'll caveat that it depends on the scope of the requirement - afterall, intel doesn't exist for its own sake :).
As for "bad" intel officers...enduring issue. In fact, post Desert Storm the Marine Corps adopted the Van Riper plan as a result of intelligence shortfalls. A Gazette article from that time frame echoed that exact sentiment - why are commanders so reluctant to fire underperforming S2s.
I do not believe you will get any traction saying that intel's shortcomings are because of 'ops'. Granted, intel officers are generally at a rank and an experience disadvantage to their ops counterpart but to say the problem is on the other end is disingenous. Good intel officers will teach their Commanders and S3s what they need to know about intel as well as learn from these officers. Most commanders know good intel when they see it (like porn) but cannot tell you exactly what they want. Given the amount of art (vs science) that makes up the intel cycle, this is not surprising. Me and a handful of analysts could have the exact same collection assets and/or information and produce something pretty different from you and your handful of analysts. Often, neither product will be wrong but I bet one will be better than the other and will have a much different result in that unit's planning process. This is not to say there are not bad commanders. HOwever, I have seen many more bad intel officers than I have seen bad commanders and for whatever reason bad intel officers seem to last longer than bad commanders do. I think this partly because commanders do not have clear expectations for intel and are hesitant to flush an officer that is not performing as well as the fact that intel is one of those jobs where guys can avoid responsibility and/or hide behind their subordinates and still get promoted because of ancillary performance.
I haven't ruled it out yet - I'm still waiting to hear back if the Gazette will publish the last piece I sent them. From what I can tell from the above comments I don't think I'm alone in with regard to the argument that the ops side could use more intel training.
It seems to me the issue is beyond whether intel needs fixing or not but rather are we good critical and creative thinkers? And just as importantly - if we are what do we do with it? I forget where I heard it first, but the saying "It's easy to be hard, but hard to be smart" still resonates with me.
RCS, you absolutely should consider writing an article. Sometimes the direct approach is required to get the spark that starts the flame, or at least frames the problem in a way that allows more than one stakeholder to take ownership.
I would offer that what you are talking about would resonate in the Gazette, any number of Army journals, and even the Small Wars Journal. Going with something like the SWJ might allow from interagency visibility on the issues you raise.
That whole "Fixing Intel" article screamed of 'CYA' and asskissing by Flynn, and showed he had absolutely no backbone to stand up to the "3" side of the house. The "fix" is on the operational side of the house, not intel's. I know on paper the 2 and 3 are supposed to be equal partners, but that doesn't hold up in the real-world. The 2 works for the 3 and his/her analysts focus on what he wants (not the other way around).
But the 3 is only the messenger, the Commander's are the real culprits. Some are ignorant and can be brought around, others can not. And since I have yet to see one single Army commander above the rank of O3 held accountable for failing to execute sound COIN strategy, I don't see this problem going away anytime soon. White-wash for the boss' it is...
There is some merit in the CIFC and SOIC concepts but both are redundant to what the S2/G2 should already be doing. In today's COIN fight, it is pretty standard for the population to be the COG. As the S2/G2, if you are not developing and assessing the commander's stated COG to drive effective operations - you should to be fired! Good S2/G2's have figured out how to fullfil these requirements. While many tactical intelligence officers have figured this out, their work is prone to get 'lost' over time because this information is most commonly reported in Bn, BCT, and DIV INTSUMs which are not serialized and queryable like other 'INT' reports are. Therefore, much of the hard earned knowledge gained from where the rubber meets the road is not absorbed by the operational level intel community which makes it very difficult for these analysts to provide the level of detail sought by their Commander and prompts the publishing of papers like..."Fixing Intel".
Intel can do better but we do not need to rename and reorganize to do this. It should start by Commanders holding intel accountable. As pointed out above, some would have to learn something about intel in order to do this.
I thought about writing an article for the Gazette called "Fixing Operations - an Intel Perspective" but then I thought that might be too direct and a more indirect approach would probably be better. Aside from intel folk - how much actual intel training do Marine Officers get outside TBS, IOC, EWS, and C&SC - very little I imagine. Instead, what we know about intel is that they laminate maps and do your security clearance. Further, what else you know about intel is what your previous experiences happened to be; if they were good - awesome, if they were not - standby S2 you're about to get steamrolled. I suppose this is an entirely different topic though.
RCS, you raise a great point, and in order to "Fix Intel", we might want to take a look at fixing operations and fixing command first. Those two layers need to define the requirements, and then focus the collection, otherwise all that remains are organization stumbling around and licking themselves. Chocolate mint anyone?
"But alas, most analysts would prefer to remain glued to their terminals, hitting the refresh key every 5 minutes." Perhaps at different levels and different places this is true - from a Division down to Battalion level - almost every analyst I've ever worked with wants to get out. You could really say the shortfall is their leadership is reluctant to do so because they "need" the analyst around to make another powerpoint slide for the CG's evening CUB. This was a point argued by Fixing Intel - a point I agree with.
However, the solution of sending them down to the lowest level or building a SOIC doesn't really work. There needs to be long term resident knowledge (arguably one of the points of Af-Pak Hands) but deployment rotations and billet assignments do not necessarily reflect this. Further, I think we have to justify why there are Red, Green, White and however many colors of PIRs. A PIR is a show stopper tied to a decision - ideally there are a few; what has happened is that we've essentially turned IR's into PIRs because we "have" to know about the populace. But what about the populace do we have to know that is so important as to justify making it a PIR?
I take issue with the premise in Fixing Intel that because most of the PIRs were enemy centric that therefore intel needed to be fixed. Requirements are staff and commander driven - having a focus on the enemy is certainly justified. I can certainly understand the desire to have population and government centric PIRs as well - but I think there's limitations to what a military force can actually do if those PIRs are tripped.
I suppose the other issue I take with Fixing Intel was the complaint that the J2 couldn't find data about the population to brief COMISAF. Well that's the J2's problem - the data existed and I can guarantee ground level units were collecting it but that folks in KAF, etc didn't bother to ask. I really don't see how creating additional organizations, cells, or analysis centers is going to help.
Having personally worked with SOIC analysts in Afghanistan, I would offer that the concept is far more attractive than the actual execution. True, a good SOIC analyst can extract great information from a variety of sources and package it in a way that comprehensively addresses intelligence requirements, to include green, white, and red perspectives. The caveat here is "good analyst". For the SOIC concept to have any merit, it requires an analyst/collector hybrid of sorts, someone with the social chutzpah and curiosity to elicit information from everyone from coalition partners to host nation individuals. At the same time, this person must possess the analytical rigor and depth to make sense of the complex picture described to him. Sadly, you often get one out of the two. The intelligence community is not configured to produce an individual with those skills in tandem.
Ad hoc solutions to systemic problems are a logical fallacy. Flynn's paper wasn't meant to change the intelligence architecture, IMHO. It was intended to change how commanders used their intelligence assets. I would be elated if more analysts ventured outside their caves to initiate mindless banter with the hundreds of coalition partners wandering around. They all know something, and heck, they might know something relevant to your requirement! But alas, most analysts would prefer to remain glued to their terminals, hitting the refresh key every 5 minutes.
From an outsiders point of view this model relies far too much on data collection and has high exectations that 'analyst reporters' will appear as if by magic or contract.
Strip the concept down to the company level and it will not work.
Trust is vital in intelligence work, it is said so often and few do anything about it. I'm sure Jon C. and many others here know who the best 'peg in a round hole' they have as an 'analyst reporter'. Build from the bottom and then the commanders requirements will be very clear.
Nor will all the 'INT' sources be available, let alone a reliable 'reach back'.
Analysts IMHO are rarely adventurous and often are inherently shy. They prefer the known world through their lens, not looking for new and unknown.
If a 'reporter' is needed I xpect the US military has them a plenty.
From an outsiders point of view this model relies far too much on data collection and has high exectations that 'analyst reporters' will appear as if by magic or contract.
Strip the concept down to the company level and it will not work.
Trust is vital in intelligence work, it is said so often and few do anything about it. I'm sure Jon C. and many others here know who the best 'peg in a round hole' they have as an 'analyst reporter'. Build from the bottom and then the commanders requirements will be very clear.
Nor will all the 'INT' sources be available, let alone a reliable 'reach back'.
Analysts IMHO are rarely adventurous and often are inherently shy. They prefer the known world through their lens, not looking for new and unknown.
If a 'reporter' is needed I xpect the US military has them a plenty.
[quote]I don't know so much that intelligence cannot support the commander's requirement but rather that commander's do not come up with suitable, feasible requirements in the first place.[/quote]
This shortfall most likely comes from the fact that it has become fashionable to focus an inordinate amount of time on learning how to say thank you in Pashto, along with other cultural niceties, as opposed to learning how to read the operating environment, and as opposed to devoting some of that wasted time to talking to the right people.
We have been led into this weakness by the cabal of cultural specialists and contractors who have a very keen interest in making sure we spend funds on the training they provide.
As a case in point, it would have been nice to have known that the substantial bridge project concept, proposed to span the Helmand in our district, was not supported by the PRT. Dozens of engineers and specialists had trumped their way to the district to look at the area, the civil affairs det OIC had put a lot of heart and soul into the notion of the paradigm shift that would happen in the local economy as a result, and the outgoing battalion made a point to brief me on the details of what the leadership thought was supposed to happen when I arrived in country. Two months went by, allowing for plenty of conversation to occur with our GIRoA partners over the prospects for the future, before word trickled down that the bridge was never going to be supported by the PRT. Imagine the embarrassment we had to wrestle with.
It became clear that the PRT's position had been established a considerable amount of time earlier, but the bare facts were never shared with the folks who needed the knowledge the most. These are the sort of lines of communication that we need to improve on, and we do that by spending less time worrying about enunciating "manana".
There a finite amount of time available to a commander before he gets in theater, and he can only focus on so much. The lens needs to be adjusted away from a cultural focus to an environmental one, of which the culture piece should be minimalized until other more important information streams are managed.
Perhaps I need to read the article again - but suffice to say it was not an easy read. That said, I did pick out a few things that peaked my interest:
First, "Among the findings of this project were that first, intelligence does not adequately support commanders requirements in Irregular Warfare (IW) operation..." Have you ever seen a commander's requirement? I don't know so much that intelligence cannot support the commander's requirement but rather that commander's do not come up with suitable, feasible requirements in the first place. I think this puts the cart before the horse - be specific in what is required and collection on that requirement becomes much simpler.
Second, I've probably read "Fixing Intel" about 5 or 6 times now for different schools and classes I've attended, suffice to say I like it less and less each time I read it. The concept of an Intel Analyst Interviewer is logical and I understand what the "Fixing Intel" author's orginal intent is based on his background but I think we need to take a step back and realize that good intelligence analyts don't grow on trees. That is - when, where and how are we going to cultivate the level and numbers of analyts necessary to do this work? Simply taking an intelligence analyst and sending him to his assignment at the SOIC does absolutely nothing to prepare him for what is required. How long does it take for an analyst to get more than a rudimentary understanding on an area such that they can actually ask good questions and develop good intelligence requirements? Further, is that what we really want to do - i.e. it's great if I have a HOA specialist, but now I'm in a ground war in Libya tell me what you can do for me? Your typical intel analyst is likely a jack of all trades and master at none...and I don't think that's a bad thing. We may be over-reaching when we discuss the need for more cultural intelligence capability. By saying that, we are arguing that future conflicts the US will find itself in will be primarily population centric.
Third, who is to say that our future conflicts will be on the scale of OIF / OEF? I understand the tie into to a HADR mission - but do we need to bring the whole kitchen sink when we go? I don't know that after our adventures in OIF / OEF are over that the money and the appetite will be there anymore. It just seems to me like there are a lot of assumptions we have to make to justify having something like the CIFC when the requirements may not justify it.
Just a thought...