How the Iraq War Crippled U.S. Military Power by Nathan Freier, Defense One
… The decline of American military influence actually began with 9/11 and the reflexive response to a growing threat the U.S. government never completely understood. It was exacerbated by the impetuous decision to go to war against Iraq in March 2003. Eleven years on, this course will be difficult to reverse. Iraq’s greatest risk, after all, was always less about whether or not we’d successfully destroy Saddam Hussein’s regime and much more about the future implications of choosing to fight in Iraq in the first place. From the very beginning, there was a real chance that great cost, misfortune or — worse — failure in Iraq would deter decisive U.S. leadership at a future time and place of much greater need.
Welcome to that future. The United States is now reaping by the bushel what it painfully sowed in Iraq. To begin with, the adverse impact of a terminally destabilized Iraq in the world’s most combustible region is obvious, even to the casual observer. For all of our effort, we also got a much more emboldened Iran. Unfortunately, that’s just the prologue…
Comments
I believe that we need to go even further than this:
Thus, not the Iraq War that crippled U.S. military power,
Nor the U.S. military occupation in Iraq that crippled U.S. military power,
But the "social engineering" aspect of the occupation that crippled U.S. military power.
We may, indeed, need to go even further than this and address the specific type of "social engineering" involved, to wit: the attempt to transform the states and societies of Iraq, Afghanistan, etc., along modern western lines.
This latter/last explanation more clearly -- and more correctly -- addressing what actually compromised U.S. military power and prestige?
Mark---good to see you back again.
Both Iraq and in the end AFG crippled the US military but not in the ways the author indicates--in a more subtle way that is costlier and effects us now with Russia.
1. the inability to fire and maneuver in a combined arms fashion ie of the 1990s fashion
2. COIN destroyed out staff abilities to simply think and design
3. the military got use to the OCO funding and forgot about the eventual drawdown that always comes
4. the military forgot to ask the civilian leadership for a sound thought throw strategy
5. COIN caused a de facto disarmament of the Army---ie shift in use of weaponry away from shoot and move---it was OK if the COIN equipment is all we have as we will never been in a serious fight ---only with "near peers"
6. the inability to use massed artillery or artillery on the move
7. the inability to force march convoys and fuel on the go
8. the inability to navigate with a simple map and not rely on GPS
The list could go on forever----
Mr. Freier makes some good points. But in some ways his piece should really be titled "How the U.S. military occupation in Iraq crippled U.S. military power."
The warning was provided by USA General Shinseki before congress on troop strengths required for such an occupation. Rumsfeld and company, ignoring history, believed a quick get-in and get-out would do the trick. It didn't work.
And where Fieier cites positives "we might have missed" without the war, just about any survey of recent military occupations would have provided such, in particular the IDF experience in Lebanon.