Avoid Change For Its Own Sake: Ground Force Unification by Christopher Barber, CIMSEC.
The inevitable fiscal crunch that is staring the U.S. military down has the Pharisees of the defense industry, think tanks, and senior military leaders all rabble-rousing about the need for change. Some of that change is strategic. Asia Pacific pivot anyone? Other bits of it reside in the acquisitions department, as we see with the pros and cons of developing “revolutionary” weapons systems to confront “new” threats. The most harrowing changes for military leaders are the all too well known cuts to manpower that will come in some fashion, no matter the logic, or lack thereof, which delineates how those cuts will happen. There is more change in the air than cordite after an end of fiscal year shooting range, but it is important to reflect on some history in order to avoid stepping on the same proverbial rakes that have smacked our national security establishment in the face during previous draw-downs…
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<blockquote>And we have elements in the defense industry who long for a return to our free-spending years in Iraq and Afghanistan and view a war in Syria as a great way to beat the sequester.</blockquote> - Ralph Peters, NYP
http://nypost.com/2013/08/27/obamas-third-war/
Unless it's big logistics contracts, trigger pullers don't put extra change in greedy pockets, I guess. Only the American people can change priorities in this way and how many odd balls like me are paying attention? (I don't think I'm an oddball but that's the vibe I get when I tell friends that I am interested in these issues. Why? Everyone else has their "issue" that they pay attention to, why is it weird for a civilian like me to care?)
I don't have a clue as to who is getting the better of this argument although I am sympathetic to the larger points on strategy that Jeong Lee makes in another piece posted here at SWJ.
However, I remember having a similar conversation with someone who does know more about this stuff than me and we had the following email exchange (it's a small part of it, anyway):
<blockquote>The United States has had a structural manpower management issue since 1919 (and a prolonged management issue going back to 1763). As a way of making war more politically palatable after our brief but bloody experience in WWI, non-combat positions swelled. Fewer than 1 in 10 members of the American military came under enemy fire during WWII. Some of this was through replacing manpower with firepower but some of it was just keeping people with connections out of battle. Attrition rates among riflemen were high and the Army's individual replacement system:</blockquote>
How does this fit into the larger conversation of consolidation? (I have no particular knowledge about any of these topics but I am a worrier by nature and see both points of view because, in a way, we are talking apples and oranges, aren't we? Don't know, that's why I'm asking.)