Also see Andrew Exum's take at Abu Muqawama, Revising FM 3-24. Ex's primary criticism of FM 3-24 is the doctrine's weakness with respect to waging counterinsurgency as a third party.
Comments
Bill M,
Agree with most of your comments. But perceptions of occupation of Saudi Arabia where Mecca is located was one reason cited by al Qaeda for attacks of 9/11.
Looking at multiple other manuals to include <i>Stability Operations</i> and <i>Security Force Assistance</i> (FM 5-0 is <i>The Operations Process</i> BTW, not Design), full spectrum operations is fully entwined in all recent ones. You get the feeling that many want to reject the notion that the Army should perform stability operations to include the lines of effort that mirror COIN.
The problem is, someone has to perform those lines of effort to solidify gains made in Major Combat Operations. Clearly, neither Iraq nor Afghanistan were in any condition to walk away prematurely last time. Why would any new conflict be different? Civilians are too at risk and too reluctant to venture from safe areas to do what the military can do post-conflict.
Legally, occupation may not be a problem. In the eyes of Muslims, its another matter. Again, in all the historical analogies offered, you seldom hear reference to successful peacekeeping in the Balkans that reduced genocide of Muslims. The U.S. should do a better job of advertising how its and NATO efforts help Muslims...to include in Libya currently and in Egypt not long ago.
Believe many of Arab nations know we are the sole force precluding greater Iranian problems in the gulf. If Shariah law is a problem, then so much the greater reason to ensure that other non-Pashtun Afghan minorities remain represented...especially since they are the ones least likely to require Shariah law in the areas where they live.
We may think we can avoid long ground wars...but history in the Middle East would indicate that more of the same is likely. Terrorism will not go away nor will U.S./European reactions to it.
"Sir, what should we do now?"
Consider:
a. Abandoning the Universal Underlying Problem (UUP) concept (fundamental problem is that outlier states and societies are not like us and not sufficiently integrated into our system), which ultimately requires that we -- as part of all of our activities -- work to achieve the transformation and assimilation of all such outlier states and societies.
b. Adopt, instead, a much more realistic "I'm pretty much OK - your pretty much OK" philosophy, which allows us to work with and through whomever. Via excellent education and training, learn to do this (work with and through whomever) better.
Respect, engenders respect.
Rewrite all FM's etc., accordingly.
Terrorism? Work this (1) case-by-case and (2) with and through and via the good relationships you have established through the "I'm pretty much OK; your pretty much OK" concept.
Bottom Line:
a. We took on a whole lot more than we could -- or should -- possibly chew in thinking that we -- or should -- personally transform and incorporate outlier states and societies.
b. Get rid of all that stuff, learn better how to work with and through whomever, and let them transform themselves and join our system -- should they desire to do so (we can help on this end -- but it is not our project.)
Move Forward, those are a lot of strong opinions for a IMHO :-).
So what if we have to rewrite two manuals? The TTP manual should be constantly updated to begin with, so it isn't that big of a deal.
Stability operations would be one of the core efforts of occupation doctrine, and the stability doctrine isn't that bad, but since we're overly fixated on COIN we never discuss it.
Occupation doctrine isn't a negative, it is a step forward that compells us to assume full responsibility as an occupation force as directed by international law after we remove a government. Occupying is not colonizing, it is a transition state and one that may take some time if we're going to transition successfully.
We didn't occupy Kuwait, we liberated Kuwait and immediately the gov in exile assumed control again and we played a supporting role. We never came close to occupying Saudi? We put troops on the ground to help defend Saudi from Saddam. That is a big difference, we were not the government, nor did we peform any governmental functions.
I agree that the surge made a big difference in Iraq, others don't agree and cherry pick their facts to justify their arguments. As you said historians are human and prone to bias, and we can each select historians and other academics that support our individual arguments.
Yes Operation Phoenix and the kill/capture missions definitely had an impact, arguably a decisive one in Vietnam, and as you stated a country we pulled the rug out from under when we refused to provide the promised air support. I only hope the Taliban and their brothers conduct a mass attack after we downsize and that we DO provide air support and kill hundreds of them. Killing them all the way back to Pakistan. That will put an end to their fantasy of being able to use military force to achieve their objective.
Search and destroy didn't work well, but an ink spot strategy would have, meaning instead of marching around until you draw fire and responding with a we had to destroy the village to save it approach, you gradually occupy each village, identify (not search) the enemy, neutralize them, integrate the village with the government, enable it to be self sustaining, then expand the oil spot.
While our efforts in Afghanistan may stand in stark contrast to the Soviets in our view, the fact is many Afghans hate us with a passion (hate us enough to risk their lives fighting us, and now many of the security forces we trained hate us. It is nice to paint us as benevolent saviors, but the reality is too many of our trainers our arrogant little bastards that tend to alienate their students with their demeaning behavior. Have seen it again and again, and unfortunately it is usually someone else that pays the price). Regardless of your or may view, how the Afghan people see us is what is important.
Again I think your feel good assessment about our efforts in aiding Muslims are delusionary. Our efforts to support the Muslim people whether in the Philippines, Kosovo, Bosnia, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan etc. doesn't seem to do much to counter the continued spread of radical ideology. Somewhere we are failing to connect the dots. Perhaps it is due to so called collateral damage? Perhaps it is because our view of human rights is opposed to true Sharia law? Perhaps it is a number of other things, but to assume that the Muslim people know we're not the Soviets doesn't seem to matter that much in the ideology war.
Also denying the facts doesn't change them. When we ousted the governments in both Iraq and Afghanistan we became occupiers IAW international law, but due to our excessive political correctness we attempted to avoid that responsibility and quickly stood up shake and bake governments that have limited legitimacy with the people they govern. Read up on occupation law and you'll see it isn't a bad thing, it actually would have compelled us to do what we should have done right away instead of waiting for the situation to deteriorate.
Several things to consider IMHO:
* Stability Operations lines of effort are nearly identical to that of COIN. Rewrite FM 3-24 to abandon the "restoration" tenets of COIN means to do the same for Stability Ops. Post-conflict OEs do not spontaneously restore normalcy without help.
* FM 3-24.2 already exist spelling out <i>Tactics of COIN</i>. Mess with FM 3-24 too much and you have two manuals to rewrite.
* FM 3-0 spells out Stability Ops as a full spectrum operations co-equal with Offense, Defense, and Civil Support. A primary National Guard mission is stateside Civil Support during disasters which easily translates into "doing windows" elsewhere. Plus now the Capstone <i>Operations</i> manual would need to be rewritten if you reject Stability Ops. The absence of stability after both current wars should show us we cannot reject Stability Ops.
* Occupation of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait was a primary reason for 9/11. Open occupation of any Islamic country without making an effort to help is a recipe for disaster.
* Historians are smart. But they are only as good as their ability to interpret history. Historians differ in those interpretations. No matter how much they pick facts that fit their views, other facts say otherwise.
* 2+2=4. But historians/statesman/politicians can manipulate numbers to claim 2+2=5 or 3. It doesn't. Sometimes the simplest explanation is the correct one. As much as others try to manipulate facts to say that the Surge, COPs, and persistence were not primary factors in Iraq and the last few months of Afghanistan does not eliminate the simplest explanation. More troops means more control of more area.
* Operation Phoenix and the Kill/Capture events of the past year in Afghanistan both proved fruitful. Changing the subject to leader drinking habitsdoes not reject the end state that remained in place until 1975 when we refused to employ airpower. Let's hope that does not occur again in Afghanistan.
* A decade of search and destroy accomplished nothing but the deaths of 58,000 American sons and daughters. Enemy-centric COIN would be dumb in terrain even harsher and larger than Vietnam. Whatever you call it, what the Marines did in Sangin is a good model that shows you can help, kill the enemy, and protect the population simultaneously. The recent attack and destruction of 80 foreign fighters and Taliban showed that the ANA can fight. But 27 million Pashtuns live in Pakistan close to where Army forces are located. No need to turn more of them into Taliban.
* What do we do now? International heroes have persisted in two separate wars and will finish the job, training their host nation replacements. Your coalition efforts show that you are not occupiers. Other nations see that. Our nations collective willingness to invest time and treasure in the future of an Islamic country stands in stark contrast to the slaughter of innocents by the Soviets.
* It would be utterly idiotic to try to put heavy armor on mainland China. Russia cannot threaten the whole of Europe anymore on the ground. What is left is a U.S. Army with less heavy armor in task forces with lighter elements with Stryker and M-ATV/JLTV. If the Army rejects the non-combat and lethal aspects of wide area security, they eliminate any need for a large army. Then when the inevitable smaller-to-medium wars occur, more Soldier will deploy repeatedly as they have for the past decade.
Bill C,
Are you saying you believe there is a universal underlying problem, or do you (like me) think the idea of a universal underlying problem is actually part of the problem?
I can understand and support why we went to Afghanistan, but I don't understand how we allowed ourselves to be convinced by some foolish think tanks to stay there. As you said, it is one small, isoloated corner in the world that is consuming a lot of resources. On one hand it is a great location relative to Iran, China, India and Pakistan, on the other MikeF's now what question is constantly present.
I suspect that some policy makers believe if we can make it there we can make it anywhere, and furthermore they probably embrace the domino theory (much as they did for Iraq), meaning if we turn Afghanistan into a shinning city on the hill the surrounding countries will see the example and follow suit. I suspect "we" will never turn Afghanistan into a shinning city on the hill, but if we did that would actually threaten the status quo of the border countries (someone is benefiting from the status quo) and they'll take action to undermine any success in Afghanistan that may threaten them.
Taking your point back to the doctrine question, I still advocate we need an updated occupation doctrine, which is what we're actually doing. Occupation doctrine planning factors will have to how we form transitional governments, establish laws, financial institutions, security forces, and everything it takes to build a functional state (nation building), while at the same time fighting off the resistance. We can call this COIN if we like because it is politically correct, but being PC has never allowed anyone to solve problems, only avoid them.
If, as we do now, we continue to use as our starting point the "Universal Underlying Problem" (UUP) concept, to wit: -- in virtually every case, the difficulties can be traced to states and societies are not being organized, ordered and alligned as we are,
Then, by this extremely restrictive and limited view, we would seem to have painted ourselves into one very small, narrow and confining corner -- and cause ourselves to only be able to respond via one very small, narrow and single method, to wit: the transformation and incorporation of the subject state/society (get rid of their present political, economic and social orders and install our such orders in their place).
This would seem to be one _itch to do as a Third Party (with and through others who have little knowledge or experience re: what this is all about).
Likewise, because of this extremely limiting factor (the "Universal Underlying Problem" [UUP] concept noted above), COIN, would also seem to be restricted to approaches heavily laden with installation-building/nation-building/WOG requirements.
Thus, time to reconsider -- if not the UUP concept generally -- then at least the manner in which this has been used (by us) to tie our hands?
Addressing Jason's points:
Strongly concur that military power works, and we need to emphasize it much more than we currently do when our national leaders decide to commit military forces. The U.S. Army and Marines are not (or shouldn't be) there to guide the host nation government in political reform (which in most countries simply won't happen anyway under our watch and guidance). If it is doctrine, then it needs to be validated to the extent possible, and unlike other lines of effort we focus on now, killing insurgents actually has been proven to work, but it is important to also be precise and limit collateral damage for obvious reasons.
As for sorting out the interagency roles, I used to feel that way, but now I think we would be better off if we just put one person clearly in charge (may be a general, may be an Ambassador, or a Bremer like entity, but not Bremer) that directs the overall effort instead of allowing various agencies to conduct their own business based on their perceived roles (after sorting out the roles) leading to a largely disjointed effort that not only confuses us, but the host nation.
Matt E. addressed the importance of the underground, but we must also avoid the trap of trying to model every insurgency based on SF doctrine. Not every insurgency has an underground according to our doctrine, but none the less the point is still valid. Now I see the term shadow government tossed around carelessly in Afghanistan by our forces. Almost every insurgent platoon/squad level leader that is captured or killed is identified as a member of the shadow government. It doesn't work that way. The Taliban have a sosphisticated shadow government, they have fighters, they have an auxilliary, and they have State support from Pakistan. All of these must be addressed.
I saw Wilf's comment elsewhere that we don't need doctrine for COIN, just good small unit doctrine for conducting combat operations. While we would do much better if we focused more on fighting, it is critical we understand the nature of the insurgency we're countering, and the political nature of it, which differs significantly from conventional warfare.
Matt,
No problem in focusing on "the underground" (though there is no underground in situations like Tunisia or Eqypt where Phase I organization is by-passed through modern technology that allows a movement to act first, and organize later...)
But one must ask "why" is there an underground in the first place (beyond the obvious "becuase they want to change the government through illegal means.") What is it about this government that drives members of it's populace to take such bold, risky action? Why does the populace listen to, or act to support this underground in their efforts? (beyond the ideologies applied, or pay or coercion employed) Why does the populace share to some degree the underground's concerns about the government??
"Indirect Approaches" that by pass the insurgent to engage the populace and "Direct Approachs" that go straight at the insurgent both share the same common flaw: Both assume the government is the right, rather than merely legal, party. Both set out to preserve the status quo, even though it is the status quo that gave rise to the insurgency to begin with.
The fact is that most insurgencies can be resolved by the government by making a few critical changes in how they do business. This is not about "effectiveness" it is about how the people feel about how the government exercises policy and how it treats them. Most governments only make such changes as a matter of last resort, and by then it is typically too late. They seek first to enforce the rule of law, or to establish security, or to wage either direct or indirect approaches in an effort to stay the same.
On a larger scale, so too the US wages a Global war on terrorism /War against AQ with direct and indirect approaches against a wide range of OPIs (Other people's insurgencies) so that we too do not have to change how it is we engage the world. It doesn't work at either level. GWOT's primary battlefield for most effect should be in the halls of power in DC across the river from the Pentagon. Yet those halls are instead full of politicians and bureaucrats going about business as usual while wishing the military would hurry up and resolve this problem. Civilian governments need to understand that this is a problem that they own, they created, and only they can fix.
We aren't there yet, and debating the relative merits of Dirct or Indirect ways to engage the symptoms of the problem are not going to get us there.
Bob
A fundamental flaw in the COIN doctrine and the conventional military's COIN and Stabilization thinking is the complete disregard for the Underground as the core of the insurgency. The Underground's goals are the reason the insurgency exists and describe the Strategic Choice the revolution or resistance offers the people over the current government. It provides the strategic political ends, ways and means of the movement and give guidance and directions to the Guerrillas and the Auxiliary. Once you start talking about the Underground, its Center of Gravity, how it takes advantage of existing and evolving Illicit Power Structures like mafias and tribes, and how to attack it via Critical Vulnerabilities and restrict its access to Critical Resources, you now are on the correct path to understanding the problem set before you. Anything short of an in-depth discussion of the Underground, all you are a doing is counter-guerrilla and development under duress, which is turning out to be an impossible mission.
Aside from the above, the manner in which the manual is written in as important as the information itself. Maybe this time we won't let a general make it out to be his own instruction book for his next duty assignment. That will also go a long way toward applicability for somewhere other than Iraq in 2005.
500lbg:
Nice points and agree especially with the notion of the "indirect approach" which pop centric coin American style has always been drawn to. In some ways it resembles airmen and airpower theory developed in the 1930s with the idea that battles can be worked around by going indirectly around them but directly to the population. Now what happened to those populations in either of the two theories was hugely different, but the idea was the same.
gian
10. Questions also should be asked about our continued strategic focus on an indirect approach to achieving foreign policy goals. This requires a willing host nation regime that will "out govern" guerrillas or "terrorize" terrorists who might, or might not, be seeking to rule. Sections such as 1-147 are simplistic and often contradicted by real world experiences and should be rewritten.