Syria Statement by the International Crisis Group.
Assuming the U.S. Congress authorises them, Washington (together with some allies) soon will launch military strikes against Syrian regime targets. If so, it will have taken such action for reasons largely divorced from the interests of the Syrian people. The administration has cited the need to punish, deter and prevent use of chemical weapons - a defensible goal, though Syrians have suffered from far deadlier mass atrocities during the course of the conflict without this prompting much collective action in their defence. The administration also refers to the need, given President Obama's asserted "redline" against use of chemical weapons, to protect Washington's credibility - again an understandable objective though unlikely to resonate much with Syrians. Quite apart from talk of outrage, deterrence and restoring U.S. credibility, the priority must be the welfare of the Syrian people. Whether or not military strikes are ordered, this only can be achieved through imposition of a sustained ceasefire and widely accepted political transition.
To precisely gauge in advance the impact of a U.S. military attack, regardless of its scope and of efforts to carefully calibrate it, by definition is a fool's errand. In a conflict that has settled into a deadly if familiar pattern - and in a region close to boiling point - it inevitably will introduce a powerful element of uncertainty. Consequences almost certainly will be unpredictable. Still, several observations can be made about what it might and might not do:
- A military attack will not, nor can it, be met with even minimal international consensus; in this sense, the attempt to come up with solid evidence of regime use of chemical weapons, however necessary, also is futile. Given the false pretenses that informed the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq and, since then, regional and international polarisation coupled with the dynamics of the Syrian conflict itself, proof put forward by the U.S. will be insufficient to sway disbelievers and skepticism will be widespread.
- It might discourage future use of chemical weapons by signaling even harsher punishment in the event of recidivism - an important achievement in and of itself. Should the regime find itself fighting for its survival, however, that consideration might not weigh heavily. Elements within the opposition also might be tempted to use such weapons and then blame the regime, precisely in order to provoke further U.S. intervention.
- It could trigger violent escalation within Syria as the regime might exact revenge on rebels and rebel-held areas, while the opposition seeks to seize the opportunity to make its own gains.
- Major regional or international escalation (such as retaliatory actions by the regime, Iran or Hizbollah, notably against Israel) is possible but probably not likely given the risks involved, though this could depend on the scope of the strikes.
- Military action, which the U.S. has stated will not aim at provoking the regime's collapse, might not even have an enduring effect on the balance of power on the ground. Indeed, the regime could register a propaganda victory, claiming it had stood fast against the U.S. and rallying domestic and regional opinion around an anti-Western, anti-imperialist mantra.
Ultimately, the principal question regarding a possible military strike is whether diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflict can be reenergized in its aftermath. Smart money says they will not: in the wake of an attack they condemn as illegal and illegitimate, the regime and its allies arguably will not be in a mood to negotiate with the U.S. Carefully calibrating the strike to hurt enough to change their calculations but not enough to prompt retaliation or impede diplomacy is appealing in theory. In practice, it almost certainly is not feasible.
Whether or not the U.S. chooses to launch a military offensive, its responsibility should be to try to optimize chances of a diplomatic breakthrough. This requires a two-fold effort lacking to date: developing a realistic compromise political offer as well as genuinely reaching out to both Russia and Iran in a manner capable of eliciting their interest - rather than investing in a prolonged conflict that has a seemingly bottomless capacity to escalate.
In this spirit, the U.S. should present - and Syria's allies should seriously and constructively consider - a proposal based on the following elements:
- It is imperative to end this war. The escalation, regional instability and international entanglement its persistence unavoidably stimulates serve nobody's interest.
- The only exit is political. That requires far-reaching concessions and a lowering of demands from all parties. The sole viable outcome is a compromise that protects the interests of all Syrian constituencies and reflects rather than alters the regional strategic balance;
- The Syrian crisis presents an important opportunity to test whether the U.S. and the Islamic Republic of Iran can work together on regional issues to restore stability;
- A viable political outcome in Syria cannot be one in which the current leadership remains indefinitely in power but, beyond that, the U.S. can be flexible with regards to timing and specific modalities;
- The U.S. is keen to avoid collapse of the Syrian state and the resulting political vacuum. The goal should thus be a transition that builds on existing institutions rather than replaces them. This is true notably with respect to the army;
- Priority must be given to ensuring that no component of Syrian society is targeted for retaliation, discrimination or marginalisation in the context of a negotiated settlement.
Such a proposal should then form the basis for renewed efforts by Lakhdar Brahimi, the joint United Nations/Arab League envoy, and lead to rapid convening of a Geneva II conference.
Debate over a possible strike - its wisdom, preferred scope and legitimacy in the absence of UN Security Council approval - has obscured and distracted from what ought to be the overriding international preoccupation: how to revitalise the search for a political settlement. Discussions about its legality aside, any contemplated military action should be judged based on whether it advances that goal or further postpones it.
Comments
IMO one of our major problems is how our motives are perceived by the Syrians, their immediate neighbors and the Third world in general. The simple fact of the matter is when someone like Kerry (who unlike Powell I found very convincing) makes a fine speech most non-westerners will believe he is lying.
Your average westerner will shake their head and wonder how anyone could possibly doubt the evidence and the appalling spectacle of civilians choking to death. But that is where growing up in the Third world and the First world gives a different insight into the motives of someone who is attempting to justify some form of action in response to a complete stranger’s horrible death.
In the Third world people die horribly painful deaths all the time. Not from war or violence but from sepsis. You get a small wound on the foot and three weeks later you can have died a slow and horrendous death. A wound to the torso will take a week to kill you but owing to trauma to lungs and stomach is even more painful. The bacterium slowly devours you - unlike Sarin which kills in 20 minutes. If you can live for the next 24 hours you should survive being gassed by Sarin. Sepsis on the other hand gets stronger by the hour. In other words compared to untreated Sepsis Sarin is a lucky break.
Your average westerner would refuse to believe nothing could be worse than dying within minutes of exposure to a toxic agent but in the Third world painful lingering death in times of complete peace is commonplace. As it was for the entire world up until 100 years ago.
Until the invention of non-perishable penicillin death from sepsis was the fate of wounded soldiers since the beginning of human conflict. Sparing your comrades suffering is where the act of a ‘coup de grace’ originates. The suffering is so horrendous your best friend puts a bullet in your brain. You can’t carry them or place them on pack animals as the rocking to and fro breaks up the purifying wound and is agonizing for the whole unit. Medevac is the only option and that is something only a westerner can get (LRRPs excluded). For the rest of the world it’s not even a dream.
IMO this polar difference in familiarity to painful death is a huge credibility barrier in citing the use of Sarin as justification for military action in Syria.
During the previous two years 100,000 people have died in Syria, many women and children. Owing to the lack of medical care many would have died painfully from the ravages of sepsis. In the mind’s eye of those folk who actually matter, where were Kerry and Co’s fine words when those long dead women and children were withering in agony? That may seem harsh and I personally believe he is sincere but who gives a shit what one more patronizing westerner thinks?
What they want to know is what has suddenly changed? As far as they are concerned this horrible war is no different to what it was last week, last month, last year.
RC
This is a little too pie in the sky for my tastes, having a strategy based on unrealistic assumptions is the equivalent to not having a strategy at all.
Ultimately this conflict may end with some sort of political agreement, but it sure as heck doesn't have to. If the insurgents and external actors are effective at tossing Assad out a political agreement among all the warring factions will most likely be a long time coming. The civil war in Lebanon lasted 15 years after foreign intervention, and the peace based on a political settlement is fragile to say the least. When Saddam fell that unleashed a civil war that still rages 10 later with no sign of an end in sight. Syria is not Lebanon or Iraq, but there are certainly similarities, and we should study the history of past interventions to try to discern why they failed, and then study the current situation and come up with a viable theory on why intervention could work this time.
From the ICG statement:
"5. The U.S. is keen to avoid collapse of the Syrian state and the resulting political vacuum. The goal should thus be a transition that builds on existing institutions rather than replaces them. This is true notably with respect to the army;"
That was obviously true in Iraq in foresight and hindsight, since the Army was a respected institution. Is the Army a respected institution in Syria? They have been at war with the majority of its population for two years. If the Army collapses that will leave security to multiple militias fighting for power, and no doubt some will pillage and rape, it is the nature of warriors in war. Not all armies reflect the professional values of Western Armies.
"6. Priority must be given to ensuring that no component of Syrian society is targeted for retaliation, discrimination or marginalisation in the context of a negotiated settlement."
In a perfect world I agree, but in the less the perfect world we live in just how the hell are we supposed to ensure this? We couldn't stop reprisals in Europe or Asia after WWII ended, in fact the reprisals resulted in more deaths for some countries than the war itself.
If our intent (though we now seem to be stepping away from regime change) is to provide enough support enabling the insurgents to dispose of Assad, we better be prepared to deploy significant forces to establish protected zones for the various ethnic and political groups if we want to limit the reprisals, if we don't then we'll be watching the bloody retaliations on Al Jazeera for months to come.
There are no good options unless we can develop a consensus with Russia, Iran, and the Arab states and act in concert instead of all waging their proxy wars. How realistic is that? I don't know, I don't know if anyone is even trying, or if our hawks in Congress would pre-empt this effort.
In a perfect world the ICG's 6 points would be what everyone should be striving for. And I agree the solution has to be political.
Quote: "Whether or not the U.S. chooses to launch a military offensive, its responsibility should be to try to optimize chances of a diplomatic breakthrough. This requires a two-fold effort lacking to date: developing a realistic compromise political offer as well as genuinely reaching out to both Russia and Iran in a manner capable of eliciting their interest - rather than investing in a prolonged conflict that has a seemingly bottomless capacity to escalate."
But like so much criticism of US foreign policy, why is it assumed that the US is not genuinely reaching out to both Russia and Iran? What about Russia and Iran's ability to reach out genuinely? Have their efforts been any more genuine that the US?
One of the things about this entire crisis that is interesting to me is that despite all the criticism of the United States (even in the ICG statement regarding US evidence be suspect based on Iraqi WMD in 2003) countries around the world and groups like the ICG still seek if not demand US leadership in crisis. All of the burden of responsibility for Syria and getting out of the current situation seems to rest on the shoulders of the United States: not the regional organizations, not Russia or China or Saudi Arabia, not the UN, but only the United States. Every other country or organization seems to abdicate leadership and responsibility and all turn to the US to "do something."
I wonder, given recent history (or despite recent history) of US involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, the war on terrorism, NSA surveillance and everything else that the US is criticized for, if regardless of what we do in the Syrian situation (strike or not strike, with or without Congressional approval, etc) will the international community still come to the US for leadership in the next crisis? I think based on the history of the last couple of decades that they will. Despite intense political criticism of US decisions (or lack of decisions) and actions (or non-actions) the international community will keep coming to the US though I think the primary reason my be that there is no other country or organization in the international community who is willing to step up.
Which leads me to the thought that in the Congressional debate that will soon take place that perhaps we should not be worrying so much about "credibility" and reputation and get down to really working out substantive policies and a strategy with balance and coherency amongst ends, ways, and means.
A quick response to the others in thirty words or less:
1. Rant Corp., I am not scared of death but the prospect of dying makes a cissy out of me.
2. Bill M., Whatever we do, or not do, has material risks, the consequences of doing nothing are apt to be worse.
3. Dave Maxwell, notwithstanding to whatever degree the criticism toward the U.S. is valid, I shudder at the prospect of the last hundred years without an America in it.
4. jcustis, I am with you -- perhaps the dialogue with Iran and Russia could come through soldiers / officers; more pragmatic, less ideological.
Thanks all.
I agree with this statement. The delay in a U.S. response has been too long. Understanding the concern, cited by others, that the military gets the man's share of the blame unfairly (an assertion with which I agree, at least with respect to the non-coms, lieutenants and captains out in the field), this temporizing is squarely the responsibility of a civilian leadership loath toward intervention. While that is understandable, what is a shame is that any measures taken at the order of the Commander-in-Chief will likely be ineffectual, though the same measures, implemented a year or eighteen months ago might well have lessened the suffering of the Syrians.
All that is to say the following. In the time required for Congress to convene, the President can walk softly and carry a big stick by flying older drones (without state-of-the art technologies) around key residences and fly an attack squadron low, over military installations of the country. Hopefully, these gesture will be the vaunted shot across the bow that will let the powers in place know that they are vulnerable, that is, if the U.S. and France (better, N.A.T.O.) mean business, the régime will not only be shorter-lived but largely dead.
In the same interim, with the stick brandished, the U.S. and France can pull out the carrot, (e.g., the one contained in my thoughts), which is in line with what I have satated in this forum before.
http://nedmcdletters.blogspot.mx/2013/08/letter-83-thoughts-on-syria-ca…
Quick housekeeping note. You will find the type-set to be different in a couple of places. These odd looking statements represent additions of thoughts I had intended to include originally, the omission of which were material. These changes went in before I heard the President's announcement about taking the issue to Congress, which, I believe is the right thing for him to do.
This warrants two thumbs up! Making it happen remains the fundamental problem.
I do like the novel approach of recognizing Iran's interests, and looking at this problem from the point of engagement vice confrontation. I think it is easier to manage the problem, instead of striking and hoping Iran behaves in a manner we predicted.