Pentagon Proposes Pre-World War II Level for Army by Thom Shanker and Helene Cooper, New York Times
Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel plans to shrink the United States Army to its smallest force since before the World War II buildup and eliminate an entire class of Air Force attack jets in a new spending proposal that officials describe as the first Pentagon budget to aggressively push the military off the war footing adopted after the terror attacks of 2001.
The proposal, described by several Pentagon officials on the condition of anonymity in advance of its release on Monday, takes into account the fiscal reality of government austerity and the political reality of a president who pledged to end two costly and exhausting land wars. A result, the officials argue, will be a military capable of defeating any adversary, but too small for protracted foreign occupations…
Comments
I agree. We need to cut numbers and concentrate on readiness. Some of the "tail" that we have now we are not going to get rid of, but it could be shifted to the VA where it belongs.
I guess I would rather see a smaller, better equiped and trained force than a large marginally equiped, poorly trained force. But you have to be willing to reduce the size of the force ...
"Of DoD’s $150 billion request for compensation in 2013, more than $90 billion would go to basic pay, food and housing allowances, bonuses, and various types of special pay. Another $16 billion would go to accrual payments that account for the future pensions of current service members who will retire from the military (generally after at least 20 years of service). In 2012, DoD paid 34 cents for each dollar of basic pay for active personnel and 24 cents for each dollar of basic pay for reserve personnel.
The remainder of DoD’s request for compensation in 2013—roughly $40 billion—would cover health benefits. Whereas 1.4 million military personnel serve on active duty, a total of nearly 10 million people are eligible for military health benefits. In addition to active-duty military personnel, the people who have access to health benefits include eligible family members of those personnel, retired military personnel and their eligible family members, survivors of service members who died while on active duty, and some members of the reserves and National Guard." http://www.cbo.gov/publication/43574
So, if we reduce the number of people on active duty down from the 1.4 million we have, only then we reduce these numbers and increase the amount availble for training and equipment.
There is also a lot of excess in the remaining. The DOD budget in FY14 was $562 Billion. Take away the $150 Billion for pay and benifits and you still have $412 Billion that went for something. A lot of that is civilian and contractors. I have been unable to issolate those costs with a simple google search.
In any case, it seems we are talking out of both sides of our mouth. On one hand we are arguing that we can't afford to reduce the number of soldiers and on the other we are arguing that we can't afford the cost of the number of soldiers we have. I assume that it is better politically to argue that cutting DOD's budget is tantamount to hurting the troops than it is to argue that cutting the DOD budget is tantamount to hurting DOD contractors profits.
But 30-40% of your operating and maintenance budget is 30-40% not available for weapons, munition or for that matter training.
When the Tricare system came into being it was strictly for active duty and then it spread to virtually anyone to include retirees.
But then I guess the DoD has unlimited budgets going forward to absorb these costs.
We got so use to having unlimited OCO funds---it is going to be hard to adjust.
Personnel costs at 30-40% of the budget is within the bounds of what most other industries have for expenses.
Yes, healthcare costs are eating a larger share of the budget and its alarming, as it is for every other employer in America. Thats a nationwide healthcare problem which isn't going to get fixed by DOD budgeting.
I did a "back of a napkin" calculation once, and after adjusting up SOF forces it looked like this:
"I am guessing that the Army really does not want to do this. “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense” (“Priorities”) lists ten Primary Missions of the U.S. Armed Forces, but “[t]he overall capacity of U.S. forces, however, will be based on requirements that the following subset of missions demand: counter terrorism and irregular warfare; deter and defeat aggression; maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent; and defend the homeland and provide support to civil authorities.” Of those four, the only one that requires a large Army contingent is “deter and defeat aggression”. Under that heading the capabilities are defined loosely as a “win one, hold one” requirement. “As a nation with important interests in multiple regions, our forces must be capable of deterring and defeating aggression by an opportunistic in one region even when our forces are committed to a large-scale operation elsewhere” This does not mean that Soldiers on the ground will be required to deter or defeat the opportunistic aggressor. “Even when the U.S. forces are committed to large scale operations in one region, they will be capable of denying the objectives of – or imposing unacceptable costs on – an opportunistic aggressor in a second region.” Arguably, imposing unacceptable costs could be effected without large scale maneuver elements on the ground.
So, the Active Duty Army needs to be able to fight one major regional war while assisting in deterring or defeating an opportunistic aggressor. The size of a force I have seen several places for fighting one major regional war is five divisions, roughly 90,000 troops. With support, we can bring it to 200,000 for one year or less. Why one year or less? In part, because any war that will last longer than that will certainly require additional reserve units and in part because the language of the “Priorities” indicates that operations for “an extended period” will include mobilized forces. What do we need for the opportunistic aggressor? Well, we haven’t committed the Marines yet. But let’s give the operation another division with support, say 50,000 Soldiers. Let’s include force generations, training, non-deploying logistics, and other Soldiers numbering, of, let’s say, 80,000. Add a SOF force of, say 60,000, and you get a REQUIRED force of 390,000 Soldiers without ever touching the Guard or Reserve. Our floor should never drop below that."
I would like to see a similar calculation as to why the number had to be 450K
This article is intentionally titled in an alarmist, inaccurate way. The secretary is calling for an army that is by a small margin the smallest army POST-WWII; but is nearly double the size of the Army that we had in 1940.
250,000 is the size of Army that worked for Great Britain prior to WWI.
250,000 is the size of Army that worked for the US prior to WWII.
Given our current shifting of duties to Army civilians and contractors it is reasonable to assume that 250,000 is an adequate size for our Army today. But that is not what Secretary Hagel said, in fact this is what he said yesterday:
"Finally, the Army. We seek a highly ready and capable Army, able to dominate any opponent across the full spectrum of operations. To achieve this, the Army must accelerate the pace and increase the scale of its postwar drawdown. Today, there are about 520,000 active-duty soldiers, which the Army had planned to reduce to 490,000.
However, the Strategic Choices and Management Review and the QDR both determined that since we are no longer sizing the force for prolonged stability operations, an Army of this size is larger than required to meet the demands of our defense strategy. Given reduced budgets, it is also larger than we can afford to modernize and keep ready. We have decided to further reduce active-duty Army end strength to a range of 440,000 to 450,000 soldiers."
Stop buying the gadgets we don't need use or want. Stop paying for 5 billion dollar uniforms. Stop paying defense contractors for ideas that are not practical at this time. Why pay 100 million on a rifle we never are getting in a useful window?
Stop throwing away money on wonder weapons, like Hitler did. Focus on realistic equipment. We need solid cutting edge equipment that is top of the line and works.
Not batman bet of gadgits.
a. With the new understanding that the great nations of Russia and China will not, as we originally thought, (1) transform more quickly and completely along modern western lines and (2) cooperate with us by helping to, likewise, transform other outlying states and societies. (Herein, Russia and China seeming to be more interested in "containing" the United States and doing so, for example, by championing the "conservative" values and causes of other outlying states and societies.)
b. And with the understanding that the populations of these other outlying states and societies, themselves, will not, as we initially thought (if liberated from their oppressive regimes/governments), quickly, easily and, mostly on their own, adopt our way of life, our way of governance and our values, attitudes and beliefs.
Because of these new understandings (which seem to negate the "end of history" thinking that, post-the Cold War, came to dominate strategy, foreign policy and military plans, operations and force structure), the United States has had to reconsider its future way forward.
Based on these new understandings -- outlined at "a" and "b" above -- the United States has moved to adopt a much less-optimistic (and, thus, a much less-aggressive) approach re: its strategy, foreign policy and military plans and operations.
This much less-optimistic and, thus, much less-aggressive approach helping to explain -- not only the reductions/changes in our military force structure (such as those being discussed here) -- but also the time frame (much longer) in which we hope to complete the transformation of such states and societies as those of China, Russia, Afghanistan, etc.
When the cost of troops salaries and benefits is now close to 30% of the entire DoD O/M budget and climbing fast especially on the healthcare side---something has to give somewhere.
Will be interesting to see just how many of the hundreds of thousand DoA civilians will also be cut---that has not been talked about.
Also not a word of cuts to the thousands of defense contractors who in fact act as slot fillers where the DoA does not have the manpower.
Very true, but some of this seems to be brinksmanship. I mean, we can buy lots of stuff, really cool expensive stuff, without having a 450k Army. Add to that the fact that the military was complaining about pay and benifits plus there is no coorelation between the numbers and what the Army is expected to do, and I question what the thought process is.
But I am not in the Beltway, so I am not "in the know"...
Rumour was that Rumsfeld was going to announce big cuts to the military as well as a revamping of the procurement system in September of 2001, but he was overcome by events. I am curious what kind of numbers for troop strength he was going to propose?
I am sure Hagel understands the phrase pre-WW II strength is hyperbole but he needs to shock the service chiefs. Just as he understands that the Pentagon's first priority is not war, but is geared toward procurement of uniforms to aircraft carriers; the latter being built larger, demands more aircraft be built . . .Ergo: too drastic of a draw-down sees jobs lost in congressional districts and therefore standby for heavy rolls port side* in the halls of Congress.
*port side: for landlocked Marines, port side is the left side.