“Small is Beautiful”: El Salvador’s Lessons and Non-Lessons for the Indirect Approach by David Ucko, War on the Rocks
Counterinsurgencies, has reinvigorated the ongoing discussion of the lessons to be learned from recent counterinsurgency campaigns. One of the key criticisms of the earlier iteration of the manual, FM 3-24, was that it focused predominantly on ‘direct’ counterinsurgency: the deployment of large formations to provide security and take on various military and civilian tasks for a foreign population. As the doctrine was written in 2006, when 144,000 U.S. troops were actively countering an insurgency in Iraq, this focus was apposite. But now, given the perceived failure of direct counterinsurgency in Afghanistan and, more generally, the high costs of this approach, the consensus has shifted in favor of an ‘indirect’ approach that relies primarily on the structures and capabilities of the host-nation partner.
There are good reasons for this shift. The indirect approach recognizes the limits on what external powers can by themselves achieve in a foreign land, particularly one they scarcely understand. The focus on partnerships also acknowledges the need to maintain host-nation legitimacy, build local capacity, and engage in a manner that is financially and politically sustainable…
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"But now, given the perceived failure of direct counterinsurgency in Afghanistan and, more generally, the high costs of this approach, the consensus has shifted in favor of an ‘indirect’ approach that relies primarily on the structures and capabilities of the host-nation partner."
These suggestions seem to (1) ignore reality and (2) defy logic.
Given that the United States DID NOT in Iraq and Afghanistan (and WILL NOT in many/most other instances) have a viable "host-nation partner" to work with,
How then can the "indirect approach" to counterinsurgency -- which SPECIFICALLY REQUIRES the presence of a viable "host-nation partner" -- be considered as a reasonable alternative/solution to the problems presented by (1) war generally and (2) our wars in Afghanistan and Iraq specifically ?????
I concur. There are no models. There are no silver bullets. There is no Holy Grail (of military operations and strategy). There is only effective policy and good strategy based on protecting our interests and understanding the situation and conditions as they really exist and not as we would wish them to be. There are constraints and limitations and risk and there is a political environment that always provides the context - both in the conflict area and at home. (though small is beautiful in many cases, but not all)