Ten Questions West Point Does Not Ask Cadets - But Should

My initial thought is which class(es) would cover this list of questions at ROTC, USMA, and OCS? What about the NCO education system? Are the answers to any/many of them that clear cut? What are the authoritative answers and why would cadets have any clear understanding of the issues?

Looking at this list reminds me of this quote:

<blockquote>“If you dislike change, you’re going to dislike irrelevance even more.”</blockquote>

71 year-old retired General Eric Shinseki (USMA '65) said this over a decade ago. Has anyone noticed that President Obama only fires former Army four star generals? While some badmouth Shinseki and only remember the black beret, few recall his two tours in Vietnam to include a year sidelined after getting part of his foot blown off by a mine.

Later in life, General Shinseki was responsible for the Stryker, and the concept of lighter, more deployable/sustainable Future Concept Systems which included more unmanned capabilities. The latter had its problems unrelated to Shinseki just as he got the bad rap for VA problems caused by a warped bonus systems and its accompanying lies. Shinseki also recommended a larger footprint in Iraq for stability operations after “mission accomplished.” For his honesty, he was sidelined and ridiculed by senior leadership in the White House of the time.

The latter lesson appears to be lost in controversy despite the obvious earlier departure from Iraq with trained security forces in place and the far later departure projected in Afghanistan where a trickling of U.S. forces and a very late surge only now leave Afghanistan with a semi-competent large ANSF. Imagine trying to train the 70,000 police of Texas from scratch in just a few years using only 150 Texas Rangers...and none of the candidates speak English, or read/write.

Now our Army will be inadequately small to perform essential stability operations without an every-other-year deployment cycle. We see an active Army destined to lose 100,000 over the next five years or less falling to 420,000, its smallest size since prior to WWII. We see problems at the VA and with servicemember suicides as troops, primarily from the ground components, are discarded by our nation after years of deployment and family sacrifice. Is Army irrelevance a function of the Army’s decade plus of two wars, or State Department and diplomatic corps and National Command Authority <strong>failure</strong> to recognize obvious lessons.

Refusal to acknowledge unique motivations of Islamic extremism (and Shiite/Sunni differences) has been one cause overlooked in pronouncements of ground stability operations failure. Refusal to implement either federalism or divided borders within prior ones has led to other problems. Soldiers/Marines have been asked to work around these diplomatic and USAID failures performing both diplomatic and “build” functions now codified in doctrine and practice because the operational environment was simply too dangerous for much civil venturing outside secure Green Zones.

Security Force Assistance (SFA) and regionally-aligned forces are one attempt at avoiding future irrelevance, while Pacific Pathways and a return to European armored force deterrence might be another. I also read recently about a new translating tablet being developed that would greatly reduce the need for language-trained SF and that would support general purpose force SFA. Don’t take this wrong SF guys, but while I admire your talents, does the Army really need more Captains/Majors and senior NCOs commanding squad- and platoon-sized elements? How will you build the skills to attract those SF leaders in a smaller overall Army?

The questions I would ask instead at the Air Force and Naval academies and ROTC programs would be these?

1. Why can’t more of the fixed wing force be in the reserve components given the similarities between military and civil flying and maintenance activities? Why can’t Warrant Officers fly more USAF, Navy, and Marine aircraft like in the Army? Why do USAF remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) pilots need to be officers and can’t there be greater automation of piloting?

2. Why can’t Air Force, Navy, and Marine overseas tours be 9 months or longer like the Army?

3. If we want only multi-mission aircraft, why can’t the Air Force create a version of the Long Range Strike-Bomber that has slightly less stealth but abilities to aerial refuel and airdrop SOF/SF and supplies? Does the USAF need 100 bombers with B-2 level stealth…or would 50 suffice to initially destroy radar air defenses allowing the other 50 with slightly less stealth to alternate between bombing, aerial refueling, and airdrop functions?

4. Do the USAF and Navy really want to risk nuclear escalation through a professed desire for deep penetration of near pear territory with stealth bombers?

5. Do we really need a nuclear triad when it will cost $550 billion over the next decade to modernize?

6. Why do new and projected USAF and Navy systems consistently cost so much for that last 5% of capability to conduct substantial air-to-air and major naval battles that have not occurred since Vietnam and WWII respectively?

7. Do we really need 11 large carriers and a similar number of smaller ones? Do we really need a Navy that is always forward deployed?

8. Do the USAF and Navy <strong>both</strong> need remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) capable of operation in a completely “non-permissive” environment or is that why we have cruise missiles, stand-off missiles, stealth bombers and fighters to completely eliminate air defenses in a matter of hours to weeks? If a Global Hawk and Triton cost upwards of $65 million each <strong>without</strong> stealth, how much would similar stealth RPAs cost? How does any stealth RPA loiter for long periods deep in enemy territory where adversary fighters can easily shoot them down?

9. Given professed A2/AD, and threat cyber and anti-satellite capabilities, should we have more Naval and USAF presence initially outside of affected theaters, shell-game aircraft shelters with less protection but more of them, greater stand-off from threat-controlled shores, and less reliance on GPS and satellite data links/communications?

10. Does a version of T.X. Hammes offshore control make sense to include a greater Army role in boarding and stopping ships inbound and outbound to/from China?

11. Should there be more ships like the U.S.S. Ponce and cheaper Mobile Landing Platform John Glenn and Montfort Point to facilitate Army and Marine air assaults via island- and ship-hopping capabilities rather than full time shipboard presence?

12. Should the USAF and Navy assist the Army in accelerating Future Vertical Lift rotorcraft to get troops onto island shores for conduct of both disaster aid; and for conventional/guerilla/insurgent warfare exploiting complex terrain for hit-and-run tactics?

Question 1 is fairly obvious.

"Terrorist" has been so debased it has no meaning beyond a label for enemy. A terrorist is the enemy and an insurgent is friendly allied or contracted guerrillas.

"Hero" similarly has been used to describe almost anyone on our side that it is often used as a synonym for "DOD, OGA and contracted personnel".

The author's questions should be dealt with at staff college along side graduates of other universities after the new platoon commanders have seen the real army operate in the real world. If Iraq and Afghanistan are anything to go by the US military has put too much store in academic study (much of it simply warehousing people) and trying to develop "soldier-scholars". For 18-22 year olds (and the troops who will soon be under their command)time spent on foreign languages and developing practical expertise is better spent than pondering the future of war.