One of the key things missing in FM 3-24 is an enemy template. Remember those things? At NTC and JRTC, we’d count T-72s, BMPs, and BTRs to try and determine if we were facing the Russians forward security element, recon forces, or main effort. They provided a foundation for our thinking.
You won’t find such a section in FM 3-24. Magically, over the last ten years, we wished the enemy away believing that through our own sheer will-power we could separate the people from the enemy.
It’s time to be honest. We need to put the template in the manual.
Here’s a start. Nearly four years ago, I described in detail the enemy disposition and composition in the village of Zaganiyah in my article, The Break Point. It shows how AQI, just like many other social movements, mobilized, organized, recruited, trained, financed their operations, developed doctrine, planned, and executed the clearance of the village ultimately establishing a shadow government complete with judicial, military, arms economic arms.
It is one way to understand the enemy template.
Recently, Octavian Manea brought together a group of experts to ask them if counterinsurgency leads to a culture of entitlement?
Because we fail to recognize the enemy, what is missing in this conversation is the economic competition between the state and counter-state (or Shadow Government) which many continue to ignore or simply wish away. AQI has one (still does) and so does the Taliban. They provide competing "security forces, providing essential services to the population, promoting good governance, and encouraging economic development."
In Zaganiyah, we were in a bidding war with AQI. Everytime we would flood the market with state backed goods, they would drop their prices in order to show the citizens that they could outgovern the Iraqi government. At the same time, we had to shut down the AQI Walmart and try to rework property and land rights issues.
It's time to start listening to the guys who have actually done the work!
If we continue to only think in terms of what Americans are doing and ignore the other 99% of the people (not tell them what they should be thinking with information operations) then we're never going to get better.
We'll continue to waste time, money, and lives.
But, don't take my word for it. This is nothing new and was around long before FM 3-24. Some of the current modern thinkers who talk about it are Gordon McCormick and David Kilcullen and Steven Metz.
I learned from Bob Andrews and Leites and Wolfe. And so it must go. We must take our experience and teach it to the next generation refusing to brand ourselves knowing that war is much bigger than one person or one ideology.
Let’s make the change and put the enemy template into FM 3-24.
Comments
My one issue with Enemy Templates is when they replace common sense thinking. Ergo, by developing the Krasnovians, we really only prepared to fight one enemy, the Russians. I have seen templates stifle thinking as much as help it.
So here is what I mean. In Iraq, and insurgent would likely use IEDs, and the template should reflect that. In N. Korea, probably similar, an insurgent force designed to prevent our mechanized advantage, while using anti-air missiles. In America, if someone invaded us, I believe the insurgency that would develop would primarily use sniper weapons and attacks, because of our overwhelming number of firearms.
That said, the idea that you wouldn't make one in an active war is madness. And the idea that you wouldn't have them in training is madness (though Starbuck says they are around which is great).
So my recommendation is we keep making enemy templates, but don't but them in doctrine. Before every training event, the intel shop should make this. We shouldn't use a fake country, we should use a real world country and base the operation on their real world capabilities. Training is supposed to be realistic right?
The current FM 3-24 is a multi-service publication. The Marine Corps began looking at a potential rewrite in 2010 (four year review process) but held off when the Army indicated it was interested in a rewrite as well. Both services are now in the beginning of the dance that accompanies all such work.
One of the interesting thoughts that has come up is, would everyone be better served with a new Small Wars manual vice a new COIN pub? In many ways I suppose this strikes at the very heart of the debates constantly raging across my computer screen. But the idea bears some thought for two reasons.
First, someone is actually going to write something. Yep - it's going to happen. So some effort ought to be made sure that whatever is produced has some relevance to the second, and most important point.
Second, regardless of whether they should be there or shouldn't be there, regardless of what doctrine does or not call the operation they are conducting, someone is going to end up doing something with a gun and perhaps with or without a smile and a soccer ball. It would be helpful if there was some decent guidance on how to go about executing that something.
A quick review of current doctrine reveals that insurgency is something that only exists if a government is being overthrown or changed (JP 1-02) unless it's just a bit more than that (FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5). COIN may be its own thing FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5), unless it's either a subset of stability operations, a type of crisis response or limited contingency operation, or a bit of everything.
Admittedly, there is a Marine Corps bias to the question. The service has a history of employment in all sorts of little, hard to pigeonhole, "small wars." But regardless of what they might be called, they usually involved being placed in a foreign country due to either good or bad political calculations, facing an armed adversary of some descript who generally sought to avoid open fights, while hiding in, working in, working with the local populace, all occuring under some sort of scrutiny or limitation.
So, perhaps instead of an "a priori" approach, which is to take any given operation and try to cram it into some pre-determined doctrinal box, we ought to expand the toolbox. To take the analogy further, instead of being given a specific toolbox which may or may not work for the given task, the warfighter ought to be given the Craftsman rolling toolchest that allows him to select what he needs.
Is it a rebellion, an insurgency, a revolt? Those are probably the wrong doctrinal questions to be asking - yet those are the questions currently being asked. At the tactical level the questions are more likely to be - "well, here I am. like it or not. So, who is the bad guy, why is he upset, how well armed is he, do people like him, do I have any friends here, are they worth a crap, what can I and what can't I do?"
I think that instead of seeking to place these questions into a pre-determined vocabulary, doctrine ought to just provide some answers. So perhaps the best way to get beyond COIN and to COIN Next, is to go back to basics...go back to Small Wars.
Outlaw: I think we may be deviating off the intent of the original post - but your points are salient. I cannot speak to Army training, only to intel training in the Marines.
In training an intelligence personnel, I've always looked at it as brillance in the basics. If you understand analysis (and synthesis) to include CTSA, collections, and targeting and how the intelligence cycle supports MCPP/MDMP then you can adapt to your OE. With some exceptions, I am reluctant to instruct current TTPs because they are either going to be obsolete by the time the student hits the fleet or they are going to get a crash course on it anyway. To me, that means my time is spent mentoring and allowing students to fail in a safe environment where they can learn from their mistakes without getting anyone killed. Is it perfect -no, do I wish I could offer more, absolutely, but I can't keep them in the training forever.
Aside from intel specific points, you also spend time teaching how intel relates to the other warfighting functions and how it supports planning. It is here where the most friction occurs. Training is not as sufficient as it could be, staffs are not coherent in the planning process, and training focuses more on check-lists than outcomes (i.e. who cares if the plan is feasible, you followed the procedures).
In terms of doing intelligence on the deck - it all depends on what you fall in on. If literally no one has been in the AO before then there are some basic 5W questions that need answering. If you replace a unit then it's a bit easier. As I mentioned before, it really goes back into what your mission is and what you are trying to accomplish. If my mission statement is to "conduct COIN operations IOT allow for the transition to GIROA rule" then good luck on how you want to tackle that one. If it's clear enemy in zone then my requirements are different. Truthfully, I could do either one of those missions without devoting a whole lot of time to "understanding" the populace, but my effectiveness may be limited.
What is unfortunate are articles such as "Fixing Intel" that promulgate the thought that we are too focused on the enemy. Rather, we get so clouded on worrying about the price of bread at the market that we forget about what really effects our ability to conduct the mission. So instead we put together brief after brief about KLEs that waste analytical effort on things that don't really matter.
RCS43---you have a couple of interesting comments.
Yes we should train our young MI officers and analysts to critically think and yes that is an art form that takes time to develop--but it can be done but it is though the clash between TRADOC and the required POI that has to be taught in order to declare someone an analyst or young MI officer-verus the reality taught us daily from theater--there is no room and motivation to build critical thinking/development courses into a rather tight and shrinking TRADOC POI--we always hear we cannot make the necessary changes to the current POI without TRADOC approval---that usually takes upwards of six months and then it is too late.
Example from the rubber meets the road of say a BN staff---the young graduate from the BOIC comes into the BN staff and is the CM working with the S2---he/she then has to build a ISM for a named operation---they sit in front of their computer and stare at the blank ISM for hours and are totally confused. WHY---in the BOIC they are shown the ISM and the course emphasis is on the ISM AS a briefing tool---not once are they taught that you cannot build an ISM without first building the Collection Plan---a clear result of the training course hitting the tactical reality of a BN. The schoolhouse hopefully knows about this particular problem, but you would be surprised how many former MI contractor types know it, but are unwilling to stand up and let the schoolhouse know --whoa I am not going to rock the system syndrome.
Second example from the analyst field--same issues on how much of the TRADOC POI is tied to producing a MOS qualified level 10 versus how much time is available to teaching critical thinking. There are a number of presentations around the concept of observerables, signatures, and indicators---you are right in the older days we knew what the indicators were for a motorized rifle regt even if we did not "see" them yet on the battlefield (we could sing them!)---where in the schoolhouse are insurgent/conflict ecosystem indicators being taught---believe me the ecosystem does not change that much and it does change when something teaches them it is time to change---how to "see" that change is not being taught. Take the example of say HME or narco organizations, production, and smuggling activities---when do young officers and analysts first learn about the actual indicators and understanding how to detect when those indicators change.
You will hear as a response---not enough time in the POI as a reason it does not occur
They come then into a BN which forces them immediately into indicators--deleveop them, build your NAIs on them, build the collection plan around them, get staff buy-in for them and then an execute--and by the way on a continious unending cycle---as an experiement stop the staff in the middle of that cycle and ask them WHY they are doing what they are doing.
Nesting what a concept---get a battle staff into a single room and ask them to define nesting as a doctrinal term per pub--ask them to define say "running esitmate" per pub or define say "battle rhythm" per pub. I do not know how many times I have seen top down bottom up refinement fail sometimes from the tactical level, but a majority of times as you point out from the operational side and you are right add multiple BNs on the ground and the complexity skyrockets---heck we even have now STBs as BSOs--not sure where that sits in doctrine. But the tactical level has other problems that impact the next higher elechon.
Those of us coming out of Iraq in 2005 and 2006 ran smack into a wall with the idea of templating--some said it cannot be done because insurgents are an adaptive organization, we do not have enough data yet on the various groups, they are working with locals who are simply doing a second job, it is foreign fighters etc. You do not want to know just how many serious intel studies were started-finished-started again on just how many insurgents we were facing in 2005 and 2006.
Then up popped AQ with the Manchester Manual on a laptop in Iraq in 2005 which is in fact AQ's own internal structure which has not really changed much---only changes occur when the state/counter insurgent applies pressure to some point on the system. We had in 2006 the hand written journal by the leader of the IAI and it was never fully translated-just a short gisting (it covered the period of two weeks after we arrived in Bagdah until mid 2006--absolutely ignored by the intel community).
If we had the buy-in from the intel community it might have happened far earlier as it was the intel community pushing back on the idea of templating--the concepts of CTCs reflecting templates only started occuring in mid 2008 when the COIC placed reach back capabilities in all CTCs. Yes the OPFOR had insurgent structure info and used it, but not in a structured way until 2008.
If we had evaluated insurgent video OSINT being put out by them even in 2003 up through 2008 we might have had a generic template far earlier---example ISI and IAI constantly released battle videos depicting the RKG-3 before we in the field knew what was hitting us as the actual RKG-3 strikes were initially being reported as EFPs. If we had used OSINT earlier we could have given the field approximate numbers of say how many are in an IED cell, IDF cell, attack cells, what are the swarm TTPs, how do they fight, etc.---but it did not happen as we the Army felt that the early videos were "proproganda" and "we should not be viewing them".
The core problem is not templates, or order of battle but how we "see" what is occuring around us---we are now graduating intel analysts with 3- to 4 weeks less of the required training time with the motto "they will get further training at their units" and we all know how that works out.
AND now we have defense contractors flooding out to intel analysts at home station giving them classes on "critical thinking"---we are really on a treadmill and nothing is improving even ten years in.
Outlaw: I remember having a very similar conversation several months ago about the battle staff, planning, etc. Obviously the points are all valid - but I'd like to address some of your comments.
From your earlier post regarding templating and adaptive systems - you are right. No publication we have right now really tells you how to do it. FM 3-24 does mention Social Network Analysis, but it's a bit too vague to be of any use. However, there are open source resources and software that can do SNA and there is quite a bit of free literature available for one to do some self-study. Naval Post Grad actually has a course on it.
With that in mind, actually fully understanding and instructing complex adaptive systems presents some difficulty because it takes time to train / educate. If you only have a certain number of weeks to push out a basic intelligence analyst or officer, there is a limit to how much you can give them. To me, the better investment is training them to be able to think rather than train them to on a bunch of procedures (no easy task). This is where contractors come in - we can essentially buy an individual to do specialist work eventually dumping that individual when we don't need it anymore. I certainly understand the lament about contractors, but many were former intel guys / military guys and simply wanted to focus on "intel" and not other duties.
However, intel itself is worthless unless it's tied to the bigger picture. This is where staff processes get involved. Unfortunately, what we expect from intelligence (our requirements) is not always feasible or always answerable. I can tell you what a soviet style motorized rifle regiment consists of, I can tell you how they fight, I can template fairly accurately where units likely are based on terrain. I take my uncertainties, I develop a PIR, and I fulfill it via my collection plan. Is this example a bit too simple? Yes. The enemy has a vote and he certainly doesn't have to play by the rules. However, the stuff works for templates because the indicators are almost too large to miss. Moving toward an irregular environment, yes, he may have conventional weapons, but those are the easiest to find. Further, doing these things is usually predicated on a fairly clear and understandable mission statement and commander's intent. I.e. we need to destroy so and so in zone in order to prevent make a unit from interfering with someone's attack. However, when we move outside of this bubble, finding requirements and having a clear mission statement (particularly at higher levels) becomes difficult and confused. Therefore what you have is a series of disconnected and ultimately silly intelligence requirements that won't actually help you accomplish whatever mission it is that you have been assigned.
That said, we can do this stuff pretty well at the battalion level, where it can start to fall apart is tying in multiple battalion efforts into a brigade / regimental mission and then tying those into higher. Ultimately what you get is a series of independent, loosely coupled actions that do not add up. At the tactical level this starts with understanding the problem and the mission. At the higher level it starts with realizing what the limits of what you can and cannot accomplish (something I think Maj Munson hit on his blog) which we don't have a fully appreciation of.
RCS43---this is an interesting comment and actually goes to the heart of alot of other battle staff functions and problems.
"Even the IPB publication, FM 2-01.3 doesn't really broach the topic in too much detail - and there is a reason. Templating out an insurgent force isn't very easy and doesn't really lend itself to templating. TTPs, sure, that's easy...Event Templates, Situational Template...not so much."
I will reference another pub that is causing major problems in staff synchronization---the current TC on ISR, since the original CM/ISR FM in 1996 the intel community only published a TCI for comments in 2009 and now the current TC. And now they are changing the term ISR to terms that are not recognizable by the rest of the military in their latest FMs and ADPs.
The IPB pub does not really address complex adaptive systems ie complexity in general---it does not give assistance to an intel section/S2/G2s on how to "see" the OE in a constructive fashion as it was tailored too much to respond to the force on force concepts not conflict ecosystems and the TC for ISR was a poor response by the intel community in replacing a solid Collection Manager FM from 1996 (which has never been updated).
IE intel analysts we now have defense contractors teaching them "critical thinking techniques" and we have multiple organizations and literally tens of defense contractors trying to improve the abilities of battle staffs to use ISR---if one sat through all of their sysnchronization presentations never once is anything really mentioned on WHY does one do something, WHY does one plan that way, What are the actual term defintions etc. The presentations are great on the WHAT and HOW, but really weak on the WHY. The presentations for example address the opertional level, but never seem to understand the tactical level where the fighting is ongoing.
Lessons Learned and TTPs---honesty have you seen in any recent say IPB/ISR training event a thorough discussion of What is not working well, How to overcome those issues, current (and I mean current not something six months old) TTPs one needs to watch for from the enemy via IPB or ISR process, How to use organic ISR assets if one cannot get the toys, What are the current battle staff problems, WHY doe we do sit temps and why do we do TSMs as well as a ISM, and How are the theater units overcoming identifed battle staff issues-- on and on. Battle rhythm---we now have BCT staffs at between 14 and 24 WGs, huddles and general meetings per WEEK-one cannot keep up with the B2C2WG process if they are honest with themselves---do we see open discussions on that specific issue?
I have not seen any such presentation in over six years---yes we talk about LL'd and TTPs, but very little actually makes it to a deploying battle staff in a constructive fashion. Some MTTs are now trying to reach units during home station training, then refreshing them at say a MRX and or MCTP and then holding their hands during a CTC and now deploying to theater to hold their hands again---it is all not working simply due to the fact that the training audience at each venue is not the same group at the next one and alot of times it is not even the same people who finally deploy to theater so the training hits tons of people, but nothing is improving and the question is now being raised --is if we have spent so much money, had so many MTTs on the problem areas, held their hands at so many levels WHY are we still seeing the same problems and it is getting worse not better. I hear way to often JUST what the heck is going on--and if one then does give a concise answer one is considered too frank and direct.
We ask, teach, and implore battle staffs to conduct assessments/conduct running estimates at every turn, and we talk/teach about MOP/MOE---I have though never seen a honest assessment or actual MOPs/MOEs on any of the training venues being provided to the field---to the training side it is all about the student critiques as a MOP---not how did they perform at the CTC/in theater as the more valid form of MOP/MOE --it is like oh there is a gap that needs training and suddenly three defense contracting companies later there is a "solution" to the gap with no one ever really thinking it through- we have never gotten out of the reaction mode in over six years.
Your comment just touches the surface of a major issue and if the above is not cleanly addressed a new 3-24 is not going to work because the underlying problems are not being addressed.
JMO
As mentioned above, many have already adopted some method of representing the enemy. With that in mind, I think doing so via a rigid template is overly restrictive. Even the IPB publication, FM 2-01.3 doesn't really broach the topic in too much detail - and there is a reason. Templating out an insurgent force isn't very easy and doesn't really lend itself to templating. TTPs, sure, that's easy...Event Templates, Situational Template...not so much.
In terms of FM 3-24 - it does offer guidance in terms of the enemy / insurgent (chapter 3, page 3-13 offers a comparison between conventional order of battle and insurgent order of battle). So I think it's a bit unfair to criticize the manual for totally overlooking the enemy, it's just not true. With that in mind, does it go far enough in looking at the enemy, no, FM 3-24.2 does a better job of that. However, there is nothing enemy-centric in FM 3-24 that an intelligent person couldn't derive from the IPB pub alone. That is, the fundamentals remain the same, the considerations simply change.
Mike:
Nice post.
I would add that not only does a rebuilt 3-24 need some sense of an enemy but it must thoroughly jettison the naive depiction and portrayal of populations in insurgencies. On page 1-29 (University of Chicago Press version) there is a diagram which depicts a population as broken down into three parts: a small minority against the cause that cant be turned; another small minority for the cause; then in the middle a large maleable mass of people just waiting to be won over by the counterinsurgent force, this portion is often refered to as "fence sitters." At the top of the diagram 3-24 has this caption "In any sitatuion, whatever the cause, there will be [a population as described in the chart]." I should also add that this statement was taken directly-verbatim-from David Galula's book on Coin.
But when i came back from Baghdad in late 2006 and read FM 3-24 for the first time and closely and based on my experience in the middle of the Sunni-Shia civil war in Baghdad in 2006 I thought to myself what happens if that line dividing a population is drawn right across the middle?
The point here is that FM 3-24's depiction of a population was taken directly from Galula and is pure, simplistic counter Mao. But in the real world populations are much more complex than that.
This is actually happening at the CTCs to a certain extent. The OPFOR now consists of general purpose forces, enemy special forces, insurgents, criminals, and civilians on the battlefield (with humanitarian needs, scripts, objectives, actors, etc).
CALL might have some interesting stuff on this, or get with me on AKO for more info after the new year.