PI COIN / FID Fight Over?

Nobody in the Philippines uses "PI" any more, it's considered a colonial relic. Usually abbreviated as "PH" or "PHL".

As usual, the "terror" theme is well overplayed here. There have been links to international terrorist organizations, but they have been neither as persistent nor as prevalent as we are typically led to believe.

I see no reason at all why the way out should be unclear. Just go, what could be clearer?

What we see in the southern Philippines is less a terror threat than a recurring insurgency. It flared in the 70s under a Libyan-influenced "Islamic Socialist" philosophy, fought the government to a stalemate, and was eventually neutralized by co-opting key leaders. The issues driving the insurgency were never addressed, and it subsequently re-emerged, straddling (in the area west of Zamboanga) a line between identification with AQ and JI and straight out banditry, with the latter generally prevailing. That resurgence has been largely (though not entirely) suppressed by US-supported military action, but if the causes of insurgency are not addressed, it will re-emerge.

This is not about the Philippines needing a better military, or needing "the technology to combat terrorism". It's about the Philippine government needing to finally find the <i>cojones</i> to address the pervasive culture of corruption, abuse, misgovernment, collusion with illegal activity and general profiteering that has dominated local governance and the local military/police establishment as long as anyone in the area can remember. That means rescinding the culture of official impunity and actually punishing people who break the law, even if they occupy positions of power. If the Philippine government can't bring its own people within the rule of law, how can it bring the insurgents within the rule of law?

This is not something the US can do, and by helping the Philippine government to maintain the military suppression of the insurgency we may actually be helping them to avoid the need to face up to and meet the responsibilities of governance. Military suppression of this insurgency can open a window for addressing the root causes, but if Government doesn't take advantage of that window and act, the insurgency will eventually resume. Development projects are not enough, and will have no more than a very temporary impact if the root problems are not addressed.

I'd like to see the US phase down involvement, perhaps maintaining regular training exercises but reducing and eventually eliminating the constant deployment. I'd also like the see the US publicly and bluntly state that while we are always willing to help our allies, the root causes of insurgency can only be addressed by the Philippine Government... and to give a blunt and direct assessment of what those causes are and what needs to be done to address them.

If the Philippine Government isn't willing to prosecute and punish civilian and military officials who indulge in corruption, abuse, and collusion with criminal activity, why should the US pour in support? I'd have no problem with a reduction in US activity combined with an open statement that unless real progress is made - meaning successful prosecutions - US participation and aid will be phased out. We can't and shouldn't tell them how to run their country, but we can and should choose what we're willing to subsidize.

Are we finished doing what the Philippines? The author focuses on JSOTF-P, which is mostly focused on CT, not COIN, but make no mistake there is obviously some collateral benefit to the GPH's COIN efforts despite our attempt to remain neutral.

From a CT perspective the threat has been significantly reduced, but the conditions that permitted the threat to evolve in the first place in my opinion have changed little. The Armed Forces of the Philippines (and their other security forces) can't transform into an organization capable of replacing what we bring to the table without their government adequately funding them, and to date that hasn't happened, so in theory we could continue to justify our holding steady action indefinitely, but should we is the question up for debate. In my opinion it doesn't really matter beyond the tactical level if we enable the AFP to kill the remaining HVIs. The strategic victory is convincing and enabling Manila to invest in and transform their armed forces, so they can effectively defend against a wide range of internal and external threats. This is an area where we really need to focus on SFA, but have limited authorities and funding to do so (and of course if the GPH doesn't put up their own $$$ to sustain what we agree to help them build, then we probably shouldn't invest more).

The Philippines is a long time ally and remains an important partner in achieving our mutual strategic objectives in the region, but it is beyond time to insist that the GPH start taking on greater responsibility for developing and sustaining their armed forces.

It is well to appreciate when assessing such situations that the primary radicalizing causation for insurgency radiates OUT from government. The Muslim people of the Southern Philippines are just one community so radicalized by their political situation. Other populaces elsewhere in the country are even more radicalized by, and more dangerous to, the government in Manila.

I doubt there is any "cure" for insurgency in the South that can be found or produced in the South. Such cures must be produced in Manila, and must be produced by the govrenment there and then institutionalized out among the people everywhere. Ten years of US engagement in the South has indeed created marked changes in how the government security forces think about and treat the populace there, and that is a positive thing, but such bottom up approaches would likely take generations to lead to substantive changes across the government and ruling elites as a whole.

As US interventions go our efforts in the Philippines have been a positive example of self-restraint and respect of host nation sovereignty (this time). As such they have been far less disruptive than our much more intrusive efforts elsewhere. But they cannot cure the issues of governance that radicalize the populaces in the south and we should not assume nor advertise that we could produce that effect.

I think we have done far more good than harm, and in the intervention business that is a win. It may well be time to accept the limitations of such engagements and leave well enough alone in terms of military-led operations there.

I do have to take exception to this quote:

"But the Department of Defense has indicated it will stay in the country indefinitely and has not put pressure on the Philippine military and government to take over security operations, he said."

This is not a direct quote but the reporter attributes this to my good friend and former recent colleague Zach Abuza. Zach knows better than to imply that the US military has the lead in security operations in any way. US SF are advising and assisting, but the Philippine military is in charge of all of its operations and the US is in no way leading operations. Since this is not a direct quote, I have to assess that the reporter has taken Zach's comments out of context or misinterpreted them.