The Wrong Debate: Reflections on Counterinsurgency by Crispin Burke, War on the Rocks.
… FM 3-24 is a far different book than its critics make it out to be. Paradoxes are a poor addition to the book, not because they are inaccurate, but because they tend to be comically over-simplified, and are replete with qualifiers and exceptions. Nevertheless, FM 3-24 does clarify its assertion that “tactical success guarantees nothing” by noting that tactical actions are “important…in achieving security,” though not in and of themselves the only means of success…
Comments
Let us say -- for the sake of argument -- that Gentile, like Clausewitz, looks at war in the old fashioned way, to wit: from the perspective of a state's own selfish desires.
And let us say that Petraeus, et. al, these folks look at war -- and indeed the state -- in a more contemporary manner, to wit: as relates to the wants, needs and desires of the global economy and the world as a whole.
Given these differences in perspective (if accurate), might these gentlemen, due to their differing view as to the purpose of war and, indeed, their differing view as to the purpose of the state; might these gentlemen come to very different conclusions as to how, when, where and why war generally and counterinsurgency specifically should be conducted?
Can this understanding (again if accurate) help to explain, for example, why Gentile and Clausewitz might not pursue nation-building -- or R2P -- whereas Petraeus, et.al, these guys, one might suggest, would?
(Gentile and Clausewitz explaining to Petraeus, et. al, that they must look more closely at whether they have sufficient ways and means to achieve their more lofty and expansive goals.)
There is a SWC thread 'The Col. Gentile collection and debate', with many comments on the colonel's writings and today I added a post with Crispin Burke's review: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=3942
From the reveiw:
"Col. Gentile misses an opportunity to push the conversation forward—in other words, he succeeds at being deconstructive, but not on being constructive. ...
Beyond debunking the “hero” narrative—which consumes the bulk of Col. Gentile’s book — Wrong Turn offers little else. A case in point is Col. Gentile’s take on the Vietnam War. For him, the lesson of Vietnam is that leaders must have “clear-headed thinking about policy and strategy that aligns ways, means, and ends relative to national interests and the potential of our enemies”. This is a frequent mantra from Col. Gentile, but he rarely offers specifics as to which ends, ways, and means. As such, this view of strategy describes everything, yet at the same time, nothing. On the rare occasions on which Col. Gentile enters the realm of strategy, we get platitudes like the US Army must have a “discussion on strategy” – failing to realize that the Army, by its lonesome, does not formulate strategy. That, of course, is a question for the entire US government (which, it should be noted, cannot even pass a balanced budget nor acknowledge that global warming exists.)
If anything, Wrong Turn’s takeaway for leaders is in the final three pages, in which Col. Gentile advises leaders against armed nation-building. Sound advice for future foreign policy endeavors, for certain, but will institutional memory keep these lessons? Thirty years after the fall of Saigon, American forces were battling insurgents in two countries, with no end in sight. Political leaders will ignore this sage advice and our military needs to be prepared to carry out these missions, even if they are unwise."
I think I have said the same thing elsewhere. We need to first, stop fooling ourselves that we are never going to be involved in these types of operations again; second, try to figure out how to do this better within the limitations presented in a post-UN/Universal Human Rights Convention world; or baring that, figure out how to explain to our civilian handlers that trying to accomplished armed democratization is not really a viable solution to the problem at hand.