Five Takeaways from a Decade of War by James Kitfield, Defense One.
… three senior retired generals offered their own thoughts on battlefield lessons. Here are five takeaways from the discussion by Gen. James Cartwright, former vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Gen. Peter Chiarelli, former vice chief of the Army; and Gen. Ronald Fogleman, former chief of staff of the Air Force…
Comments
"What did they learn strategically about the fundamental nature of these conflicts ... "
Might this suffice as an answer: They (the generals) learned that -- whether acting on their own, as part of a whole-of-government effort or even as part of a coalition of nations -- they cannot, minus (1) an exceptional degree of ruthlessness and/or (2) an extraodinary expenditure of treasure (time, money, soldiers, political capital, etc.) expect to change the political, economic or social structure of other states and societies in any meaningful way.
Well, that was disappointing. Three senior generals, and their top points are all procedural or tactical.
I wonder if any have any thoughts as to why, despite all of the hard work of the servicemembers under their respective commands, that the best we were able to achieve were temporary, tactical suppression of the symptoms of deeper problems either unleashed or caused by our actions. What did they learn about the nature of the conflicts they commanded in, what are their thoughts as to why our efforts are failing and what we should either do, or not do, in the future to advance/secure our interests without such a long, bloody, expensive, and ultimately failed, response?
What did they learn strategically about the fundamental nature of these conflicts we unleashed, stirred vigorously, suppressed temporarily, and then left to their own devices once we declared victory and went home?
Morgan, my thoughts on your comments reagarding the five points:
1. A lofty and worthy goal, but won't happen. A number of reasons would negate efforts towards this; the resistance from general officers to concur, the natural inclination of leaders to want to have what I consider 'too much information' during combat operations, leadership 'knowing' what is better for the guys on the ground - i.e. declined call for fire missions for CPT Swenson and his bunch or much further back the declined requests for tents/boots/winter gear for T.E. Lawrence when he was in the mountains with his Arab forces (rationale: British HQ knew they were in the desert...doesn't get cold there of course). I concur with you additional information should facilitate your point, but would submit that leadership gets addicted to everything from radio SITREPs to real-time viewing of combat operations on huge flat screen television in some Tactical Operations Center.
2. Agree augmentation has taken place and worked - in theater, however that is going to be the extent of it. The natural deployment cycle of GPS vice SOF cannot be synched due to the very nature of the mission differences. Further, the dynamic nature of SOF deployments isn't limited to purely combat operations; one must factor in JCET operations and non-standardized operations which cannot be dovetailed with standardized big army training schedules.
3. I haven't seen a break-out of the purported $2M cost/deployed person in theater, but have always argued against the CONUS-comfort efforts that are provided to deployed forces. However, with regard to costs on healthcare I know of many Army installations that provide drug coverage for retirees but not any further medical care - to include checkups once prescriptions run out. Lots of out-of-pocket expenses for retirees makes me want to see the spread sheet that one general refers to as ‘personnel being 40% of DoD costs’ - this may lead back to my point on deployment costs. Those costs aside, I would submit that our national psyche will not allow us to employ an Americanized version of the French Foreign Legion albeit staffed by contractors.
4. Tricky part here would be to define your use of "decisive outcome." You can kill some bad guys and win an engagement but that tactical win cannot be used to replace cogent strategic goals (if they have been defined!). With regard to your question in this paragraph I would respond "no", not only because I question the efficacy of the premise (including some of my thoughts above) but the idea leads to extend the fallacy that exists in both the minds of many military leaders as well as our civilian population; smarter/cooler/faster enables a reduced US footprint that can 'logically' overwhelm an opponent who isn't as technologically savvy. There is a saying in Army Special Forces: You equip the man, you don't man the equipment. This should not be dismissed.
5. Current PME has so few hours dedicated to SOF missions/capabilities familiarization it is shameful - that should change. I think rather than a standardized, 'one size fits all' period of instruction on "how to run an occupied country with a military government" we will be light years ahead if we can change our expectation management and our benchmarks for identifying success; we must recognize that when we involve our country in conflict, we are not always going to be bringing democracy/freedom/starbucks/bikinis to that country. T.E. Lawrence recognized and advised us to let the other guys do it rather than doing it ourselves (perfectly?!). We, as a nation and as a military, have to embrace the idea that something in a foreign land can be 'good enough', at which point we can disengage and not become inexorably entangled in that which we do not necessarily need to fix. Do we need another organization - I would say absolutely not; we have enough outfits whose stove-piped and selfish disregard for sharing information already muddies our waters. A huge (unpleasant) restructuring with a whole lot less 'cooks in the kitchen' would be a better approach to this.
Just a few of my thoughts, thanks for your post.
Just thought of a possible 6th take-away.....the unavoidable need for the US to operate as part of a coalition in order to project an image of "unity", create an image of "legitimacy" both at home and abroad, and reduce the need to deploy even more US forces. We need allies, especially the ones we work with on a routine basis. Given this, should we expand opportunities for exchanges between US forces and our allies, including allowing allied members (like the UK, Aus, NZ, Can) to command US units....companies, battalions, brigades.....and serve on US staffs? Should we try to bring in more allied members to serve as instructors in our PME system? What about non-allied members (Pakistan, Russia, China, etc).....their perspectives might be the ones we really want to hear about.
To go even further, is it possible, or sensible, to create standing coalition units perhaps modeled on the Franco-German brigade.....North American Brigade consisting of US and Canadian battalions, an Atlantic Brigade made up of BNs from the US, UK, & Canada.....Pacific BDE with US, Australian, and NZ BNs.....which will ensure coalition participation in future efforts but also serve as a built-in restraint because of coalition concerns...?
I need to get to sleep before more ideas flood my brain.
Based on the 5 Take-Aways, should we look at:
- Information Age war: More information available to more levels, including lower levels like “the strategic corporal” means the ability to reduce overhead and get rid of more general officers and their headquarters, flatten organizations and decision-making capabilities, which may allow for more rapid responses given the decreased number of overseers, yes?
- New jointness: This synergy can be seen in Village Stability Operations (VSO) where SOF elements are augmented by general purpose forces (GPF) in what is traditionally an SF/ SOF mission set. Based on this and other examples of GPF/ SOF cooperation, should we standardize the concept of GPF (mainly squads and platoons) augmenting ODAs and other SOF elements and train like this?
- Al-Volunteer Force: It takes time to expand and lots of money to maintain and care for (medical, retirement health benefits) meaning we have to maximize their capabilities while we also husband this limited asset. Should we look at increasing the use of contractors, perhaps even issue Letters of Marque and Reprisal to private military companies (PMC) for specific and limited engagements; or organize and field a limited numbers of units led by US military leaders but manned by foreigners (at reduced but tax-free pay)? Politically questionable certainly but more cost-effective in the long-run, yes?
- Precision strike: More information made available at greater speed resulting in more rapid decision-making coupled with weapons of incredible precision = smaller forces with greatly increased ability to create a decisive outcome. Does this justify even greater reductions in forces (manpower) in exchange for more spending and increased reliance on precision weapons and other high-tech?
- COIN: We don’t like it and our enemies know this so they will choose this when engaging us. As this requires a whole-of-government approach, is a new organization needed (like the recently proposed Office of Contingency Operations)? Does our PME need to include a heavy dose of non-military related instruction and/ or emphasis on civil governance (read “How to run an occupied country with a military government”)?