Pentagon Should Think Twice Before It Cuts Ground Forces, Historians Warn by Sandra Erwin, National Defense. BLUF:
In the wake of every conflict since World War II, ground troops have been declared obsolete. And each time, the prognosticators have been wrong, says military historian John C. McManus.
After a decade of grinding wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the conventional wisdom is that America will have no tolerance for any more ground fights. Policy makers will take that as a cue that it is now time to shift defense dollars from infantry to high-tech weaponry that can be fired from aircraft or ships, far away from the battlefield.
That would be a huge mistake, says McManus, the author of “Grunts: Inside the American Infantry Combat Experience, World War II Through Iraq.” In the book, which examines in detail 10 major conflicts over six decades, he concludes that “foot soldiers,” regardless of technological advances in weaponry, end up carrying the day every time the United States goes to war.
Comments
If I have mis-characterized -- as mere goals and ambitions of the United States -- what are, in fact, our long-standing and continuing national security objectives (to wit: to bring forth, expand upon and/or better secure an international order whose chief characteristics are "openness" and "accessability" and, thereby, better provide for the wants, needs and desires of the American people).
(Past strategy -- in the form of containment of the former USSR and communism -- being considered as potential evidence of this fact [strategy designed and implemented to overcome the then-primary obstacles to the international order that we desire]).
How then might this consideration, if at all, change our discussion re: how our instruments of power should be configured -- and how they should be employed -- to overcome today's primary obstacles to our national security objectives (noted above)?
bumperplate, there are lots of ideas floating out there under the misleading rubrics of soft power and smart power. Despite their titles, there are still some ideas being floated under those discussions which you can find on SWJ and of course doing a search on Big Brother Google.
From a SOF perspective we have a saying that you can only move at the speed of trust, which is why persistant engagement and relationships are critical at various levels. The persistent engagement allows a deeper understanding of how that State's leaders, its military leaders, and its populace view the world, it helps us find out what their legitimate interests are, which is a starting point for discussions to find mutual interests and ways to pursue them (influence). That is just one example, but historically we tend to rely heavily on threat of force or attempt to buy influence with large sums of money which often simply reinforces corruption and keeping the wrong people in power, which in turn pushes the afflicted populace away from viewing the U.S. as a positive influence, creating an opportunity for anti-Americanism to fester and sometimes explode as it did in Iran in 1979.
There are a number of other approaches we can take also, some are sensitive and others belong to other organizations, but to be most effective the whole of government and ideally whole of nation need to be working in concert.
We're talking about power of ideas mostly, but those ideas can't be pushed onto to people by brute force effectively as the communists found out. As soon as the credible threat of force dissipated the people largely rejected communism (outside of Berkley, CA).
My ideas are still immature at this point, but others have been looking at this for some time.
Getting to your point, can we do it? I think we have been doing it in many places of world where there are small missions and limited military engagement. We aren't seen a threat, a bully, or any other negative way, but rather as a friend.
This isn't an approach we apply everywhere, but we can apply it in a great many places. Our friends also need to know we're going to stand by them if threatened (in situations where that exists), so a strong military is still critical (the big stick) to deter from bad actors from pursuing their goals by force. More to follow as I think this through, but keep in mind in some ways we had more influence during the Cold War not due to our military power, but due to our ideas about freedom. Voice of America was one of the most powerful weapons we had. It is time we put the war against Al Qaeda back into the shadows where it needs to be waged, and publically start refocusing on projected the values that made us great.
That's an excellent comment about influence v. control. It's never really occurred to me to look at things quite that way because I don't think our nation is capable of doing that. But that may be my ignorance talking.
It's one thing to talk about and I'm sure it's quite different to actually do it...how should the US go about accomplishing this in light of the likely restructuring of the force? Will we be in too much disarray, internally, to really affect and influence things as you mention?
I have to concur with all of this, particularly regarding the peacetime employment of SOF and the wartime employment of the RC.
The fact that we have considered much of the past 10 years of peace as "war," coupled with an earlier decision by the AC to make themselves non-deployable without the USAR (sold as a noble effort to ensure the total force joins in every combat, but in reality a selfish effort to keep the sexy jobs in the AC and shift the nug work to the RC, only spoiled by the huge political clout of the Guard that allowed them to retain combat missions and units over fierce AC resistance), has led to a tremendous abuse of the reserve component to support our recent bloated peacetime combat adventures. I spent the first 8 years of my career in the Regular Army, the second 10 in the Guard and Reserves; and the final 8 mobilized on OEF orders. I essentially came back on active duty one year at a time. Many of my friends were yanked in and out of their primary lives in a way that AC senior leadership simply cannot appreciate. This was not because the regular force was too small; it was because the design of the operations was too large.
On the SOF side we now struggle to validate within a threat-centric DoD community the vital peacetime role of SOF to prevent and mitigate nonstate actor and state actor violence through smart, dedicated, focused, persistent presence. SFA is a joke, as it seeks as its primary focus to develop some skill in some foreign force. SOF employment uses such training as a vehicle to build relationships and understanding as the primary focus. This is a subtlety that cannot be overstated and that is not fully appreciated in execution or effect.
We are out of balance. Our force is out of balance; our mission is out of balance; and our priorities are out of balance. We are attempting to conform the world to a situation that we want it to be, rather than embracing the world as it actually is. The weight of that effort is crushing us, much as it has every other major world power before us. We are not unique; we will not somehow prevail where all others have fallen short. Unless, unlike all those others, we resist this urge to maintain an unmaintainable status quo. Influence is far superior to control. It is time for the US to shift from a "Control" focus and force to an "Influence" focus and force. Tragically, I see no inclination at DoD to make this shift.
Bill C.,
What we should consider first and foremost is our national security objectives, and then develop a rational and sustainable strategy (ways, ends, and means) to pursue those objectives. The political objectives that you identified in my opinion are not rational objectives to be pursued through the offense, but rather long term ends that we pursue through so called soft power over decades. We can't afford a military that is capable of occupying and transforming every nation that doesn't conform with international accepted norms.
At the risk of setting some people's hair on fire, I suggest that SOF can be employed as both military and non-military means. Their contribution to the joint military effort is fairly well known and constantly evolves, but we should seriously consider a new Title in addition to Title 10, 50 and 22 that gives SOF unique authorities to act in the realm of competition (prior to conflict and war) as part of a larger interagency effort to prevent and deter future conflict and "maybe" help pull non-integrated nations into the modern world order. We do that now of course, but with two hands tied behind our back.
This is a conceptual shift for most GPF theorists who develop plans focused largely on enemy centers of gravity or their decisivie points. In a non-military use of SOF, we could use them for persistent engagement to develop relations and a useful understanding of the environment and recommend ways to shape it to sustain or improve the peace. Very small elements as part of an interagency team providing limited assistance is cost effective over time and if none well won't create anti-American fatigue. This method can also be applied where applicable against state and non-state adversaries, but not from the perspective of "attacking" decisive points, but using the Sun Tzu approach of attacking their strategy by helping the host nation (or in some cases select population groups) create conditions that make the adversary's strategy ineffective.
The challenge of maximizes the utility of SOF (and I mean the entire spectrum, but mostly focused on what we call theater SOF, SF, CA, MISO, and so forth) is we try too hard to conform to conventional joint doctrine.
The realm of the possible is much greater than what we're currently doing, and we can accomplish a lot over time at a relatively modest price. Of course there will always be situations that well beyond the capability of SOF and GPF will ride in on their white horse and save the day, but I suggest we don't develop a force structure for GPF for integrating the non-integrated countries into the fold by force (we can't afford it), but at the same time we need to sustain enough force structure to support large scale stability operations, which means we really can't afford to cut GPF structure by much. I'm not a big believer in reserves and NG stepping up to the plate to support these operations. They can't sustain the appropriate skill level, and we destroyed a lot of reserve and NG lives by using them to repeatedly support the "long war." Employers can tolerate the loss of employee for limited emergencies, but we relied on this force for far more than that.
Should we consider that a logical and proper use of power (political, military, economic and cultural) -- by the United States or by another country -- in periods of little relative threat and significant relative advantage, is not so much for defensive but rather for offensive purposes?
(Thus, a nation's "instruments of power," if properly utilized in such circumstances, could/should be employed to take advantage of -- rather than squander -- the opportunities presented by the present advantageous moment.)
If THE GOALS AND AMBITIONS OF THE UNITED STATES are to bring forth, expand upon and/or better secure an international order whose chief characteristics are "openness" and "accessability," and, in this manner, better provide for the wants, needs and desires of the American people,
Then what should our "instruments of power" look like (for example: our military ground forces) -- and how should they be employed -- to take advantage of this moment of advantage and better fulfill the goals and ambitions of the United States outlined in the paragraph immediately above?
1) Bigger but not necessarily smarter dogs than us...exactly. That is the biggest reason I advocate for a large standing ground force component.
2) Grand strategy, containment, and so forth...I believe you've hit on the heart of this matter. While I do believe the other issues such as jobs and the current economic mess will contribute to strategic changes, end strength for a peace time force will relate to containment: do we adopt such an outlook, if so to what extent, what do we contain, what and where are the decision points for force application etc etc etc. How well that turns out for us depends on #1 and those bigger dogs.
Bigger dogs than us are hammering on this in DC right now. I wish I could say that smarter dogs than us were working that, but smart gets checked at the door more often than not and pure dollars and advocacy for pet issues and services tends to dominate the day.
I will add that technology is actually largely moot in my argument, as even in day of sailing and steam ships this position was true. Tech has not altered that much.
As to guys like Amadenajad? Iran, like AQ, or North Korea, or Venezuala, or (insert name of small country or VEO or NSA here) may threaten the US, and may well attack the US, but none of these are really THREATs to the US. So long as we cling to a Containment mindset and apply Intel-driven analysis to our national security we will continue to latch onto such minor A-hats and prop them up as larger than life "threats" to build our forces against. We need to evolve to a new construct of Grand Strategy that is more focused on promoting our interests than on finding some obscure problem to defend them against.
Also, while many are quick to point out how "unprepared" the US was for WWI and WWII; I would be equally quick to point out that the US mainland was never significantly attacked in either of those devastating wars, that we were arguably the deciding factor in who won each of those wars, and because we had no large army standing around, we missed out on about 7 combined years of bloody conflcit on the front ends of both and thereby saved millions of young American soldiers from death and mutilation.
We are blessed with key terrain, I say make the best of it.
Cheers!
Bob
First...again I apologize. I found your comments really stimulating but I was really, severely crunched for time so I know I had some typos and probably misread some statements.
Looking at your reply: I understand your geostrategic reality comment. My inference was made because it seemed you were heading down that road. Given your endorsement of Navy/Air Force + SOF, it doesn't seem I could be far from the mark, could I? USN/USAF are big technology employers, add the SOF and there you go.
I understand your point about the post-Cold War and optempo generated by constant demands. My counterpoint to that is simply this: when has that mattered? When has that stopped our policy makers from sending us to places? Why not be prepared for that, if that's going to be the case.
As for large scale endeavors being counterproductive...could be true. Again, what's our choice in that regard? If we'd have gone into Rwanda with a large scale operation to stop the genocide, would that have been counterproductive? We have done a lot of stupid things in Iraq for instance. We've killed a lot of civilians, broken up families, and brought havoc to that nation. We've also rid the Iraqi people of a man they feared on a daily basis. Given a man of Ahmadinjed's mental disposition, I'm not sure our activities in Iraq or Afghanistan matter. Same goes when dealing with people like Putin and Chavez and nations like China. So, from a pragmatic and strategic standpoint, I don't see a reason for reducing the size of a standing Army based on the notion that it may reduce our likelihood of taking on these endeavors. I think we'll be told to eat that sh** sandwich whether we like it or not, regardless of the size of our force.
Your query about Iraq and Afg is a loaded one, for sure. We sent in SOF to Afg. Did that fix anything? Bin Laden escaped, AQ survived, the Taliban retreated. The Taliban is back, and after ten years and a large commitment of conventional and SOF, bin Laden is dead, AQ is either morphed into splinter groups or is about to die away. Has the situation changed that much with respect to protecting ourselves from the threat of terrorist action, the employment of dirty bombs, etc? I don't know if I can answer that question because I feel there's no distinction. What if we left Afg to the USN/USAF and SOF? Would it be in better shape than it is right now? I would answer no based on what happened when boots first hit the ground there. But, this issue takes us into the realm of strategy and not so much about force tailoring and force sizing.
Regarding Iraq, SOF is everywhere in Iraq and many Iraqis are substantially more scared of SOF than conventional. Conventional rides around, gives out backpacks, and when the fight kicks off they start shooting. SOF flies in at 0300, raids, grabs someone, shoots someone, and off they go. That's the perception of many in Iraq. That's similar to how Saddam ran his show. Not trying to besmirch SOF, just stating what I observed and heard from Iraqis. If we delegated OIF and the main premise for going (getting WMD), to SOF, would things be different? Eventually SOF would be on the ground, and eventually they'd request a BCT or Div to provide security, QRF, and so forth. That requires an invasion and the seizing of land. SOF doesn't do that. So, without the conventional side i don't think OIF happens at all. My point with this is that your question sounds good but really doesn't get at the substance of the discussion. It's like saying, 'do we put chairs and a desk in there because it's an office, or is it an office because we put chairs and a desk inside?'.
I got your point on being American - this is in no way a conventional v. SOF deal for me. My inference was about your view of the way forward and wasn't trying to hint that you had any bias. I do see your point about history, but again, when has that stopped us from deploying and committing forces? We can talk location, but it's less of a factor. The earth hasn't changed size. But our ability to traverse it has. When my father grew up, a 100 mile trip was significant. Today, a 1000 mile trip is on the same scale for most of us.
I am of the opinion that a rather large standing Army, and USMC, even during peace time, must accompany a robust Navy. I feel that it's the Air Force we can ramp up in time of war, primarily on the personnel side. The equipment needs to be there but the people don't necessarily have to accompany it in full force. It's much different calling up someone to refuel planes in Germany for a war in Iraq, than to call up someone to ride in a convoy through Baghdad. If you see it differently, so be it, I can understand that.
Wow. Where do you get the inference that I think we can get by on SOF and tech? My argument is that based upon the geostrategic reality of the US, we, much like Great Britain historically, do not demand a large standing active peacetime army to secure our vital national interests. The Navy, Marines and Air force, suplemented in key ways by SOF and Tech are the keys to our peacetime security.
Location, Location, Location.
We began diving into all kinds of interventions following the Cold War as we began attempting to sustain the Status Quo of a world that was already obsolete with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Those interventions created an artifical optempo that has been used to justify much of the excessively large force that we had built for the Cold War mission of fighting on the European continent. Eruopean continental nations demand large armies to secure their national survival due to their geostrategic realities. Again, location is the key factor.
We will soon, I suspect, realize that endless large scale adventures to attempt to force others to bend to our will where few vital national interests exist is far more conterproductive than helpful. Particularly when those interventions are executed by a warfighting force such as the army.
Query: Were Iraq and Afghanistan large operations that demanded an Army, or were they operations that grew large because we deployed an Army to execute them???
No, my argument is purely geostrategic and historical. Yes, I was Army, and yes, I was SOF. I try not to let those facts blind me from clear thinking, because yes I am American, and that trumps both of those other two.
Robert C. Jones makes good points about the cost of a large standing Army, etc. But, I believe he may be looking at the world through some SOF/Techno-Centric glasses.
I'm inferring from his comments that he believes we can "make do" with SOF, technology, ISR, drones, and so forth and that a standing Army can be built to need, as the need arises. He wrote a lot, I'm encapsulating, so I apologize to Mr. Jones if it's not 100% accurate.
My response is as follows:
1) Let's talk jobs...unemployment over 9% with no hope of coming down. Cut the force, that's more unemployment. Seems paltry compared to the nation's defense. However, it has far reaching effects. This unemployment is going to drive policy decisions, and our welfare, unemployment benefits, entitlements and so forth are going to pick up the tab for these people that are unemployed. Take health care for instance: kick out 1LT Jones from the Army because we magically have enough CPTs due to a RIF and he needs health care, and if he can't afford it and still goes to the hospital. The hospital eats that bill, which will eventually be passed on to the tax payers - whether it's ObamaCare or something else, there will be "bailouts" "buyouts" and "takeovers" of industry/business by the govt if our current economic situation does not increase. 1LT Jones can be a productive member of the military and get health care and other services that are already budgeted for we can throw him out and add his bils to the debt meter. As we do this to 1LT Jones, then to SPC Smith, and so one, pretty soon we don't need as many child care centers, gyms, etc on the installations, so those people get fired - more to the unemployment line.
2) Let's talk economics: military is pared down, money to BAE and other R&D entities goes away. That means less fancy gadgets for SOF to play with, less technology to enhance our platforms, etc etc etc. Companies will not develop as much if funds are cut. This means capability takes a hit.
3) Let's talk value: the FCS program was a huge bust. It wasn't because of the technology, it was because of waste and mismanagement. How many billions were spent on that program, and just about all of it was for no benefit at all. How many people could be placed in uniform, or sustained in uniform for that cost? The common chasis for the FCS version of the tank, IFV, and many other platforms wouldn't even be used in a place like Afghanistan - but that money could certainly be used to put more boots on the ground, enhance training, and so forth. I recently read an AAR focused on tactics from Afghanistan. Many units are having to call in Predator or another similar platform, long range artillery, and CAS/CCA in order to accomplish kills on two - yes, TWO individuals. The cost of the fuel, ordnance, and maintenance for those additional platforms could pay for an entire platoon in theater for 60 days if not longer, yet we question the value of ground forces. Once you cut the people from the force, the need for X number of Predators or whatever will go down and that part of the budget will go away as well. So, when we need to bump that number up, not only will we need to bring in more boots, but we'll have to wait on more "Predators" to be built, as well as the people to operate them, facilities to house them etc. It is far more economical to bolster the Predator inventory than the people inventory should we enter a true war in the future.
4) Let's talk war: yes I agree the nation is not at war, and that is the single biggest reason that our military is about to get crushed. People don't see it, feel it, and it doesn't get close to many in our country. 9/11 is a distant memory now. We are about to bring in austerity, reduce the force, and go zero-defects with fire and brimstone. We will throw out the propaganda that we'll scrutinize promotions and only the best will get command etc, but that's all BS and we all know it. We are about to begin developing a new brand of toxic leader and command will be based on how pretty an officer or NCO is, not how effective they are. Combine that to budget cuts that will affect troop strength, R&D, equipment readiness, and training and you have a recipe for disaster - and our oceans are not the robust barrier they used to be and when your economy is not just tied to sea lanes but also to internet cables, it changes the situation. At the least we can now count on, with certainty, on our SOF community having some catastrophes, our conventional forces arriving to an area wholly unprepared, etc. We'll ask why, but we already know the reasons.
We've been doing this stuff for 250 years now. I guess it's human nature. But at some point our luck will run out and we won't be able to build, equip, and train a force fast enough, or respond well enough and it's going to get ugly.
We need to fix our personnel system and fix the waste problem in our budget first. Then we should start looking at personnel numbers. Why we jump to personnel costs is beyond me. We know we're getting ripped off on everything we buy, why not start there?
Does this article, our discussion and the JOE fail to adequately address an important aspect of what we intend to use our ground forces for -- today and in the future?
This monster missing element (the proverbial 800 pound gorilla in the joint operating environment room?) is: The goals and ambitions of the United States.
This article, written by COL (ret.) Bacevich in 1998 may help address this critically important element; that seems to be continually FTR or AWOL from many forums.
http://www.leaderu.com/ftissues/ft9803/articles/bacevich.html
An excerpt:
"In short, the new narrative would both recognize and ratify the grand enterprise in which the United States has engaged, on and off, for a century. That enterprise spans administrations, transcends party and ideology and persists -- as has become apparent since the demise of the Soviet Union -- independent of any immediately threat to American security. The historian John Lewis Gaddis has characterized the result as "empire by invitation." If so, the invitation is one to which those presiding over United States foreign policy have long since given collective assent. As a direct result of this enterprise, the United States has ascended to the status of global hegemon, with far-flung interests and responsibilities and without a challenger worthy of name. The implicit, if officially unacknowledged, grand strategy of the United States today is to consolidate and preserve its world supremecy, with the clear understanding that doing so will require the future extension of American influence."
If this (or some other) articulation of United States' goals and ambitions is accurate, should we work to better include -- and factor in -- this 800 pound gorilla (the goals and ambitions of the United States) in such things as the JOE; and in other forums addressing what size and shape our forces/ground forces should be?
You are basing your assumptions on hypothetical scenarios which is fair enough, but you are also assuming that response to either of these events will require a large ground force, which is not necessarily true. If another State Nukes us we can conduct strategic strikes against them (nuclear or non-nuclear), and in the unlikely event we get into a major war with China do we need a large ground force? Why can't we punish them with Naval and Air power until they agree to stop pursuing objectives through military action? I really don't think we want to march to Bejing like we marched to Berlin and then occupy the country. Perhaps you are right, but assuming right off the cuff we need a large land force for these scenarios seems as though you simply have dismissed other options.
As for the $450 billion the President has proposed for the jobs bill, if it actually went to rebuilding our infrastructure I think we would get a better return on our investment than overly militarizing our nation, but we each have our opinions.
OK folks. I’m going to go way out on a limb here and take a contrarian view. We don’t need to cut our end-strength. We need to increase it. And here are a few (very simplified) reasons why I think so.
First off, we need to plan for the worst. What is the worst case for our nation militarily? Two things keep me up at night: The threat of a major theater war with another major power such as China or a surprise nuclear attack against the homeland. While neither event has a high probability of occurring, the results of either would be catastrophic for our nation. In any case, we will need lots of uniformed bodies to respond; which we just don’t have enough of right now.
Second, growing the military has a stimulus effect on the economy. Adding end strength requires equipment which must be built here in the states. It also generates demands for supplies and services.
Third, increasing end-strength puts folks to work, both directly and indirectly. You have the direct hiring of additional folks in uniform plus the jobs that are created in the factories providing the equipment and supplies for the troops. Add on top of that the jobs that are generated in the local economies by increases in troop levels at bases and you result in a net overall increase in jobs.
Now granted, all of this is enormously expensive. However when you consider how much we spend each year to provide entitlements, I believe the money would be better spent in putting people to work providing for our common defense. Intuitively, more people working equals less collecting entitlements and more contributing to the tax base.
Just think of how many Brigades, ships or aircraft we could buy with the $450 billion the President recently proposed in his jobs bill? Let’s put Americans to work defending our nation and our way of life.
SWJED, relax, keep your thickskin on, no slights intended. I have read the JOE, and in fact, in my duties as the Director of Strategic Studies at USSOCOM, where we developed a Strategic Appreciation for that command, we coordinated very closely with JFCOM as we developed our separate, but coordinated products.
But that misses the point. We are not a nation at war. By applying that status to our current situation it has allowed DoD to in effect hold the nation hostage to ever growing defense budgets to counter a relatively minor problem at a time when our nation is facing its greatest financial challenges in generations. Smarter COAs for dealing with AQ that do not launch the US like a raging elephant stomping on a little mouse across the nations and populaces of the planet are far more acceptable, suitable and feasible than those pursued over the past decade are easily designed and adopted.
Combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan (beyond the initial strategic raid to punish AQ for the 9/11 attacks over 10 years ago) were and are both optional operations. In fact, 10 years ago there was few if any Afghan or Pakistani Muslims who had any incentive whatsoever to work with AQ to attack the US or US national interests at home or abroad. Would anyone dare to claim that the same is true today after 10 years of US military operations in, and political manipulations of, both those two countries? AQ merely leverages populaces with local grievances and the belief that the US enables the conditions that cause those grievances. By over-militarizing responses against the symptoms of the much larger political/foreign policy problem at the base (the same base that the popular movements of Arab Spring arise from) we have in many ways INCREASED the "threat" to the US even as we work to defeat those individuals who oppose our presence in their homelands.
Yes we need a credible peacetime deterrent force. States are deterred by such a force, non-state actors with no infrastructure to be held at risk far less so. The active Army is a relatively small part of deterrence compared to what the Navy, Air force, USMC and our robust reserve component bring to the table. Each service has a unique role, and the Army's role is indeed warfighting. We must not allow the anomaly of the Cold War, where we essentially assumed the geo-strategic reality of Western Europe (which absolutely demands a relatively large investment in ground forces to deter aggressive neighbors). In fact, it is these same Western European states that should be making the current investment in large ground forces, which are critical to their national survival, allowing the US to focus on the type of forces critical to ours. Where are our allies in this? The US peacetime army is historically way too large, while Europe's peacetime armies are I suspect (don't have hard data at hand) historically far too small. We enable our allies to take "peace benefit" that rightfully belongs to the American taxpayers.
No one, least of all me, is suggesting that we make radical, illogical cuts to our defense in any sector. But do not expect me to stand by silently either while others press for maintaining radical, illogical capabilities at a cost that hurts our nation far more than the capabilities benefit our nation.
Now is the time for selfless service. Equal is not fair, and if Service components push for "equal" cuts across all services and SOF we will not be "fair" to the American people, and we will not be providing them the best, most appropriate force for the world we live in today, and that is developing into the future as well.
The JOE was probably the best document JFCOM ever produced. I hope another agency picks up the ball in producing future ones every four or so years to help with the QDR.
I'm for reducing the ground forces a very modest amount, but believe we need a fairly large and capable ground force to wage peace. Waging peace is at least partly waged by having a credible deterrent to discourage actors from pursuing their aims through military force. Waging peace also involves support peace operations, which is largely boots on the ground to maintain the terms of agreement between the former (or currrent) warring parties. This definitely needs to be thought through carefully.
Robert, please give me some credit in talking to the people on my street and beyond. None of those streets are occupied by those who are forward looking enough to understand a threat unless it hits home like, say, 9/11. Exaggeration is most often a function of ignorance or overreaction to a defining event, not prudent preparation. Am I saying a ground force level on par with WW II or Vietnam, or now? Most certainly not, but let's do the cuts wisely based on a National Security Strategy, a National Defense Strategy, and a National and Defense Threat Assessment before we willy-nilly cut based on domestic economic politics. Oh wait, we do have a NSS and a NDS, go figure what they provide in guidance on the way ahead. The best threat - future operating environment assessment is JFCOM's JOE, which has largely been ignored because that product "wasn't in their lane" - too bad, they stepped up when no one else would.
Look out your window. Talk to the people on the street. Do you see a nation at war? A nation with troops in combat, certainly, but not a nation at war. We have exaggerated the threat to our nation, and we have exaggerated our responses to that threat as well.
We have always been a nation in conflict, and it has indeed been persistent. But we have rarely been a nation at war. There will always be those who "threaten" us, and even those who sting us. But there are few true "threats" to the US that are not well deterred by a DoD with a relatively small army.
"Threat" and "War" are much abused terms in our current lexicon. We do ourselves disservice and elevate small antagonists to lofty heights in the process.
What peace are we going to wage? From what I've read the most likely global scenario is one of persistent conflict and, it can be argued, a conflict that economics play a fairly significant role. I'm not diminishing air and sea LOC freedom of action, rather that our adversaries always have and always will devise a "work around". There are many options besides a deep cut in ground forces, unfortunately many of those options are tied to high ticket platforms that are rooted in many Congressional districts. Besides, it is always easier to "sell" a "war-figthing" technology than the esoteric value of a strong ground force. Everyone likes to believe in the tech silver bullet, ha.
Of course the Army carries the load in war. We just don't need a large one in peace. America's wars are historically fought by militia and draftees, and our excellent geo-strategic situation makes that as true into the foreseeable future as it has been into the past. The relevant history here is the history of Great Britain and the US, both maritime nations with no land threat. Like Great Britain we will need a modest Army to work our foreign interests and to provide a core to mobilize a robust National Guard around. But we don't need a large standing Army, and haven't since the collapse of the Soviets.
I suspect decisions regarding Iraq and Afghanistan would have been much more "subtle" had we not been possessed of an excessively large standing Army that was all ramped up and ready to go. Add the first Gulf War to that list as well.
To carry an unnecessarily large Army creates a drag on our economy that is every bit as dangerous to our national security as any threat that might rise to challenge us in the time necessary to mobilize an effective force.
Now is the time for selfless service within the Services. To fight for the right force rather than some perceived right to maintain their own Service force. I love the Army, but we don't need much of one to wage the peace.