American Commando Brought His Girlfriend to Afghanistan, And Armed Her by David Axe, War is Boring
Let me be clear about what I’m writing here. This is not only a story about disgraced U.S. Army Special Forces major James Gant. This is also a story about a story about Jim Gant.
On March 24, David Wood at Huffington Post published a glowing profile of Gant that carefully, even elegantly, talks around the shocking reality of Gant’s rise and fall as a commando officer in the Afghanistan war.
Gant had invited his girlfriend Ann Scott Tyson, a Washington Post reporter, to accompany him and his team on secret missions in a remote province in eastern Afghanistan in late 2010. And according to Wood quoting Tyson, Gant armed Tyson, teaching her to use “almost every weapon” in the Special Forces inventory.
Gant and Tyson, who are now married, lived close together in Afghanistan while unmarried—a big no-no by Islamic standards. Gant also kept alcohol in Afghanistan, where drinking is illegal. And he had unauthorized drugs and unsecured classified documents.
This long list of violations got Gant fired, demoted and kicked out of the Army. Tyson wrote a hagiographic book about her disgraced husband called American Spartan. I have not read it…
Comments
I agree bringing your girlfriend to the combat zone is a bad idea. Unfortunately USASOC codified the bring your girlfriend to war tactic with CST's; all female "Cultural Support Teams," essentially issuing the SFODA's paramours at their remote VSO outposts. So, take some impressionable female soldiers in their late teens and early twenties, add them to a bunch of horny U.S. commandos stuck in the middle of nowhere in a combat zone and you get the best "As the World Turns" for U.S. forces Afghanistan soap opera that taxpayer money can buy. You can guess what happens, and it has...Instant home wrecking. Good idea.
Something is not adding up here.
I would argue that the two worst things a small unit could do when attempting to establish village security in any Third World country are bring your girlfriend and bring booze. To attempt that in Kunar strikes me as impossible – I mean the can of worms you would open is staggering. In my experience the least of your problems would be the enemy – in other words the mission would go out the window.
I obviously don’t know where all of this is alleged to have occurred but the Kunar is, believe it or not, a comparatively ‘liberal and accessible’ region of AF. I’m sure the mission required security to be imposed along the Kunar Valley itself but further up the Parun and Kunar Rivers into the interior is where the more intelligent ALQ & Taliban were likely to have holed up and you would need to eventually address that possibility. IMO the suggestion you could interact with these more isolated mountain folks with your GI Jane girlfriend and a few cases of Jack Daniels is complete bullshit.
If you think in the mind of the average AF mountain man that sexual fraternization with a native village female was much more fraught with danger than bringing your own western ass to the gig you should think again.
If you then teach the broad to shoot, use comms, strip weapons, read maps, display courage, education, humor, medical skill as good or better than any Afghan male within the village you may as well walk around the village and go on patrol with an unpinned grenade in your mouth.
Unlike native women who are ‘protected’ by a mind-blowingly harsh code of conduct that deals death to transgressors both ways a western women who is living in sin is rated as some sort of exotic animal that human considerations need not apply. And the notion they would let her near their wives, sisters, daughters etc. I suggest unlikely. Many folks may find this attitude unacceptable but these conditions are widely understood and accepted by the natives. Furthermore they are aware many foreigners do not live by the same customs and they make it very plain to any potential visitor if you can't live by their code stay out of their village.
Like I mentioned earlier these are allegations but it is not the first time someone has attempted this type of behavior in this part of AF.
I had the misfortune of encountering a similar couple (both foreigners) who attempted the same thing as it is alleged here. On a romantic stroll thru the forest above the village the couple were intercepted by a group of men, the male was immediately bludgeoned to death in front of his lover and she was raped for several days and then murdered. The Taliban were blamed but eventually it emerged it was youths from the village who were the culprits. The elders determined 8 youths (all unmarried virgins) were guilty to varying degrees of culpability including those condemned by association and all eight were executed.
Sure they deserved it but you can imagine what happened to the mission the US taxpayer was hoping the team might have accomplished.
Similarly at a different time and location another individual attempted to introduce his girlfriend into the mission and the elders informed him either she goes or the team goes. Obviously they sent her out but unfortunately for all involved the local guides decided to ‘rest’ the women at a summer shepherds hut up on the alpine pasture.
She was held there for three months. Miraculously she survived long enough for one of her guilt-ridden assailants to contact me and I was able to get her out. The poor kid was completely covered in festering sores and bites and addicted to what I guessed was opium. She only spoke French but she knew a bit of broken English and as I attempted to clean her weeping sores I’ll never forget her mumbling that she been raped by numerous men for three months “up both roads” as she put it.
On another occasion the village elders suspected the couples within a NGO medical team were not married despite their claims to the contrary. I was asked to determine if their claims of legitimate marriage were genuine. They were not and I informed the elders as much.
After considerable persuasion I got the now furious elders to allow the 4 male doctors and none of the women permission to enter the valley. The medical team refused to compromise and as a result the entire team (5 doctors and 5 nurses plus a large caravan of medical supplies and camp-followers) failed to treat a single patient in the valley for the entire tour.
I have heard of numerous other instances of similar problems in AF & elsewhere but these three were in this region and I know to be true and none involved official sanction as they were all under the radar.
The two questions I always asked was :
“Why the hell are you here ?”
and
“ What the fuck is the purpose of your mission?”
Never once did I get an even remotely acceptable answer. Invariably the women burst into tears and the men just frowned at you with dumb red-faced indignation.
RC
Robert C. Jones:
Revisionist history? Well maybe as you define it. What i saw and the world saw was the PAVN, hundreds and hundreds of thousands of them, a considerable part of which was armored and mechanized, defeat the ARVN in South Vietnam. To pretend that it was anything else is to pretend it was something it wasn't, to put a false and confused label on it so to speak.
Good, after all this time you admit Taliban & Co are illegitimate claimants to rule in Afghanistan and the anti-Taliban forces formed because of that. Or I suppose you could say they formed because Taliban & Co provided poor governance. So since in this world sometimes we have to choose between grays, which side should we support? I figure the anti-Taliban side since the last time Taliban & Co were running the outfit AQ killed a bunch of us in an op that had it's heart in Afghanistan. And be because we told them we would stand with them against Taliban & Co. And because Taliban & Co are really really hard on women which are 50% of the Afghans. And etc.
Carl,
Your revisionist version of what happened in Vietnam is a popular one, but that doesn't make it accurate. Far from it.
The insurgency began long before any Americans were ever involved and ultimately prevailed against the French. Then Ike pulled a fast one, cancelled the national elections and had a line drawn through the middle of the whole thing. The insurgency continued, all the line did was give the victors of the insurgency against France a legal sanctuary and legitimate voice in official settings. It was always a fiction of our own making, however. The NVA were as much a part of the ongoing insurgency as the Viet Cong.
We put false and confused labels on things, then we begin to believe the labels ourselves and treat the problem as we have named it rather than the problem as it actually is. That doesn't tend to work out well.
As to the Taliban, I never said they had a legitimate right to rule - what I said is that the Northern Alliance team that we put into power and then dedicated ourselves to protecting their monopoly on governance was de facto illegitimate. The illegitimacy of the Taliban for similar reasons was why the Northern Alliance formed to challenge them. All we did was flip it from one illegitimate system to another.
Robert C. Jones:
Two observations, the first about "leveraging one segment of the population against another as a means to resolve insurgency". True enough that those types of programs did not "win" the war in Vietnam. They couldn't have done that since they weren't meant to address the thing that did win the war, the People's Army of Vietnam, ie the North Vietnamese Army. Those programs did however do a tremendous amount towards resolving the insurgency in South Vietnam
Second, I don't see how you can suggest Taliban & Co had a legitimate claim on governing Afghanistan since they are creatures of the Pak Army/ISI, couldn't survive without them and initially took power through violence and are attempting to regain it through violence. It occurs to me that many Afghans don't like them considering how many have died fighting them and have been murdered by them.
Wow, we love a good drama, don't we? I am sure someone in Hollywood is already scrambling for the movie rights on this little drama. Thirty years from now that yet to be made movie will be the narrative of that defines our little misadventure in Afghanistan for most Americans.
I wish Jim well. It sounds like he has demons to wrestle, like so many of our guys coming back from Iraq and Afghanistan. I hope he wins that wrestling match some day. I didn't walk in his boots in battle, so I won't judge him here in this forum. It sounds like he made bigger mistakes than most and that it ultimately caught up with him.
As to leveraging one segment of a population against another as a means to resolve insurgency? I think the jury is still out on that one. It certainly did not "win" the war in Vietnam, and it will not overcome the fundamental illegitimacy of the Northern Alliance monopoly on governance we established and have defended these many years in Afghanistan either.
Ron White the comedian says "you can't fix stupid," well, I'm thinking maybe you can't fix extreme acts of hubris either. At least not in an enduring way, and not in this modern strategic environment where everyone is so connected by modern tools of communication.
Jim's hubris as an individual has caught up with him - our hubris as a nation is closing fast... I, for one, am far more concerned about the latter than the former.
DOL,
Bob
Bill---yes I do BUT here is the BUT--there was no strategy incorporating it into an overall long term program.
While copied VSO built on the CIDG program the CIDG program was not a stand alone concept but fully integrated into four other long term tactical (maneuver and controlling space) and strategic intel programs.
Along with the CIDG program one had a robust Mobile Strike Force concept with their own transportation if necessary and their own support mechanisms via the fielded SF companies. Each Corp had their own plus a National MSF.
Tied into these core elements where then the SR and raid capabilities of the various Greek groups and MACV-SOG.
In 1969, we started shifting the CIDG program to more VN SF planned and led operations and by 1971 we successfully transitioned over 40 BNs to the SVN Rangers, 10 BNs to RF/PF or Provincial Control and provided the core Cambodian BNs under Lon Nol.
We did what many talk about---"we worked ourselves out of a job". BUT then again Big Army was happy to see us go and it started the downward spiral of SF being eliminated by Big Army because of VN.
VSO was doomed to fail as it was not integrated into an overall strategic concept from the very beginning regardless of what is being written now about the VSO/ALP.
We don't have group think in SF, and we frequently debate among ourselves on strategy and tactics issues. To be otherwise is to be other than elite and American. A lot of people have different views than Gant's, and some of us wonder how turning so called tribes on one another will actually achieve our stated ends in Afghanistan.
UW is one of the few special operations that is strategic in nature instead of tactical. We don't educate our brothers to think strategically, but we train them to be expert tacticians. Those who learn to think strategically do it through their own education. Working through the indigenous personnel in pursuit of the wrong aims isn't good UW any more than a frontal charge by infantry forces against a fortified enemy position is a good tactic.
Take all the emotion out of the debate about Gant and focus on his proposed strategy alone, do you really think it would have worked? This would be another example of "hustling the Asian brown," which simply means we would be fooling ourselves into believing we're manipulating the indig, when in fact we're the ones being manipulated.
VSO/ALP have indeed been integrated as a major cornerstone of the Afghan strategy for the last few years. As stated in Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan:
"Village Stability Operations (VSO) and the ALP are complementary components of both the ISAF and Special Operations Joint Task Force-Afghanistan (SOJTF-A) COIN strategy. The VSO is an umbrella term for a collection of governance and development programs at the village level that are linked to the ALP. The VSO/ALP programs aim to promote progress along three lines of operation: governance, development, and security."
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/October_1230_Report_Master_Nov7.pdf
One has to wonder why ALP was not an automatic response of the SF community upon entering Afghanistan. SF had the CIDG program in Vietnam and the Marines had the CAP program...all ALP predecessors. It took a maverick like Jim Gant to get SF back to a core FID capability in the rural areas. Why? Also, why didn't SF pull his "paramour" out earlier? Why didn't they pull Gant out earlier to wind him down? I think there is a leadership failure here as well as Gant's own shortcomings.
Finally, what is the difference between BG Sinclair, General Petraeus and MAJ Gant? Petraeus didn't get caught with his "paramour" while he was on active duty.
Bill M... Point by point right back at you… I’ll keep mine short. Why does the “enjoy killing” statement have to be about promoting one’s ego… Inappropriate or not, why can’t it be a statement of fact? Are you a psychiatrist? If you are, let me tell you about my issues.
I agree with you that we can’t confuse emotion with fact or relevance. A number of your opinions are not based in fact… since we don’t have all the facts yet… i.e. the need to ask his men whether they felt unnecessarily endangered or not… Secondly, what makes us think that his men have to come to his defense? Maybe they know he can take care of himself. Maybe these men are still on active duty and think it best to wait. Maybe they are happy to be rid of him. I don’t know… all I know is what I read and I read that Jim Gant didn’t lose any team members. Is this true?
Jim Gant and I spoke in person and he gave me credit for what I did. I don’t expect Jim to shout it from the mountain top… and although I can’t speak for others… maybe others who worked with Jim feel the same way.
I participated in the prolonged “arguments” on his proposed strategy and I hate to share this bit of news with you…the sources you cite as valid criticism of Jim Gant’s approach were not universally accepted as valid. So, what are we calling tribes today… solidarity groups, kith and kin networks, cluster of clowns? The very same smart people who disagreed with every descriptive of the locals never did provide a useful analytic construct of Pashtun society. It is always easiest to shout down an idea than to develop one... Oh, the lamentations... We could have won this war and the hearts and minds peace years ago if only they would have taught us better... but no one did and we didn’t…
Thanks for this exchange of opinions.
I don’t believe the problem here is the arming of civilians. In the battle ecosystem that the article describes the majority of armed personnel are civilians. Attempting to disarm them would not only be impossible but why would you want to? Admittedly it takes some getting used to but having children wandering around with loaded AKs selected to fire is commonplace. In my experience you could politely ask them to drop the selector off full-auto down to semi but otherwise that’s how they roll. Their argument is they have to pull the charging handle to chamber a round so man up and stop being a pussy. Needless to say more often than not a round is already chambered but that is a very personal question that’s unlikely to be appreciated.
Having said that I have seen every ND from every weapon up to and including HMGs & RPGs. Those on the receiving end have had their eardrums burst, hair parted, fingers and legs removed and a surprisingly few killed outright. For some reason ND is an accident that doesn’t seem to upset the natives (excluding the victim) when it does happen - somewhat like our acceptance of traffic accidents.
The problem that the article is framing is an unmarried women sleeping with someone within the village. IMO this is as an extremely dangerous position to put yourself into. Unlike the western attitude that the relationship is no one’s business but the couples, in both PAK and AF it is everyone’s business - including passer-byes. Essentially in their minds-eye you are demanding the pleasure of a community prostitute to be yours and no one else’s. She is not your wife and to insist on protection of Pashtunwali is an unforgivable insult to the entire community. It blows my mind anyone would take this risk.
This obsession with the opposite sex is something that contemporary Islam IMHO fails to address in most, if not all, Islamic communities. Widespread acts of homosexuality, zero interaction with females prior to marriage, multi-generational refugee dislocation, lack of privacy, war, poverty etc makes this aspect of manliness extremely dysfunctional and very detrimental to normal community life. Into this volatile soup add the complete raft of modern infantry weapons all selected to FIRE and you have an extremely dangerous situation. The temptation to tilt the barrel slightly whilst drinking from a stream, milking a goat, buying tomatoes and having a otherwise ‘normal’ ND into some promiscuous infidel’s skull is something a considerable number of sex-starved AF males would find tempting.
If the assailant fears he would be immediately cut down the opportunity to murder the women offers a survivable alternate and as often happens if the broad get it, the assailant escapes.
Experience and sensitivity to local custom does not necessarily protect you. I know of lovers who were murdered by Pathans who were entrusted to protect them – one victim male and the other female. Both were in cities and the lifestyle was very westernized. Both murders were passed off as tragic accidents to spare their next of kin (as well as less worthy individuals) – but they were not and their deaths could have been easily avoided if warnings signs had been heeded.
Though it is pure speculation on my behalf (as opposed to the above) the slaughter of the IAM Medical Team in Munjon in Aug 2010 has all the hallmarks of the crazed behavior sexual dysfunction and western women bring out in men in this part of the world. Doctor Little’s team had experience and expertise that no military team could hope to achieve in any field – military or civilian. We are talking a hundred years of collective AF experience held by a less than a handful of dedicated volunteers. Furthermore they had a level of native admiration that bordered on saintliness. Even in my jaundiced eye I found their slaughter in such a brutal way a shock.
My point is in this part of the world bring all the guns you want, give them to who you want but leave your women at home.
If you insist on female companionship in AF do what ALQ has been doing for 30 years – marry a native girl and boost your mission.
RC
An interesting question when you mentioned non combatants are not to be armed---what if one is a defense contractor and per contract not to be armed--runs into an ambush and is captured due to not being armed--especially when the strange regulation gives him/her a GC ID in the event of capture? So to speak yes unarmed but hey you are entitled to be covered by the GC---what as a medical officer and priest who in Iraq/AFG were in fact armed the last time I saw them there.
Secondy, then why do defense contractors working in an hostile environment unarmed work next to US civil service types who are armed but doing the same job cannot when necessary protect themselves?
Seems to me we have opened a can of worms and no one wants to take responsibility if in fact an unarmed non combatant gets captured and or has to defend themselves if everything around him goes south and the Army who is to defend him/her cannot.
Interesting question raised by the article but until now never cleanly addressed by the Force.
I simply relayed what was reported to me by those who served on the team with Jim and the NP Leaders I spoke with that served with him.
I'm not trying to slander anyone, just reporting what was told to me. In my sign off I wished him and his family the best. I'm offering the information relayed to me so the general audience can do with it as they please. If you have information contrary to what I put out, then feel free to offer your take.
My basic point is that we are Soldiers and we have regulations to follow. That's life. You don't get to make the rules up as you go. Jim it seemed had a knack for doing what he wanted without regard for what higher said. I think his actions prior to his last tour in AFG indicate a pattern of reckless and less than professional behavior.
Some SOF get a pass. When Jim was on a MiTT he wasn't working in SOF, and wasn't authorized to take the liberties he took. He got a pass because the leadership at NP HQ TT was weak, and Jim could fly under the radar. Arming non combatants is a no-no. If you want to go through life flipping the bird to rules, then man up, be the so called "quiet professional" and take your lumps when you get busted; don't have your girlfriend write some hagiography decrying your situation. (I could go on about how unobjective that is, re: Paula Broadwell)
Jim put himself out there and made himself a target. I also doubt his punishment was something that happened without warning or without him receiving due notice to clean up his operation. At the end of the day he was found to have broken the rules and was punished. That's what happens when your hubris overrides better judgement. Fortunately non of his poor judgements caused anyone their lives.
Kind regards and thank you got your service.
I was on Jim’s team in Iraq, and I wish I went with Jim to Afghanistan. Unfortunately I was already on orders to Afghanistan when he called to ask if I would come with him. One of my few regrets in life is that I did not go with Jim to Afghanistan.
You made a few statements that I want to add some clarity to. Everything I say here is from my personal experience with Jim in Iraq. We joined with Jim in August of 2006 and rotated back to the States in February of 07…so all my comments reference this time frame.
In your opening paragraph you said “the team seemed to exist to support his own operations.” To an outsider, I could see why one would say this. In the beginning, we would often conduct daytime reconnaissance missions in the battle-space where we best thought the NP QRF would operate (By the way, these were coordinated with the battle-space owner…I personally did that). The idea of going “outside the wire” when we didn’t have a NP QRF mission took some mental adjustment…but Jim knew what he was doing. These recon missions exposed us (on OUR terms) to the ground we found ourselves operating on with our NP QRF counterparts. This did wonders for our confidence when missions would come in the middle of the night.
In paragraph one you spoke of unilateral operations. Never! The battle-space owner always knew who we were, where we were going, and our call sign. I personally did this. I knew what patrols they had in the battle-space, the combat air patrols over top and how to contact them in the complicated frequency hopping net structure of Iraq. This was rehearsed prior to every mission. We did not leave our base without having positive contact with the battle-space owner.
I am not sure what the point is to your paragraph two other than to slander a person you did not know. If you want to know if this is true…read the book. Or better yet ask Jim. He is the only person I ever met that spoke the truth 100% of the time…always!
In paragraph three you spoke to Jim’s grooming standards…yes he had a beard. I will be the first to say Jim was the worst Soldier I ever met but at the same time I will go to my grave knowing Jim is one of America’s best Warriors. He would agree…with both statements.
In paragraph four you spoke of Jim arming interpreters. Your sources on this were accurate. I know to most who read this, the following logic will be seen as flawed and could be picked apart by even the newest of cadets but I still choose to offer you a glimpse of Jim’s logic and explain to you the immeasurable effect this had on our team’s relationship with our NP QRF. The arming of interpreters did more than break a regulation…it built trust. Trust with our translators…young men who were willing to put their lives on the line for our country and their country. We trusted our translators completely and this was quickly seen by the NP QRF’s officers and policemen. They began to see a group of Americans treating Iraqis with trust and respect. And soon they saw a group of Americans willing to stand with them and sometimes in front of them (but never behind them) in combat. Trust is why we (the Iraqi QRF and the US MiTT) were so effective. So…it was not about giving a person willing to risk his life a weapon…it was about trust.
I was not with Jim in Afghanistan…wish I had been.
I inherited Gant's Iraqi NP unit in 2007, (note: he was not the TT chief at the time as he had redeployed). The Iraqi NP were well-trained and I'll give his team some credit there. However, from what was reported to me, the team seemed to exist to support his operations. From my conversations with officers (US and Iraqi) and enlisted here is what I gleaned.
1. Gant ran his own sources and would go out and conduct unilateral operations without coordinated. Obviously given the congested battlespace of Baghdad this could pose problematic with BCTs and BNs and their AOs. According to those I talked to, he would roust them at o dark hundred and take them on missions without reason or purpose, no NP, no backup, nothing.
2. He routinely went out with NP BN leadership in civilian cars, dressed in Arab garb to the Babylon hotel to booze it up and cavort with their whores. From what I recall he was married at the time to another Army officer with kids.
3. He flaunted the rules and regulations set forth by those in charge regarding dress and grooming standards. He was on a MiTT in Baghdad, not some JSOC kill team or A Team in Kunar.
4. He armed his interpreters which according to a MND-B JAG ruling was against the laws of armed conflict (arming a non-combatant).
All of this sounds very similar to the issues surrounding his relief in Afghanistan. In my opinion he felt he the rules didn't apply to him, and it looks like someone finally called him on it. I doubt his relief was something that occurred overnight...probably was given some counseling, but ignored it.
Best wishes to him and his family.
... absolutely... Jim and his teams', and many other independent local successes by MANY different elements conventional and otherwise, governmental or non-profit were never integrated into a coherent and comprehensive strategy. But instead of talking about that we'd rather kick "former SF Major Jim Gant" for doing his job IAW our local ally's cultural frame of reference... How unimaginative the people who can't envision how Ann Tyson's visit with her "paramour" and future husband might have been turned into a positive message... The fact that a western woman joined her partner in Indian country did not go unnoticed by the local Afghan women... these are the same women Kipling wrote about in his poem "Ballad of the Young British Soldier"... The village accepted and helped protect them both. Can you imagine the positive impact Ann Tyson had on the young girls and women in the village? But I guess it’s more salacious to drag the both of them through the mud.
Do we need to have a conversation about how many of our combat soldiers self-medicate... How about having a conversation about how many different types of "drugs" are prescribed to our combat veterans by the medical profession for PTSD while still serving in hostile areas! My son served two tours in Afghanistan as a mental health counselor. He shared his concerns about drugs and institutional drug abuse with me. It disgusts me that my Army used the "alcohol, sleeping pills, and sex... and lets pile on with an inappropriate storage of classified materials charge to boot" against Major Gant. Talk to me about General Petraeus, his paramour and General Order Number 1.
But all these scandalous tidbits currently discussed don’t address the critical point. COL Maxwell is correct… There never was a coherent and comprehensive strategy or campaign plan to integrate former SF Major Jim Gant’s successes… nor anyone else for that matter.
It is time to bring the kids home.
Mac: I think that is the problem, Neither Jim Gant's successes or any other team and in particular the ALP/VSO work has ever been part of a coherent and comprehensive strategy and campaign plan. I think we have a lot of independent local successes by many different elements conventional SOF, other government organizations, etc but none of them are really part of a coherent and comprehensive strategy.
Riddle me this. Did Jim Gant’s military and cultural tactics work; was his team successful? I have read no official (classified or unclassified) report that suggests otherwise. If so, how was Jim Gant and his team’s success exploited and integrated into our coherent and comprehensive strategy and campaign plan in support of achieving long term military, social and political success (in accordance with the cultural frame of reference of our local Afghan allies in the hills) in Afghanistan?
Mc---you are right with the flag comment---in VN I deliberately choose on a number of occasions to attack and attack hard via constant ambushes the VC control of four specific villages---never took a single causality.
I did this initially as a SP4 and my CPT was in the fight as much as we were---would have followed him literally to the end of the earth as he was even married and took the same risks as we singles did--and was he loud and crazy on Company night parties darn right he was---it is a way to let of steam as he had the responsibility for all of us.
BUT this is the key in an insurgency one must in fact take the fight to the enemy whether one likes it or not---by constantly engaging (and we on occasions also took hits) we established ourselves as a force to be reckoned with which in turn often delayed attacks on our camp and when they did occur we picked up the indicators from the four villages and deflected them---some of the attacks were in BN sized VC/NVA elements.
When I shifted to mobile strike and then on to Command and Control/SOG we always let the NVA know who had been there--it was not to them a "secret" who had been there-it is not an ego thing it is simply defining yourself to your enemy as an equal who has to be taken more than for granted.
It is hard on the team darn right it is ---BUT this is the critical element our team losses where extremely low ---we took losses when we sat back for any amount of time and allowed the enemy to rebuild, refit and to go over to attacks.
Did I "like" killing no but faced with the simple choice me or them I choose myself over and over---did regular Army guys get off on it yes but they were under constant attacks and that was their return bravado.
What worries me is that if one is in a "war" ie is not one suppose to "win"--if in fact we were not at "war" then why did we send troops over and over to AFG.
What also worries me is the conversation that occurred in a large number of blogs and with "government close journalists" when he published his article--the hits were brutal and big Army basically said it would not work AND this is key even SF was against it---wonder why?
It goes back to the internal SF war between door kickers and FID and in 2009 SF was in a door kicking mode and they let Jim know that in often a brutal open way which bordered sometimes on disrespect.
Bill---you know SF as well as I know the old days---in the old days team members would have stood up for their team officer---this SF is different for some strange reason they remain quiet when hits are being aimed at them or their team.
Maybe the removal of a General Officer (former JSOC for comments) that has tempered the force.
Point by point: whether you, I or others find we enjoy killing, I still it is an impropriate statement for an officer to make to a reporter. Especially in this situation. The Taliban has no doubt we're serious about killing them when they're in Afghanistan (while we allow them safehaven in Pakistan) since they're dying by the hundreds, so what purpose did the statement serve other than to promote one's ego?
I agree his story, and others need to be told honestly, something the media is incapable of doing in most cases. Also something our public affairs is incapable of in many cases. They each spin the story to influence an audience, not present non-bias history. I'm under the belief we get closer to the truth the further we get away from the event and the emotion becomes less intense. Obviously this story is loaded with emotion at this point. That is understandable, but we can't confuse emotion with fact or relevance to what works and what doesn't.
I agree with your comments on the captured flag, and hope it was well coordinated and planned out to include a robust PSYOP campaign afterwards to maximize the impact. However, based on the article, that was just one example of so called reckless behavior. In this case it may have been a valid mission that had a significant psychological impact. May have..........
I like you would love to hear from Gant's men. In my experience in SF when a good leader is dragged through the mud his men stand up for him. I haven't seen any of his men come to his defense yet, which frankly makes me suspect.
If you have an example of where Gant gave credit where it is deserved please share it, and I'll retract and apologize for my comment.
As for criticism, some of it overdone and personal in nature, I think some the following links offer valid criticisms on his proposed strategy.
http://easterncampaign.com/2010/01/18/petraeus-and-mcchrystal-drink-maj…
"So, we’ve left a bunch of people without the land they’ve been farming/grazing and living on for at least the last 50 years, and possibly well before that (this may be land seized by King Zahir Shah or a previous ruler as punishment and/or granted as a reward to a loyal local leader). It’s as if Gant is a recruiter for the insurgents. What will these people do now? If I was them, I would join the insurgency for sure."
"Ignoring the fact that he uses tribes as a unit or reference for the time being, why does he neglect to mention American interference in their affairs? Why highlight Kabul and not America? And why does he think that Kabul is not tied up in local politics? It most definitely is, as the fact that his friends were claiming a piece of land that the King of Afghanistan had given to them."
http://registan.net/2009/06/12/argh-more-praise-for-pressfield/
"So, I still don’t get it. “The Tribal Mentality” doesn’t really make its way into modern tribal studies (the British stopped trying to define people according to savagery and tribalism when they realized doing so was in fact deeply racist and not terribly accurate), and even within tribal studies, Afghanistan is singled out for being especially difficult to understand from a tribal perspective. Hell, in 1983 or so Anthropologists were arguing that tribe was a useless analytic construct when examining Afghanistan. 1983! We should not be heaping praise on Pressfield for deceiving people into thinking his ignorance is insightful. We should be scorning him."
Bill M.... I could start a brawl whether the professional soldier should revel in killing, or whether it is only appropriate for senior officers to employ acolytes… I for one strongly believe that former SF Major Jim Gant’s story and his lessons learned need to be told honestly.
Calling out the Taliban to fight was not for our benefit… it was to challenge the local Taliban… It is a shame and honor thing…. something that “hearts and minds” may not cover… also… if the story is true and I hope to God it is… how do you think the local Taliban were made to look to other inhabitants of the district after Jim’s team “captured the Taliban flag” … I venture to say that some of the inhabitants who witnessed the shaming of the local Taliban fighters probably experienced Taliban “administration” … i.e. taxes, food, lodging, dress codes, religious duties, etc may have felt a change of heart. I am personally very interested to know what the effect (immediate, mid and long-term) of calling out the Taliban had on establishing a sense of order in the district. Can you tell me? Can you tell me how long it would take to plan a "Taliban flag snatch"? Do we actually believe that this snatch was executed without a detailed plan (primary, alternate, contingency, emergency) and timeline?
Before we speculate too much about whether the team leader put his men unnecessarily at risk… let’s ask some of former SF Major Gant’s men… What was his team’s turnover rate… causality rate? I read that his team didn’t lose a man… What is the truth???
Lastly … and I speak from experience, Jim Gant gives credit where credit is deserved.
We're probably going to disagree on this one. I'm not being self-righteous on the drug and alcohol issue and didn't comment on it. A lot of guys are under a hell of a lot stress and will seek ways to alleviate it. General Order Number 1 is a failure of leadership in my opinion. The guys need a way to alleviate stress. I can hear the counter attacks coming, are you endorsing alcohol and drug abuse? No, but what someone else calls abuse I may not, and I also don't think you can effective "regulate" people's behavior, so we would be better off if we created opportunities for these guys to off ramp with a few drinks on occasion if they felt the need.
My issues on his professionalism were related to self-promotion and junior enlisted comments about how he likes killing. If the allegations are true about him putting his guys at risk unnecessarily to get his jolly's (calling the Taliban out to fight) then I'm calling that into question also if not tied to an overall strategy.
I was one of the bloggers to strongly non-concurred with Gant's article "One Village at a Time" and I stand by my criticism on the program, as addressed above my others it wasn't tied into the larger strategy. SF did CIDG in Vietnam, so apparently we should do it in Afghanistan also. Tactically based on what I heard, I have only seen one VSO team in action, the guys are doing brilliant work at the tactical level, so my criticism is aimed squarely at the strategy where the ways and ends are not aligned. At that point my criticism was strictly a professional disagreement, since I wasn't aware of the other issues.
Finally, the previous article promotes the perception that all of our senior officers are flawed and the heroes like Gant are getting kicked out. We all know we have our share of toxic leaders and probably always have, but no articles focus on the great officers and NCOs we have in the ranks. It paints an inaccurate picture.
Bill----Jim came up from the SF NCO ranks and as far as I remember he has always given his team huge respect comments when he was in Iraq.
Also it is noted that when he released his article "One Tribe at a Time" it was shredded by countless writers and bloggers in 2009 to include a large number of DoD and military members.
What really bothers me deeply about comments concerning Jim is the simple
fact that if one thinks the issues mentioned in say David Axe's comments or say the rebuke by the Army were justified----then it totally and I mean totally overlooks the true fact that if one thinks the entire 5th SFGA in 10 years of war in VN did not have the same things going on---alcohol, drugs, women, journalists being armed and accompanying patrols, and even yes SF personnel who had reputations for the enjoying of killing which got them on the top ten wanted list by the NVA and Hanoi Hannah are in another world.
Was it right in say a moral way---probably not---was it right within a military standard --no---but was the 5th highly successful in a war---yes it was.
By the way even with alcohol, drugs, women, and the love of killing by some SF the 5th SFGA was the highest decorated wartime US Army SF Group in the history of SF.
I remember starkly the debate that broke out when Jim released his article
"One Tribe at a Time" in 2009 in which the concept of VSO was first being discussed.
He took a major beating and one should have read the voices of doom and gloom on a program that made sense to no one at that time in 2009---and some even questioned openly his thinking.
So here we are five years after the article was written--and the core question remains was VSO a success or a failure?
AND if a failure---why then a failure?---I keep going back to an old SF UW saying---if at war win it or go under trying---did the Army really want the VSO program to really succeed? Did the Army really want to win in AFG?
IMHO---no to both questions.
This is a much better article than the earlier one by David Wood who made a self promoting Major out to be a hero when he was anything but. His article was a disgrace to the hundreds of special operations soldiers, sailors, Marines, and airmen who have numerous tours in Iraq and Afghanistan and fought at least as well as Gant (he is not an outlier in that respect) and who served quietly. Furthermore our many good officers appropriately gave credit to their men instead of spinning a self-serving myth.
Most Special Forces ODAs have to rely on locals for their safety, but that doesn't remove the responsibility for them, especially their leaders to "trust, but watch your six." As for outliers, most Special Forces soldiers enjoy the thrill of combat (as do many throughout the U.S. military). I don't think most enjoy killing their fellow man, and certainly most are not immature enough to publically boast about it. I just assume we all have a dark side, and mature individuals with character struggle to subdue it. That kind of boast is something you expect from a young Marine graduating boot camp years ago, a tone that changes quickly once he gets some life experience. Finally, NCOs are the backbone of SF, and I don't recall Gant crediting his team mates with any of his supposed outlier successes. On the other hand, officers are entrusted to lead these men and enforce a high moral standard which is also critical for success in COIN and FID. Based on what I read and heard from others it doesn't appear Gant accepted his responsibility as an officer.
For the military we shouldn't allow the media to tell us who our heroes are. We all know how the spin machine works, and we also know who our real heroes really are, and most of them go out of their way to avoid media coverage for themselves. They're the junior enlisted, NCOs, Warrant Officers, Officers who have been on repeated combat rotations who you count on when the going got tough. They provided valued leadership at their level, despite questionable leadership at higher levels. Fortunately, they aren't that rare in the Special Operations community. To them a sincere thank you for their service, many of us can't hold a candle to you.
Excerpt:
QUOTE Gant isn’t the military genius that he, Tyson and Wood would have you believe he is. Foreign Internal Defense was an established doctrine before the 46-year-od Gant was even born.
The former major didn’t invent counterinsurgency practices such as soldiers meeting with village elders. Nor is Gant responsible for America’s increasing reliance on secretive Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan and other conflict zones.
In fact, the very first U.S. troops in Afghanistan in late 2001 were Army Special Forces. These Green Berets trained and led local forces, just as Gant did in Kunar in 2010.END QUOTE
As we have discussed on SWJ before and in fact specifically when One Tribe at a Time was published, the concept really has its roots in Foreign Internal Defense doctrine and specifically "remote area operations:"
"Remote area operations are operations undertaken in insurgent-controlled or contested areas to establish islands of popular support for the HN government and deny support to the insurgents. They differ from consolidation operations in that they are not designed to establish permanent HN government control over the area. Remote areas may be populated by ethnic, religious, or other isolated minority groups. They may be in the interior of the HN or near border areas where major infiltration routes exist. Remote area operations normally involve the use of specially trained paramilitary or irregular forces. SF teams support remote area operations to interdict insurgent activity, destroy insurgent base areas in the remote area, and demonstrate that the HN government has not conceded control to the insurgents. They also collect and report information concerning insurgent intentions in more populated areas. In this case, SF teams advise and assist irregular HN forces operating in a manner similar to the insurgents themselves, but with access to superior combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) resources. (From FM 3-05.202 Foreign Internal Defense 2007.) "
But we should by now understand that such operations are not war winners in and of themselves. They must be part of a coherent and comprehensive strategy and campaign plan in order to support achieving success in the long term.