What are the Basics?

This was a good article and I applaud Mr. Vandergrift for his ideas that many times had me nodding my head yes but also had some controversial aspects such as mandatory enlisted time for officers. I was one of those guys but don’t really think it is essential. The main objections I will voice lies in other training areas. Some of his observations may apply only to leader training in mission command. However, all units have leaders/led, orders, and a planning, preparation, execution, and continuous assessment process. Mission command and collective training involves them all under very real time constraints. Hence my concerns about some of his claims about standardized training vs. somewhat ambiguous Outcome Based Training where every leader seemingly “gets a trophy” if only they learn how to frame the problem and adapt…no matter how long it takes.

<blockquote>Schools must constantly put students in difficult, unexpected situations, and then require them to decide and act under time pressure. Schooling must take students out of their “comfort zones.” Stress—mental and moral as well as physical—must be constant. War games, tactical decision games, map exercises, and free play field exercises must constitute bulk of the curriculum.
Drill and ceremonies and adhering to “task, condition and standards” (task proficiency) in name of process are not important.</blockquote>

Mission training plan task lists exist so METLs can be created. Standards exist because some semblance of what right looks like must be available. Otherwise, you cannot train the basics and fundamentals institutionally, collectively, or create drills. Otherwise there is no basis for tactical SOPs telling units how units should do typical things. If not everything can be trained, commanders and schoolhouses must identify what is most important. Lesson outlines that lead to lesson plans are based on collective tasks. You cannot have every leader and unit doing everything differently based on intuition and personal whims alone.

Don’t intuition and experience build over a Soldier's career based on execution of training and combat with other units and leaders in a somewhat like manner of standardized execution? If there is a task and purpose given a unit, the unit leader must have some conception of what the task means in military terms. The leader must associate the purpose with an understandable military objective. There often isn’t sufficient time to ponder and frame the problem. Limited planning time and at times immediate action often are required. All troops that plan, prepare, execute, and assess an action, be it actions on contact or a more elaborate deliberate attack, must be on somewhat the same sheet of music. Yes? No?

What about pilots? Does it make sense to have pilots with unstandardized training for how to fly a particular mission and operate as a crew? Aircrew training manuals exist and instructor pilots teach standardized skills. What about artillery? Is there time to frame the problem when issued a fire mission? Are there time and accuracy measures that must be met? What about a tank? Gunner, tank, sabot! Infantry bounding cannot be made up as you go along. Air defenders cannot shoot down everything that flies or use homegrown techniques that ignore rules of engagement and IFF.

As for taking students out of their comfort zones, sure that’s great. However, the Army has a crawl-walk-run training philosophy for a reason. You must take troops out of their comfort zone in a progressive manner to avoid the firehose treatment of too much information being force fed too early.

For instance, you might start by giving a PPT class using separate lessons on reconnaissance, security, and attack. These lessons are developed based on mission training plan collective tasks which in turn are based on doctrine. These are just starting points that allow units and leaders to adjust training based on each unique unit-type and situation. You might have unclassified videos that show how missions were executed by actual units in Iraq and Afghanistan. You might conduct practical exercises after watching unclassified simulation reenactments of particular battles being asked how your unit could have fit into that historic battle.

You, the facilitator, would have paper and digital maps of the area, declassified CENTCOM illustrations from units on that battlefield, declassified mIRC logs, other terrain depictions, and your facilitator has read the books, blogs, Army investigations and histories of the events. Finally, you would be given orders and graphics by the facilitator. You would be given time to plan and then execute the mission on a simulator that recreates the terrain and conditions of the recent historic battlefield.

Outcomes will differ as changes would be introduced into the scenarios altering the reenactment simulation to train particular tasks and attempt to stress and insert the Soldier and his leadership into a similar but not identical historic scenario. The facilitators might role-play the ground force commander and JTAC to simulate radio calls and cueing. VBS3 role-players would add the human element of an adaptable enemy and friendly ground element while artificial intelligence rounds out the remaining players.

The type of training just described replicates the following quote from page 14 of the U.S. Army Learning Concept for 2015 under learning science:

<blockquote>(2) Adult learning is promoted when the learner’s prior knowledge is activated prior to learning new knowledge. The learner observes a demonstration. The learner applies new knowledge. Demonstration and application are based on real-world problems. The learner integrates new knowledge into everyday practices.</blockquote>

The U.S. Army Learning Concept for 2015 somewhat understandably wants to remove the PPT aspect, instead substituting computer-based constructive training performed individually by Soldiers. The sole problems with this idea is that collective training done individually loses the learning aspect of having multiple Soldiers with varying experience levels teaching one another. More senior Soldiers simultaneously witnessing the same video, simulation or slide as junior troops can offer advice and experiences based on what was previously done in theater. Distributed learning too often can be under-supervised, and an unenthusiastic go-through-the-motions activity. It often is insufficiently command-emphasized vs. live training with download times for mB intensive videos or simulation taking extensive download time on a student’s computer vs. already loaded onto the facilitator’s laptop. Other simulation simply is too complex or unlicensed for student download.

In addition, with all students together, facilitators can comment and inquire about the video reenactments adding and soliciting nuggets of information not in the original simulation. All students conduct the training together to save time and place all students at the same training progression level for follow-on learning of more advanced skills. Facilitators also can explain to students how to use institutional discs like ROC-V and ROC-IED, quiz the entire class simultaneously on vehicle ID cues, and explain nuances about the Afghan culture and ethnic locations that are explained on ROC-IED…but will change on other battlefields. We also know that the constructive computer-based training will require continuous updates which is not a skill often found in the military or civil service community, and frequently requires contractors who may or may not understand what the military SME wants to convey.

<blockquote>Research also tells us that making a large number of decisions in a stressed environment solidifies competence in decision-making. Leaders must understand that deciding when and how to close with an enemy may be the least important decision they make on an asymmetric battlefield. Instead, actions that builds and nurture positive relationships with a community, local leaders and children may be the defining factors for success, as well as the primary tools that contain an insurgency, build a nation, or stop genocide. True tactical prowess often entails co-opting the local population’s will while shattering the cohesion of Asymmetric adversaries.</blockquote>

If you asked two Medal of Honor winners at Ganjgal, suspect they would question the notion of complete trust in higher level decision-making on an asymmetric battlefield. Lack of situational understanding at the CP and overly restrictive ROE led to many lost and wounded troops. The attempt to build and nurture positive relationships with the Ganjgal community should have still ensured resources were available to reinforce and provide situational understanding through quick reaction forces and adequate pre-mission and execution information collection.

While every situation requires adaptable leaders and units, not every military problem involves COIN and heroic restraint. Offense, Defense, and Stability Operations encompass nearly all overseas military missions on the ground. That is what the Direct Action Training Environment attempts to replicate. It does not need to replicate Russian separatists in area where no U.S. or NATO conventional Soldier would ever venture. It <strong>does</strong> need to replicate actions that deter or defeat a Russian unit should it cross into a NATO state with major armored forces or only those Russian SF and mercenary types. Methinks you won’t convince many NATO nations through propaganda and information operations alone or bribery to rejoin the former Soviet Eastern Bloc. Suspect the three strategies of China will be less than effective against its neighbors who are onto their games.

<blockquote>Bjork’s work, as it relates to evolving the current task-centric and process-centric approach to Army education can be summed up in the following two statements:

• “Conditions of instruction that make performance improve rapidly often fail to support long-term retention and transfer,
…Whereas

• Conditions of instruction that appear to create difficulties for the learner, slowing the rate of apparent learning, often optimize long-term retention and transfer.”

The basics begin with teaching people how to frame and solve problems. All learning grows from there. All skills training is taught in the context of a problem. Learning evolves from that concept.</blockquote>

There isn’t always sufficient time to extensively frame and analyze problems in many battles. METT-TC analysis and abbreviated troop-leading procedures may suffice. Drills improve Soldier performance rapidly when it counts the most…during battle or more minor troops in contact when there isn’t time for paralysis through analysis. SOPs taught and learned also remove uncertainty in how the unit fights in particular common situations. Drills and SOPs can adapt. New FRAGOs and tasks/purposes can adapt. I still haven’t heard how junior Soldiers at company level and below benefit from or will understand Operational Design.

As for mission command and orders, synchronization of an attack or defense typically does not allow solely “trust” at lower echelons because of inexperienced leaders, and the need to nest adjacent small unit actions with other units in mutually supporting execution. You may say that is something junior leaders and staffs collaborate based on the commander’s intent and concept of the operation. The problem is there are no staffs at lower echelons. There still must be a designated main and supporting effort and the company commander must know how his upper echelon enablers fit into subordinate and battalion/brigade plans. There is no time for node diagrams. There is time for a quick METT-TC analysis, planning, and task/purpose orders as part of Troop-Leading Procedures assuming that all small units understand what is involved in a particular collective task they trained on as part of their METL.

<blockquote>Outcomes-Based Training and Education (OBT&E) best supports Mission Command principles in that it operates on outcomes while subordinates select the appropriate way to achieve those outcomes.

Results show that adaptive and innovative Soldiers and leaders who continually engage in problem solving and learning have proven abilities to make timely decisions under stress. In this case it would be TRADOC/the Combined Arms Center (CAC) that would define the outcomes for each Center of Excellence (CoE) for the operational Army as well as the resource parameters, and allow the CoEs and their subordinates to figure it out.</blockquote>

It briefs well. However, how do you measure "outcomes." When we started our ambitious plans to insert new equipment into historical battles, we thought it might change the outcome. Wrong and right for a variety of reasons involving simulation fidelity, unrealistic role-playing artificial intelligence and Soldier-play, and the simple fact that one system can’t fix stupid. That sounds harsh but it’s a classic example why full trust in subordinates (and for that matter superiors) is not always appropriate. You could argue that at Wanat, if the company commander had not been tied up in a 15-6 investigation ordered by higher, he might have precluded a young heroic lieutenant from erring in the OP Topside location and in not using his ANSF to patrol.

The Wanat example both supports and refutes the notion of trust insofar as lack of trust in the company commander prevented supervision of his subordinate until it was too late. Even at higher levels, the battalion CP at Ganjgal was not fully worthy of trust but in turn was driven by unrealistic ROE of higher ISAF HQ. Someone at higher levels also decided to put COP Keating underneath overlooking high terrain even though the major population area Kamdesh was atop the mountain, not below it.

Lack of trust also applies at the highest levels where the result of inadequate resources allowed initially in Afghanistan by the Secretary of Defense and President led to lost lives and prolonged conflict with multiple deployments. Many today, particularly in the SF community, would tell you that we can get by with even fewer Soldiers in future conflicts. Tell Soldiers involved in multiple battles in/near Kunar province that they could have gotten by with far fewer forces based out of distant Bagram alone instead of closer Jalalabad and other nearby FOBs with enablers.

Some argue that it is micromanagement and lack of trust to have battalion and brigade leadership nearby with staff watching RPA video of battles. They claim we don’t need all that artillery and combat aviation. What goes unmentioned is that such RPA and attack helicopter video potentially supports other enablers that can come to the rescue of an outnumbered TIC. That only can occur if such enablers are sufficiently close and certainty is guaranteed that neither fratricide nor collateral damage will result. If you only have 10,000 troops in a country the size of Iraq and Afghanistan from the start of the war through its finish, you not only will never adequately train a new security force as required, you also will lack sufficient forces or “nearby” enablers for local security, let alone stability operations and shape-clear-hold-build-transition.

Extracted from Field Service Regulations Part 1 'Operations' published 1909:

An operation order should contain just what the recipient requires to know and nothing more. It should tell him nothing which he can and should arrange for himself. The general principle is that the object to be attained, with such information as affects its attainment, should be briefly but clearly stated; while the method of attaining the object should be left to the utmost extent possible to the recipient, with due regard to his personal characteristics. Operation orders, especially in the case of large forces, should not enter into details except when details are absolutely necessary. It is usually dangerous to prescribe to a subordinate at a distance anything that he should be better able to decide on the spot, with a fuller knowledge of local conditions for any attempt to do so may cramp his initiative in dealing with unforseen developments. The expression "will await further orders" should be very sparingly used for this reason. It is necessary to train subordinates not only to work intelligently and resolutely in accordance with brief and very general instructions, but also to take upon themselves, whenever it may be necessary, the responsibility of departing from, or of varying, the orders they may have received.

Chapter II, Section 12 Paragraph 2.

ii. A departure from either the spirit or the letter of an order is justified if the subordinate who assumes the responsibility bases his decision on some fact which could not be known to the officer who issued the order, and if he is conscientiously satisfied that he is acting as his superior, if present would order him to act.

iii. If a subordinate, in the absence of a superior, neglects to depart from the letter of his orders, when such departure is clearly demanded by circumstances, and failure ensues, he will be held responsible for such failure.

Chapter II Section 12, Paragraph 13.

Mission Command in different guises has been around for a long time, it is trust that now appears increasingly in short supply.

Robert as always has some critical points that make sense--initially mission command was pushed by the JCoS in late 2012 early 2013 --it was around the concept of building trust via open fear free dialogue/collaboration/calculated risk taking and the trust building was driven by the commander. then we had the ACoS start pushing the concept of Trust as a key element as well in 2013.

Side note---look at the list of Army Values---nowhere is the word Trust--some will say it was implied---if implied then spell it out do not leave it in space to be assumed.

There was hype, articles, classes, MTTs both from Leavenworth to Grafenwoerhr and hundreds of hours of discussions between commanders and their staffs especially at the BN and BCT levels.

And here we are again in 2014 wondering if mission command is going anywhere? or even what is it---no it is not going anywhere as the Army culture especially that of the O6s and up and coming O5s killed the concept by late 2013.

One of the key points that Robert mentions is micromanagement and it goes to the heart of the problem---in order to make it to a one star and or COL O5/6s cannot tolerate failure simple as that and yet it is as Robert states through failures that young officers learn their tradecraft.

But trying to make one star does not allow for failures as that could easily hit the OER.

Mission command as envisioned by the JCoS and ACoS is dead in the water until there is true cultural changes.

Robert is 100% correct---it is all about Trust and the current Army culture does not foster Trust.

Side note---in 2013 a contributor to SWJ had his BN Commander tell him point blank---your NCOs and officers under you must fear you and that is how he drove his BN---and he made it to BCT command with that mindset.

Does that sound like a positive or toxic leader?

Amen to that post Bob. In simple terms train your men well, trust them to do their job, have the moral courage to underwrite their mistakes, mentor so all learn from the mistakes, let them go at again without micromanaging. You'll develop officers and N COs that are in turn patient mentors who are not focused on covering their butts and creating a toxic command climate that is combat ineffective.

Most leaders of my generation (Cold War - GWOT) are generally baffled by both the urgent call for "mission command" by senior leaders, and how the problem is being described.

After all, the Army we grew up in was rooted in the type of leadership being called for in the mission command concept. Mission orders; task and purpose; the criticality of commander's intent being well understood by all two levels up; "how" belonging to the executor; the need to avoid the staff officer's urge of filling maneuver graphics with unnecessary details that tie the hands of subordinate commander's; etc. This has always been the strength of the American Army, and Western armies in general, for that matter.

But why do we describe the current problem as being one of our junior leaders?? This is clearly a problem that resides most consistently and detrimentally among our SENIOR leaders. Let our junior leaders do their job, and they will amaze you with the results they produce; sure, there will be mistakes and failures, but that is how junior leaders learn to become effective at their level and the future levels they will attain.

So, if there is one "basic" that we are currently lacking above all others, for my money it is TRUST.

We have lost trust. Seniors don't trust subordinates so they micromanage actions that should not be micromanaged. Seniors expect perfection where small mistakes should be expected and encouraged. This in turn breeds a command climate where subordinates learn to not trust their seniors either. We have broken faith with our junior leaders, and the result is a loss of trust and a break down of the mission command climate that has served us so well for so long. Technology is both the bane and enabler of command and control. We have taken it to the dark side though, and need to learn to be more risk tolerant and allow subordinates to fail, succeed, and learn.

Yes, we have a command problem. But looking for how to fix junior leaders is a long hard gaze in the wrong direction.