David Petraeus: We Must Be Coldly Realistic Over The Use Of Force - Many of the lessons we have learnt post-9/11 have been paid for and written in blood - The Telegraph.
Since leaving the US government, I have had an opportunity to think about some of the missions in which I was privileged to engage while in uniform and then as director of the CIA. Reflecting on what some term the “counter-insurgency era” – or occasionally even “the Petraeus era” – I want to argue that this era is far from over, for the simple reason that the era of insurgency is not over.
Insurgencies, or so-called small wars, are among the oldest forms of warfare, and remain the most prevalent. Whether they are triggered by domestic struggles for power and influence, ideology, ethno-sectarian differences or subversion from outside a country’s borders, their outcomes will shape the world in which we live – as the upheavals associated with the Arab Spring and the extremist challenges in Mali and the Maghreb remind us...
Comments
Politicians, generals and others, it would seem, often view security and strategic interests in terms of expansion, and in terms of transforming and incorporting frontier regions and outlier state and societies.
C.E. Callwell stated it something like this:
a. Great nations,
b. Seeking expansion in remote quarters of the globe,
c. Send out their traders and their soldiers,
d. To bring civilization to regions afar off.
e. These great nations must accept the consequences of their actions, which most commonly are, to be dogged by small wars.
Thus, the "urge" -- amongst politicians, generals and others -- is not to conduct small wars but to achieve greater security and prosperity via expansion, transformation and incorporation of various frontier regions and outlier states and societies.
Small wars to be understood simply as, per se, the cost of doing business.
General Petraeus would seem to understand that this urge or requirement common to great nations -- to expand into and transform and incorporate frontier regions and outlier states and societies -- this urge/requirement is unlikely to be denied or kept down for long (today, only due to the financial crisis?).
Thus, he suggests that we retain the capabilities needed to deal with the small wars that are normally associated with such expansion, transformation and incorporation activities.
Can an argument be made, however, that the strategy, methods and capabilities that we have utilized in the recent past (those that GEN Petraeus suggests that we retain?); these have proven to be insufficient/inadequate for dealing with today's small wars?
A pithy commentary 'Sorry General, War is a Choice' by Dr Patrick Porter, an Australian and Reader in War and International Security at Reading University (UK): http://offshorebalancer.wordpress.com/2013/06/14/sorry-general-war-is-a…
From my civilian vantage point I do wonder at the apparent urge amongst politicians, generals and others to conduct 'small wars' when it is unclear what 'national interest' or strategic interest is involved. All too often the insurgent is advancing a rival ideology and leadership in opposition to our ostensible 'ally'. For the reasons SWJ are familiar with there is no military answer, so force may gain time for the 'ally' to change - often not to a course of action you desire.
I think that the U.S. too often fails to tie strategy to the sources of terrorism and rebellion. If rebellion, and terrorism as a form of rebellion (read Michael Mazzar), is a result of discontent then why do U.S. strategies meant to counter this form of war primarily focus on the product of violence instead of the roots of violence. The roots of violence tend to be motivational (i.e. Gurr's RD). Rebellion results when the discontented are mobilized and resourced. U.S. strategy is out of balance and needs more state department involvement where necessary and a bigger focus on the roots of violence instead of individual terrorists or cells. The case of Mali is informative in this instance. The U.S. has been militarily engaged in Mali since 2003. The focus has been FID, and yet AQIM was still able to expand aggressively (there is an argument to be made that we are focusing FID too kinetically as well). I suggest this failure is a result of not focusing on the roots of violence. Our kinetically focused strategy has seen the number of terrorist organizations grow post 9-11 compared to pre 9-11. One final note. Our ability to analyse the roots of violence and discontent tends to be too one dimensional. Discontent is not always about jobs and economics. Sometimes the sources of a collectivities discontent is much more complex...as in the case of Mali and the Tuareg. Not too many commanders want to hear about environmental scarcity, demographics, resource mobilization, or nationalist sentiment and devise an appropriate strategy. Then again the history of small wars suggests the 'occupying force' is rarely successful to begin with.
It does indeed appear that the Admiral regards the military generally and SOF specifically as being somewhat central to these endeavours, which is worrying.
The military is optimised for security assistance the provision of good jobs, the rule of law and good governance lie outside its competences. While good jobs can be provided by the military, providing for good governance and the rule of law (the two are inextricably linked) simply cannot be done by the military. The military can assist in developing a professional police force, but the 'rule of law' means that all elements of society (including the ruling elites) are subject to and abide by the law. This is as much a social construct as it is a legal or technical competence construct. Good governance and rule of law will look different in each country for each society. Russia for instance is generally regarded as lawful, but does not have 'the rule of law' as the West would understand it in that the elites stand outside of the law; the law supports and does not constrain them.
The military's role is to provide technical assistance which may enable social change over time, but it is difficult to see how military assistance can effect social change directly. War may be politics by other means, but that does not mean that the military could or should be used to achieve what is a task for politicians, especially when the military is a foreign presence. . The job of the military is to hold the ring to enable the politicians to have the time and space to operate.
I think that some of our military understand that, I'm not convinced our politicians do. I think our politicians have conflated using the military to give them political influence abroad, with using the military to achieve foreign political change.
@ Bill C,
There is what people say and what people actually do, the aspirations based on the supposed ideal and then the messy reality of practice. It's like in any bureaucracy, you have to state the company line in official documents. I'm not saying people don't believe such things, but I bet the thinking behind close doors is more nuanced. Unfortunately, institutional aspirational white papers and so on may serve as intellectual straight jackets that affect planning in a variety of scenarios.
Good comment.
When some critics complain that the military etc. didn't learn the lessons of the nineties about stability operations and peacekeeping, I think the critics miss that theories of social unrest and violence during the 2000's were very much colored by thinking from the 90's. Think about the Bonn Conference for Afghanistan.
The "pivot" to Asia based on changing economics and demographics--not AirSeaBattle or a foolish idea of China containment--might have been the very thing the US needed to disengage from destructive practices in foreign affairs, especially in the MidEast.
Not to be just yet, given the latest Syrian announcements. I know the military is capable, far, far more capable than critics contend, but what a mess. And what a supreme human tragedy.
So money IS ammunition in Syria, ammunition that fuels a civil war and violence. So-called R2P "humanitarians" are combining with strategic simpletons that think "Iran supports Assad, so we should support the rebels" makes sense in a complicated multipolar world. Plus, does anyone have any concrete ideas on what an endstate will be? Regime change, I suppose. That has been the consistent call for two years on Assad.
Didn't we give a waiver to China and India for Iranian oil? And didn't the Taliban tax our development efforts in Afghanistan, and isn't aid fungible, in proxy wars and globalized economies alike?
It's like the West buying Soviet oil during the Cold War. We paid for our weapons, and our economic system paid for theirs too.
No reason for me to complain here, it's not the military's fault. Finally getting around to reading <em>Cobra II</em>. How the &^% is the military supposed to operate in such background? Coldly and with no illusions, I suppose.
Some of the theories developed in the 2000's to deal with Iraq and Afghanistan probably won't be much help in a Syrian civil war with many refugees fleeing to neighboring nations and different fighting factions backed by powerful outside benefactors. A mass of fence-sitters in the middle that just need to be bought off by economic development in order to join a future government may not be the best model. Syria was already pretty developed economically compared to many nations.
So, viewing the world through the lens of small wars and economic development is both too narrow and too broad.
Bill M:
As I thought I had carefully indicated in my comment below, the theory is that transforming outlier states and societies along modern western lines is the way to prevent wars -- and to prevent violent conflicts generally -- of all shapes, sizes, types and varieties (to include internal conflicts and terrorism), regardless of their origin. Forgive me if I did not make that point clear.
The evidence for this theory is said to be the lesser number of such violent conflicts (to include internal conflicts and terrorism but, indeed, violent events of all shapes, sizes, types and/or varieties, regardless of their origin) which occur between and within states and societies who are organized, oriented and configured along modern western lines.
(And while "hate," indeed, may be "real" -- in both the more-modern and the less-modern world -- in states and societies ordered, organized, oriented and configured along modern western lines "hate," if acted on with violence, is outlawed. It is, in fact, a very serious crime, to wit: a "hate crime.")
The lesson we think we have learned over the last decade is not that the theory noted above is incorrect or wrong, but simply that we cannot expect -- as we did initially -- that the subject populations will embrace these outside-initiated state and societal change projects with open arms. This disconnect between belief and reality causing us to devote too many and the wrong type of resources to get these projects done. (A point driven home by the current financial crisis.) Thus, the recent Change 1 ( a "ways and means" adjustment only -- not an "ends" adjustment) which now provides for:
a. More of "them" and less of "us." And
b. More SOF -- less GPF.
As for me, I believe that there may be no good or easy way to solve these problems. The more we press to achieve our goals (to prevent wars, to improve our security, and to achieve greater economic benefit -- by transforming outlier states and societies along modern western lines) the more likely, it would seem, that we are to cause wars (of all shapes, sizes, types and varieties -- to include internal conflicts and terrorism), to endanger our citizenry and to jeapordize our economic well-being.
This suggesting that we should seriously re-consider "the theory" noted above, specifically from the standpoint of:
a. Whether the benefit to be derived from the transformation of all outlier states and societies is worth
b. The cost of that must be paid to achieve such an enormous and all-encompassing goal.
(Herein, consider the perceived "global" nature of the problem -- and the perceived "global" requirement for the solution -- that has recently been articulated.)
Likewise, the cost of not achieving these goals, of course, must also be considered.
Bill, I am painfully familiar witb the argument that jobs and the rule of law will prevent terrorism, but in many cases this has been proven not to work. We too quickly embrace simple ideas and dedicate resources to pursuing them to no end. For some cultural reasons we cannot seem to grasp the concept that hate is real and that providing jobs and establishing a legal system will not make it go away. Do you think we could change the situation in Syria by providing jobs? There are so many underlying issues locally, regionally, and globally that is driving that conflict, yet we think we can simply apply cold war COIN doctrine and win the conflict thru economic development. We are perpetuating myths based on the wrong lessons learnt over the past decade. Furthermore the original article said we could prevent war which is a different animal altogether from internal conflict and terrorism. Instead of repeating what others are saying what do you think will work?
Let me attempt to address both:
a. Red Rat's comment that the role of the military in these "national restructuring" projects (in our case, transforming outlier states and societies along modern western lines) is (IHHO) extremely limited. And
b. Bill M.'s challenge for us to try to put into context and make sense of GEN Petraeus' statements re: " ... an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure ... " and " ... money is ammunition ... "
Admiral McRaven has noted that:
" ... everyone in SOF understands that to build an enduring solution to violent extremism, you must use a whole of government approach centered around many of our SOF core competencies like foreign internal defense, SFA, military information support, civil affairs, as well as unconventional warfare and counter insurgency, when required."
http://www.soc.mil/swcs/SWmag/archive/SW2502/SW2502QAAdmiralWilliamMcRa… (Response to the third question from the top.)
" ... to minimize the rise of radical extremism ... [one must] ... create conditions on the ground where people have good jobs, where there is the rule of law, where there is stability [and] where there is good governance ... from a military standpoint, we can certainly help with the security that will be required to help begin to build that stability ... "
http://www.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=118560 (See the last few paragraphs of this article.)
For Bill M:
The focus of the Admiral on such things as the "whole of government" and "good jobs, the rule of law, good governance," etc., would seem to clarify that "national restructuring" (as per Red Rat) and/or state and societal transformation (as per yours truly) is the job at hand. Thus, should we consider GEN Petraeus' statements regarding "security assistance ... an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure" and "money is ammunition" from this "national restructuring"/"state and societal transformation" perspective also?
For Red Rat:
While the Admiral, in his statements above, would seem to clarify that these "national restructuring" and/or "state and societal transformation" projects are, indeed, (1) the job at hand and (2) the responsibility of "our" and "their" whole of government, could we agree that the Admiral does, indeed, seem to see the role of the military generally and our SOF specifically as being somewhat central to these endeavors?
Is this helpful?
(All of this seeming to clarify that [1] the prevention of war today is still seen through the lense of [2] the transformation of outlier states and societies. The Change 1 to this concept being that the military part of this endeavor will now be done mostly by SOF -- rather than GPF -- for reasons similar to those noted in my comment below.)
Looking at Bill C's first comment and points 'a' and 'b'. Transforming a society to a liberal western style democracy is a political project. Looking at the history of political development imposing democracy is easy, but a liberal democracy assumes a balance of powers between the interested constituents in the society. In societies that transition quickly to democracy before this status quo is achieved all that tends to happenis that a veneer of democracy is given but the fundamental power structure has not changed - Russia, Iraq and Afghanistan are all case in points.
My point is that COIN is one thing, FID is another and national restructuring another. In the latter the role of the military is (IMHO) extremely limited.
A quickly-made response not to Gen Petraeus but rather Bill C:
The theory is, I believe, uniquely affected by a world interdependent economy with shared, yet scarce resources. This makes war between major states like the U.S. and China less likely. However, given a growing population of 3rd world countries trying to modernize in some cases, or restrict modernization in others:
First, the theory:
a. States and societies who are ordered, organized, oriented and configured along modern western lines tend to be wealthier across their entire populations and often possess nuclear weapons; it is believed that these states and societies are (1) less likely to go to war with one another due to MAD and mutually assured economic destruction (MAED) and are (2) also less likely to experience internal conflicts.
b. Thus, it is believed that the best way to "prevent war" is to be preemptive in sanctioning, stabilizing, and deterring 3rd world and rogue states and terrorists whose outlying populations are often irrational or brain-washed. These nation state rulers and non-state actors are not necessarily rational adherents to MAD and don't care about MAED, and may even embrace primitive conditions. Unfortunately, the rulers of such states squander, divert, or steal foreign aid which limits ability to transform the lesser and remaining "outlier" states and societies using western money alone.
Now, the new twist:
a. Due to what should have been expected resistance in trying to make Sunnis/Shiites/Kurds, and Afghan ethnicities coexist in western created irrational boundaries creating illogical nation-states: U.S. attempts to overthrow irrational rulers and governments -- experienced most recently during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan -- led to uniquely expensive warfare and stabilization in large areas with little infrastructure far from ports. Less obvious, less threatening and more efficient ways of helping these outlier states and societies coexist would have been realized if during occupation we had split up these nations into smaller more autonomous states. However, academic idealists and utopian professors without real-world experience breed equally unrealistic state department advisors who believe peace can be created within colonial boundaries through nation-building and attempts to win over radicals and disparate ethnicities through COIN techniques and throwing foreign aid at the problem. They will embrace two-state solutions as a necessity in Israel while refusing to recognize the same need in other areas.
b. Thus, the current proposal re: a "smaller footprint" and the "by, with and through" approach; wherein, our special and other forces are deployed -- early on -- to conduct raids such as in Libya, allow friendly dictators to be replaced by extremists in the case of Egypt, attack terrorist leaders with drones to keep them off-balance, ignore other problems until they gets more serious as in Syria (leading to Israeli action), threaten and sanction without much back-up in the case of Iran (leading to Israeli action), and <strong>deter with force on the ground in Korea where is has worked for 60 years without open conflict.</strong>
We also recognize that we don't need to go it alone. As Gen Petraeus cites, the cooperation of NATO states prevented war with the Soviets during the Cold War...again with massive deterrent ground force forward deployed. It also proved that nations can be stabilized with forward deployed major peacekeeping forces in places like the Balkans and the Sinai. In the Pacific, no extraordinarily costly and dangerous deep penetration of China is required in the event of war. Rather, the other Pacific states need merely band together to deter China.
Forward presence also can deter in the Pacific in recognition that A2/AD strategies are far less effective against dispersed and hardened ground forces already there and air-dropped/air-assaulted onto Taiwan or the Philippines in the event of conflict. A2/AD works against Chinese attempting to cross a hundred miles of Strait if ground forces infiltrate and destroy their lightly armed invasion force and resupply efforts as they try to land and sustain after a long-distance sea invasion. We also merely board and stop their commercial ships with Army and Marine ground forces to end such shenanigans rather than risk nuclear war trying to penetrate Chinese airspace deep into their territory.
We also develop relationships, produce capabilities and handle resistance problems with varying degrees of success in places like Mali and the Philippines where threats are more minor (1) before they get out of hand and (2) in a less overt and obvious manner. As Mali illustrated, sometimes we get it wrong on which side we are supporting/training.
And, thus,
a. The delay of war until what would have been a small war gets far bigger. If we had maintained more forward presence ground forces, there would have been more deterrent against invasions by China/Russia or attempts to threaten Israel or resources in other areas. If we had maintained such presence within boundaries of allies, the cost in blood and treasure would not be excessive.
b. The proliferation of WMD that threatens state and societal transformation by diverting excessive rogue state resources that could be helping their people, and ignoring the one-sided destruction if their WMD are mistakenly used by non-state actors or irrational leaders
c. Eventually leads to major expenditures and loss of life in larger wars and repairs of stateside and European irradiated infrastructure after irrational actors or leaders of rogue states lose control of WMD and they are used against more modern states.
A quickly-made attempt:
The theory is, I believe, the same old theory with a few new twists, as follows:
First, the theory:
a. States and societies who are ordered, organized, oriented and configured along modern western lines; it is believed that these states and societies are (1) less likely to go to war with one another and are (2) also less likely to experience internal conflicts.
b. Thus, it is believed that the best way to "prevent war" is to help transform the lesser and remaining "outlier" states and societies along modern western lines.
Now, the new twist:
a. Due to unexpected resistance re: this state and societal "change" initiative -- experienced most recently during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan -- we now realize that we must find a cheaper, less obvious, less threatening and more efficient way of helping these outlier states and societies make these necessary transitions.
b. Thus, the current proposal re: a "smaller footprint" and the "by, with and through" approach; wherein, our special and other forces are deployed -- early on -- to develop relationships, produce capabilities and handle resistance problems (1) before they get out of hand and (2) in a less overt and obvious manner.
And, thus,
a. The prevention of war
b. To be achieved via state and societal transformation
c. Is accomplished at a more reasonable and acceptable cost/price.
Most of it is standard rhetoric by now, and for the most part I agree with his points. I would like to see some SWJ thoughts on the following quote from the article.
"we will have to place a greater emphasis on security assistance, to enable others to meet their own challenges. Along these lines, it would be wise to recognise that an ounce of prevention will often be worth a pound of cure. And that, in another observation from my days in Iraq, “money is ammunition” – something equally true at a strategic level."
Many of our strategic and theater operational level documents address "prevention" as an objective/goal and offer various ways to prevent conflicts. If we wanted to develop and execute plans to prevent potential conflicts what role should the military play (beyond deterrence)? How does the small footprint approach outlined in our Defense Strategic Guidance prevent conflict? How does security assistance prevent conflict? Please use cause and effect logic, which means proposing a theory on why some nations may go to war with each other, or have internal conflicts with their population, and then how our actions could prevent it from happening.
It too often seems we throw these concepts out without explaining the underlying logic.
Well, Gen P is viewed as one intellectual architect of much that the military has attempted in Afghanistan (and partly Iraq) so perhaps the speech is being viewed within that context.
He offered a string of banalities that seem to be typical of such events. When examined critically, there is no "there" there. I doubt you could get too controversial in such a setting, to be fair to the man.
Small wars have occurred in many settings and to lump everything under that banner is likely too broad to be meaningful in some senses, while useful in others.
It's like the four "laws" of counterinsurgency that are basically fortune cookie aphorisms, seemingly profound until examined critically.
The US has managed to stay out of plenty of conflicts so it is perfectly possible to do so. It's not American isolationism, but, as you stated, a judgment call based on a whole host of other factors.
Restraint is a sign of will and strength too. Only the truly stupid overextend themselves.
For instance, money as "ammunition" means what exactly? It may help to quell violence in one setting while serving as a source of corruption and increase violence in another. At the strategic level, the same problems persist. Sometimes aid "works", sometimes it doesn't. How that is a useful observation beyond the personal experience stated I can't understand. It's perfectly fine as a starting point, but it doesn't go anywhere intellectually.
At any rate, Gian Gentile has a book coming out soon and Douglas Porch too, on COIN, and later in the year, the Mansoor book on the surge, titled, I believe, "Surge."
Well, Amazon/etc keeps reminding me these titles are to be released. Between NSA and Amazon, the net is pretty creepy, isn't it? Maybe the tinfoil hat wearers <em>literally</em> have a point. Does Prada do tinfoil wear?
I am eager to see the substance behind many of the arguments.
kotkinjs1:
Man, you are one tough audience. Gen P. makes some fairly obvious points about not forgetting what we learned, knowing what we are getting into, maintaining a culture of initiative and you jump all over him. You may not like the messenger but the message seemed pretty sensible to me.
In an absolute sense, we do get to choose the wars we fight. We never have to fight any war ever, of course that means we get conquered eventually but we don't have to fight at all. You qualify that statement by saying 'unnecessary wars' but that is viewing things either through the retrospectiscope or through the lens of political judgment. Which means it is all a matter of judgment, one man's needed war is another man's foolish adventure.
Staying out of other people's civil wars is not possible. It is a nice dream, good old fashioned American isolationism, but it isn't possible and hasn't been since the steamship was invented. Most of the conflicts we have been involved in since the end of WWII have been other people's civil wars. We figured rightly or wrongly, a judgment call again, that we had to get mixed up in them so we did. That isn't likely to change.
From the headline of the article I was hoping for some honest reflection and maybe even a mea culpa a la McNamara in 'In Retrospect.' Not to be though. He's still too close to the narrative he wanted to prove and still has got the COIN fantasy all neatly wrapped up and sprinkled with a good dose of ego to see it any differently yet. His last sentence lays the COINdinista party line bare: "And we should never forget that we don’t always get to choose the wars we fight." Yes, general, yes we do....as far as Afghanistan and unnecessary wars like that.....at least when our policymakers get the right information to make the better choice from their supposedly unbiased military advisors....not steamrolled into a false promise that could never be achieved. If there's anything that Afghanistan should teach us that we should be sure we retain is to stay out of other people's civil wars, the military's role is not foreign policy, statecraft, diplomacy, or outright nationbuilding for nationbuilding's sake, and, most importantly, generals should do what they're told by civilian leadership and not create policy on their own when it suits their agenda better.
Some key elements/questions that I wish GEN Petraeus would have addressed/discussed:
1. In what general context will we, today and in the immediate future, be countering insurgencies and/or be supporting rebel groups seeking to topple oppressive regimes? (Or acting by, with and through others to achieve these goals?) Will we:
a. Most likely and in the first instance (countering insurgencies), be helping pro-modern governments put down and defeat anti-modern rebel groups?
b. In the second instance (toppling oppressive regimes), will we, most often, be assisting pro-modern rebel groups defeat and overthrow "oppressive" (anti-modern) regimes?
(The term "modern," in this instance, meaning a way of life and way of governance somewhat similar to our own.)
2. When engaged in "stability operations," does it make any sense -- at this critical moment -- to try to impose one's own entwined political, economic and social system on a government and/or a population? Or have we learned that -- by such an effort -- we are far more likely to guarantee instability rather than stability? This suggesting that we should either:
a. Retain the term "stability operations" but discard the notion that stability can be achieved via the imposition of one's own political, economic and social system. Or
b. Discard, from our lexicon, the term "stability operations" and substitute, therefore, a term (forced state and societal transformation) for the imposition of one's way of life and way of governance on others. (The term "forced state and societal transformation" neither implying nor suggesting that stability is the goal/the priority nor that stability -- via this initiative -- can be readily achieved.)