COIN is Dead, Long Live the COIN

COIN is Dead, Long Live the COIN by Ryan Evans, Foreign Policy.

When the U.S. Army and Marine Corps released their Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency, in 2006, key military leaders and civilian advisers promised a different kind of warfare. Written as Iraq crumbled, the manual institutionalized key tactical and operational methods that were geared to fighting against irregular armed foes, rather than the maneuver warfare most of the U.S. military had preferred. The new theory was based around several key principles, including proportionate and precise use of force to minimize civilian casualties, separating insurgent groups from local populations, protecting populations from the insurgents, the importance of intelligence-led operations, civil-military unity of effort, and security under the rule of law.

Some of these methods had already been practiced in Iraq by innovative commanders, but Gen. David Petraeus, who oversaw the process of writing FM 3-24 and later went on to command U.S. forces in the country, was key to their institutionalization and broad implementation in the context of an overall theater-level strategy.

As President Barack Obama decided to "surge" forces into Afghanistan in late 2009, former Joint Special Operations Command head Gen. Stanley McChrystal was tasked to follow the Petraeus playbook in Afghanistan. When he was relieved, Petraeus, the man many saw as having helped bring stability to Iraq, was called upon to do it again in Afghanistan. However, success has eluded the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), which has been unable to translate operational progress into strategic success. A number of triumphant obituaries for counterinsurgency have since emerged, as it becomes clear that the campaign in Afghanistan is failing to deliver on its promises...

Comments

Rob,
Like you said the drugs are a moot point. It is the exorbitant money idiotic westerners pay for them that is the problem.

You refer to a "balance of power" which the Taliban facilitated prior to the US invasion. I respectfully suggest very few Afghans, let alone foreigners, consider the Taliban as representing a balanced form of governance. Leaving aside the female population the people you call the Northern Alliance but what I call Dostrum's Militia have a right to live in Afghanistan without persecution. Dostrum and his henchmen have the distinction of being more despised than the Soviet Spetsnaz by every Afghan I have had any dealing with but having said that it does not alter their legitimate rights as Afghan citizens.

I'm not sure how Karzai and his clan would take to being referred as a member of the Northern Alliance.

"The drugs are a reality, but even without drugs the same degree of insurgency would be going on." I'm sorry Rob but I couldn't disagree with you more. I'm afraid whether it is Miram Shah, Khwost, Terri Mengal, Beger Metal, Bannu, Barikot, Dwanababaa, Parun, Pech, Dara, Bara, Kharcin, Paris, London, New York or Tokyo - money talks and bullshit walks.

Even back in the day when Charlie Wilson was bouncing a ten month old Sirajuddin Haqqani on his knee the fighters would demand to be paid. The suggestion they would engage the enemy without being paid is laughable. As much I had hoped this was not so it was an inescapable reality. The well of cynicism from which the average Afghan draws contempt towards fighting for a political or religious cause is bottomless.

If any organisation understands that 'cash is king' it is the Mafia. Hence the explosion of almost uncut heroin flooding the globe from this region.

However this presents an opportunity rather than a problem. As you rightly pointed out " I wish that were the case, as that is an easier matter to resolve."

I'm not sure it is easier but it is certainly a much more doable strategy than the current one.

Regards
RC

RC,

My point is that the drugs are moot. Yes, they provide ready cash to every power broker in Afghanistan (except the US). They fund GIRoA officials, they fund "warlords", they fund businessmen, they fund the Taliban. Everybody is getting rich on drugs. True and so what?

I wrote only because I believed you were attempting to make the case that somehow the actions of organized crime were creating the violence and instability in Afghanistan. I wish that were the case, as that is an easier matter to resolve. The actions of the US government are far more at the source of causation to the current conflict than those of any other party or factor. That is an uncomfortable truth for most Americans to swallow, and one that most senior offials would adamantly deny. Yet there it is.

There was a balance of power in Afghanistan prior to US intervention. We used our power to disrupt that balance and reverse the fortunes of the major players acorss the region. Then we dedicated ourselves to codifying that new balance and protecting it from being reversed yet again to something that we did not control. "King-making" and COIN designed to protect those foreign made Kings is right out of the "Euro-Colonialism 101" handbook. We read the wrong book, we listened to the wrong experts, and we employed the wrong operational design; and the results are predictable. Varying the mixes of tactics of CT vs capacity building vs development is interesting, but largely moot under the overall operational design we have been committed to since LTG Barno was in charge.

The drugs are a reality, but even without drugs the same degree of insurgency would be going on. This is not a high-cost operation being waged here, at least not for the insurgents. Drugs are a distractor from what is really important if we want to facilitate true stability. I have no problem with the counterdrug community and mission. I do believe it is largely futile, but primarily I just don't want anyone to think that it is somehow going to help resolve the insurgency.

Rob,
I'm glad we agree that the insurgency is in fact "well funded" by the illegal drugs industry.

If I understand you correctly your contention is that a conflict which is "well funded" by the Sicilian Mafia is not necessarily funded for profit but can in fact be funded for political reasons?

Do you find it difficult to believe that the presence of the Mafia in the NWFP is very deep-rooted within the Pak elite. If you do, I understand your position. If you agree that there exists a strong Mafia presence I am somewhat confused.

It is understandable if you believe that situation is akin to a bunch of 'out of town' gangsters roughing up the neighbourhood but having very little say what goes down 'on the street'. However this is not the case. The conflict in the Af/Pak region and its subsequent lawlessness has expanded the poppy acreage enormously both in the Tribal Area and more recently into Afghanistan itself. The region has become over the last 40 years the epicentre of a an extremely wealthy, powerful and ruthless criminal organisation which makes the Taliband very much a minor player. Any suggestion that a supposedly fundamentalist religious movement, to whom the Mafia pay good drug money, is going to influence the way they manage their business I find difficult to accept.

Regards

You are joking, right?

Sure, organized crime, from Warlords and regional power brokers to GIRoA, enrich themselves on Afghan drugs. That is not why there is conflict.

The conflict in Afghanistan is rooted in the political realities of a Taliban government ran into exile in Pakistan by the US and a Northern Alliance government raised into power and sustained there by the US and our ISAF allies. This in turn is exacerbated by a growing resistance insurgency due to the very size and nature of our foreign presence in Afghanistan. Political in purpose, this is fundamental insurgency that is well funded by illegal drugs. But those same illegal drugs also fund players on all sides of this little political drama.

Mexico is a for-profit business venture that is becoming so large, rich and powerful as to threaten the stability of government. Profit in purpose, political damage is a side-effect.

To compare the two is like comaring the Moon to the Sun because both are in the sky above our planet and provide light. The sad truth is that we have a much better handle these days on our understanding of our solar system around our planet than we do of the nature of various types of conflict between the inhabitants of our planet.

It is interesting that very little discussion relates to the identical nature of the element which drives the violence in the US/Mex and the Af/Pak regions. Many do not see the folly of using helicopters and fast jets in Afghanistan but even the most ideologically opposed protagonists on this topic agree that deploying these systems and the remaining nine yards of the Big Army into Mexico would be profoundly stupid.

The fact that it is well understood in US/Mex but not in Af/Pak strikes me as odd.

It is reminiscent of McNamara's genuine failure to realise that the Vietnamese would be the last people on the planet to allow their ancient enemy, the Chinese, to use their country to mount the Domino Effect. At the Peace and Reconciliation meetings 20 years after the war ended the North Vietnamese delegates were profoundly shocked that a man as intelligent and widely read as MacNamara was ignorant to the historically bitter relations between the Vietnamese and the Chinese which had been reasonably well-document for centuries.

Beginning in the late 1960's the Mafia targeted the Af/Pak region to take the place of the the Golden Triangle as the centre of world's heroin production. The Mafia flooded the Pak law enforcement with huge amounts of cash in order to facilitate the growing and refining of opium. The Army came somewhat later into the industry and decided it would be prudent to get the ISI to run their side of the business.

The money involved is enormous. Heroin moves around the NWFP in ten-ton loads sometimes in convoys of trucks. It is a massive industry. The US knows better than anyone the acreage under cultivation in the region thru their satellite imagery and military operations.

One hears about the Pak's desire in maintaining an influence if the Taliband come back, preventing a second Indian front (my favourite) the desire to preserve Islam (obviously never met any senior police or ISI officers) etc. Can you imagine the ridicule if you listed the Mexican cartels motivations for their violent acts as 'preserving Catholicism ' and 'maintaining a Latino influence' in the southern US after Mexico regains the 'homelands stolen by the yankees'.

It is all about the narco-dollar and even by US levels of organised crime the amounts are enormous. In a country where the annual per capita income is less than three thousand dollars you can imagine overwhelming influence the nacro economy has on every aspect of the region. It has been entrenched for so long now that no law enforcement or ISI officer would know any different. Their livelihood, career, pension, aspirations etc. would be totally integrated into the narcotics industry.

There are not many US government officials who understand the degree of penetration the Mafia has in the region but there are some who were there at the beginning. The US military needs to get them 'de-spooked' and get their input into the strategic, operational and tactical level as currently the military appears to have very little understanding of what genuinely motivates the 'insurgent'.

regards,
RC

Ken:

We have done all the damage that can be done. But just two small things mainly as a sop to my delicate pride. I never claimed a unique discovery. To my knowledge I've never had a truly unique thought or discovery in my life. And sadly, I do realize the difference between my opinions and verifiable fact, much as I wish they were synonymous.

Carl:<blockquote>"That intransigence has not often enough been accurately described. So the first step it to call it what it is, even if it hurts some feelings."</blockquote>Nah, that's not true. It's been noted and publicized by thousands of people including senior serving Generals (and me plus dozens of others on this board). Nor does it hurt anyone's feelings to say that; thousands of folks say it daily. You have not made a unique discovery...<blockquote>"That bureaucratic refusal to change isn't inept soldiering, it is dishonorable, dishonest soldiering. That is the first step in my solution, call it what it is."</blockquote>That's not what it is, that's what you think it is. You're entitled to your opinion -- but that's all it is.<blockquote>"For example, if the services came to Congress and said we have too many generals and admirals, we want to reduce the numbers by half, it will increase our effectiveness and save this much money; I doubt Congress would squawk much."</blockquote>Nope, they wouldn't squawk at all. In fact many in Congress frequently complain about the excessive number of Generals -- as have I and many other folks in uniform and out. I've written dozens of times on this Board that we have too many Officers, all grades. Folks in Congress have voiced the same complaint. Bills have been introduced to achieve those cuts -- they went nowhere. The Army itself has instituted cuts -- and has been told to back off...

In spite of all that, the numbers change but little. When you figure out why that is the case, then you'll understand the problem. Until then, we've done all the damage we can do to this issue.

Well...since you asked.

We both possibly agree that the reason the American military is rather less proficient than it should be and that a large part of the reason is bureaucratic intransigence on the part of the military. They just don't feel like it. Now as you say, that has been recognized for years. But it has always been sort of glossed over by saying things along the lines "big army will never change" etc. That intransigence has not often enough been accurately described. So the first step it to call it what it is, even if it hurts some feelings.

What it is, is disloyalty, to the country and to the men serving. It is a refusal to honor the oath in favor of making life comfortable for the institution. It gets people who believe in the honor of the institution killed. That bureaucratic refusal to change isn't inept soldiering, it is dishonorable, dishonest soldiering. That is the first step in my solution, call it what it is.

I am skeptical that Congressmen view military officer numbers and selection as a make work program for that worthless nephew constituent. There have too many ups and downs in the numbers over the decades for me to really buy that. For example, if the services came to Congress and said we have too many generals and admirals, we want to reduce the numbers by half, it will increase our effectiveness and save this much money; I doubt Congress would squawk much.

Carl:

This is rapidly descending into irrelevance. Three points only.<blockquote>"I think it doesn't have to be. Something did cause the military to be marginally competent. I just think that the majority of those things can be laid at the feet of the professional military."</blockquote>Possibly true. What's your solution?<blockquote>"So if you brought in fewer but better candidates, I don't see how the law would mitigate against that option."</blockquote>The law might not but I can assure you that those in Congress will be quite concerned if in that quest for better, you excluded some of their Constiuents generally regardless of quality. I can also assure you a letter from a Congress person to anyplace in DoD will get rapid and compliant action. Congress has power of the purse, beyond mere laws and everyone in government knows that...<blockquote>"That the bureaucracy doesn't want to do it, is not a valid reason for it not being done."</blockquote>I agree and have been making that point to anyone who would listen. So have a lot of others with more horsepower for a good many years. It's done little good. Perhaps you have a solution?

You're right. I am not willing to accept a soldiery less than proficient than it should be. We may have copied the wrong things from foreign armies in the past but because we did so in the past doesn't mean they are set in stone. We can discard them adopt things that actually work, or dream some up on our own. Congress isn't going to say, no you can't train up the infantry better. That is in the hands of the military. A lot of the arguments you put forth seem to me to fall into the category of, that is just the way it is, has been and will be. I think it doesn't have to be. Something did cause the military to be marginally competent. I just think that the majority of those things can be laid at the feet of the professional military.

I looked at that table. The language limits the number. It doesn't require a minimum number (unless I read it wrong which may be more probable than not). So if you brought in fewer but better candidates, I don't see how the law would mitigate against that option.

Why should the small wars force that I postulated be so big? The value would be in the expertise brought about by experience and desire to do that particular job. Cut your putative number by 75%. Also why should it be limited to just the Army? All the services should participate since all participate right now. We should be able to manage an all services force of 15K, volunteers all. It would obviously be a special force and special forces have cachets that often make for a surfeit of volunteers. Maybe you would need a bonus, I suspect you wouldn't but maybe. In any event you would be much more likely to end up with a force more effective at fighting the small wars we have historically gotten into regularly than you have now.

That the bureaucracy doesn't want to do it, is not a valid reason for it not being done.

If you are going to quote me and thereby judge me, it would be more accurate to do it in context. You quoted me as saying "The authors example implied that if the place fell apart some would consider helping put it back together, not conquer it.", which I did say.

However the context is provided by the following three paragraphs which I wrote. What you quoted is only a single sentence in amongst others.

"The author used Mexico only as an example of something that might happen that would require a big effort, not as a prediction or an endorsement. He could as easily said something will happen that we can't imagine but people would have dismissed that too easily.

Why on earth would we want to conquer Mexico? That is what you seem to suggest would happen if we went in there in force. The authors example implied that if the place fell apart some would consider helping put it back together, not conquer it. I think you are shooting at a shadow.

I disagree about Mexico being a situation that can be nipped in the bud. There isn't anything at all we can do, in Mexico, to affect things. That is strictly a Mexican show no matter what happens. We will be watching only, I hope. The thing that we could do that would really help south of the border is something we will never do-substantial legalization of drugs."

Carl:<blockquote>"That is my primary complaint. That we do not have a truly professional soldiery."</blockquote>Mine too. The difference between us is that can accept the reality and you do not seem to want to do so. That's okay, I think, or should be anyway.<blockquote>"You say the US and Congress in particular do not want this because of a possible perception of danger to civil society. But you also say that we had a professional soldiery before 1940. So it either it wasn't a danger to civil society then or wasn't perceived as being a danger then. What has changed that it is perceived so now?"</blockquote>Size, mostly. There's a difference between 161,000 and 500,000 or so. Add communication ability and the visuals of TV. Congress has always had a love / hate relationship with the Army (they tend to like the Navy and Marines and they like that the Air force buys expensive stuff...). They always fund the National Guard pretty well to serve as a counterweight to the Army. It was perceived as a danger back then but manageable. That's still the case. That 'management' consists of telling the Beast what you'll feed it and insuring it's brain realizes who's Boss...<blockquote>"I don't think it has been a danger to society for a very long time. We just don't the historical tradition that would allow that. Besides, the Australians seem to have a professional soldiery and I don't see how that proficiency is viewed as a domestic danger."</blockquote>I don't think the US Army has ever really been a danger to the society from which it springs. Congress really sort of knows that but it's been a tenet of American political tradition for over two centuries -- big Army bad...

You -- and they -- are also confronted with the problem that Congress knows one other thing I wrote above: "We can afford to lose small wars. We cannot afford to lose a large war."I also wrote they would likely not support a lot of small war efforts. That's not their call, it's the Presidents -- however, the Congress does determine what it will pay for and support with no Presidential input...

As for that Australians, different tradition. The British and the Commonwealth nations have always trained their new entrants far more thoroughly and better than have we -- and both the discipline and the control are much, much more firm than is US practice. The US, unfortunately, copied things from the British and the Germans with a few French twists here and there but we copied most of the bad things and few of the good...<blockquote>"That doesn't have much to do with the professionalism part. The officer ranks do. Why can't we make a system that has most officers staying for a career?"</blockquote>Because that Personnel System that I keep telling you about doesn't want them to -- nor does Congress. Check the <a href=http://uscode.house.gov/download/pls/10C32.txt>LINK</a> (scroll down to the Tables of ranks authorized). Most Lieutenants / Captains do not stay for a variety of reasons, most Majors usually do not make Lieutenant Colonel, etc. The 'professional' guidance is ameliorated by many things -- and Congress in its well intentioned but intensively micromanaging quest for fairness and objectivity in selection (among other things) does not help.<blockquote>"That gets back to the military controlling its own destiny. I've read article after article about officers who want to stay in, but can't stand the BS anymore. Congress doesn't mandate BS. The military does that on its own."</blockquote>The military bears the bulk of responsibility for arcane BS, no question but things like that Statute I linked above are huge enablers. I and many other share your upset at that factor -- but the system is terribly resistant to change lacking a big war. In peacetime -- and the bulk of the US Army, the institution has been at peace since 1945 -- administrative ease trumps professionalism; comfort outweighs competence. May not be nice but that's reality. The Army can indeed control some of that but, as I said, they have a lot of enablers -- including the entire society from which they come. Much of what you say make sense but it doesn't happen. There are reasons for that, some good some not -- but all pertain. If they did not, things would be more to your liking and that they are not is as much a result of the American polity and society as anything. The Army did not set out to be marginally competent, something caused that...<blockquote>"If the military created a volunteer unit that would stay in a small war place for years, there wouldn't be any letters because guys would know what they are getting into. That they haven't done so is the fault of the military, not Congress."</blockquote>Partly true. Let's say the Army did that and it required 40,000 persons. Those 40K cannot be static, one time, no changes -- family problems, illness, WIA, KIA, etc all have impacts. So that's 40K spaces plus replacements in training and so forth, say about 55-60K total. That's about 8-10 Brigade slices and the Army would have to eat that loss. Consider also that you'd get a few volunteers for such duty with little to no added incentives but I suspect that for the bulk of volunteers, you'd have to add some financial incentive. Figure about 1.5 the regular compensation -- that means your 60K people will cost the same as 90K regular troopies, so you've just wiped out another 2-4 Brigades. Few other minor problems but you are not the first to have thought of that and this isn't the first war in which it's come up. Congress at other times has resisted that as a potential 'Foreign Legion' and 'un-American' (and too expensive for the benefit realized...) You're looking for simple solutions to a complex problem. I wish there were some...<blockquote>"Nothing in Mexico except watch. It is a wholly Mexican show. How did you get from that to me wanting another Pancho Villa like foray?"</blockquote>From this, 10:46 PM 16 Dec: "The authors example implied that if the place fell apart some would consider helping put it back together, not conquer it." The implication I took from that statement was that you envisioned using the US Army to be peacekeepers and rebuilding assisters. Aside from the fact that as you may recall, I don't think Armies do that at all well, the eschewal of combat struck me as wishful thinking. So I figured you envisioned again just going "into Mexico, nothing much of importance happened besides wearing out some horses, trucks and airplanes..."

As you wrote earlier, there's a lot of history there, too much for that earlier tranquility, I suspect...

Ken:

That is my primary complaint. That we do not have a truly professional soldiery. You say the US and Congress in particular do not want this because of a possible perception of danger to civil society. But you also say that we had a professional soldiery before 1940. So it either it wasn't a danger to civil society then or wasn't perceived as being a danger then. What has changed that it is perceived so now? I don't think it has been a danger to society for a very long time. We just don't the historical tradition that would allow that. Besides, the Australians seem to have a professional soldiery and I don't see how that proficiency is viewed as a domestic danger.

I just can't see why the professional military can't be proficient enough to handle big wars and small wars. Yes there is a lot of turnover but most of that is amongst the low level enlisted ranks. That doesn't have much to do with the professionalism part. The officer ranks do. Why can't we make a system that has most officers staying for a career? That gets back to the military controlling its own destiny. I've read article after article about officers who want to stay in, but can't stand the BS anymore. Congress doesn't mandate BS. The military does that on its own.

You say yourself the institution didn't change much but the people did. Why can't the institution change within limits imposed by politicians? People die because of it doesn't.

If the military created a volunteer unit that would stay in a small war place for years, there wouldn't be any letters because guys would know what they are getting into. That they haven't done so is the fault of the military, not Congress.

Yes the Mexican-American War was a long time ago. But since we acquired a considerable part of the lower 48 as a result of the war I still contend it worked out well enough. We have stayed in those places pretty long.

Regarding your statement about what you think I believe: "Now you seem to wish to forget it and have another Pancho Villa like foray."

Sometimes I wonder if you actually read what I write. What I write all the time about Mexico is that there isn't a darn thing we can do in Mexico about how things will turn out except watch.

This is from my post of 12-17.

"(With the above being said, small footprint, large footprint or early on little cat's feet, there is nothing, nothing we can do about Mexico except watch. Anything important that will be done down there will be done by Mexicans. More than 200 years of history insures that.)"

And this is from another of my posts of 12-17.

"I disagree about Mexico being a situation that can be nipped in the bud. There isn't anything at all we can do, in Mexico, to affect things. That is strictly a Mexican show no matter what happens. We will be watching only, I hope. The thing that we could do that would really help south of the border is something we will never do-substantial legalization of drugs."

Nothing in Mexico except watch. It is a wholly Mexican show. How did you get from that to me wanting another Pancho Villa like foray?

If we had a truly professional soldiery, your comment might be accurate. We do not, for the most part, have that. There are parts of the Army and Marines that reach that mark but the majority of both are not professional in any sense -- not with a 30% plus turnover. About 40% plus of both services are short term enlistees or officer accessions that do not intend to stay for a career. In the remaining 60%, well over half are in support trades and positions or in training / education assignments and are actually little more than typical suburban Americans. We have a volunteer force, it stopped being professional in 1940 and never looked back.

As for Congress' responsibilities contrasted to those of DoD (an intervenor) and the Services, that's a lengthy subject for discussion and not appropriate to this forum or thread. Suffice to say you're partly correct on, say the Officer assignments in Viet Nam -- but Congress also had a hand in that because Congress insists on 'fairness' in assignments and selections, ergo, everyone had to be accorded some 'experience.' There' enough blame for the services and Congress but much the services do is at the behest of Congress; some by direct fiat or statutes, much by inference and threats of funding withholds.<blockquote>"when the big war came, the Army didn't suddenly develop aggressive, imaginative leaders, they mostly kept right on doing what they had been doing. Arguing that we will get around to displaying mental agility in a big war but won't in a small war is just an excuse for having no agility."</blockquote>You're entitled to your opinion. As was the author of the book entitled to his. The reality is a bit different. The institution did indeed change little if at all -- that's the bureaucracy and the sclerotic nature. However, the people in the institution did change and those people are the Army, the Army in the field, not the institution that never leaves Washington. Combat does that, the guys and gals that have to do the work change and adapt while the institution fights to not change. In a small war, the institution wins because it is bigger and more powerful than the field Army. In a big war, the field folks win. One thing that aids that is seeing the relief of your peers for incompetence -- a solution to failure used liberally in WW II that has fallen into disuse since then due, again, to insistence of 'fairness' and the lack of existential need.

You may also recall that here and in Council postings I often complain of the 1917 model personnel system that refuses to change. We adopted big war process then, went back to a small professional Army after WW I that stuck around until 1940 when the Draft for WW II began. That was the end of a professional US Army. Since then the personnel system has been unblinkingly focused on being prepared for a big war; it views small wars as a distraction. That system receives strong support from members of Congress for their work...<blockquote>"If the military wanted to arrange for officers and men to stay deployed in a small war place for years if they so desired, how has Congress precluded that?"</blockquote>Congress precludes that by catering to letters from mothers, Husbands and Wives who get upset that their sons, daughters, husbands and wives are sent to bad places for excessive periods. That was true as a result of the lengthy away from home time during WW II and a desire to not do that unless it was really necessary. Thus Korea had one year tours as did Viet Nam. Note that neither was an existential war.

The Armed Forces go along with that willingly because extended tours are a proven recruiting deterrent -- remember, we're volunteer, not professional. The US (and Congress in particular) do not want a truly professional armed force, they want one that is adequate for most tasks without being super killers honed to a razor's edge and thus perhaps dangerous to civil society -- and that's what we have, a volunteer force that is adequate and which is structured and designed to mobilize for a big war at the behest of Congress and which can be assigned to do other things by the Executive. Left to its own device, Congress likely would not participate in small wars. <blockquote>"The last time we went into Mexico, nothing much of importance happened besides wearing out some horses, trucks and airplanes. The time before we got half a continent so that time worked out well enough."</blockquote>In reverse order, "the time before" was in a vastly different world -- and even then we did not stay long, you'll remember. Most Mexicans do and not fondly. They also remember Pershing and Co. again not fondly. You cited our mutual history. Now you seem to wish to forget it and have another Pancho Villa like foray. I strongly doubt it would go down like that. I suspect all those now fighting; Cops vs. Armed Forces vs. Cartels vs. whomever would stop shooting at each other and find new targets which would lead to escalation. You also seem to ignore the fallout both here in the immigrant community and in broader South and Central America...

Hugo would be beside himself in ecstasy if we Gringos "had to go into Mexico..."

Why are those days gone for the USMC or for that matter the Army? Pershing was in the Philippines for four years when he was just a captain. Why can't we do that now? Why would we have to structure for small wars or large wars? I don't see why it is either or. Pershing handled the big war ok, and Puller did well against the Japanese; both after having fought only small wars before. It seems to me that well trained officers who know military history should be able to handle that.

If the military is structured for big efforts, it can handle small efforts, but only if it continues to think about small efforts and therefore has some idea of what must be done when the time comes. I fear we will pull a Scarlett O'Hara as we have done before and refuse to think about it until tomorrow which will never come.

You mention small wars not being a sufficient impetus for change and learning being better done in big wars. I don't think that is right. A professional soldiery should be able to learn and adapt regardless of the magnitude of the conflict. They should not be content to sit complacently and reassure everyone that when things are actually important, why then, then they'll get around to displaying the mental agility to adapt. I don't think that will work. It is professional incompetence. I am reading a book you recommend, Command Culture and according to that book, when the big war came, the Army didn't suddenly develop aggressive, imaginative leaders, they mostly kept right on doing what they had been doing. Arguing that we will get around to displaying mental agility in a big war but won't in a small war is just an excuse for having no agility.

I understand that Congress is responsible for some things but they are not responsible for all. What are the one they are specifically responsible for? I am don't know much about it. Some things though they are not at all responsible for. They are not responsible for units being rotated back to places where they have no prior experience. In Vietnam, they were not responsible for the screwed up way officers were assigned. If the military wanted to arrange for officers and men to stay deployed in a small war place for years if they so desired, how has Congress precluded that?

The last time we went into Mexico, nothing much of importance happened besides wearing out some horses, trucks and airplanes. The time before we got half a continent so that time worked out well enough.

The author used Mexico only as an example of something that might happen that would require a big effort, not as a prediction or an endorsement. He could as easily said something will happen that we can't imagine but people would have dismissed that too easily.

What kind of games have we been playing vis-a-vis Mexico?

Carl:

"General purpose" is the clue -- jacks of all trades, masters of none. They can do small wars but will never do them well because our system is structured for large wars; to do the small ones well you need forces like the long-serving US Marines of the 1920s and 30s or the British in Malaya in the 50s. Those days are gone for the Marines and they were for the US Army after 1917. Lack of continuity is a killer in COIN. If OTOH we structure for the small wars, we will not be able to do the big ones. While there are some complementary skill sets, there are many factors that very greatly and large wars entail massive personnel turnover while small ones cannot be well pursued with such turnover.

We cannot afford to provide adequate numbers of troops for both skill sets, so the GPF has to be able to do both as well as some other things. That means it will not do either all that well but if it is designed and structured to do large efforts, it can persevere and learn as it did in WW I and II.

We can afford to lose small wars. We cannot afford to lose a large war.<blockquote>"we should figure out why and fix it. You say, among other things, we are too inflexible, too bureaucratic and the personnel system won't support it. Why? Those things are handicaps no matter if the war is small or large and they are within the control of the military, or should be. Why can't the professional military be more flexible, less bureaucratic and why can't the personnel system be changed?"</blockquote>Once more on the topic of what should be versus what is, I'll point you to Congress. I agree the fixes should be within control of the military. Most in the military also agree. They are not. Write your Congress person...

Consider also that in a large war, the casualty count is quite large; far larger then the efforts of the last few year, larger even than Viet Nam or Korea. That factor leads to a fairly rapid discard of most of the bureaucracy and scleroticism and a development of flexibility, small wars doe not provide the impetus for those changes.<blockquote>"The author cited Mexico simply to show that if the place fell apart completely, we might be FORCED to seriously consider going in big again. This was a pre-emptive counter to the argument that we will never have to do it again."</blockquote>How did that work out for us the last time we went into Mexico? Hopefully those who suggest our going there in force realize the likely outcome of that. It'll take more than ten years and the body count will be in the hundreds of thousands on both sides -- not to mention the unrest inside the US and the spillover effects to the rest of so-called Latin America.

If there was ever an example of one to be nipped early and where commitment of major forces should be avoided, Mexico is it. As you say, our mutual history insures that everything needs to be done by the Mexicans themselves, we must watch -- and provide only the help that is asked -- but that should be freely provided and we should not play games as we have been doing...<blockquote>"Our choices on occasion WILL be structured by our competitors. There is no way around that unless you can ensure that our competitors will always be dopier than we are and we will never make major errors. We will play by our opponents rules on his terrain when he outsmarts us which he will surely do once in a while, and we had better have a good idea of what to do when that happens."</blockquote>That's why I said above "That said, we do need to maintain the skills to use in a worst case..." and "While I agree that we should not discard the lessons of the last ten years, I strongly disagree that our choices must be structured in any way by our competitors. If they in fact are, it will most likely be due to a major error on our part."</blockquote>That last differs only a little from what you wrote.

We must be prepared for other small wars. We will not do them well if we commit major forces but we will do them adequately. Adequate is acceptable but to be avoided insofar as possible. That's all I've been saying for many years -- about 49, in and since Laos, to be specific. Hasn't done much good but after 60 plus years, even the US can get a little smarter...

Indeed, our choices will on occasion be structured by opponents -- ideally, we will limit those occasions to only those that cannot be otherwise avoided -- and I still believe those will be minimal in number unless we continue trying to arrogantly and condescendingly stick our overlong noses in the business of others. That's the dopier than them part...

Ken:

Why shouldn't one of the general purposes General Purpose Forces are used for be to fight small wars when the need arises? General purpose anything might not be the best for the job but they shouldn't get a pass on being reasonably good at it. Or at least they shouldn't be called General Purpose.

It conceivable that another "large scale campaign" will happen, or won't happen. But given the history of the world I bet it will happen, no matter how hard we try to stay out of one. So it stands to reason that instead of merely proclaiming we can't do it well, we should figure out why and fix it. You say, among other things, we are too inflexible, too bureaucratic and the personnel system won't support it. Why? Those things are handicaps no matter if the war is small or large and they are within the control of the military, or should be. Why can't the professional military be more flexible, less bureaucratic and why can't the personnel system be changed? "General Purpose" or no it is a bad thing if the military can't quickly adapt to the conflict it has to fight. If our lamentable efforts in recent small wars have shown us to be so hidebound, that should be viewed as a warning signal that something is wrong, needs to be fixed and we were lucky the flaws showed up in a small war instead of a big one.

The author cited Mexico simply to show that if the place fell apart completely, we might be FORCED to seriously consider going in big again. This was a pre-emptive counter to the argument that we will never have to do it again.

(With the above being said, small footprint, large footprint or early on little cat's feet, there is nothing, nothing we can do about Mexico except watch. Anything important that will be done down there will be done by Mexicans. More than 200 years of history insures that.)

We should be willing to nip minor problems before they get to be big problems. What worries me is that if we could get so determined to never again get involved in a "large scale campaign", we will refuse to nip the minor problems for fear that getting involved at all will result in a "large scale campaign."

I know you hate categorical statements but here comes another one. Our choices on occasion WILL be structured by our competitors. There is no way around that unless you can ensure that our competitors will always be dopier than we are and we will never make major errors. We will play by our opponents rules on his terrain when he outsmarts us which he will surely do once in a while, and we had better have a good idea of what to do when that happens.

Fairly good summation and call for a much needed discussion. One could quibble around the edges a bit. Here are two:<blockquote>"The new theory ... and security under the rule of law."</blockquote>That was not a new theory, not at all -- all those things had been 'learned' in Viet Nam. They were not terribly appropriate or effective there and have really been little if any more so in Afghanistan or Iraq. The major flaw was the adoption of Colonial power techniques to fight a war or wars in which we were not such a a power and indeed did not have the ability to govern or make unilateral decisions nominally lacking the assent of the host nation.

So called COIN theory is based on outmoded models. It also presumes, in theory, certain attributes of the COIN force that are never likely to be present over a course of years. METT-TC is a tactical tool that has wide applicability at the strategic level. The 'Troops available' item will not support COIN theory through multiple rotations for a variety of reasons. That said, we do need to maintain the skills to use in a worst case but the certainty is that General Purpose Force units will never do COIN at all well -- nor should they.<blockquote>"The real question is: what form will American counterinsurgency take in the future? It seems reasonable to argue that "big footprint," "population-centric" counterinsurgency is dead, but "small footprint" counterinsurgency that focuses on security force assistance, Special Operations, and/or foreign internal defense lives on (see Yemen, the Philippines, and Somalia). But is it really inconceivable that we will ever again conduct another large-scale population-centric counterinsurgency campaign? Those who think it impossible might consider how the United States would respond to violence spilling over the border from catastrophic state failure and humanitarian crisis in Mexico, for instance."</blockquote>It is not inconceivable that we will ever conduct another large scale campaign. That does not mean that it is inconceivable that we will not do so. Nor does it meant that such campaigns are inevitable. Given our record in such campaigns post 1945, it would seem wise to go to great lengths to avoid such commitments unless there is no other choice -- and there usually will be other ways if we're smart enough to take them.

We have not, do not and will not do such campaigns at all well. We lack the flexibility required, are too bureaucratic and too culturally insensitive. Our personnel system will not support them, the voters do not like them -- and that can cause fickle domestic political machinations.

For the Mexican example, I refer the author to his own words; "Insurgency lives, and has proven itself throughout history as the best means by which to oppose established political and military power." Thus it is decidedly to our advantage to not go there but rather to early employ ""small footprint" counterinsurgency that focuses on security force assistance, Special Operations, and/or foreign internal defense..." Given our current shenanigans and condescension towards Mexico, we have work to do...

Our problem has always been unwillingness to nip minor problems before they become traumatic.<blockquote>As always, our choices will be structured by the agency of our competitors. Therefore, we would be foolish to avoid learning the tactical and operational as well as the policy and strategic lessons of the last ten years. We must maintain our capabilities and competencies for counterinsurgency, if only because history has shown that they will come in handy again."</blockquote>While I agree that we should not discard the lessons of the last ten years, I strongly disagree that our choices must be structured in any way by our competitors. If they in fact are, it will most likely be due to a major error on our part. While we have foolishly allowed various opponents to do that since 1945, surely in 66 years we've learned that is terribly unwise -- why engage in combats of a type that negate our strengths and amplify those of the opponents? Why should we play by an opponents rules on his terrain?

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COIN is Dead, Long Live the COIN

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