FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies Now Posted

My initial critique of Chapter 1 FM 3-24 “Understanding the Strategic Context”

This chapter very much clung to the wrong to many of the wrong lessons from 10 plus years of stability operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Everything in this chapter could be correct in some situations, but it is too often written as declarative in tone. The value of higher learning for our officers is it improves our ability think critically, not conform to group think or political correctness. The way this chapter is written it doesn't encourage the reader to think critically about policy, context, and an operational approach, but to more or less accept the principles in the previous version of the 3-24.

Paragraphs 1-1 implies we or the host nation must address the root causes of the insurgency. We should never automatically assume this is something we must do. Instead we should conduct an analysis of the situation, analyze our policy guidance, and conduct a net assessment of all the actors to include ourselves before we even start thinking about determining what we must do.

1-2 is bothersome because it assumes we don’t need a whole of government approach for all forms of warfare, not just irregular warfare.

1-4 correctly states there may be a number of ways to defeat an insurgency, but in the next para it states if the U.S. is directly involved in defeating the insurgency then its primary role is to enable the host nation. This is false logic, the government may be beyond enabling, and we generally conduct COIN to defeat or contain an insurgency that threatens our interests. Why get involved if it didn’t? If it threatens our interests and the government if beyond being enabled, then we should consider other options. Furthermore, Table 1-1 assumes our end is always to defeat an insurgency. This may be generally true, but I think another option is to simply protect (avoid letting it fall) the government we want to see stay in power. That simply means containing the insurgency so they can’t win, which can be much less resource intensive than going for the big win.

The part of this chapter that most concerns me is what the authors boldly called strategic principles.

1.78 states legitimacy is the main objective? The insurgency already implies the government is legitimate to a segment of its population, but unless it is mass uprising that segment is generally less than 15% (enough to present a serious insurgent threat). Again it depends on our policy aims and what higher strategic objectives our COIN effort nest with, but I would wager that legitimacy is always desired, but seldom required.

1-80 Intelligence drives operation is another trite saying not unlike it takes a network to defeat a network and we must build partner capacity. Intelligence frequently drives missions for targeting specific individuals, but that is far from driving all operations. The force will conduct broader stability operations, CA, and MISO, and stability patrols, etc. These will be ops driven and inform the intelligence community.

A lot of other concerns with prevention, surging, etc.

Scenario One: (We'll call this the "Expand the Franchise" scenario):

If the West, led by the United States, continues to be embarked upon a worldwide campaign to transform "different" states and societies more along modern western political, economic and social lines,

And if men and women inside these outlying states and societies continue to be determined to not allow such foreign (and, in their eyes, essentially profane) changes to take place,

Then, within this context:

a. What is the cause of the resulting global/networked insurgency?

b. Who are the insurgents/the aggrieved parties?

c. Who are the counterinsurgents (the parties responsible for addressing the grievances of these insurgents)?

With the above as our starting point, now let us write JPs and FMs which will provide us with broad guidelines needed to deal with such 21st Century insurgencies.

Scenario Two: (We'll call this the "Hold What Ya Got" scenario):

If the West, led by the United States, has -- for the time being -- abandoned the idea of transforming outlying states and societies more along modern western political, economic and social lines,

And has opted (due to various constraints), instead, to adopt a more Cold War-like approach to its foreign policy (contain the bad guys/retain as many of the states and societies that it have already been transformed as is possible),

Then, within this context and scenerio:

a. What would most likely be the cause of insurgency?

b. Who would, most likely, be the insurgents/the aggrieved parties? And

c. Who, in this instance, would be the counterinsurgents (to wit: the party[ies] responsible for addressing the grievances of these insurgents)?

With the above alternative scenario as our starting point, now let us produce JPs and FMs which will provide us with the broad guidelines needed to deal effectively with such -- alternative -- 21st Century insurgencies.

Not my intention to divert the discussion regarding the new Army pub, but note that what the Russians are doing today in Eastern Ukraine is not new. They simply dusted off their old playbook from 1919 when the Bolsheviks sent "little green men" into Ukraine along the same axes of advance as today. In January 1919, Bolshevik Moscow needed grain and decided to seize Ukraine from a recently imposed upstart nationalist government that arose following a peasant revolt. However, following the signing the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk to end WWI with Imperial Germany, they could not use the Red Guards/Red Army as the invasion force. Otherwise, the Bolshies would have been breaching the treaty. Consequently, they organized a faux Ukrainian invasion force, the 1st Soviet Ukrainian Division, and sent it secretly over the border into north and east Ukraine to liberate the Ukrainian proletariat from the bourgeoisie. Their plan was to subvert the Ukrainian peasant conscripts of the Army of the Ukrainian National Republic with Communist slogans ("land to the peasants"). In essence, they pulled off a relatively bloodless invasion, where printing presses and agitators forced the Ukes to melt away before nary a shot was fired. This was, first and foremost, a propaganda war that utilized class struggle and the similarity between the Ukrainian and Russian languages. This time around, most of the Ukrainians live in cities and have had 24 years of relative democratic rule. We will have to see whether Putin will be able to pull off a similar bloodless invasion this time around (assuming he decides to invade). By the way, the commander of the 1st Soviet Ukrainian Division was one Mykola Shchors.

In paragraph 4-7 in the last sentence, add the word <strong>is</strong> between” it” and “a” in the highlighted area:

<blockquote>The main point of a coup d’état is that <strong>it a </strong> means to change a regime by actors who are part of the government.</blockquote>

In Paragraph 4-32 in the bottom third speaking indirectly about opium exports from Afghanistan or cocaine from Columbia, etc., "insurgencies" is misspelled:

<blockquote>These types of <strong>insurgences</strong> are more likely to develop networked organizations with connections to criminal organizations or other insurgent groups with similar interests.</blockquote>

A final edit recommendation is in paragraph 4-64 to change the word “eternal” to “external”:

<blockquote> Limiting <strong>eternal</strong> support provides one means to affect an insurgency indirectly.</blockquote>

BTW, if a hiring authority I applied for a GS Technical Editor job at the National Ground Intelligence Center and for an Intelligence Specialist (ICD) position at ARCIC. Look for MQ-1C in the resume. Now for miscellaneous comments on substance, in paragraph 4-49 this quote is in its last sentence:

<blockquote>Organizations dependent on key charismatic personalities to provide cohesion and motivation
for their movement are vulnerable to disruptions if those leaders are co-opted or killed.</blockquote>

This statement under a “First Dynamic-Leadership” is why UAS/RPA strikes are effective. Educated, charismatic leaders are not easily replaced nor are key technical skills such as bomb-makers. Even if new insurgents are created by UAS/RPA strikes, they are not nearly as important to the cause as lost leaders and technical skills. This is also why insurgents assassinate effective political and military leaders that are part of or cooperate with host nation governments and external counterinsurgents. This is why green zones and bodyguards exist and why State Department and USAID civilians do not want to venture from safe zones (or volunteer to come) while the military will.

In paragraph 4-56 under the caption “Third Dynamic-Objectives” there is this statement:

<blockquote>In the example of the attack on the convoy, the operational objective might be to prevent logistic support of host-nation forces. When insurgents achieve various operational goals, they can achieve the strategic end state of their insurgency.</blockquote>

This applies to more than just COIN. This is one basis for the concept of A2/AD and its intersection with the need for prepositioning, FOBs, COPs, and safe airfields and ports. Those who argue that FOBs and COPs should not be used don’t recognize how that would complicate sustainment and increase force structure in theater. Missile and IDF defense are inherent in the creation of safe FOBs and COPs and it is more realistic to provide such support for a few FOBs rather than multiple tactical assembly areas easily identified and then targeted via future insurgent and lesser nation precision munitions.

HESCO and bunkers mitigate damage to ground forces from distant missile attack or local IDF that does get through whereas expensive stealth aircraft and large ships in port are more susceptible. Helicopters and F-35B can disperse off large airfields to hide using airfields primarily for major maintenance and perhaps refueling. A2/AD also is an argument for armor active defenses from top attack and new laser tactical weapons. Even with FOBs and COPs, concepts such as the Marine K-MAX UAS and driverless supply vehicles make sense to limit logistical support in theater. From a strictly cold-hearted monetary analysis, the pay-out for a driver killed or severely injured via an IED will easily pay for the driverless or UAS resupply capability—and save lives and limbs.

Then go on to the next paragraph 4-57:

<blockquote>4-57. A strategic objective is the movement’s overall political goal or desired end state. An insurgency will seek to—
* Force significant political, economic, or religious change.
* Overthrow the existing social order and reallocate power.
* Generate resistance to outside occupiers or change within a society.
* Nullify government control in an area.
* Cause a region to secede.</blockquote>

If truly objective in examining these bullets, they are not automatically unreasonable desires. These are areas that the State Department and National Command Authority should consider in rare future cases where a U.S. and allies attack or defend in a failed state area with follow-on and concurrent stability operations. This is where national boundaries and/or a federalist system make sense when the U.S. military has control prior to elections and handover to new host nation authorities. In lesser insurgency cases of existing governments with effective military forces, only diplomatic pressure and sanctions may apply along with SF irregular warfare.

From paragraph 4-66, is further evidence of the problem of say Pashtun areas on both sides of an international border that subscribe to Pashtunwali and therefore often will allow Taliban to operate in their areas. It also is an argument for a separate Pashtunistan within Afghan borders, Kurdistan and Anbaristan in Iraq...but too late now:

<blockquote>Passive supporters do not report insurgents to local counterinsurgent forces out of sympathy for the cause, antigovernment sentiment, reluctance to get involved due to peer pressure, threats of violence, or the benefits that the insurgency provides.</blockquote>

I would argue that allowed secessions and redrawn borders while the U.S./Allies are in charge would eliminate many of these nicely articulated symptoms in paragraph 4-68:

<blockquote>4-68. When analyzing the type and amount of support an insurgency has, possible indicators are:
* Reduction in local medical supplies or personnel absent from clinics and hospitals.
* Increased black market activities and extortion for resources.
* Increased theft or purchase of food and gas.
* New presence of bodyguards.
* New areas in which the local police are growing reluctant to patrol or conduct operations.
* New or increased interaction with local civilian leaders by insurgents.
* Intelligence confirming the presence of insurgents in areas where people gather and
communicate.
* Increased assassinations of those opposing insurgents or for symbolic value to frighten locals
* A drop in the number of walk-ins and tips due to fear of retribution.
* A rise in the reluctance of local civilians to be seen talking with counterinsurgent forces.
* An increase in the absence of local reconstruction crews, police, and military or a decrease in
their willingness to be associated with counterinsurgent forces or to leave their families.
* Suspension of local government or community meeting and events.</blockquote>

Under the caption Seventh Dynamic—Phasing and Timing, there is an interesting discussion about the three phases of an insurgency: latent and incipient, guerilla warfare, and the war of movement. The last of the three would be if Pakistan supported a full scale attack on Afghanistan after we depart or the historical example of the 1975 conventional invasion of South Vietnam.

I confess to not reading the Eighth Dynamic- Organizational and Operational Patterns and paragraphs 4-76 through 4-103 because it essentially involved Design for 8 pages to include the wiring diagrams.

Others here should exploit this opportunity to edit and comment on this manual. For instance, edits have already been made to Chapter 1 based on earlier comments about redundancy that must have been read here in the SWJ comments. Here is another minor Chapter 2 passage needing edits:

<blockquote>2-14. The area of interest is that area of concern to the commander, including the area of influence, areas adjacent thereto, and extending into enemy territory. This area also includes areas occupied by enemy forces who could jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission (JP 3-0). This area also includes areas occupied by enemy forces who could jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission.</blockquote>

Note the same sentence listed twice in the above quote.

As for substance that we won’t influence but can still argue about :), under the Social section of the PMESII-PT Operational Variables that is said to include cultural, religious, and ethnic factors, paragraph 2-32 contains the following “Danger Will Robinson “ (“Lost in Space” for the younger troops) statement:

<blockquote>A society usually has a dominant culture, but it can have secondary cultures. Different societies may share similar cultures, as Canada and the U.S. do.</blockquote>

One comment would be that we have an extensive Hispanic population in the U.S. so why are we only comparing similarities between Americans and their northern neighbors. What about those in Quebec? Next, go to Silicon Valley and see if traditional caucasian culture is dominant there. Then compare the fewer remaining white guys/gals there to folks in the south or northeast. Are their cultures the same? Adjust the median income and education of any particular American of whatever color. Which cultures and demographics are "dominant" in which areas? Yet in the U.S. we all get along to include the multiple Indians, Pakistanis, and other Asians in Silicon Valley who might be at each other’s throats in other areas.

Now go to other operational environments where the income and education disparities remain and ethnic and religious cultural differences are far more prevalent and not accommodated by law and practice. The term culture itself is pretty ambiguous as we find in the manual's attempt to define it:

<blockquote>3-3. There are many definitions of culture in use by the United States (U.S.) military. As a starting point, this publication understands culture is a <strong>web of meaning</strong> shared by members of a particular society or group within a society.</blockquote>

This definition of the term “culture” is pretty confusing. Contrast the paragraph 3-3 definition with this far more clear one off the internet:

<blockquote>cul•ture
• noun \ˈkəl-chər\
• : the beliefs, customs, arts, etc., of a particular society, group, place, or time
• : a particular society that has its own beliefs, ways of life, art, etc.
• : a way of thinking, behaving, or working that exists in a place or organization (such as a business)</blockquote>

Then when you already are confused you read this in paragraph 3-4:

<blockquote>To be successful, commanders and staffs consider four fundamental aspects of culture when planning and executing military operations:

• Culture influences how people view their world.
• Culture is holistic.
• Culture is learned and shared.
• Culture is created by people and can and does change.</blockquote>

Each bullet’s explanation makes sense but I’m not sure it is a Soldier’s duty to learn in detail about or attempt to influence culture which is the implication of bullets 3 and 4. The learned and shared bullet implies a lifetime of parental and local influence that indoctrinates host nation and/or insurgent youth into ways of thinking. That is why youth become suicide bombers and jihadists after brain-washing in a madrassa or schools of the Gaza Strip.

The internet, TV, and things like the Arab Spring-turned-Fall (of governments) can alter culture but is cultural change deemed an objective of our military and is the "Arab Fall" always beneficial both internally and externally? Can most troops recognize the unique cultural influences of civilians they encounter often from afar particularly since it may vary substantially from person to person in a village, valley, and ethnicity or religious group in conflict with others in the same proximity.

How is the Soldier to know automatically who believes what in any encounter? For example, from afar is the Ukrainian a Russian favoring separatist or someone who wants to remain part of Ukraine? How can the interpreter fully be trusted to properly translate what all parties are saying particularly if two languages are involved and his proficiency is limited in one. If an interpreter is required, why not just use a host nation Soldier/Leader from the same ethnicity group or culture? Why are U.S. Soldiers playing diplomat if we aren’t completely sure a junior ANSF trooper who may speak the lingo can be taught to do the same?

Now don’t get me wrong, I’ve actually taught the cultures and make-up of different ethnicities in Afghanistan to Soldiers. I’ve taught in “crawl-stage” how cultural influences affected particular OEF battles using simulated “walk-stage” battle reenactments to include “run-stage” interactive simulation exercises. That is important for some level of situational awareness in understanding motivations of the operational environment as a whole.

However that does not mean culture will be readily absorbed by most troops or that a dilettante’s level of awareness (to include my own) makes troopers ready to play Henry Kissinger. I recall having discussions with a very competent Aviation Major who had never heard of HiG. Culture can be conferred in generalities for specific areas of Afghanistan. However district, valley, and village situations are all unique and there are not enough Green Teams and foreign area officers for one per battalion, company, or platoon in a micro-area let alone Human Terrain Teams of questionable expertise (unlike Ned who has proven knowledge and experience).

Chapters 2 and 3 completed. Chapter 2 talked about the Operational Variables of which Social is just one. It was 10 pages. Then 5 pages are dedicated in Chapter 3 to Culture which is included under the Social "S" in the PMESII-PT acronym. It is Chapter 3 that seems fraught with potential controversy. On to Chapter 4, "Insurgency Prerequisites and Fundamentals."

I've only gotten through Chapter 1. Paragraph 1-38 and 1-88 have very similar and in some cases identical sections. Paragraph 1-39 and 1-89 <strong>are</strong> identical. Elimination of one pair of paragraphs or the other would save half a page.

Overall, I liked Chapter 1 although the NGO portion seemed long, particularly since you normally would not expect much cooperation between the military and NGOs.

<blockquote>1-5. There is a spectrum of involvement in countering an insurgency. The U.S. could enable a host nation by not providing forces that are directly involved in securing the population or attacking the insurgents. For example, the U.S. could provide training or intelligence support to a host nation. Moreover, even if the U.S. is directly involved in defeating the insurgency, its primary role can be only to enable a host nation. A host nation may be capable of providing civil control and security. The U.S. commander can integrate a force into the host-nation’s efforts that provides a force to perform direct action or fires provided by airpower or field artillery. U.S. involvement can range from a modest and supporting commitment to a major ground force commitment that may, for a time, take the role of primary counterinsurgent force while host-nation forces become better able to take on that role themselves.</blockquote>

This is a fitting synopsis of the entire manual. The final sentence in the above quote is why Iraq and Afghanistan were different than FID and COIN examples such as Columbia, El Salvador, and the Philippines. In OIF and OEF there were no existing governments or national security forces until large foreign forces built them. Retaining a Baathist Iraq security force only could have worked if separate Kurd and Shiite forces and areas had been created while we were still in control before separate elections.

<blockquote>1-6. Ideally, the host nation is the primary actor in defeating an insurgency. Even in an insurgency that occurs in a country with a nonfunctioning central government or after a major conflict, the host nation must eventually provide a solution that is culturally acceptable to its society and meets U.S. policy goals. The conclusion of any counterinsurgency effort is primarily dependent on the host nation and the people who reside in that nation. Ultimately, every society has to provide solutions to its own problems. As such, one of the Army and Marine Corps’ primary roles in counterinsurgency is to enable the host nation.</blockquote>

This does not address whether a singular host nation should exist where current historic boundaries were illogical and even purposely drawn to break up ethnicities and religious groups. Until the National Command Authority and State Department begin to accept that some nations should be broken up, in other cases federalism is appropriate, and in place like the Philippines, areas can be ceded to particular groups, the main source of the insurgency and the difficulties for the counterinsurgent will remain in place.

I questioned the oversimplification of Consent and Coercion as being the sole means of achieving the population's cooperation with the host nation government in paragraphs 1-30 to 1-33.

As you read paragraph 1-33 below, think about the role of unified nationalism (as in post war Japan and Germany), carrots (like oil-rich states), and language, religious, and cultural affinity (or lack thereof as in Syria and Ukraine) that can create either consent or coercion/built-in conflict. Also note the misuse of state security operations frequently found in communist and Islamic states, and the ultimate coercion mechanism the West will never again practice...genocide and neighborhood slaughter by association if insurgents are deemed to be from a particular area.

<blockquote>1-33. Even if a population does not see an insurgency or a government as legitimate, control can be established effectively by coercion. Many states and insurgencies have used domestic intelligence apparatus or other means to control every aspect of their populations. Illegitimate governments often use distrust and divisions within a population to effectively control a society. Moreover, a population is not monolithic. It is made up of many groups and subgroups. In many autocratic regimes, various groups within a population have a vested interest in continuing the current government, even if it is repressive. Likewise, an insurgency might receive support from elements within the population, even if it is repressive and uses coercive methods. Legitimacy must be seen from the different perspectives of the different groups within a society.</blockquote>

Note that the second to last sentence in the quote above describes the relationship between Pashtuns and the Taliban, and between the ISI and the "good" Taliban and Haqqani network.

<blockquote>1-37. Soldiers and Marines are not permitted to use force disproportionately or indiscriminately. Typically, more force reduces tactical risk in the short term. <strong>But in counterinsurgency, the more force that is used, the less effective it can be.</strong></blockquote>

The law of land warfare applies, unless you are Syria or Russia in which case the last sentence bolded (by me) in the quote above is inaccurate. Russia leveled Grozny to rubble and Syria's use of barrel bombs and the leveling of neighborhoods also was effective. The West lacks that option, however the relocation of ethnicities through land swaps as well as the separation via concrete T-Barriers in Baghdad (and in Israel) are viable options. Establishing new nation-states or a federalist system within previous boundaries can work with the T-Barrier solution to break up large urban areas and let particular areas within them be controlled by different governments and security forces.

<blockquote>1-37 continued. It is more likely that counterinsurgents will achieve an end state by protecting a population, not the counterinsurgency force. When military forces remain in secure compounds, they lose touch with the situation, appear to be indifferent to the population, simplify enemy intelligence operations, or appear afraid to engage the insurgents. In effect, they concede the initiative to the insurgents. To be successful, counterinsurgency forces must work with and share risks with the host-nation forces and the population. Soldiers and Marines must accept some risk to minimize harm to noncombatants. Accepting prudent risk is an essential part of the warrior ethos and an obligation of honorable service.</blockquote>How does this portion of the paragraph jive with the notion that heavily armed patrols risk alienating the population and attracting IEDs and direct fire to areas where they otherwise would not exist? Can we ask Soldiers/Marines to patrol without armored trucks, jammers, rollers, dogs, body armor, and tools like aerostats and UAS? Can the host nation military lead the patrols on point and do most of the talking? If so, the U.S. will look less like an occupation force and you won't have privates being asked to act like diplomats.

I have a personal (and possibly misguided) concern that patrols that use an honesty trace thereby never retracing prior ground are not of much use since you never observe the same areas on a recurring basis. Even if they observe from differing vantage points, what prevents the Taliban from emerging as soon as the patrol leaves? Would presence surveillance be more appropriate using squad-sized OPs and unattended sensors and unmanned ground and air systems? How do you secure that OP (HESCO, parked M-ATV?) and are commander's willing to take that prudent risk? With sensors you don't have the risk and you also don't have the appearance of occupation.