Exclusive: CIA Falls Back in Afghanistan by Kimberly Dozier, Daily Beast
The CIA is dismantling its frontline Afghan counterterrorist forces in south and east Afghanistan leaving a security vacuum that U.S. commanders fear the Taliban and al-Qaeda will fill—and leaving the Pakistan border open to a possible deluge of fighters and weapons.
"The CIA has started to end the contracts of some of those militias who were working for them," said Aimal Faizi, spokesman for outgoing Afghan President Hamid Karzai, a longtime critic of the CIA's Afghan operatives. "Some of them were in very important locations, so we deployed our troops there."
U.S. and Afghan military commanders tell The Daily Beast that Afghan forces are stretched too thin to replace many of those departing CIA paramilitaries. Thousands more CIA-trained operatives are about to get the boot ahead of what already promises to be a bloody summer fighting season. That could mean spectacular attacks against U.S. and Afghan targets just as the White House is weighing its long-term commitment to Afghanistan. And it could give the now-small al-Qaeda movement inside the country more freedom to grow and eventually hatch new plots more than a decade after the invasion meant to wipe out the perpetrators of the Sept. 11th attacks…
Comments
I think the thing that concerns me almost as much as losing the CTPT capability is the closing of the forward bases that provided platforms for other intelligence operations. Many of these operations enable other intelligence operations that subsequently enable action. These interlocking characteristics put our ability to act at risk when we lose platforms, sources or accesses that get us to the next level. As we continue to roll back from the borders, our ability to detect and interdict cross border threats destined for Kabul (and elsewhere) will become more and more limited.
I share the concern about the lack of a transition strategy. To just give these guys a pink slip and send them on their merry way is beyond the pale. Its not like we didn't know we were leaving at some point.The draw down of forces, especially in the east, has been clouded with uncertainty. Every new RC East Commander who comes in for a year, wants to tweak the plan. A base gets half way to closure and finds out its staying open and a base scheduled to stay open gets told to pack. Then next year we will change our mind again. I'm surprised the agency has held on as long as it has...
Dave---hate to take things back to VN days but USASF did have a solid transition strategy ----all CIDG and or special project guys were "safely" transitioned to the SVN Rangers or the RF/PF Provincial regional side with their salaries/ranks protected and along with their families.
SVN Army SF who had been working jointly with USASF assumed command positions in those Ranger units.
Even during the Lon Nol Cambodian days we were able to transition entire CIDG Cambodian companies into Cambodia and still were able to maintain operations.
When the concept of VSO/ALP came up this was the one main thing I keep mentioning over and over---there has to be a transition to regular forces somewhere in the strategy---surprised though to hear the CIA did not have one especially based on their VN experiences as well.
Excerpts:
QUOTE But CIA officials told lawmakers this past week that with U.S. troops slowly closing bases across the country, the intelligence agency's footprint also has to shrink. The CIA doesn't want to face another high-risk situation like Benghazi, Libya, where militants attacked both the U.S. diplomatic outpost and the CIA base. The U.S. ambassador, one of his staff and two CIA employees were killed in that strike.
...
The elite Afghan teams have built a fearsome reputation for their U.S.-special-operations-like targeting of terrorist suspects, guided by a handful of CIA paramilitary officers on most missions.
The forces now facing the chopping block are 750 members of the Counterterrorist Pursuit Teams in the Kunar region -- home to the elusive Afghan al-Qaeda leader Farouq al-Qahtani al-Qatari -- and the entire 3,500-strong Khost Protection Force. END QUOTE
One of the most difficult actions when dealing with indigenous irregular forces is demobilization and/or transition. I only had one boss in my entire military career who made us think about the end of the mission and how we would transition or end the mission from the very beginning. And of course our past history shows we leave many indigenous forces hanging out on a limb.
QUOTE "We tried to hire those militia for the same pay as the CIA," he said. "But only a 100 or so said yes."
In Kunar province, the Afghan army commander there is trying to keep history from repeating itself, by moving his troops to fill the key U.S. outpost and its nearby CIA base, before the Americans depart.
"I need to take that position, but I need more troops," Maj. Gen. Mohammad Zaman Waziri told The Daily Beast through an interpreter, during a visit to the Afghan National Army's 201st Corps headquarters in eastern Afghanistan.
Two U.S. officials said the CIA-trained paramilitaries at the Kunar base have been told of their imminent firing, and some have already reached out to the Taliban, possibly to reach a peace deal for when they no longer have Americans to pay or protect them. END QUOTE