A Return to Core Competencies: An Argument for a Balanced Approach

A Return to Core Competencies: An Argument for a Balanced Approach

Marc J. Sanborn

“The Army’s officer corps not only must prepare for the war that could begin today but must also anticipate the nature and evolution of future likely conflicts.”[1]  Though these words were written during the Cold War over twenty-five years ago, they ring truer than ever today.  Understanding the potential nature of future conflict must be at the forefront of every military leader’s mind so the United States is adequately postured to face future adversaries, defend the nation, and protect its global interests.  As irregular warfare and counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in Iraq and Afghanistan end, the United States must carefully consider its strategic future. 

Many have argued that the United States, as a matter of policy, should avoid situations that might involve irregular warfare or COIN and focus solely on conventional maneuver warfare.  As an example, Dr. Colin S. Gray, Professor and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, argued that Americans do not possess the political or military skills necessary for irregular warfare and should therefore focus its efforts on conventional, regular warfare.  He concludes that “it would be a political and strategic mistake to identify irregular warfare, COIN especially, as America’s dominant strategic future.”[2]

In addition, throughout the Army there is an eagerness to return to core competencies at the expense of COIN and irregular warfare training.  In the January-March 2013 issue of Armor, LTC Andre L. Mackey writes in an article entitled “How to Eat Steak with a Knife and Fork!” that “our maneuver force needs to return to training the core competencies” because “many critical combat skills of the maneuver force have atrophied.”[3]  The conclusion that the United States should put little strategic focus on irregular warfare and let skills developed over twelve years of war atrophy is imprudent.  The United States’ strategy must continue to include a significant element dedicated to irregular warfare in order to counter likely future threats and to retain hard won knowledge and expertise in irregular warfare. 

The current geopolitical landscape suggests that future threats to United States national security interests will, by their nature, involve irregular warfare.  The likelihood of conventional, large-scale warfare is less likely in an era of global economic interconnectedness.  In The World is Flat, Thomas L. Friedman describes the high financial costs for a globally connected country to go to war.  In the event of war, these countries would lose their place in the global supply chain and consequently lose their economic engines far beyond the length of the war.  As a result, states will be much more cautious in the future when deciding to use conventional military force.[4]   

By no means does the global economy eliminate the threat of conventional war between countries.  It does, however, reduce the likelihood of growing global powers such as Russia, China, or India going to war with their neighbors or the United States due to the potential for substantial economic loss.  In a sense, financial interdependence serves as the twenty-first century version of the Cold War’s Mutually Assured Destruction theory.  On the other hand, countries disconnected from the global economy – Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and much of Africa – will “remain hotspots that could explode at any time.”[5] How will adversaries in these hotspots engage in conflict with the United States?

These adversaries are not likely to engage the United States in head-to-head conflict but will likely use other means to accomplish their objectives.  The United States is, and will continue to be, the most significant military power in the world for the foreseeable future.[6]  As a result, it is unlikely that any adversary will attempt to directly match American military power in a conflict.  It is much more realistic for state adversaries to employ a combination of regular and irregular warfare in order to capitalize on American military weaknesses.[7]  The hybrid threat implies that the United States must be simultaneously prepared for both regular and irregular warfare and be able to transition quickly between the two. 

In addition to state actors, the United States will continue to face non-state terrorists and criminal threats that will require the use of irregular warfare to protect our interests.  Terrorist networks will continue to take advantage of technology to organize themselves to attack the United States and its allies.  Friedman asserts, “Hell hath no fury like a terrorist with a satellite dish and an interactive Web site.”[8]  Criminal networks will also continue to threaten the United States’ national security interests.  For example, the ongoing Mexican drug war and South American drug cartels will continue to pose security issues for the United States.  Dismantling of terrorist and criminal networks requires irregular warfare and simply cannot be done with large-scale military operations.

Given the very real threat of irregular warfare in the future, the United States cannot afford to relearn the lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan in a future conflict. In the past, the United States pursued a similar strategic approach of focusing solely on conventional warfare with unfortunate consequences.  The United States military lost the irregular warfare and counterinsurgency lessons learned in the Vietnam conflict and had to painfully relearn them to fight the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.  In his study of the early phases of Operation Iraqi Freedom, Thomas E. Ricks says that “after it came home from Vietnam, the Army threw away virtually everything it had learned there, slowly and painfully, about how to wage a counterinsurgency campaign.”[9]  After the invasion of Iraq, it took the United States nearly four years to redevelop and employ effective irregular warfare doctrine.  These lessons were relearned with significant tax dollars and many American lives.  

In the future, the United States may not have the fiscal resources or required expertise to quickly adapt to irregular or hybrid warfare from a conventional posture.  For the past decade, the American military enjoyed high defense spending levels and increased troop strengths in reaction to the events of 9/11 and the invasion of Iraq.  The era of unconstrained resources is over.  Defense budgets are shrinking and all of the services have or will be downsizing in the near future.[10]  In addition, as the national debt continues to grow the United States will face further fiscal constraints that could significantly impact future military spending.  Concurrent with these challenges, the military will need to be prepared to fight regular, irregular, and hybrid wars.[11]  Therefore, the United States should make every effort to retain the knowledge gained in Iraq and Afghanistan to be able to quickly transition to irregular warfare.  The unnecessary loss of American lives and financial costs are too great for the United States to have to fight for this knowledge again.

Beyond retaining the irregular warfare lessons learned, the United States must capitalize on them to overcome weaknesses in the American way of war.  Irregular warfare is not something that the United States inherently does well.[12]  For the United States to place little emphasis on irregular warfare because it is not something Americans do well, as Gray suggests, could prove disastrous in light of the potential future threats.  Because of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States has military and civilian personnel with vast knowledge and expertise in irregular warfare tactics, operations, and strategy.  Therefore, the United States has a unique opportunity to overcome its irregular warfare weaknesses by institutionalizing that knowledge and continuing to improve its doctrine.  Combat training centers, professional military education, and home station training must continue to include irregular warfare components to ensure that leaders are adaptive, flexible, and prepared for a wide range of potential future conflicts.  This is only possible, however, if the United States continues to include a significant irregular warfare element in its strategic future. 

This is not to say that irregular warfare should be the United States’ sole focus.  Gray and Mackey correctly note that the United States is not currently postured for regular warfare after focusing for more than a decade on irregular warfare and counterinsurgency.[13]  Regular, large-scale warfare is the strength of the American military and in order to deter aggressors armed with weapons of mass destruction, it must continue to be.[14]  The United States’ strategic pendulum must swing back from a sole focus on irregular warfare towards the traditional American way of war, but not so much as to ignore the very real irregular warfare threat.

The United States must carefully consider its strategic future as its military resets after a decade of war.  That strategy must continue include a significant element dedicated to irregular warfare.  Due to the nature of the globalized world, the probability that the United States will face both state and non-state adversaries that employ irregular or hybrid warfare is much higher than a large-scale, conventional war. In light of these threats, the United States has a unique opportunity to retain and capitalize on irregular warfare lessons learned through the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.  However, to provide an effective deterrent to future aggressors, the United States must also be postured for regular, large-scale warfare.  In order to be prepared for this wide range of threats, the United States should pursue a balanced strategy that is prepared for both regular and irregular warfare.  The challenge for future military leaders will be to maintain competencies in both and be able to quickly transition between the two.