The latest “Marine Corps” issue of Proceedings has another provocative article from Lt Col Noel Williams, USMC. The Next Wave: Assault Operations for a New Era (subscribers only) advises the Marine Corps and Navy to develop unmanned breacher vehicles (UBVs) to perform the first, most dangerous wave of an opposed amphibious assault. Earlier this year, Williams and Captain Henry Hendrix, USN controversially proposed phasing out big Nimitz and Ford-class CVNs in favor of a much greater number of America/Wasp-class LHA/LHDs. In his new essay, Williams is proposing a robotic replacement for the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV), a project that collapsed in engineering overreach.
The EFV died because the Marine Corps expected it to do too many things. The anti-ship missile threat has pushed the launch point for an amphibious assault out to at least 25 miles from the land. The Marine Corps wanted the EFV to traverse this distance in one hour. On land, the EFV was to be a late-model infantry fighting vehicle, complete with chem-bio protection, able to take on other armored vehicles, network with others, and hopefully survive IEDs. It was an impossible engineering task, at least at an affordable price.
Williams proposes to let robots breach the beach obstacles. An excerpt:
In the 2020s and beyond there will simply be no reason to place 20 Marines in a steel box and drive them through mined waters to land on an area-denied beach. An unmanned breacher vehicle (UBV), or family of unmanned systems, could clear and mark the assault lanes ahead of any manned surface movement. These UBVs could be launched from surface, subsurface, or airborne delivery means—overtly or covertly. UBVs could be given large magnetic and acoustic signatures to trigger influence mines and could be equipped with cameras, remote gun systems, plows, cutters, and/or line charges to clear beach obstacles. Additionally, it would be possible to transition the UBV to convoy reconnaissance and clearing missions once manned vehicles are ashore.
Introducing an unmanned system breaks the tyranny of the hybrid vehicle that we have found to be so costly and that inevitably results in compromises in both operating domains—afloat and ashore.
Under this concept, once the robots have cleared the beach, non-armored but high-capacity landing craft such as LCACs LCUs, and other connectors could bring ashore all of the ground-only vehicles and equipment, such as tanks, the next-generation Marine Personnel Carrier (which could very well be like the Army’s Stryker), trucks, logistics, etc.
In summary, Williams describes the following general phases for an amphibious assault:
- ISR
- Shaping fires/advance force operations
- Vertical (helicopter) assault of distributed teams
- Unmanned surface assault
- Surface assault
- General off-load as required.
Without humans aboard, unmanned breaching vehicles could take many hours or even days to swim ashore. They could launch from much farther distances in a much wider area of ocean. And DARPA and others have already demonstrated the ability of unmanned vehicles to self-navigate and to move, communicate, and shoot.
Williams concludes his essay with a discussion of the problem of achieving fire/network superiority in the wider amphibious objective area in the modern era. It was this general problem that killed the EFV and would still need to be solved in order to make any opposed amphibious assault, including one by robots, a feasible endeavor.
Williams discusses the need for the Marines and Navy to locate and target the enemy’s sensor and guided munitions network before and after the surface assault. Breaking down the enemy’s battle network is partly, or even mostly, a battle to achieve superiority over the electro-magnetic spectrum. That task would take place during the first three phases listed above. It would be a task for air and naval precision fires and those air-delivered infantry teams performing distributed operations. And it is a phase that could last weeks or even months.
In the age of long-range guided munitions and their sensors, an opposed amphibious assault will look far different than Iwo Jima. Under this concept, precision air and naval fires, supported by distributed teams of Marines ashore, would wage a long attritional campaign against the enemy’s sensors and missiles. That would clear the way for the surface assault, which, with enough preparation, would ideally be largely permissive.
The Marine Corps is searching for a cheaper replacement for the EFV and a way to keep the opposed amphibious assault viable in the age of guided missiles. Williams’ beach assault robots are a helpful idea. But the bigger problem is achieving dominance over the enemy’s sensors and the electro-magnetic spectrum. Regardless of the landing craft, the Navy and the Marine Corps need a solution and a doctrine for that problem.
Comments
Good question, however it also illustrates how existing land, sea, and air force capabilities could get the mission accomplished. One of the first tactical things aviators learn is terrain-masking to stay safe from air defense fires. Taiwan has a large mountain range running down the middle that blocks any straits or mainland-based radar air defenses from engaging aircraft on the southeast side of the friendly-to-the-U.S. island. Any Chinese surface ships would be hard-pressed to survive long east of the island.
Our Air Force could continue the same airdrops routinely executed in Afghanistan along the southeast side of Taiwan by flying lower than the mountain range. Army and Marine helicopters and MV-22 would similarly resupply from the Philippines, Okinawa, and amphibious ships. It frankly is probable the U.S. and allies would fully control the area east of Taiwan while China attempted to control the area across the Taiwan Straits for its own amphibious/airborne assault and resupply. That effort would be unsuccessful due to our subs and reinforcing true-stealth airpower from Guam, amphibious ships, and CVN. Also keep in mind that if we could create an unmanned AAV, it could also be equipped to carry supplies. Aircraft like the Kaman K-MAX are other unmanned resupply methods.
Remember that forces being AAV's/MV-22d, parachuted and helicopter air- assaulted onto Taiwan primarily would be light infantry. They would have less fuel usage characterized by years of build-up in Afghanistan to keep FOB and COP troops more comfortable for multiple year-long tours. Meals-ready-to-eat are not heavy, although bottled water probably would still be required to prevent troops from getting sick drinking local water. The heavy MRAP/M-ATV also would not be present consuming fuel. If Strykers/LAVs were put ashore, they consume far less fuel than heavier armored vehicles.
The Soviets lost over 300 helicopters and 100 fixed wing aircraft over its decade in Afghanistan and surprisingly large numbers in its conflict with Georgia. We have lost about 100 helicopters and most of ours were accidental crashes while most of theirs were shoot-downs. The Chinese pilots are equally inexperienced. Recall the one jet harassing our P-3 that hit it and crashed. There has been no long war or large number of training flight hours available to China or Russia, let alone Iran or North Korea, to enhance their skills. That factor alone is far more critical than the equipment itself...and ours is superior.
Don't trust simulations with an agenda. Wargames show U.S. aircraft should not be nearly undefeated in air combat since 1980. Yet only a few aircraft have been lost in air-to-air with few exceptions. Simulations are a classic case of garbage-in technical-only assumptions with no means of accurately measuring intangibles like training. Our training is better because simulation does have great value in training pilots. Simulation is also poor in making assumptions about the accuracy of Chinese long-range missiles...much of which we have little data about, just as APA has no data about our stealth aircraft capabilities, or theirs.
I don't get Proceedings so maybe this is covered in the article.
If you are going to put small infantry teams on a hostile shore using aircraft, and keep them there for several weeks, how are you going to supply them and protect them without having ships close by upon which to base the aircraft that will supply and protect them? And how are those ships going to survive if they have to hang around close by unless the the weapons that would threaten them are already taken care of? I am a forever a civilian but it seems to me that if that is "distributed operation" it just puts a lot of highly trained guys into the bag.
The idea of an unmanned AAV-upgrade makes sense so Amphibs can stay farther off shore and fly troops in to rendevous so they aren't seasick. But realistically, why do you need the other bells and whistles? There aren't many places where forcible entry from the sea is essential given good ISR. If the unmanned AAVs make their trek early in the Chinese invasion of Taiwan, what is going to stop them? Are Kilos going to torpedo individual unmanned AAVs? If the Russians invade Ukraine, why not land on friendly Romanian coasts? Maybe Pakistan would let us land there to land assault toward Iran? South Korea has ample area to get to shore far from DPRK influence.
After reading Bryan McGrath's characterization of the time gap between Desert Storm and OEF being 20 years, it leads me to wonder whether the Anti-Access/Area Denial crowd is math-challenged. Another InfoDissemination guy ArkadyRenko implies we should be afraid to move out of our Spratly Island base 1000 kms from the Chinese coast. What is going to shoot down our helicopters and MV-22s 600 miles from China before the war even starts?
If the Chinese have about 60 Kilo and other subs and the east side of Taiwan has at least 300 miles of coast, let's say they put 10 undetected subs on that side near the shore. That means each must cover an area 30 miles wide. Seems to me a speedy vessel with P-8, LCS/MH-60, destroyer, and other counter-sub support can zip right in before slowpoke Kilo can react. Will there be some losses. Sure, but better smaller-sized vessels than large amphibs?
Why do the Navy and Air Force believe they are entitled to casualty-free war and the Army and Marines are not because that is essentially what happens when you divert money from the land component to the other services. Isn't the very presence of amphibs, LCS/HSV, and destroyers 12 miles off Taiwan an adequate deterrent along with a multitude of orbiting aircraft and others on islands within range?
I know diddly about Navy TTP but grade school math says a HSV, LCS, and Amphib can travel a long ways given adequate warnings and indications BEFORE hostilities commence. There are many small islands near Taiwan where helicopters could refuel and amphibs/LCS/HSV could stage. Even then, the Chinese are not 10 feet tall and you boys are...despite all the crying and A2/AD gnashing of teeth. Just can't imagine that many enemy surface ships will survive our air attacks east of Taiwan or outside the Straits of Hormuz along the Iranian coast.