U.S. Soldiers Find Surprise on Returning to Pech Valley: Peace - Azam Ahmed, New York Times.
… No one is exactly sure how the Afghan forces have managed to make some gains that eluded the Americans for so many years in the Pech Valley. But it presents a sketch portrait of what Afghan-led security might look like in some places after the international military coalition is gone next year.
Interviews with American and Afghan officials and local residents paint the progress as an amalgam of many things: the absence of foreign troops as an irritant, the weakening of the Taliban and an improved Afghan Army. Officials also noted the beginning of de facto agreements in some areas between Afghan soldiers and militants about what is and is not off-limits — not a particularly positive sign, but still an indication of how the battle might change when it is Afghan fighting Afghan...
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Good answer and all is forgiven. I just tire of hearing all the bashing of our military and its role in the successes and failures of this decade-plus of two wars. Unlike you in the quote below, I have no contacts with Generals (although I'm proud/defensive of the 25+ flag officers and hundreds of LTC and COLs that I went to school with who played such a large role in these conflicts) and zero experience on the ground. However, suspect my book-knowledge of many OEF battles and the cultural diversity there far surpasses most historians. So when you say this, I will offer a counterpoint:
<blockquote>General Allen, a man I very much respect... and am proud to know (how do you like that dropped name?) explained in an article that the ANA was the defeat mechanism for this insurgency... I am not so sure... I believe the defeat mechanism to be the local deal... the continuous renegotiation of the social contract in any given area, at any given time in the Texas-sized territory... and it is this fact, the fact that the locals are always renegotiating the local social contract at any given time that makes it a certainty that all our efforts will fail... no matter the fact that we actually succeed in stability operations (or force protection measures on a grand scale) when we have boots on the ground... But as soon as we depart... the locals renegotiate the deal... and all our efforts have been for naught...</blockquote>
The reason I get upset that the military gets blamed for these long wars and continued ethnic in-fighting is that it seems crystal clear that if we had split up Iraq and Afghanistan, many of the stability operations problems would have been solved far more rapidly. The military does not make that call. The military does not get to decide how many forces will be deployed. The military only gets to deal with getting by with what they are allotted.
If warlords return and villages/ethnicities form their own fiefdoms, it will simply be Afghanistan being Afghanistan...a territory that never should have been a single country and a Durand Line that should not exist. The military has <strong>nothing</strong> to do with keeping it that way. Only the State Department and President make such decisions in years past and now we see similar circumstances in Syria and appear to be heading down the same path of trying to retain historical boundaries that make no sense.
Grant,
What organization or person is to be defeated with the ANA defeat mechanism according to Gen Allen? Seems to me that after reading the article, very little could be determined by it. It shouldn't be too shocking to anyone that the ultimate solution (versus defeat mechanism) will be determined by the people of Afghanistan and to some extent regional actors such as Pakistan. I suspect the constant evolution series of solutions over time will be result of much more fighting, dope deals, shifting alliances, temporary agreements, etc.
The question at the end of the day is when we leave Afghanistan (if we leave), will the environment have been changed in a way that is to our strategic advantage (a better peace, but obviously short of that) compared to what existed prior to us going in? Was that change worth 10 plus years of blood and treasure?
Before answering consider the full ramifications regionally and globally of our coalition's efforts. I haven't formed a strong opinion yet, but there were some positives from getting much of the world to act in concert in pursuit of a common cause against a common evil in a way that could expand a common effort well beyond the borders of Afghanistan. On the other hand perceived failure and lack of trust will undermine the trust in U.S. leadership in the future, which is already apparent in the Syrian situation.
The world and our people are rightly leery of Western imposed solutions (democracy imposed by bayonets and sanctions) on foreign societies that never seem to work, so I think the take away is if we want to sustain our position as a global leader we need to be honest and set realistic goals with correlating expectations. This way the coalition will have a much better chance of achieving success, and success brings confidence and further cooperation. The military should work with the interagency and international community to facilitate achievable objectives based on a rational policy. Over the long run our diplomatic efforts can endeavor to shape outlier states and non-state actors in an attempt to achieve more aspirational goals, these goals will be achieved at different paces if at all, but most importantly they can't be imposed by force in a way that will last.
Move Forward.... please... no need to be so defensive... the "arrogance hides stupidity" comment is directed at the author of the piece ... NOT ISAF or the US Army in toto... in the words of Michel de Montaigne “All I say is by way of discourse, and nothing by way of advice. I should not speak so boldly if it were my due to be believed.” ...
Debating whether an existing U.S. exit strategy will work is waste of time because it's the locals who will decide. What our exist strategy must do is ensure that we depart the AO with some semblance of frontier prestige intact... if not... every two-bit warlord will know that it's open season on the paper tiger. I submit by way of discourse that the locals will most likely revert back to traditional means of renegotiating the social contract... Renegotiating the social contract in the Texas-sized territory is a national past time. I understand that it is very hard for us to accept the notion that negotiated ceasefires only last as long as they are beneficial to one or the other parties involved... We would like them to last forever but they don't... How many times are we forced to listen to our politicians, political pundits or arm-chair strategists tell us that it is our responsibility to "make sure that this or that NEVER happens again"... The only thing that is certain in the Texas-sized territory is that everything is open for renegotiation. A negotiated ceasefire and or a negotiated relationship between government forces and local fighters will be renegotiated as soon as the military commander in charge of an area is reassigned... or when the local Taliban commander hands over his duties and responsibilities to his most capable son or relative... or after an internal power-struggle has been initiated or settled or one or the other side feels himself in a more advantages position vis-a-vis his rival or a provincial governor creates a powerful patronage system and marches on Kabul... or.. or... or...
I've been asking for a long time now what is the defeat mechanism in the Texas-sized territory? General Allen, a man I very much respect... and am proud to know (how do you like that dropped name?) explained in an article that the ANA was the defeat mechanism for this insurgency... I am not so sure... I believe the defeat mechanism to be the local deal... the continuous renegotiation of the social contract in any given area, at any given time in the Texas-sized territory... and it is this fact, the fact that the locals are always renegotiating the local social contract at any given time that makes it a certainty that all our efforts will fail... no matter the fact that we actually succeed in stability operations (or force protection measures on a grand scale) when we have boots on the ground... But as soon as we depart... the locals renegotiate the deal... and all our efforts have been for naught...
We are a template people... Hence my comment... arrogance hides stupidity.
Man-hugs,
MAC
Before we bash ISAF and U.S. Army stupidity and congratulate the ANA for its superiority let's examine the total recent history of the area. The first time we turned the valley over to the ANA, they stripped the bases, sold what they could, and left the place a disaster. This 2 year old article implies that we left in March 2009, yet had to return 4 months later imposing the PEP program of embedded U.S. troops with the ANA.
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Military/2011/0831/Will-US-exit-strategy-w…
If the link doesn't work, google the Christian Science Monitor article: Will US exist strategy work in Afghanistan? Brutal valley emerges as test.
I'm assuming the picture in the current article is of our troops looking at the former Camp Blessing which now is a COP rather than a FOB. However, note that they cite that the ANA there today is not the same one of two years ago when the 101st was there. This is a perfect example of how it took the long haul for a nonexistent ANA to become a progressively better fighting and negotiating force. In the old days, they simply would have run or cowered low in fighting positions as exemplified by nearby Wanat (former Camp Blessing is 5 miles south of Wanat) and COP Keating. The new article also cites better leadership of the local ANA which takes time to identify and develop.
Note also that this appears to be an ANA success, the centralized ANSF versus the local ALP that the SF are building. They also refrained from going into Korengal valley which was too hard for even our SF and 173rd Airborne and was replete with timber smugglers thus violating national policy, as do the nearby Wanat Waigal valley residents who smuggle gems. Its hard to win hearts and minds when you outlaw their means of making a living.
It remains to be seen if negotiated ceasefires last when we leave. However, most certainly it is heartening to see a stronger ANA able to address main efforts throughout Afghanistan. That is the primary difference between a strictly ALP strategy that may lead to future warlords and ethnic/tribal/valley/village separation from the main state. Only the ANSF (and GPF US Army) can withstand a concentrated massing of effort over Texas-sized territory by whatever forces in Pakistan decide to overthrow the 2014 Afghan government.
Grant and McCallister,
Interesting back-and-forth. During most of 2010, I worked in Kunduz under the Regional-Command of the North, handled by the Bundeswehr. As I was reading this article, I was smiling at how similar in sound these off-limits areas, etc. were with the tenor of what the German military patrol and intelligence officers told me about so often.
The Germans fit their COIN strategy into those local parameters. From the standpoint of working well and making progress in the villages, it worked (at least for the short time I was there). I tried to communicate this progress and the approach behind it to my civilian chain in the Embassy. Many appreciated what the Germans were doing.
This German response was pretty uniform since the civilians and military worked together well, especially in a relatively restive district populated by Pashtuns. Nonetheless, the USG 'check-list' ruled, less because of arrogance -- and not at all because of laziness because my buds worked hard -- than because of USG funding and contracting regulations to be met.
Ned McDonnell,
Peace Corps-Mexico.
And many of our allies were doing the same and we made fun of them as well- while they enjoyed very little to no loss of life and relatively strong development in their AOs.
I'll never forget an ANCOP kandak packing up and moving in a miles-long convoy of Toyota pickups from Kabul to Helmand with 5 days notice and not one TIC or KIA on the way. But, we measured it as a failure due to them not doing a METL analysis, METL-based training prior to deploying, MDMP, or a movement plan or rock-drill. The second kandak did all of that- because we forced them to- and they had a month to prepare. That kandak got hit three times and lost personnel. But, we called that successful because they met our checklist of important things to do. One comment made afterwards: "well, that first kandak commander probably paid someone to let them pass safely."
Arrogance hides most stupidity. As if the Afghans know nothing of the Art of War and Peacemaking. After ten years of interacting with the locals what have we learned? It appears that the real defeat mechanism of this insurgency is the local deal. But instead of embracing this fact we scoff at the idea of de-facto agreements between Afghan soldiers and local fighters as “not a particularly positive sign.”
Government forces have set up more than a dozen new outposts and checkpoints farther into the valley in a bid to secure the main road that runs through the Pech Valley through Nangalam. If the smaller outposts and checkpoints have not been attacked this might imply that a local truce is in effect and that some profit sharing between government and local fighters from a local security or road usage tax is on-going as well.
The local deal is exactly the method through which local commanders accomplish their mission against enemy opposition and have done so for millennia. If we actually had some serious scholarship on the Afghan Art of War and Peacemaking… we might not respond quite so condescendingly to local ways of warfighting and peacemaking. Instead, we lament the fact that no one is exactly sure how the Afghan forces have managed to make gains that eluded the Americans for so many years in the Pech Valley.