by Jamsheed K. Choksy
Download the Full Article: A Sino-Persian Grab for the Indian Ocean?
China and Iran are constructing a series of strategically placed harbors -- their strings of salt water pearls -- partially for independent strategic reasons but equally to ensure maritime commerce in oil, gas, other licit resources, and illicit technologies between both nations can continue uninterrupted. Those ports provide facilities for the two countries' warships as well, extending their military power into a region hitherto dominated by the U.S., Britain, and India. To ensure the Indian Ocean's vital transportation lanes continue remaining accessible to all nations and transfer of prohibited items does not occur, the U.S and Britain need to remain actively engaged in building political, social, and economic relations with several nations in South Asia. Diminishment in access to Indian Ocean ports will have serious long-term consequences for American and British military and commercial operations in a troubled yet important region of the world.
Download the Full Article: A Sino-Persian Grab for the Indian Ocean?
Jamsheed K. Choksy is professor of Central Eurasian, Iranian, Indian, Islamic, and International studies, and former director of the Middle Eastern studies program at Indiana University, Bloomington. He is also a member of the National Council on the Humanities at the U.S. National Endowment for the Humanities. The views expressed are his own.
About the Author(s)
Comments
The Indians may well (and probably will, of course) perceive any potential threat from China differently than we Americans. And the same may happen for Europe and Russia, and Japan and China, and Israel and Iran, and so on....
The challenge is to keep focused on <em>American</em> interests given the tendency for constituencies in DC to confuse American interests with those of allies or individual DC bureaucracies and their respective "client" states. (Incidentally, I ought to be wary of this phenomenon because of my ethnic background. Human nature is human nature.)
I found the article a nice companion "thought" piece to Dr. Corn's article:
http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2011/06/the-atlantic-alliance-and-the/
Whether it is alarmist or not, it's a topic worth thinking about <em>carefully</em>. The following reference is interesting in light of the varied comments in this thread:
From the GWU National Security Archives (2004):
<em>Exactly what the United States government knew (or believed it knew) about Chinese nuclear sharing with Pakistan and when it knew it, remains highly secret. So far no intelligence reports on the issues have been declassified, although during the Clinton years Washington Times correspondent Bill Gertz published highly damaging communications intercepts on Chinese-Pakistan nuclear transactions in 1996. (Note 6) In light of the sensitivities involved--U.S. relations with two highly important partners, Pakistan and China--the relevant details may not be declassified for many years. Moreover, the presidential records that would shed light on how consecutive administrations tried to reconcile the larger goal of engagement with Beijing with specific concerns about nuclear proliferation issues remain secret. Within the limits imposed by the secrecy system, this briefing book sheds light on how U.S. government officials looked at the China-Pakistan nuclear relationship, their persistent efforts to discourage it, the repeated denials by Chinese diplomats, and the evolution of China's nuclear nonproliferation policy. Among the disclosures are:....</em>
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB114/index.htm
From my vantage point and from the information available to me as an everyday sort of person, I find it hard to assess the connections.
At any rate, even if the connections are relatively benign (trade or energy related), actions sometimes have unintended consequences. So I don't understand the almost immediate dismissal of the two articles by some?
One needn't be alarmist - or think in terms of "containment" alliances like NATO - to be intrigued and interested. A certain watchfulness may be in order.
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/jul/5/irans-nuclear-program-he… presents an interesting story, based on interviews with former US officials, that supports the thesis by Choksy and indicates the US should be very concerned about the China-Iran naval link. Better safe than sorry. The Indians have noticed but need support.
The author's sources check out fine.
There now is a link to an Iranian list of ports used for illicit activities http://www.irantracker.org/roundup/iran-news-round-july-5-2011. An English discussion can be found at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2011/07/revolution….
Iranian subs have now ventured into the Red Sea as well http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=13779621, http://www.rferl.org/content/iran_sends_subs_to_red_sea/24227074.html.
The author's academic research indicates he has excellent sources in Iran, Pakistan, India, and Sri Lanka and perhaps in China.
This author is being unnecessarily alarmist.
Iranian development of naval bases around Chahbahar are well behind schedule and fleet upgrades are nowhere near a priority.
Also, Chinese trade into Iran eclipses Iranian non-oil trade into China.
And, while China has signed agreements with Iran to develop the Pars oil fields, the onset of work is not on the horizon and an IRGC-associated firm has reportedly been picking up the slack.
I also urge caution when taking into account the author's sources. Some of the ones justifying the author's thesis are either unreliable or heavily biased.