SOCOM's Goal: Pre-Empt Wars

President Obama: "The status quo is not sustainable."

Given that we understand that the status quo cannot and will not hold (nor do we wish it to), we would now seem to:

a. Start/support wars to achieve favorable state and societal change and

b. Deploy our forces to prevent wars which might result in unfavorable state and societal transformation.

Regarding favorable and unfavorable state and societal change, it may be important to note what our President means when he talks about "self-determination."

The President would NOT seem to indicate that we support the idea that people have the right to choose their own way of life and their own way of governance.

Rather, the President's view of "self-determination" would seem to be that populations have the right to pursue OUR way of life and OUR way of governance, to wit:

a. Free speech,

b. The right of peaceful assembly,

c. The equality of men and women,

d. The rule of law,

e. And the right to choose one's own leaders.

(Some of the President's statements and thoughts on the "status quo" and "self-determination" to be found here: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/05/19/remarks-president…)

Thus, and attempting to come full circle: When we see American forces deployed in other countries today, should we understand that these forces, generally speaking, are being deployed:

1. To support a government and/or population which is attempting to achieve (and/or maintain) some version of our way of life and our way of governance, and,

2. To stand against, prevent and preclude a government or population from achieving (and/or maintaining) a way of life and/or way of governance which is fundamentally different from our own?

The "end" to which our special and other forces will be used to "prevent" and/or to "facilitate" war to be understood within this context?

That's easy.....we prevent wars to preserve the status quo. We also start them to preserve the status quo. E.g. Gulf I. We are actually quite bad at starting wars to alter the status quo, usually blundering into the altering while initially starting only to preserve. E.g. WWII, Korea, Vietnam. And when we do get around to doing it on purpose, we usually wind up in the ugly little place that OIF/OEF put us in. Because to alter the status quo means to establish something new, which requires intent. Occasionally we manage it, e.g. Nicaragua, but the batting average is pretty poor.

We also don't fight for self-determination of others lest it suit our needs. Of course, that is a perfectly valid tactic that I have no problem with employing. It's invalid, however, to suggest we value self-determination on its own merits. History simply does not support that idea.

Now my two cents. The rhetoric about pre-emption is just that, rhetoric. It is the product of the ideas that 1. the status quo is of value 2. nothing worth having is gained by offensive war 3. the one who prevents war has moral standing.

All of that is for public consumption. At least I hope so. I'd hate for our wars to be crusades for their own sake.

Interesting interview with COL Bradin here:

http://www.kmimediagroup.com/sotech-home/480-sotech-2013-volume-11-issu…

Bill M-

I am with you entirely on the matter of faux novelty of modernity when it comes to warfare and human affairs in general. But to the point of SOF taking on some novel, global role I have to apply the same conclusion. Employing assassins, saboteurs, rabble-rousers, and provocateurs has always been easier on the public stomach than sending "any man" to compel the opponent. That we don't like to use the pejoratives I just did to describe their actions because we cloak what we do in honor and goodness doesn't make these actions different in kind. I do agree that it is the best use of SOF for such things, but it is not novel.

The strategy governing the employment of these tactics, however, should be beyond the opinions of SOF. They will always justify these tactics if given a problem set, as they are generally life-long operators with at most a few early years in the GPF. SOF should always be at the decision table, but it is not the lead. Under the current system, the COCOM's should be the lead as they are supposed to manage the employment of US military power abroad.

I say this because I interpret Amd. McRaven's and your point to imply SOCOM primacy in such operations, as is becoming established.

There are limited locations outside of Central Asia and small parts of Africa where a U.S. led VSO program would be welcomed by a partner nation or our country team. ADM McRaven has said repeatedly SOF won't be focused only on counterterrorism, but the article's focus was on countering radical extremists, so unfortunately the media that spreads our narrative doesn't seem to be able to move beyond that.

Counter terrorism operations will remain a constant much like they did prior to 9/11, as most of us know terrorism isn't going away; however, that is not the only strategic challenge that SOF should be focused on. The more I try to describe how the world has changed in the past decade the more challenging I find those arguments to stand up to reason. We have the same security challenges we had prior to 9/11, but our response to one of them "transnational terrorism" only demonstrated how we changed, not how the world changed, but we convinced ourselves it has. We changed, and we ignored a lot of what was in happening in the world as we directed most of our assets: intelligence, SOF, General Purpose Forces, USAID, etc. in pursuit of a largely failed effort to remake cultures. Furthermore, our narrow focus on Al-Qaeda enabled other adversaries to achieve positions of advantage globally. There are other ways to fight terrorism that don't involve taking over and occupying nations that will prove to be more effective and affordable. Despite all the talk about shifting our efforts to enabling partners, we'll still find it necessary to conduct direct action missions to kill those who intend us harm. Large or small scale stability operations will not pre-empt terrorist attacks. SOF will need to continue the fight against terrorists for the foreseeable future, but in a sustainable way that will have little to do with large scale stability operations. We need SOF to go global and expand their focus beyond countering violent extremists to address other strategic challenges to our national security that SOF is uniquely organized, trained, and equipped to do. That will require SOF to use a combination of tried and true approaches and to develop new tactics and capabilities.